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WILLIAM W. MENDEL is a senior analyst with the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Before his retirement from active duty as a U.S. Army Colonel, he served as a tenured faculty instructor at the U.S. Army War College where he held the Maxwell D. Taylor Chair of the Profession of Arms. His military duties included infantry and general staff assignments in the United States, Korea, Vietnam, and Germany. He is coauthor of three Strategic Studies Institute reports, Campaign Planning (1988), Campaigning Planning and the Drug War (1991), and Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat (1997), and Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, National Defense University Press, March 1995. He authored the articles “New Forces for Engagement Policy,” Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1995- 96, and “Operation Rio,” Military Review, May-June 1997.
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Authored by COL (RET) William W. Mendel, Dr. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr..
The authors report their observations of the different ways combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs) produce a strategy document, and suggest that new joint doctrine is needed to bring a degree of regularity and orderliness to the CINCs' strategic planning process. The CINCs' Strategies: The Combatant Command Process provides a brief look at the CINCs' strategy objectives and concepts in order to place the planning process in context.
Authored by COL (RET) William W. Mendel, COL (RET) Murl D. Munger.
The primary purpose of this publication is to show how the principles and techniques of strategic and operational planning can be applied to the supply reduction side of our national effort to curb the trafficking of illicit drugs. An earlier version was published in 1991 which introduced campaign planning methodology as a means to help bridge the gap existing between the policy and strategy.