Captain Jeanne F. Hull
U.S. Army Captain JEANNE F. HULL is a Military Intelligence Officer at the Training and Doctrine Command, Washington, DC; and Ph.D. Candidate at Princeton University, New Jersey. She received her commission from West Point in 2000, and her first duty assignment was as a Company Executive Officer in Ft. Lewis, Washington. After September 11, 2001, she spent 10 months in Sarajevo, Bosnia, as a counterterrorism analyst on the Stabilization Force, Joint and Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF). Captain Hull later served in Iraq as the Division Targeting Intelligence Officer for the 101st Airborne Division during the Iraq invasion and post-conflict support and stability operations from 2003-04. She returned to Iraq 3 months after redeployment to work as a special assistant to the Commanding General for the newly formed Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), then Lieutenant General David Petraeus. In late 2007, Captain Hull went back to Iraq and worked as an adviser to the Iraqi Directorate General of Intelligence and Security (DGIS) before transferring to the MNF-I Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC) as a strategic engager. She will join the West Point Department of Social Sciences as a professor of International Relations in the summer of 2009. Captain Hull holds a Masters in Public Affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs through the Army’s Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) program, Princeton University, New Jersey. She is currently attending the Military Intelligence Captain’s Career Course (MICCC).
*The above information may not be current. It was current at the time when the individual worked for SSI or was published by SSI.
SSI books and monographs by Captain Jeanne F. Hull
September 24, 2009
Authored by Captain Jeanne F. Hull.
Military commanders and diplomats in Iraq and Afghanistan have been meeting with important local officials since the inception of those conflicts. These engagements have aided commanders and diplomats alike in furthering their objectives by establishing productive relationships with those who know and understand Iraq’s complex human terrain best—the Iraqis. However, these engagements frequently take place on ad-hoc bases and are rarely incorporated into other counterinsurgency operations and strategies. In some cases, unit commanders fail to see the utility of using these engagements at all--an oversight that contributes to deteriorating security situations and loss of popular support.