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Lieutenant Colonel John A. Glaze

Email Lieutenant Colonel John A. Glaze

Photo U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel JOHN A. GLAZE, is Deputy Commander of the 353rd Special Operations Group at Kadena Air Base, Japan. He previously held positions as Commander of the 67th Special Operations Service (SOS) of the Royal Air Force in Mindenhall, Great Britain; Operations Officer of the 9th SOS at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; Chairman of the Special Airlift Branch of the Joint Countermine Operation Simulation at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina; Air Force Institute of Technology at Ft. Dix, New Jersey; Standards/Evaluations Flight CC/Chairman of Safety of 550th SOS/58 Special Operations Wing at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico; and C-130 E Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System Navigator of the 40th Airlift Squadron at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. Lieutenant Colonel Glaze holds a B.S. in business administration from the University of Arizona, Tucson; an M.A. in management from Webster University, Albuquerque, New Mexico; an M.A. in military arts and sciences from Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; an M.A. in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA; and a master’s degree in logistics from the Air Force Institute of Technology, Ft. Dix, New Jersey.

*The above information may not be current. It was current at the time when the individual worked for SSI or was published by SSI.

SSI books and monographs by Lieutenant Colonel John A. Glaze

  • Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy

    October 22, 2007

    Authored by Lieutenant Colonel John A. Glaze.
    The author concludes that the skyrocketing opium trade in Afghanistan is threatening to destabilize the government and turn the conflict-ridden country back into a safe haven for drug traffickers and terrorists. The author also argues that the counternarcotics strategy has been ineffective in reducing opium production and needs to be modified to better help achieve stability in Afghanistan.