

the 1983 battlefield fire which gave greater clarity to locations of the fighting positions held by Custer's battalion and by native warriors.

This book is highly recommended for contemporary strategic leaders. Both an entertaining and educational read, it highlights the complex nature of the battlefield, the impact of personality and personal relationships, and the numerous challenges of fighting a native tribal foe. Poignantly, Philbrick notes that there is plenty of evidence that both leaders, Custer and Sitting Bull, would have preferred a peaceful resolution to conflict. When the evolving situation placed their forces into direct conflict, any chance of success for Custer was tied to his personal vision on how the tactical fight would progress and the ability of his subordinates to execute in accordance with that vision, especially once he split his force prior to the battle. Unfortunately, Custer's vision was flawed, he failed to adequately relay it to his subordinates, and Reno and Benteen were, even if given clear guidance, ill-equipped to make the appropriate tactical decisions. As many historians will argue, the Army was lucky it did not lose the entire 7th Cavalry Regiment during this fight.



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With Friends Like These: The Soviet Bloc's Clandestine War Against Romania, Volume I

by Larry L. Watts

Reviewed by Colonel Charles W. Van Bebber, Ph.D.,
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During the Cold War, American diplomats, intelligence specialists, and scholars viewed Romania under the leadership of Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu as something of a paradox. On one hand, it was a harsh, Stalinist regime that clearly fell within the Soviet orbit. On the other hand, it behaved internationally as a maverick state that often defied the foreign policy positions of

Moscow and even withdrew from the Warsaw Pact command structure after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Conventional wisdom asserted that such defiance could be tolerated by Moscow because Ceausescu's firm Stalinist control over the country gave the Soviets no expectation that Romania would deviate from communism. With the defection in 1978 of Romanian intelligence chief Ion Mihai Pacepa, the idea that Romania's autonomous foreign and security policy was actually a Moscow-orchestrated conspiracy to deceive the West (known as Red Horizon) became widely circulated and accepted by many. In fact, the idea that Bucharest was not a Warsaw Pact maverick but rather a "Trojan Horse" would become a contentious issue within the US policy community in the 1980s. In 1987, former US ambassador to Romania David Funderburk asserted in his book *Pinstripes and Reds* that the US Department of State had been deceived into giving Romania Most-Favored-Nation status


and that US diplomats had been hoodwinked by Ceausescu to believe the false pretense of Romania's independence from Moscow.

In *With Friends Like These*, historian Larry L. Watts provides the historical "coda" to the question of Romania's geostrategic orientation during the communist era. Using evidence gleaned from recently opened intelligence and defense archives of the Warsaw Pact, Watts examines Romania's strategic behavior during the Cold War and explains why this country earned a reputation from scholars and diplomats of the era as a so-called "maverick" and why some believed Romania's seemingly autonomous behavior was really a sham. By tracing Romania's relationships with Moscow and its Warsaw Pact satellites through the dimensions of intelligence and defense relationships, Watts confirms that Romania was at the very least a reluctant if not defiant member of the Warsaw Pact. Watts demonstrates that Romania never enthusiastically embraced its inclusion in the Soviet bloc and that its relationships with its nominal allies deteriorated from the early 1950s onward. Watts documents the clandestine disinformation campaign (beginning in the 1950s and heightening after the events of 1968) orchestrated by Moscow to discredit and isolate Bucharest. The archival evidence Watts reveals indicates that this premeditated effort to discredit Romania met with a large degree of success and Ceausescu's Romania would consequently become increasingly isolated both from the West as well as from its fellow Soviet bloc "friends."

This work is more than just an exposé of Cold War intelligence secrets. The author has written a geopolitical history of Romania and not, as the title implies, simply an examination of Romania's experience as a member of the Warsaw Pact. This lengthy first volume specifically spans a period from the early 19th century to 1978 and highlights the turbulent relationship Bucharest experienced with its allies—particularly its problematic historical relationships with Moscow and Budapest. The author takes the reader through this history in five of the first six chapters which are best skipped if the reader's focus is on the Cold War. Although the background provides an insightful context for Romania's subsequent defiance of Moscow, this book's real merit lies not in the breadth of the author's treatment of Romania's struggle for national autonomy from the region's great powers and irredentist neighbors, but in its particular focus on Romania's status within the Eastern bloc of communist states after World War II. It is Watts's detailed narrative of Romania's experience as a member of the Warsaw Pact that captures the reader's attention and justifies the title.

The author is well qualified to examine the topic of Romanian strategic culture and history. He has authored a biography of Romania's controversial Second World War leader Marshal Ion Antonescu, and has written extensively on contemporary Romanian military and intelligence affairs. He also served intermittently as an advisor to the Romanian government on defense and intelligence issues. Most notably, he was an advisor to General Ioan Talpeș, a former director of the Romanian foreign intelligence services and national security advisor to President Ion Iliescu, who penned the foreword to this work.

With Friends Like These represents a monumental effort by Watts to come to terms with Romania's Warsaw Pact legacy. Although it is poorly edited and somewhat lengthy—at times it becomes mired in the details of covert activity—it is nonetheless a worthwhile read for those who wish to understand contemporary Romania. In particular, Watts's understanding of Romanian strategic culture and his access to communist-era archives combine to make this volume a must read for those interested in Cold War history and the Warsaw Pact.



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The United States and the Second World War: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War, and the Home Front

edited by G. Kurt Piehler and Sidney Pash

Reviewed by Colonel Matthew Moten, Professor and Deputy Head, Department of History, United States Military Academy

Editors Piehler and Pash gathered students and colleagues of John Whiteclay Chambers II to publish this anthology in his honor. Chambers is a prolific historian, author of *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* and editor of *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, to name just two of his many well-regarded works. This volume is part of the Fordham University Press series, *World War II: The Global, Human, and Ethical Dimension*, of which Piehler is also general editor.

Eleven essays range from Depression-era foreign policy to the American pacifist and antinuclear movements during the Cold War. The editors have arranged chapters into sections on foreign policy, the home front, the conduct of the war, and the end and aftermath of the war. Sidney Pash provides a useful and detailed introduction.

In their examination of the 1941 decision to provide convoy escorts for Atlantic shipping, J. Garry Clifford and Robert H. Ferrell portray FDR at his wiliest. Roosevelt cagily gave the appearance of leading while refusing to get too far in front of the public. Instead, he allowed events, such as the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, to create popular momentum for convoys. The authors poke holes in FDR's reputation for bipartisan war leadership, showing that he disdained politicking with the congressional opposition. In "Containment, Rollback, and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1933-1941," Pash explores prewar United States-Japanese relations. The Americans were largely successful in containing Japanese expansion, but they changed course in 1941, aggressively attempting to reverse Japanese gains. Pash deftly shows how an ill-considered policy shift helped bring on the war it was meant to avert. Secretary of State Cordell Hull's historical reputation continues to wane.

Two essays comprise the home front section. Justin Hart marshals a fascinating cast of characters—Archibald MacLeish, Robert Sherwood, and