The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
Dr. Metz starts this series with a review of the decision to remove Saddam Hussein by force. SSI hopes that this and the succeeding monographs will generate debate on just how the United States made decisions—some of them disastrous—about Iraq.
State-owned enterprises affect stability in conflict-prone environments, and decisive control of them creates positive or negative conditions. However, it is a challenge to know how and when to use these enterprises, and a good set of metrics is necessary to measure their effectiveness.
Authored by Dr. Sarah Meharg, Ms. Aleisha Arnusch. Edited by Professor Susan Merrill.
Security sector reform (SSR) has emerged since the end of the Cold War as an important tool for stabilizing and reconstructing post-conflict countries. It offers a means of arresting the failure process in failing states and supporting failed state
recovery. The U.S. Government endorses the concept of SSR as a component of stabilization reconstruction in the new (October 2008) U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations.
Afghanistan was America’s first attempt at conducting formalized Security Sector Reform. This case study offers readers an opportunity to learn whom the United States saw as key actors in the process, what institutions were slated for reform, and how well the United States and its partners met the typical challenges of SSR.
Colombia has experienced conflict for decades and, as the author observed, was a “paradigm for a failing state” in that it was replete with terrorism, kidnapping, murder, corruption, and general lawlessness. But today it is much safer through the imposition of the "Rule of Law."
Authored by Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Ronald W. Johnson, Richard Hill. Edited by Professor Susan Merrill.
The authors provide a set of principles and operational guidelines for peacekeepers to help a country restore public infrastructure and services. The extent to which public sector reconstruction takes place is a function of the mission, the level of resources, expertise of the troops, and the host country context. This guide provides courses of action to both planners and practitioners in executing these operations and supplements existing and emerging documents.
The author outlines eight principles for a risk management defense strategy. He argues that these principles provide “measures of merit” for evaluating the new administration’s defense choices.
Authored by Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Ronald W. Johnson, Richard Hill. Edited by Professor Susan Merrill.
This guide focuses on the military’s role in rebuilding and establishing a functional, effective, and legitimate nation-state; one that can assure security and stability for its citizens, defend its borders, deliver services effectively for its populace, and is responsible and accountable to its citizens.
The Department of Defense experienced revolutionary change in its strategic outlook over the past 8 years. As it transitions to new leadership in the White House and undertakes
a historic Quadrennial Defense Review, it will be important for to examine the “first principles.”
that guide its force planning.
Historically, defense strategy demonstrates three flaws: (1) it is generally reactive, (2) it lacks sufficient strategic imagination, and (3) as a result, it is vulnerable to surprise. The current administration confronted a game-changing “strategic shock” in its first 8 months in office. The next team would be well-advised to expect the same kind of unconventional and nonmilitary shock to DoD convention early in its first term.
Having the right "who" to devise strategy is critical to success in counterinsurgency or any asymmetric, cross-cultural encounter. This monograph contends that if we do not get the "who" right, none of the "whats," in terms of what we do, matters.
Increasing numbers of Russian intellectuals became disenchanted with the West, particularly after the end of the USSR, and looked for alternative geopolitical alliances. The Muslim world, with Iran at the center, became one of the possible alternatives.
Historically, the U.S. Army has employed its officers to good effect, but is there need for improvement? Does its current assignments paradigm lead to optimal career satisfaction and productivity? Does it allow officers to develop the depth and breadth of talent the Army needs? Perhaps most importantly, does the Army really know enough about the officer talent it possesses, as well as the requirements for that talent?
The U.S. Army is almost universally acknowledged as an organization that powerfully develops talent in areas such as leadership, teamwork behavior, work ethics, adaptability, fitness, and many others. Employers know that the Army invests substantially in its people, and that this investment translates directly into enhanced productivity. Despite this well-earned reputation, however, are the Army’s current officer development programs equal to tomorrow’s challenges? Does it suffer from a growing imbalance in talent supply versus demand? Perhaps most importantly, is there an effective relationship between its developmental and employment strategies?
Authored by Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Michael J. Colarusso.
Organizations often focus their recruiting efforts on high-payoff markets--how does the Army identify the right market in which to focus its officer accessions efforts? What role does education play in officer accessions? How does the Army identify and go about meeting its officer diversity requirements? Why is establishing the proper ratio between commissioning sources so important?
Authored by Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Michael J. Colarusso.
Why have Army junior officer retention rates plummeted since 1983? Are the root causes truly understood? What are the long term consequences of failing to retain talented young officers? What steps has the Army taken to meet this challenge, and how effective have they been? What must the Army do to restore junior officer retention rates to previously healthy levels?
Authored by Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Michael J. Colarusso.
What is the difference between competent and talented? What is talent, and which people have it? What talents should the United States Army seek in its officers? Most importantly, what are the consequences of failing to create an officer talent management system?
Authored by Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Michael J. Colarusso.
The authors consider America’s continuing commitment to an all-volunteer military, its global engagement in an era of persistent conflict, and evolving changes in its domestic labor market.
Do you think the Army officer corps needs a clear statement of its professional ethic? Colonel Matthew Moten does, and he has written it in one page. Join the debate.
Authored by Dr. Don M. Snider, Major Paul Oh, Major Kevin Toner.
As the character of conflict in the 21st century evolves, the Army’s strength will continue to rest on our values, our ethos, and our people. Our Soldiers and leaders must remain true to these values as they operate in increasingly complex environments where moral-ethical failures can have strategic implications.