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United States Army War College

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Publications Tagged: COIN

COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy... Cover Image
Added January 10, 2008
COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy. Authored by Dr. Steven Metz, Ralph Wipfli.
Given the wide-ranging and deep impact of counterinsurgency, the participants in the "Future Defense Dilemmas" seminar conducted by The Brookings Institution and the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, explored two key questions: (1) Is the United States pursuing and executing the right strategy? And (2) Does the military’s focus on counterinsurgency detract from other defense and security needs?
Maintaining Effective Deterrence... Cover Image
Added August 01, 2003
Maintaining Effective Deterrence. Authored by Dr. Colin S. Gray.
Today there is a sense that terrorism has rendered deterrence obsolete and forced the United States to substitute preemption for it. The author provides both a conceptual framework for understanding deterrence or, more accurately, the psychology of deterrence and policy guidance on how the United States can most effectively use it. The author concludes that an adaptable and flexible military with robust landpower is the only tool that can maintain deterrence.
Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of Ame... Cover Image
Added February 01, 1995
Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability. Authored by Dr. Steven Metz.
Dr. Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult.