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Eisenhower as Strategist: The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace

Authored by Dr. Steven Metz. | February 1993

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CONCLUSIONS

Grand Strategy.

For Eisenhower, the transition from a warfighting to a deterrent strategist was a major one. As a warfighting strategist, he had the luxury of steady increases in the quantity and quality of available resources, including both troops and material. As a deterrent strategist, he faced declining resources. Uncomfortable trade-offs were the order of the day and defining the level of risk acceptable in an environment of amorphous threat became a central planning procedure.185 In addition, the fundamental nature of the risk changed from the danger of faltering public or allied support which he faced during World War II to the more ominous threat of outright defeat. This meant that the dyadic dimension of strategy, the balancing, harmonizing, and trade-offs, were more important to Eisenhower-the-deterrer than to Eisenhower-the-warfighter.

The same held when Eisenhower served as engineer of our grand strategy. He assumed the presidency convinced that major alterations were needed in American national security policy. Eisenhower was convinced that containment, as it developed under Truman, was incoherent and immorally passive. According to the General's calculations, the Truman strategy had allowed 100 million people a year to slip under Communist control.186 As a student of strategy, Eisenhower believed in the value of the initiative, and felt that Truman had surrendered it.

Even more importantly, Eisenhower was worried that Truman's military buildup had made American grand strategy insolvent. American prosperity and economic health, he believed, undergirded all other elements of our strategy. The high taxes required by the Truman strategy endangered this and could erode public support for the strategy. According to a basic statement of U.S. national security strategy prepared by the National Security Council, "Continuation of this course of action over a long period of time would place the United States in danger of seriously weakening its economy and destroying the values and institutions which it is seeking to maintain."187

Eisenhower's response was to shape an altered American grand strategy--the "New Look"--which sought to integrate political, psychological, economic, and military components in a coherent but frugal way. Continuity was the byword. The New Look was imbued with themes, ideas, features and characteristics developed when Eisenhower dealt exclusively with military strategy, but attempted to translate these into the more complex arena of grand strategy.

The military dimension of the New Look stressed strategic nuclear weapons.188 Reliance on conventional military force for deterrence was extravagant in its use of valuable resources. And, should the military actually be used, it was potentially expensive in human terms. But this problem could be overcome. The American advantage in numbers of nuclear bombs and in delivery systems could be used to minimize the need to match Soviet conventional forces. In the words of John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State, the way to attain "a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost" was to reinforce local conventional defenses with "massive retaliatory power."189 Hence massive retaliation became a cornerstone of the Eisenhower military strategy.

Massive retaliation required serious consideration of the <%-2>utility of nuclear weapons. While Truman must have given sober thought to the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons-- <%0>particularly in response to non-nuclear aggression--he never spelled out these conditions. Eisenhower and Dulles often implied that a nuclear response to certain types of non-nuclear aggression was likely. Despite concern for nuclear disarmament later in the Administration, the early Eisenhower strategy reflected John Foster Dulles' view "that somehow or other we must manage to remove the taboo from the use of these weapons."190 And this was not a bluff. Basic strategy documents show that Eisenhower was clearly willing to consider the first use of nuclear weapons as a means of ameliorating strategic risk at a low economic cost. In his memoirs, Eisenhower wrote "My intention was firm: to launch the Strategic Air Command immediately upon trustworthy evidence of a general attack against the West." 191

Once the Administration decided to rely on nuclear weapons, it set out to garner support for this move and to implement it. Within the defense establishment, emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons paved the way for Army support of cuts in conventional forces.192 Dulles and other officials, including Eisenhower, made many attempts to explain massive retaliation to the American public. Eisenhower's aides convinced NATO of the credibility and efficacy of what came to be called "extended deterrence."193 And the Administration instigated a number of programs to upgrade U.S. nuclear forces. The Minuteman, Polaris, B-47, B-52, and B-58 were all children of the New Look.194 As an adjunct, civil and continental defense programs received increased resources.195

Eisenhower accorded conventional military forces a relatively minor role in the cold war. He believed that any war between the superpowers would inevitably involve the early use of nuclear weapons. Should the conflict persist, conventional armies could be mobilized.196 In smaller wars, allies would provide most of the land forces. "Our allies along the periphery of the Iron Curtain," Eisenhower wrote, should "provide (with our help) for their own local security, especially ground forces, while the United States, centrally located and strong in productive power, provided mobile reserve forces of all arms,with emphasis on sea and air contingents."197

As NATO's first commander, Eisenhower had recognized that reliance on American power for protection of Europe could lead our allies to minimize their own defense efforts and thus erode American support for the strategy. As president he continued to support the European Defense Community and increased defense spending by the NATO allies.198 This, however, was to little avail, and throughout the life of the New Look, the United States bore a disproportionate share of the burden for European security.

The Eisenhower Administration did not stop at this blend of extended deterrence, alliances, and mobile reserves. The President and his top advisers realized that traditional American attitudes toward military force, which,as Robert Osgood argued,disassociated power and policy, did not fully fit in a cold war setting.199 To Administration strategists, paramilitary covert action appeared to offer a partial curative. Eisenhower inherited the basic institutional structure for covert action. During the initial stages of the New Look, however, the poor prospects for covert activity in the Soviet Bloc led to skepticism about the value of this tool.200 But as European influence in the Third World waned, covert action took on greater importance, and the Administration set out to develop thecapacity and willingness to use it.201The Eisenhower Administration thus represented "the heyday of American covertaction. "202

New Look economics were primarily designed to encourage American prosperity. This was not only desirable in itself, but also a central component of national security.203 According to one of the earliest Eisenhower Administration studies of American strategy, "A vital factor in the long-term survival of the free world is the maintenance by the United States of a sound, strong economy."204 In part, this reflected the old "arsenal of democracy" thinking. A healthy U.S. economy was necessary to undergird military power. Stockpiling of strategic materials formed part of the solution, and Eisenhower saw this as vital for the New Look.205 Industrial mobilization was even more important.

In response to serious problems encountered at the beginning of the Korean War, Defense Mobilization Order VII-7 (August 25, 1954) made the Department of Defense responsible for maintaining facilities, machine tools, production equipment, and skilled workers for wartime needs.2 06 But within a few years, Eisenhower Administration strategists became convinced that the New Look made even a Korea-type conventional conflict unlikely. Led by the Air Force, the Administration began to assume that any war would be a total nuclear conflict fought with weapons on hand at the start, and thus attention to mobilization declined.207

American economic power was also to undergird self-defense by allied nations. As an Eisenhower Administration document asking Congress for continued support of the Mutual Security Program noted, "Enduring military strength cannot be built on a shaky economic foundation. Nor can freedom itself live for long in an atmosphere of social stagnation and marginal living standards." 208 The Marshall Plan applied such logic to Western Europe, but Eisenhower was keenly aware that the same truth held for the emerging Third World. There, especially economic development, stoked by American assistance, was as much an implement of containment as a means to assure access to raw materials.209

In an even broader sense, American prosperity was to circumvent the economic stagnation that opened the door for Communist subversion. Since democracy depended directly on economic health, the arsenal of democracy would provide not only the tools of war, but also the means for creating a foundation for political stability which, in turn, would limit Soviet influence. "Squalor and starvation," Eisenhower explained, "worked to the advantage of Communist ambitions."210 Security and economic assistance from the United States was based on a type of triage. The United States would directly help the weakest and most geostrategically important nations. Our European allies would then assume responsibility for areas where the United States was not active.211 This was especially true for Africa where the New Look assumed that even following decolonization, the former European colonial powers would retain responsibility for economic development.212 The United States, correspondingly, would play an increasing role in the Far and Middle East.213

Beyond the tangible advantages of American economic strength, prosperity was also a powerful psychological weapon. For the American people, economic growth would mitigate the costs of the cold war and bolster public support. Internationally, American prosperity would serve as a beacon for those torn between free enterprise and the allures of communism.214 According to an NSC study, "The ability of the free world, over the long pull, to meet the challenge and competition of the Communist world will depend in large measure on the capacity to demonstrate progress toward meeting the basic needs and aspirations of its peoples."215

Initially the Administration thought that implementing the economic component of the New Look would be easy. Military strategy required active measures against a malevolent foe and error could spawn holocaust. Prosperity, on the other hand, required only a balanced budget, lower taxes, and limited inflation.216 The productive genius of the American people would do the rest.217 It did not take long, however, for Eisenhower to realize that vested economic interests were nearly as implacable foes as the Soviets, especially the "military-industrial complex. "218

Politically, the New Look placed great value on the maintenance of alliances. Given the inherent weaknesses of the Soviet Union, it was forced to purse a divide-and-conquer strategy. This meant that "no nation outside the Iron Curtain can afford to be indifferent to the fate of any other nation devoted to freedom."219 It was thus vital to convince allies (and potential allies) of the U.S. commitment to their defense and advancement.220 To do this, the New Look sought to develop political unity, strength and determination in the free world by a range of political and psychological measures; extend good offices to resolve free world controversies (including decolonization); and, encourage the formation of further mechanisms for collective security and mutual defense.221

The political component of the New Look also called for continued American support for international organizations. Eisenhower advocated collective security through international organizations well before his presidency. In fact, his enthusiasm for the United Nations was somewhat at odds with his conservative peers.222 Despite the deadlock of the Security Council engendered by the cold war, Eisenhower stated that the United Nations "still represents man's best organized hope to substitute the conference table for the battlefield."223 Even well into his first administration, Eisenhower lauded the U.N. and argued that it was entering its second decade "with a wider membership and ever-increasing influence and usefulness."224 Faced with the cold war stalemate in the U.N. Security Council, the Eisenhower Administration also supported collective security by regional international organizations.225

The final component of the New Look was psychological. Eisenhower saw the cold war as "an attack on the minds of men" with world opinion the battlefield.226 Perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs were crucial weapons. Eisenhower understood the essential psychological structure of the cold war (at least as relates to Europe and North America) much better than Truman. The old soldier recognized that even the best trained and equipped troops were useless without good morale, and set out to integrate this simple truth into American grand strategy.

The Truman Administration created the institutional structure for psychological warfare.227 Still, the Eisenhower Administration felt that the Truman efforts, which dealt mostly with psychological operations during general war, were not far-ranging or holistic enough.228 Eisenhower thus directed organizational streamlining and policy changes to broaden the span of U.S. psychological warfare. The actual content of the New Look's psychological strategy was built on the intrinsic appeal of the American system. If the differences in the American and Soviet systems are publicized, Eisenhower believed, our system will prevail.229

Liberation was the key theme of the psychological strategy. As the New Look initially took shape, this meant liberation of Soviet satellites. Moscow's divide-and-conquer techniques were to be turned around; American strategy would "place the maximum strain on Soviet-satellite relations and try to weaken Soviet control over the satellite countries."230 But however much Eisenhower understood the perceptual contours of the cold war, he overlooked one of the most basic elements of psychological warfare: threats unsupported by tangible power have a limited lifespan and utility. Thus while Eisenhower promised "to render unreliable in the mind of the Kremlin rulers the hundreds of millions enslaved in the occupied and satellite nations,"231 he was not willing to back it with military force. Failure to aid the Hungarian uprising of 1956 proved this and eroded any remaining psychological value of liberation in the Soviet bloc.232

Support for liberation in the Third World proved equally shallow. Privately, at least, Eisenhower prodded the European powers on the pace of decolonization.233 Publicly this was counterbalanced by warnings from the State Department that "premature independence can be dangerous, retrogressive and destructive. 234

The domestic component of the psychological strategy was even more central. Eisenhower fully grasped the transitory nature of American support for the costs of global responsibility. Fear of isolationism played a large part in convincing Eisenhower to seek the presidency in 1952, and he believed that it still lurked just below apparent public support for the cold war. Thus the New Look called for explicit steps to preserve support for American strategy, and Eisenhower himself pursued this tirelessly.235

In the end, the New Look exhibited both the strengths and weaknesses of the approach to strategy Eisenhower had honed as Supreme Commander, Chief of Staff, and SACEUR. He recognized that in an environment of constrained resources and amorphous threat, the linear component of strategy was secondary. The threshold where the cost of more resources seemed to outweigh the benefits was simply lower than in wartime. Thus the focus was on the dyadic.

Here Eisenhower continued his stress on the managerial rather than the entrepreneurial. Despite some dynamic early rhetoric, there was almost nothing that was creative or bold in his grand strategy. It was steady, cautious, and persistent. Given all this, a final assessment of the strategic coherence of the New Look is necessarily mixed. It was not markedly worse than the strategies which preceded and followed it, but then again, it was not fundamentally different.

Assessment.

In many ways, Dwight Eisenhower was the archetypical American military strategist. Though unusual in the extent and length of his influence, the enduring characteristics of his approach to strategy were those of several generations of American strategists. Put differently, he was unique only in the level of his accomplishments. This is part of his allure. We may study more atypical commanders such as MacArthur and Patton and draw lessons from them, but it is Eisenhower who best shows us the ultimate strengths and shortcomings of American military strategy.

Despite fits of self-criticism, there are many strengths in the American approach to military strategy. These include steadiness, a genuine sense of care for troops, careful attention to the linear component of strategy, sensitivity to public perceptions of military operations, and a functional attitude toward military/civil relations that defers to civilian leaders but prefers to not let political concerns dominate military decisions. Resistance to the full blending of the military and the political is consummately American. After all, one of the reasons that Clausewitz is given so much attention in American military education is because his dictums concerning the relationship of policy and war are not intuitively obvious to officers reared in our peculiar strategic culture.

Eisenhower's military strategy also exhibited the enduring weaknesses of the American approach to strategy. He was inconsistent at harmonizing the dyadic elements of strategy and almost always stressed the tangible results of the application of military power over the psychological. The greater the ambiguity of the context in which military power was applied, the more serious these weaknesses. They did not drastically inhibit Eisenhower's warfighting strategy, but placed limitations on his approach to deterrence. Without a temporary monopoly of nuclear weapons and superiority in methods for their delivery, these weaknesses could have proven deadly. We were, in a very real sense, lucky. Eisenhower was a skilled practitioner of precisely those things which worked in the security environment of the 1940s and early 1950s.

What lessons, then, can we draw from Eisenhower's career as a military strategist? There are many, but a few are most stark.

First, Eisenhower showed the vital nature of symbiotic relationships among strategists. He recognized his shortcomings and developed functional ties with counterparts strong in talents where he was weak--Bedell Smith, Patton, Marshall, etc. Ironically, this penchant for developing symbiotic relationships showed strength in an often-overlooked dimension of the dyadic realm. Put simply, great leaders regulate their egos with a sense of their weaknesses. No one reaches the pinnacle of power without a robust ego which gives them the confidence to lead and to create the command presence which causes others to follow.

But nearly all leaders who sustain their greatness over time also have an accurate notion of their own shortcomings. Leaders such as Napoleon and Hitler did not have this, and ultimately they failed. Eisenhower recognized his faults and thus took steps to transcend them. This is a process which all truly great strategists must follow. Second, Eisenhower's career as a military strategist illustrated the difficulty and the importance of careful attention to the dyadic realm of strategy. It is natural for humans to prefer one pole of strategic dyads over the other, to be either hard or soft, entrepreneurial or managerial. Successful strategists sublimate or transcend these natural feelings and develop instead a sense of harmony and balance. To slip into cliche, "all things in their place." A great strategist thus has a penchant for occasionally taking actions which make him uncomfortable or even afraid.

Third, Eisenhower's career illustrated that there were times when the need for creativity, for ignoring proven principles and patterns, can be decisive. In war, such instances often occur when the enemy develops expectations and builds his strategy on them, or when the enemy faces some sort of trauma such as the collapse of German defenses in France in September 1944. In peacetime, bursts of strategic creativity are decisive during times of deep change or transition in the global security context like the beginning of the cold war, or when strategy formulation and strategy itself becomes overly-bureaucratized and stultifying. The tendency in a realm as complex as strategy is to persist in patterns and techniques until they are proven ineffective. The astute strategist senses such obsolescence before it is proven, and uses a burst of creativity to establish new patterns, expectations, and procedures. Eisenhower did not do this, but tended to stick with a technique or method until it failed.

Finally, Eisenhower's career illustrated the need for psychological acumen in strategy. Eisenhower, of course, was an astute psychologist when it came to understanding and motivating colleagues, superiors, staff, and troops. Where he failed was in understanding the enemy or opponent. It is not an overstatement to say that he was too American, and thus unable to overcome our natural insularity. Psychological acumen in strategy is not an absolute necessity for an antagonist with an overwhelming advantage in the material realm, but is for an antagonist facing parity or a disadvantage.

In general, Eisenhower, as a military strategist, is a model for emulation when a high cost but low risk strategy is necessary or desirable. He provided tremendous examples of the advantages of the sort of positive interpersonal style so valuable in coalition warfare. But is a high cost/low risk military strategy the way of the future for the United States? In the short term, yes. We will clearly remain militarily preponderant for some years. As Desert Storm showed, we have mastered the sort of linear/tangible military strategy that Eisenhower preferred.

In the long term, however, the global security environment will change in fundamental ways. Preponderance is always temporary, and as the quantity of American military power declines (even assuming the quality stays level) and as other nations increase their military power (which they inevitably will), we will need more efficient military strategies. This will demand greater attention to creativity, increased psychological acumen, and harmony in the dyadic component. Hopefully, students of military strategy can learn both the positive and negative lessons of Eisenhower's career and use both to develop these sorely needed skills.

ENDNOTES

185 On the role of acceptable risk in strategic planning, see Steven Metz, "Analyzing Strategic and Operational Risk," Military Review, Vol. 71, November 1991, pp. 78-80. "Text of Eisenhower's Address in Cincinnati on Foreign Policy," The New York Times, September 23, 1952.

186. NSC 153/1, "Restatement of Basic National Security
Policy," June 10, 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961, (henceforth, Eisenhower Papers), White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records 1952-61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 5, p. 2. The Eisenhower Papers are housed in the
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.

187. The following section draws heavily on Steven Metz,
"Eisenhower and the Planning of American Grand Strategy," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 14, March 1991, pp. 49-71.

188. "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," Address by Secretary Dulles, January 12, 1954, reprinted in U.S. National Security Policy and Strategy: Documents and Policy Proposals, ed. by Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert A. Vitas, Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988, p. 54.

189. "National Security Council Meeting of 8 October 1953," Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4.

190. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, Garden City, NY:

Doubleday, 1963, p. 453.

191. Glenn H. Snyder, "The `New Look' of 1953," in Warner
R. Schilling, et. al., Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets, New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, pp. 436-437; and Weigley, The American Way of War, p. 402.

192. Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989, p. 35.

193. Duane Windsor, "Eisenhower's New Look Reexamined: The View From Three Decades," in Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman, ed. by Joann P. Krieg, Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1987, p. 148.

194. NSC 153/1, pp. 5-6.

195. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 452.

196. Ibid., p. 446.

197. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume II: The President, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, p. 49.

198. Robert Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American
Strategy,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp. 28-45.

See also Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," Parameters, Vol. 18, September 1988, pp. 38-39.

200. "Brief of Approved U.S. National Security Objectives,
Policies and Programs With Respect to the USSR," n.d., Eisenhower Papers, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 8.

201. NSC 5412, "Covert Operations," March 15, 1954,
Eisenhower Papers, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 10. For detail see Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981.

202. B. Hugh Tovar, "Covert Action," in Intelligence
Requirements for the 1980s: Elements of Intelligence,
revised edition, ed. by Roy Godson, Washington: National Strategy Information Center, 1983, p. 73.

203. "Expansion of Domestic and Foreign Prosperity,"
Excerpts from the President's Economic Report to the Congress, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, February 15, 1954, p. 219.

204. NSC 149/2, "Basic National Security Policies and
Programs in Relation to Their Costs," A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary, April 29, 1953, Eisenhower Papers, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 4, p. 1.

205. Eisenhower diary entry, reprinted in The Eisenhower
Diaries,
ed. by Robert H. Ferrell, New York: W.W. Norton, 1981, p. 307.

206. Harold J. Clem, Mobilization Preparedness, Washington:
National Defense University, 1983, p. 66.

207. Ibid., p. 67.

208. "The New Framework for the Mutual Security Program:
Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, August 17, 1953," reprinted in Documents on American Foreign Relations 1953, ed. by Peter V. Curl, New York: Harper and Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1954, pp. 68-69.

209. Eisenhower, "Our Quest for Peace and Freedom,"
reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, April 16, 1956, p. 702.

210. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1965, p. 313.

211. NSC 149/2, p. 8.

212. See Steven Metz, "American Attitudes Toward
Decolonization in Africa," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 99, Fall 1984, pp. 515-534.

214. "Memorandum of Decision at the 136th Meeting of the National Security Council," March 11, 1953, reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, Volume VIII, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 1124.

215. NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy," January 6, 1955, Eisenhower Papers, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 14, p. 13.

216. NSC 149/2, p. 1.

217. While lower taxes were an Administration goal, early
strategy documents like NSC 153/1 admitted that until the war in Korea ended, the best that could be hoped for was to hold tax rates steady.

218. "Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People," January 17, 1961, reprinted in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 1038.

219. "Principles of U.S. Foreign Policy," Address by the President, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1954, p. 360.

220. NSC 162/2, "Basic National Security Policy," October
30, 1953, Eisenhower Papers, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 6, p. 20.

221. NSC 153/1, p. 8.

222. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume I, p. 450.

223. "Remarks to the Members of the United States Committee for United Nations Day," September 23, 1953, reprinted in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, (henceforth, Public Papers, 1953), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960, p. 605.

224. "State of the Union 1956," reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, January 16, 1956, p. 81.

225. "An Expression of Faith in the United Nations," Remarks by Secretary Dulles, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, March 16, 1953, p. 403.

226. "Meeting with Nelson Rockefeller," May 24, 1955, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 5.

227. "NSC Progress Report on Implementation of the Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning," February

20, 1953, Eisenhower Papers, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 1. See also Robert E. Summers, ed., America's Weapons of Psychological Warfare, New York: H.W. Wilson, 1951.

228. James S. Lay, Jr., "Memorandum for the National Security Council on the Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning," March 15, 1955, Eisenhower Papers, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 3.

229. "Remarks to the Staff of the United States Information Agency," November 10, 1953, Public Papers, 1953, p. 754.

230. NSC 153/1, p. 9.

231. "Text of Gen. Eisenhower's Foreign Policy Speech in San Francisco," The New York Times, October 9, 1952. Emphasis added.

232. Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management, p. 39.

233. "Conversation with Malcolm Muir on Colonialism," May 25, 1955, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 5.

234. Henry A. Byroade (Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs), "The World's Colonies and Ex-Colonies: A Challenge to America," State Department Press Release 605, October 30, 1953, p. 3.

235. See, for example, the public addresses and radio and television talks given in support of the defense budget and foreign aid: "National Security and the Cost of Waging Peace," reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, June 3, 1957, pp. 875-877; and "The Need for Mutual Security in Waging the Peace," reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1957, pp. 915-920.