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Authored by Professor Marybeth Peterson Ulrich. | May 2007
Ukraine?s geopolitical location positioning it firmly between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to the west and Russia to the east has demanded that its foreign and security policy take into account its interests in the east and the west. The pro-reform forces in power since the Orange Revolution would like to move Ukraine squarely into the Euro-Atlantic community with only limited deference to Russia in matters where Ukrainian dependency remains unavoidable. Political forces favoring a more neutral stance between east and west or openly in favor of leaning eastward remain formidable. Russia?s astute deployment of its national instruments of power in support of these forces will loom large into the indefinite future.
Key areas in need of radical reform include the quality and degree of intragovernmental coordination and improving the expertise of civilian defense bureaucrats, along with adapting Soviet era military experts to the new security environment and democratic political system. Other areas requiring priority attention and resources are the creation of a rational defense planning system and the revamping of personnel policies in accordance with the needs of a professional and expeditionary force.
Reform may take place unevenly across the various governmental institutions depending on the level of democratization, especially with regard to transparency, accountability, and, in the case of the security sector, the introduction of effective civilian democratic control. The Ukrainian political and military leadership has remained divided over the question of whether Ukraine should pursue a collective security approach or retain its neutral status.1
A key pillar of defense reform is the creation of a rational defense planning system. The essential ingredients of such a system include a coherent articulation of national interests within national security documents, defense programming processes that adequately match resources with requirements, and the systemic ability to choose among competing priorities using long-term planning timelines. Ukraine embarked on independence with 0.9 million Soviet troops stationed on its territory. Significant downsizing occurred, but by 2004 the remaining force of 355,000 ?matched neither the requirements of the military-political situation in the world nor the country?s economic capabilities.?2 The 2004 Strategic Defense Review (SDR) recommended adopting a rational defense planning system linking objectives to an economic basis of reform.
Fundamental transformation of personnel systems has eluded most post-communist militaries and been a major cause of these armies? lack of capabilities. Ukraine?s distribution of officers is cylindrical rather than pyramidal, reflecting the fact that there are still far too many senior officers in proportion to junior officers. The White Paper lays out the objective of moving toward a normal-curve distribution, while interjecting a Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corps and contract professional soldiers into the mix alongside the conscript pool. Conditions attracting appropriately educated civilians to serve in the Ministry of Defense (MOD) are also lacking.3
Military education is another area in need of radical reform. The communist era system must adapt not only to the vast ideological changes that occurred within the state, but also overhaul curriculums to educate officers to perform within the post-Cold War threat environment in multinational coalition or alliance operations. Overall, the military education system is characterized by the side-by-side existence of two standards?NATO and Soviet?causing systemic tension and a continued waste of resources.
Some conditions have emerged as key factors for beginning the cycle of substantive reform, which may lead to improved capabilities through systemic and integrated change.
Ukraine has made tremendous strides toward its integration into the Euro-Atlantic community of states. The overall move toward the West is unlikely to be reversed, but Ukraine is still a divided society that is not yet at the stage of political, social, and economic development where a broad and deep consensus on Euro-Atlantic integration is possible. Ukraine?s main strengths lie in its capacity to develop sound reform concepts and to back them up with the strongest level of political will evident since independence. Ukraine?s greatest obstacles to reform are the prospect of indefinite underfunding of reform concepts and the lack of consensus beneath the top leadership within society as a whole and the military overall with regard to the reform agenda, both at the level of defense policy and in the overall orientation toward the West.
Ukraine?s geopolitical position lies firmly between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to the west and Russia to the east, thus demanding that its foreign and security policy take into account its interests in both directions. Maintaining its independence has been a consensus foreign policy objective since 1991, but the policy courses pursued to achieve this end and to determine the proper balance between Russia and the west have been more contentious. The pro-reform forces in power since the Orange Revolution of late 2004 would like to move Ukraine squarely into the Euro-Atlantic community, with only limited deference to Russia in matters where Ukrainian dependency remains unavoidable. Political forces favoring a more neutral stance between East and West or openly in favor of leaning eastward remain formidable. Russia?s astute deployment of its national instruments of power in support of these political forces will loom large into the indefinite future. Meanwhile, the legacy of the Soviet past still has a great hold on Ukraine?s political institutions, society, and bureaucratic culture.
This monograph examines the course of Ukrainian defense reform against the geopolitical backdrop outlined above. The experiences of Ukraine?s former Warsaw Pact allies to the west in defense reform may offer lessons that could be applied in support of Ukraine?s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The picture re- mains mixed in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland as the four states follow different road-maps for defense reform. By observing the successes and failures in these cases, we can develop a credible framework for reform in the emerging Ukrainian case. Ukraine?s prospects for achievement of radical defense reform can be measured based on its performance across the key areas identified as essential in the Central European cases and based on the presence or absence of the key conditions proven to facilitate defense reform in post-communist Europe.4
1. ?Armed Forces, Ukraine,? Jane?s Sentinel Security Assessment: Russia and the CIS, March 24, 2005, p. 18, www.janes.com/Search/ printFriendlyview. do ?docID= /content1/janesdata/sent/cissu/, p. 5, accessed March 3, 2006.
2. Ukraine?s Strategic Defence Bulletin until 2015 (Defence White Paper) Kyiv: Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, p. 7.
3. 3 Ibid., p. 24.
4. See Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, ?Civil-Military Relations and Defense Reform in Post Communist Central Europe,? paper prepared for the Interuniversity Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society (IUS) Biennial International Conference, October 21, 2005.