From Parameters, Spring 1999, pp. 54-70.
Classic or traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations are conducted by small forces, armed only for self-defense. The forces are deployed between factions after formal or informal cessation of hostilities and only with the consent of the factions. The purpose of these operations is to provide impartial reassurance to all sides that the cease-fire is being observed. United Nations peace enforcement operations, on the other hand, are normally conducted with large, well-armed forces deployed under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter to stop ongoing hostilities and to punish aggression. This type of mission virtually assures that peace enforcement operations neither have the consent of all combatants, nor can be carried out with any degree of impartiality.
In recent years, theorists have attempted to address the doctrinal void in the so-called "gray area" of conflict between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. One result is a new concept of induced consent focused on that segment of the gray area dealing with failed or failing states involved in intrastate conflict. At first blush, the idea of inducing consent for a settlement among factions in such conflicts appears to border on the oxymoronic. At the very least, the concept would require an extremely delicate balance between coercion and rewards to be successful. This article seeks to demonstrate how the concept of induced consent can establish that balance in a limited portion of the gray area.
The Cold War Setting
The Cold War caused impasses and shortcuts in establishing principles for peace operations that obscured fundamental doctrinal problems. The founders of the UN had created Chapter VII, peace enforcement, in the Charter as the only alternative to Chapter VI, pacific settlement; Chapter VII seemed to reflect a new realism based on the experiences of the interwar years. It introduced, for instance, the idea of escalating collective responses to interstate aggression using all elements of power. And the dismal military legacy of the League of Nations was acknowledged by providing "teeth" to the UN, requiring members to make available as needed forces, facilities, and any other means of assistance necessary to maintain or restore peace. Finally, there was the proposed Military Staff Committee, to be led by the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council, which would provide "strategic direction" to any armed forces put at the UN's disposal.
The ultimate realism in Chapter VII, however, was in Article 51, the right of all states to individual or collective self-defense, a well-founded acknowledgment that collective security peace enforcement could fail. The deepening chill of the Cold War was set against the most potent element in the Charter, the great power veto provision. Agreements were to be "worked out subsequently" for placing national forces at the general disposal of the UN and for commanding such forces. In the ensuing negotiations, the United States actually advocated a total from all contributors of 20 divisions, 1250 bombers, 2250 fighters, 3 battleships, 6 carriers, 15 cruisers, 84 destroyers, and 90 submarines. The negotiations, not surprisingly, never reached fruition because of fundamental disagreements among the five Security Council permanent representatives involving the composition and strength of the contributions. The result was a much diminished concept of collective peace enforcement in the Cold War, reflected in the UN-authorized "coalition forces" deployed to Korea, made possible only by the absence of the Soviet representative, and to Desert Storm, made possible by Soviet cooperation at the end of its decline.
The inability to fulfill the original enforcement goals of the UN Charter produced a doctrinal fix that fell short of collective coercion, but still had some utility when states decided on cease-fires rather than pacific means to settle their disputes. The principles of traditional peacekeeping, dubbed "Chapter six-and-a-half" by Dag Hammarskjold, emerged as a result of experiences by UN forces deployed to the Middle East subsequent to the 1956 Suez crisis. The basic premise of the emerging doctrine was that peacekeeping forces could not create the conditions for their own success--could not create the peace they were required to keep. Consent of the belligerents to the presence of peacekeepers was thus absolutely essential to an agreement to some type of cease-fire. Consent, in turn, was closely tied to the perceived impartiality of the peacekeeping troops, whose role was to keep the factions separated by maintaining buffer zones and monitoring the cessation of hostilities. As a result, Cold War doctrine for traditional peacekeeping required small, lightly armed troops that used force only in self-defense and, if necessary, to complete their mission. This military weakness assured all the factions that peacekeepers could not change the balance, but were instead a device solely to guarantee the transparency of all sides.
These adjustments to Cold War impediments contributed to the initial euphoria concerning peace operations in the immediate wake of that conflict. Even if standing forces had been established, there still would have been a need for the Security Council to create new doctrine for military operations, since many of the conflicts the UN had dealt with did not reflect clear-cut interstate aggression. The crisis in the Congo, for instance, revealed doctrinal problems in a new environment for both peace enforcement and peacekeeping that had only been postponed by the bipolar standoff. That standoff also glossed over the short-term nature of peacekeeping doctrine, the limited objective of which was itself the product of the Cold War. Cease-fires which rarely lasted were a far cry from conflict resolution. And as the UN experience in Cyprus demonstrated, when such pauses did endure, they could reinforce a solution deemed illegitimate by one side, thus making more difficult a settlement that appeared progressively less urgent. Cessation of hostilities may be a necessary condition for peacemaking, but after the Cold War it became clearer that cessation was far from sufficient for conflict resolution.
The New Environment
In the wake of the Cold War the great powers, liberated from that conflict's geostrategic balance of power, were increasingly willing to work within the UN framework to solve emerging problems in countries around the world. This change contributed to the growing tendency on the part of the Security Council to agree on cooperative actions as crises arose. Moreover, regional peace agreements between 1985 and 1991 in areas ranging from Namibia to Central America were creating a demand for traditional peacekeeping. One result was an increase in such operations, large enough that by 1992 Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali could speak of a "crisis of too much credibility." Another result was a growing belief that traditional peacekeeping forces could deal with intrastate conflict--a belief that reached a high-water mark in 1991 when a UN guard contingent deployed to northern Iraq. The safety of that force, of course, had already been ensured by the defeat of the Iraqi army during the Gulf conflict, the earlier occupation by US and NATO forces under "Provide Comfort," and the continuing allied air cover. Nevertheless, such operations only bolstered a new tendency to blur the distinction between traditional peacekeeping operations and coercive action, particularly concerning the requirement of the former for the consent of the belligerents.
Optimism and Disillusionment
These trends were reflected in the Secretary General's 1992 An Agenda for Peace, formulated as a guide for more diverse and active UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era in response to comments by heads of state and government during a Security Council summit. The document defined peacekeeping as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of the parties concerned." An important concomitant to this downgrading of consent was the Secretary General's vague call for a new UN military role falling somewhere between peacekeeping and all-out warfighting. The expectation was that the Security Council would examine the role of peace enforcement units in cases in which belligerents had not complied with previously agreed cease-fires and truces. It was a concept of peace enforcement that clearly went beyond the traditional Chapter VII focus on interstate acts of aggression and implied that UN forces could play a role in the domestic affairs of failed or troubled states. Swept along by the optimism reflected in An Agenda for Peace concerning the efficacy of collective action, the Security Council in conjunction with the activist Secretary General generated more Chapter VII resolutions in 1992-93 than it had in the entire existence of the United Nations.
There was, however, no clear-cut doctrinal response to these developments, an unfortunate situation since many post-Cold War conflicts were already moving from the interstate model to an intrastate structure. This condition applied whether the conflict stemmed from collapsed federal polities, such as the former Yugoslavia, or simply the absence of or struggle over domestic authority, as in Angola and Somalia. What followed was a hurried, often inept expansion of traditional peacekeeping, the one workable doctrine for the collective management of power that had emerged during the Cold War. This newer, more forceful hybrid was superimposed on a vastly different environment in an attempt to address a wide range of situations. What often resulted were inappropriately sized and inappropriately armed force projections into "gray areas," which could not be helped, and in fact were endangered, by ad hoc peace enforcement interventions. The 1993 US Quick Reaction Force in Somalia and the 1994-95 NATO air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina are examples of such operations. "It is no easy task," one UN official summed up this doctrinal dilemma, "to make war and peace with the same people on the same territory at the same time."
Reaction to the dilemma was mixed. On the one hand, some saw the either/or aspects of traditional peacekeeping principles as incompatible with the emerging gray area. "Consent and impartiality," one analyst pointed out "are too fragile to serve as a fulcrum around which a sensible doctrine can be built." The logical result was the promotion of a "robust" or "muscular" second generation of peacekeeping operations along a horizontal spectrum of action between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Key to this spectrum was the assumption that an outside force need not necessarily be dependent on, or have to promote or be guided by, the necessity of full consent. "The size of the force," John Mackinlay concluded in this regard, "is dictated not by the characteristics of the task, such as conflict prevention and protection, but by the degree of consent expected in the operation zone."
On the other hand, UN peacekeeping failures in the new environment also inspired retrenchment, including rejection of the idea that peace enforcement was merely one more stage in a peacekeeping continuum. "It is doubtful whether it is right to highjack the respected term `peacekeeping' and apply it to actions that are not based on the full consent of all the parties to the conflict and that involve the extensive use of force," Adam Roberts pointed out. "Is there not something Orwellian about this?" Certainly, by 1995 the leadership of the United Nations appeared to think so. That year, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali issued a paper celebrating the 50th anniversary of the UN that modified his earlier An Agenda for Peace. Peacekeeping operations required the consent of all parties, he emphasized, and the use of force was not consistent with such operations. Even in the cause of faster conflict resolution, he concluded, it was "necessary to resist the temptation to use military power."
The logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peacekeeping is intended to facilitate. To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the peacekeeping operation and endanger its personnel.
Wider Peacekeeping--The British Approach
The military doctrines of the United Kingdom and the United States appeared to mirror this conservative retrenchment. For the British doctrine of Wider Peacekeeping, there could be no middle ground between the role of referee in peacekeeping and the role of player implicit in any attempt at peace enforcement. The two types of peace operations were thus "mutually exclusive activities" that could not be merged within the gray area. Consent of the belligerents was the Rubicon of the separation: "The betraying characteristic of middle-ground theories is the downgrading of consent from critical determinant to take-it-or-leave-it option." In a similar manner, US military doctrine maintained that peacekeeping and peace enforcement were
not part of a continuum allowing a unit to move freely from one to the other. A broad demarcation separates these operations. . . . The crossing of the consent divide from [peacekeeping to peace enforcement] is a policy level decision that fundamentally changes the nature of the operation.
New doctrines regarding the emerging gray area were not quite as conservative as they appeared. For instance, the British acknowledged that Wider Peacekeeping was likely to occur in environments characterized by elements that could range from numerous parties to the conflict, undisciplined factions, ineffective cease fires, and the absence of law and order to undefined areas of operations, violations of human rights, and collapse of political and civil infrastructure. In such a milieu, those carrying out peace operations were likened to a tight-rope walker at a circus who carries only a balancing pole, representative of the structure of consent, but still has to contend with a circus audience that is restive and begins to throw objects at him. It was, in short, a concept that called for the "wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the general consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile."
While it continued to reject a horizontal spectrum of consent in this more volatile environment, British doctrine explored a vertical continuum encompassing the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict. This continuum was a doctrinal warfighting staple of both the US and British armies, designed to ensure that scattered tactical battles and engagements would not degenerate into separate duels with no connection to higher strategic objectives. The key to this concept was the operational level of war, at which a commander could synchronize tactical events in major operations and campaigns to achieve theater strategic objectives. By drawing on this vertical structure, it was possible for the British doctrine of Wider Peacekeeping to incorporate compellence, in which peacekeeping forces could still act decisively even if the full consent of the belligerents was lacking or incomplete. The important task was to create a framework of consent at the strategic and operational levels that was "sufficiently robust" to withstand the use of force at the tactical level.
Thus the consent barrier could be breached at the tactical level with the measured application of a "maximum presence of forces on the ground . . . desirable for wider Peacekeeping Operations, both for deterrence, credibility, and information-gathering purposes and for domination, albeit discreetly, of the general environment." Therefore the use of force at the tactical level could "represent a valid consensual peacekeeping technique. Consent can thus facilitate, not hinder, the use of force." The key was the legitimacy of settlements at the higher levels and the need to make the effect of this consent felt at the tactical level: "For example, if the theater commander has secured the agreement of a faction leader to a particular course of action, he should then do everything he can to have that agreement transmitted down to those faction members facing the tactical commanders in the field." Thus the British concept of Wider Peacekeeping did not diminish the problems inherent in a vertical approach to peace operations. At the very least, the concept offered an alternative to the problems of dealing with consent based on a continuum along a horizontal spectrum between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. "Peacekeeping and Wider Peacekeeping," the British manual concluded,
rely on having the consent of the belligerent parties, at least at the operational (i.e., theatre) level, and depend on their success on consent-promoting techniques--peace enforcement does not. What divides peacekeeping from peace enforcement, therefore, is not the level of violence, but the level of consent.
Wider Peacekeeping--The Multi-Dimensional Approach
Wider Peacekeeping also evolved as a generic term for what came to be called "multi-disciplinary" or "multi-dimensional" operations during comprehensive settlements arrived at after lengthy peacemaking procedures. In many cases, traditional peacekeeping had tended to inhibit or lead to the stagnation of conflict-resolving peacemaking. The new type of operations, with a settlement in hand, could focus on peace-building, during which civilian and military forces strengthened civil and humanitarian institutions, aided economic and social development, and organized elections and full political participation. On the military level, Wider Peacekeeping enhanced commitments negotiated with factions that could include cantonment of military forces, demobilization and disarmament, and even the formation of a unified military. Thus, this version of Wider Peacekeeping went beyond traditional peacekeeping requirements for interposing forces after a cease-fire but before significant progress in conflict resolution.
Many of the new tasks were evident in the UN's involvement in civil wars ranging from Namibia and Angola to El Salvador and Mozambique. New tasks in the new environment also made it clear that the concept of consent was still evolving. In traditional peacekeeping, consent at the strategic and operational levels could generally be relied upon. Leaders of states such as Egypt and Israel or of military wings such as the Palestinians or the Turkish Cypriots could for the most part exercise control of their factions down through the tactical level. The post-Cold War focus on intercommunal violence in failed or failing states, however, created new facets of consent, much different from those envisioned in the original criteria for traditional peacekeeping. International organizations now might deal with insurgent leaders at the strategic and operational levels, like those in Somalia and Cambodia, who brought to the bargaining table very little understanding of traditional concepts of statesmanship or the rule of law.
This lack of accountability often permeated to the tactical level, where local factional leaders might be barely, if at all, controlled by agreements entered into by higher commanders at the negotiating table. One reason had to do with the new peace-building tasks in the multidimensional peacekeeping milieu. In weapon control measures, for instance, the traditional concept of consent could be overshadowed by the normal "security dilemma" that occurs when some factions are unable or unwilling to match disarmament commitments. Tactical unpredictability could be caused by uncontrollable splinter groups, or by local factions that lacked full information about the peace agreement, or by a command and control structure that was deficient or nonexistent down to the tactical level. Whatever the reasons, the result was that wider, multidimensional peacekeeping operations increasingly placed intervening forces in semi-permissive tactical environments created by partial, sporadic, or decaying consent. And as demonstrated by the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, vertical uncertainty can disable any force configured for traditional peacekeeping.
The result in recent years has been a renewed focus on the use of force to secure the operating environment in wider peacekeeping missions. In 1989, for example, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) authorized or at least tolerated South Africa's use of the very forces being subjected to a UN arms embargo to block infiltration by members of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). This use of force allowed UNTAG to complete peacekeeping operations successfully that had expanded to include election monitoring. By 1993 Kofi Annan, as the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, could point out that the new multidimensional tasks for the UN "call for `teeth' and `muscle,' in addition to less tangible qualities that we have sought in the past. In other words there are increasing demands that the United Nations now enforce the peace as originally envisaged in the Charter."
Peace enforcement in this context of producing a secure environment can extend to areas without comprehensive peace settlements. In some cases, there could be a type of consensual Chapter VII in which factions concur on weapon controls for humanitarian purposes, such as the "safe haven" of Srebrenica or the UN Protection Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia. There also could be the more traditional coercive aspect of Chapter VII, but focused--like wider peacekeeping operations--on violence reduction as the necessary basis for political change and even reconciliation among factions. In Haiti, for example, the linkage to peacemaking and peace-building was implicit in the goal of Operation Uphold Democracy, which was to provide "temporary security support to a society moving from authoritarianism to democracy." But by 1995, the most far-reaching use of the peace enforcement concept had to do with the Wider Peacekeeping role of implementing peace settlements. Earlier that year, great power pressure caused the belligerents in the former Yugoslavia to consent to the Dayton Peace Agreements. The induced nature of this consent at the strategic and operational levels caused the UN to authorize a large, heavily armed Implementation Force (IFOR) under Chapter VII to "take all necessary measures" to ensure compliance with the agreement down to the tactical level.
The international community continued throughout 1995 to exert pressure on warring belligerents throughout the world to undertake or honor peaceful settlements. Early that year the Security Council instructed the Secretary General not to deploy the troops authorized by the Council for the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) until the Angolan parties demonstrated their willingness to honor commitments made to each other in their peace agreement. Equally important, there was the recognition that in the new gray area there could be no return, as Sashi Tharoor pointed out, to the "brave old world of buffer zones and policing cease-fires, the non-threatening application of military skills to defuse conflicts." Instead, any doctrine for the post-Cold War environment would have to include what Alexander George has termed "forceful persuasion," in order to demonstrate to belligerents that the best option was a negotiated settlement. Consent would be the objective in such initiatives. But full consent of the belligerents in the gray area might not always be forthcoming, requiring instead some degree of deterrence or compellence based on force that must be used impartially. By the end of the year Secretary of Defense William Perry pointed out that "IFOR will be an impressive force that will intimidate anybody in the area."
Kofi Annan observed early in 1996 that speedy involvement in failed or failing states was at the core of his concept: "The problem is that the `CNN Factor' tends to mobilize popular pressure at the peak of the problem--which is to say at the very moment when effective intervention is most costly, most dangerous, and least likely to succeed." But early intervention in the new environment would require a modified approach to the most basic of traditional peacekeeping conditions. In dealing with volatile, internal conflicts in societies teetering or already falling into anarchy, Annan concluded, "the old dictum of `consent of the parties' will be neither right [nor] wrong; it will be, quite simply, irrelevant." Thus consent by the disputants could no longer be an independent variable.
Nevertheless, consent had always been a function of the options available and had depended on whether it would lead to rewards or punishments once given. From this perspective, induced consent was not a new concept. During the Cold War, when it was in their interest to end proxy wars before they became directly involved, the superpowers used the possible increase or reduction of military and economic assistance to client states in order to induce consent for and cooperation with peacekeeping operations. And if the purpose of the coercive aspects of inducement were, in Annan's words, "to intimidate recalcitrants into cooperating," there were the post-Cold War examples ranging from the United States-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia and the French Operation Turquoise in Rwanda to the multilateral force in Haiti. Under such circumstances, the Under Secretary General pointed out, once consent had been obtained, a major premise was that a credible force would be needed in the target area. At the same time, actions in that area were also predicated on a measure of freely given consent by much of the population--something that would also have to be encouraged and sustained. Annan acknowledged that the result was a fundamental contradiction for forces caught between full-fledged enforcement operations and traditional peacekeeping. "The purpose of an inducement operation is to build, not to destroy," he concluded, "even while intimidating into acquiescence those who would prevent reconciliation."
The Way Ahead--Inducement and Implementation
The inherent contradiction of induced consent notwithstanding, the concept can become a major feature of new doctrine for gray area peace operations. But this is possible only if one portion of the gray area is addressed initially. The void in that area is too broad and too complex for a comprehensive doctrinal approach. Secretary General Annan has suggested as much by more narrowly defining gray area operations as those that fall between traditional peacekeeping and multidimensional peace operations which implement "comprehensive settlements arrived at in good faith on the basis of a lengthy political process."
Credibility and the art of the possible are integral to this approach. Simply put, the credibility of the United Nations and the attendant will of its member states are at stake. Just as Lester Pearson and Dag Hammarsjkold developed traditional peacekeeping in the 1950s, so now Kofi Annan and subsequent leaders will have to chart a path for the UN to move beyond the doctrinal turmoil of the 1990s. Otherwise, the UN could become irrelevant to the most important needs of the international community. Any steps that the UN takes in this regard must be successful, for as a recent report on the UN's enforcement capabilities concludes, the "key to long-term progress is to take small steps first, to begin to lay a foundation on which to build later, as experience and changing conditions permit."
This incremental approach is illustrated by the contrast between Somalia and post-Dayton Bosnia, two types of gray area operations that the international community is likely to face in the future. A situation similar to that of Somalia at the beginning of the 1990s is simply too complex to serve as a start point for developing doctrine. The international community will have to begin with small, credible, successful steps, suggesting that doctrine development should focus on future gray area operations similar to that in Bosnia subsequent to the Dayton accords. Such operations will be characterized by a measure of consent in the form of a political settlement. The settlement, however, will not have the "full faith" commitment of the parties, for consent at the strategic level will have been induced among the principals in the conflict. Inducement in this sense is "a process of persuading, bringing about, or causing," casting "its net over all forms of influence from reasoned discussion to threat of military force."
The key to developing this new, more narrowly focused peacekeeping doctrine is to meld both the British and the multidimensional approaches to Wider Peacekeeping. The multidimensional focus on implementing peace settlements yields the ultimate organizing concept; the British focus on a vertical continuum provides the structure. Settlements will follow peacemaking efforts at the strategic level in fora such as the UN and at the operational level by a peace operation force whose presence in the region is based on consent induced among the principal parties to the conflict. Consent will never be absolute in such an environment, and at the tactical level it may be ambiguous, in decline, or--among some factions and splinter groups--nonexistent. In order to exploit this unclear vertical relationship, UN forces in this portion of the gray area will have to balance the need for limiting armed conflict with the longer term peace building aspects of multidimensional tasks implicit in the generic term of Wider Peacekeeping.
Inducement Operations--The Multidimensional Approach to Wider Peacekeeping
Induced consent assumes the absence of the voluntary consent of traditional Cold War peacekeeping and acknowledges the lack of full faith consent to the political settlement. In such an environment, inducement operations can expect either sporadic or centrally coordinated opposition by a government, factions, or gangs. For the UN to conduct such operations, it will have to deploy political-military forces sufficiently large and varied not only to punish, but to reward and ultimately to resolve conflict. It is not an easy task under any circumstances. "Inducement and enforcement operations," one study concludes in this regard, "are neither for the faint of heart nor the marginally competent."
The ability to intimidate is the first criterion for the use of force. This does not necessarily mean a heavy use of the force. But it does mean a heavy deployment of robust military force that is equal to tasks inherent in Chapter VII operations. A mismatch between forces and missions, due to lack of doctrine for the gray area and incomplete understanding of the mission, has been a common failing in many post-Cold War UN interventions in troubled states. Only with the proper matchup, as the NATO and national contingents in the Implementation Force and Stabilization Force in Bosnia illustrate, will it be possible to field a credible force. This is absolutely essential, since credibility is the bedrock foundation for deterring attacks on the civilian population and on UN forces, and for extended deterrence against assaults on third parties, such as those conducting humanitarian, development, or peace-building missions. If a UN force is unable from the outset of its intervention to deter such attacks, as was the case with UNPROFOR in Bosnia, the more important mission of establishing extended deterrence will be virtually impossible.
The introduction of a credible force must also be linked politically to the objectives of the peace operation. Without a political context at least minimally agreed to by the indigenous parties, the use of force has no counterbalancing incentives to change behavior. Thus one of the logical extensions of doctrine development for the narrowly defined gray area involves a new concept of "peace-maintenance," defined as:
the overall political framework, as part of which the objectives of diplomatic activities, humanitarian assistance, military forces, and civilian components are not only coordinated but harmonized. The concept provides a link between the strategic and operational levels of command and control, and constitutes the exercise by the international community as a whole of political authority within nations.
This concept is necessary to doctrine developed under induced consent if that doctrine is to be used by the international political, military, and humanitarian and development communities. The idea of entrusting international organizations with political authority over a nation's domestic affairs is always controversial. But without peace-maintenance, the prospects of harmonizing political, military, and humanitarian and development efforts are significantly reduced. Nowhere was this better illustrated in recent years than in Rwanda, where by 1993 a condominium of regional and great powers had induced consent among the warring factions to a comprehensive peace settlement, the Arusha Accords. Among the many deficiencies in the international community's subsequent efforts in that country was the lack of adequate doctrine for the three communities to act effectively at the strategic level on that induced consent.
All this simply acknowledges that coercion alone will never suffice. Inducement operations will have to balance the punishment implicit in the intimidation factor with rewards that go beyond just the restoration of stability. The most promising option in this regard is peace-building in the context of peace-maintenance. Recent UN Wider Peacekeeping operations in the wake of comprehensive settlements indicate that the peace-building tasks associated with the restoration of civilian society can have an immediate and positive effect on civil operations. In particular, the actions of SFOR in Bosnia, harmonized as never before under the political authority of the High Representative, demonstrate the possibilities of peace-maintenance with induced consent.
Consequently an inducement force will have to be, in John Mackinlay's term, multifunctional and capable of coordinating and conducting aid and peace-building projects that establish a reward structure derived from indigenous civic action and peace incentives at the operational and tactical levels. These projects, as they have in recent multidimensional peace operations, can range from infrastructure restoration to basic police, medical, and veterinary services. At the same time, military and political options must be woven together in a constant and consistent effort with incentives such as development and reconstruction work. Efforts at the operational and tactical levels to balance rewards and punishments must be harmonized both vertically with the strategic level and horizontally across the political, military, and humanitarian and development communities.
These efforts are important, because intimidation is bound to erode over time, causing instability that will adversely affect the rewards process. Diminishing rewards, in turn, will reduce the chances of converting induced consent of the belligerents to the presence of UN forces into a genuine consent for a peace settlement. In short, peacemaking buttressed by the concept of peace-maintenance must be an essential and immediate by-product of rewards and punishments applied at all levels to sustain induced consent.
Inducement Operations--The British Approach to Wider Peacekeeping
The key to inducement is the ability to adjust the variables and activities on the vertical continuum, descending from strategy to operations to tactics, that is the hallmark of British Wider Peacekeeping. In this vertical continuum, legitimacy reinforces consent and may initially be the dominating variable. At the strategic level, collective political legitimization by the UN will remain important for inducement operations. At the very least, the use or threatened use of compellence will always have greater legitimacy and credibility when buttressed by a Chapter VII authorization. Moreover, there is value in the idea that the UN represents interests and values that transcend the focus of any one belligerent, thus setting the stage at lower levels for impartiality to be linked not so much to actions between the belligerents, as to actions required to carry out decisions of the Security Council. At the operational level, for instance, the idea that there does not necessarily have to be a targeted adversary in inducement operations is particularly valuable, since it sets such operations apart from full-fledged enforcement and is in keeping with Article 40 of the UN Charter. This, in turn, helps create an environment at that level which facilitates understanding by the factional leaders that beyond the legitimacy of power in collapsed states, there is also the power of legitimacy implicit in the peace settlement, however forced their consent in the beginning.
Once the initial cease-fire has taken hold at the operational level, the primary task of the UN force on the ground is to ensure that the legitimacy of the settlement is felt at the lowest tactical level. It will seldom be an easy task. A common complication in collapsed states is that indigenous political and military leaders exercise authority that is either weak or has broken down and thus have little control over their tactical subordinates. There may also be rogue tactical factions, ranging from splinter groups to bandits, that will not acknowledge any settlement imposed "from above."
These types of problems will require application of short-term military leverage that is finely calibrated and sharply focused so that coercion does not preempt future cooperation. In such circumstances, unlike the experience of traditional peacekeeping, force and impartiality will not necessarily be mutually exclusive. But it requires an unbroken line of legitimization down the vertical continuum to support the limited use of force at the tactical level that enforces a strategic UN mandate for a peace settlement at the operational and tactical levels. The legitimacy of these agreements, no matter how induced the consent at higher levels on which that legitimacy is based, is essential and must be constantly and publicly reaffirmed by the strategic and operational leaders responsible for carrying out UN carrot-and-stick initiatives. Only in this way will it be possible for UN troops at the tactical level to apply minimum force impartially, as if they were police forces upholding the law. The nuances of impartial force may be lost temporarily on those to whom it is being applied. But if the legitimacy of higher settlements is intact and is sufficiently understood at the tactical level, limited compellence will appear to be a logical concomitant of ongoing peace-building and peacemaking efforts in the context of peace-maintenance. Certainly this remains an underlying principle in NATO doctrine developed for operations in Bosnia, which asserted that it is possible to use "limited force against any party that violates the mandate and still preserve the overall impartiality of the PSF [Peace Support Force]."
The logic of legitimization will be short-lived, however, unless the UN force at the tactical level balances rewards and punishments consistent with consent at the higher levels that provided the basis for legitimacy in the first place. In terms of punishment, the force must have a credible capability to establish escalation dominance in the most critical areas of operations. This capability also ties into a rewards system, particularly concerning the provision of a sufficient level of protection and overall security to allow the unimpeded operation of the political authority in aid and peace-building efforts. This harmonization, both vertically and horizontally, requires a level of integration of military operations with other international and indigenous actors that is unprecedented in the training and experience of most political, military, humanitarian, and development organizations.
In this manner, UN forces establish for the majority of the civilian populace a positive association with the higher-level settlements and are able to present any factional holdout as a threat to the benefits of these settlements. Added to this is the synergistic effect of tactical peacemaking efforts on the operational level effort to achieve full consent to the implementation of the peace settlement. Tactical operations that are a blend of political, military, and developmental actions are the "battles" that shape the operational campaign to achieve the overall goal. The cumulative effect is one that replaces autocratic images of political authority with those of sovereignty as a state recovers from collapse. But such developments will have to be monitored closely, since new multidimensional tasks may emerge requiring support by UN forces powerful enough to maintain escalation dominance. Operations in El Salvador and Mozambique have demonstrated that in the absence of a powerful UN force, problems can occur during sophisticated activities such as disarmament and demobilization. This intervention force must be adequate to provide reassurance until the former belligerents can create their own unified army and police organizations.
There is no quick fix to the doctrinal void in the gray area between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The experiences of the international community in peace operations throughout the decade have shown that there can be no comprehensive doctrinal approach to this area. The challenges are simply too varied and complex to be dealt with by a single doctrinal concept. But the experiences of the 1990s have demonstrated that there are opportunities to develop doctrine for a more narrowly circumscribed segment of the gray area, in which the international community induces some measure of consent to a settlement by warring factions in a collapsing or collapsed state. The British work in Wider Peacekeeping on the vertical approach to this inducement is a valuable contribution. This is also true of the experience gained in multidimensional approaches to Wider Peacekeeping in terms of horizontal efforts to coordinate political, military, and development operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in order to implement comprehensive settlements.
The multidimensional approach also reinforces the fact that it will not be enough for the militaries of member states alone to write the new doctrine for induced consent operations. Military efforts need the support and involvement of the political and development communities if the United Nations is to achieve the harmonization of effort that practitioners--from Cambodia to Somalia to Rwanda to Haiti to Liberia to Bosnia--have indicated time and time again is essential for any lasting success of an international intervention. It is this fully structured effort on the part of the political, military, and developmental communities that establishes the fine balance of coercion and reward that is the essence of successful induced consent operations. Only with this balance is it possible to begin the process of causing factions at all levels in failed states to see themselves as shareholders in the peace process.
This article is based on a paper presented to the annual meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System, 17-19 June 1998.
1. John Gerard Ruggie, "Peacekeeping and U.S. Interests," The Washington Quarterly, 17 (Autumn 1994), 180. See also John Gerard Ruggie, "The UN and the Collective Use of Force: Whither or Whether?" International Peacekeeping, 3 (Winter 1996), 1, 4; John Gerard Ruggie, "Wandering in the Void: Chartering the UN's New Strategic Role," Foreign Affairs, 72 (November/December 1993), 26-31. John Mackinlay, "Improving Multifunctional Forces," Survival, 36 (Autumn 1994), 152; and John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," The Washington Quarterly, 15 (Summer 1992), 113-31.
2. Kofi A. Annan, "Peace Operations and the United Nations: Preparing for the Next Century," unpublished paper, February 1996. See also Kofi A. Annan, "Challenges of the New Peacekeeping," in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century, ed. Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 169-87.
3. Ruggie, "UN and the Collective Use of Force," p. 3.
4. On the criteria that Brian Urquhart developed as Under-Secretary-General in the early 1970s as a result of the experience of the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), see UN Document S/11052/Rev, 27 October 1973; Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the `Sheriffs' Posse," Survival, 32 (May/June 1990), 198; and Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), pp. 241-42. See also Ruggie, "Peacekeeping and U.S. Interests," p. 180. The mission completion principle emerged after 1973 as a wider definition of self-defense. It was only rarely used, however, because peacekeepers on the ground recognized the need for the continued perception of impartiality and most importantly the fact that the peacekeeping force level was predicated on the assumption of compliance by all parties. Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," International Affairs, 69 (July 1993), 455.
5. Stanley Hoffmann, "The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention," Survival, 37 (Winter 1995-96), 42; Ruggie, "UN and Collective Use of Force," p. 4; and Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 9, 104.
6. Between June 1990 and May 1993, for example, there was no use of the veto, although the existence of that provision still influenced decisions. Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," Survival, 36 (Autumn 1994), 96-97.
7. Shashi Tharoor, "Foreword," Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, ed. Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. xvi.
8. John Mackinlay, "Improving Multifunctional Forces," Survival, 36 (Autumn 1994), 152. UN peacekeeping forces, of course, had earlier been involved in conflicts that had at least some of the trappings of civil war. For instance, Kashmir after 1949, Lebanon after 1958, and Cyprus after 1964. In this regard, Adam Roberts has pointed out that "most conflicts in the world after 1945 have been internationalized civil wars." Roberts, p. 106. See also Jim Whitman and Ian Bartholomew, "UN Peace Support Operations: Political-Military Considerations," in Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, p. 169.
9. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace Keeping, UN Document A/47/277-S/2411, 17 June 1992, paragraph 20.
10. Ibid., paragraph 44. For a critique of the document, see Thomas Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace," Washington Quarterly, 16 (Winter 1993), 51-66.
11. Through 1989, the Security Council passed 12 Chapter VII resolutions concerning five disputes: Palestine, Congo, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and Iran-Iraq. Whitman and Bartholomew, pp. 169, 186. On the evolving forms of peace enforcement under Chapter VII, see Hoffmann, pp. 37, 42. On the movement away from peace enforcement defined in terms of interstate aggression, see the more general definition in Joint Pub. 3-07: "Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order." NATO's "MC 327-Definitions of Peace Support Operations" is even more explicit: "Action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict. This can include dealing with an inter-state conflict or internal conflict to meet a humanitarian need or where state institutions have largely collapsed."
12. Sashi Tharoor, "Should UN Peacekeeping Go `Back to Basics'?" Survival, 37 (Winter 1995-96), 60. Tharoor pointed out that the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has been blamed for failing to do things it was never mandated, staffed, financed, equipped, or deployed to do." Ibid., p. 58. See also Adam Roberts, "From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force," ibid., pp. 7, 25; and Whitman and Bartholomew, p. 169. On why doctrinal inconsistencies were muted in the Cambodian operations, see Ruggie, "The UN and the Collective Use of Force," p. 6.
13. Richard Connaughton, "Time to Clear the Doctrine Dilemma," Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 April 1994, p. 20. See also Ruggie, "The UN and the Collective Use of Force," p. 180, who concludes that the UN "has tried simply to ratchet up and project a perfectly good instrument into highly unstable and potentially unstable environments for which it was not designed and in which it cannot succeed." See also John Mackinlay and Randolph Kent," A New Approach to Complex Emergencies," International Peacekeeping, 4 (Winter 1997), 31-49, who conclude that initial doctrinal responses were "a `stretched version' of an existing doctrine that re-emphasized traditional principles," ibid., p. 35.
14. Mackinlay, "Improving Multifunctional Forces," p. 158.
15. Roberts, "Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," p. 110.
16. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, UN Document A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, paragraphs 35-36. See also ibid., paragraph 77, in which Boutros-Ghali pointed out that in terms of Chapter VII, "neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose."
17. Charles Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," Survival, 36 (Autumn 1994), 143. See also ibid., pp. 121, 133, 141, and 145; and Interim Army Field Manual, Vol. 5 Operations Other Than War, Part 2. Wider Peacekeeping, September 1994. Director General Land Warfare, pp. 2-7 and 2-12.
18. Original emphasis. Field Manual (FM) No. 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington: GPO, 30 December 1994), pp. 12-13.
19. Wider Peacekeeping, pp. 1-2 and 2-5. See also ibid., pp. 2-11 to 2-12.
20. For the evolution of this doctrine in the US Army, see the 1982, 1986, and 1993 editions of FM 100-5, Operations.
21. Wider Peacekeeping, p. 2-11.
22. Ibid., p. 4-10. But see also ibid., p. 4-6 and Dobbie, p. 137, for the discussion of "minimum necessary force."
23. Wider Peacekeeping, p. 2-10. See also Dobbie, p. 135, original emphasis: "The need to preserve consent does not foreclose the use of force by peacekeepers. Indeed, consent may serve to marginalize opposition and render it vulnerable to the use of force"; and p. 136, original emphasis: "The use of force--even though mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter--may represent a valid consensual peacekeeping technique. Consent can thus facilitate, not hinder, the use of force."
24. Wider Peacekeeping, p. 2-7. See also Dobbie, p. 130.
25. See for example, Wider Peacekeeping, p. 2-9: "In practice it is likely that most factions will accuse the Wider Peacekeeping force of being prejudiced against them." See also ibid., p. 2-14: "In practice, Wider Peacekeeping operations are likely to represent a continual struggle to preserve and sustain whatever consensual framework might exist." For US reservations on the vertical continuum in this context, see FM 100-23, p. 33: "The use of force to attain a short-term tactical success could lead to a long-term strategic failure."
26. Wider Peacekeeping, p. 2-5.
27. For examples of the new, more expansive roles and activities in multidimensional peace operations, see Roberts, "Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," p. 97. See also Whitman and Bartholomew, "UN Peace Support Operations," pp. 172-73; Diehl, p. 102; and Fred Tanner, "Weapons Control in Semi-Permissive Environments: A Case for Compellence," International Peacekeeping, 3 (Winter 1996), 126.
28. Mackinlay, "Improving Multifunctional Forces," p. 150; and Tharoor, "Should UN Peacekeeping Go `Back to Basics'?," p. 54.
29. Hoffmann, pp. 42-43; Tanner, pp. 128-30; and Mats Berdal," United Nations Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia," in Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, p. 242.
30. Kofi A. Annan, "UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO," NATO Review, 41 (October 1993), 4. See also Roberts, "From San Francisco to Sarajevo," p. 16, and Chester A. Crocker, "Southern African Peace-Making," Survival, 32 (May/June 1990), pp. 221-32.
31. Tanner, p. 18. See also Hoffmann, p. 41.
32. UN Security Resolution 1031 (1995).
33. Tharoor, "Should UN Peacekeeping Go `Back to Basics'?," pp. 54, 58.
34. Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 1991). See also Ruggie, "UN and Collective Use of Force, pp. 13-14, and Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, "Securing Observance of UN Mandates Through the Employment of Military Forces," International Peacekeeping, 3 (Winter 1996), 123.
35. Secretary of Defense Address to Officers and NCOs of the 1st Armored Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany, 24 November 1995. See also Tanner, p. 133.
36. Annan, "Peace Operations and the United Nations," p. 1. See also ibid., p. 5.
37. Ibid., p. 3.
38. Ibid., p. 4. See also Daniel and Hayes, "Securing Observance of UN Mandates," p. 111.
39. Annan, "Peace Operations and the United Nations," pp. 4-5. See also Daniel and Hayes, "Securing Observance of UN Mandates," p. 110, for a similar acknowledgment: "If the lines between inducement and enforcement appear blurred, they are. That is the very reason this middle ground has been referred to as a `gray area,' and it will not disappear simply by failing to account for it in some theoretical paradigm."
40. Annan, "Peace Operations and the United Nations," p. 2.
41. Words to Deeds: Strengthening the UN's Enforcement Capabilities. Final Report. December 1997. International Task Force on the Enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions. United Nations Association of the USA, p. 48.
42. Daniel and Hayes, "Securing Observance of UN Mandates," p. 108. See also Berdal, p. 242, and Tanner, pp. 127, 143.
43. Daniel and Hayes, "Securing Observance of UN Mandates," p. 121.
44. Mackinlay, "Improving Multifunctional Forces," p. 158; Ruggie, "The UN and the Collective Use of Force," p. 12; Annan, "Peace Operations and The United Nations," p. 5; and Daniel and Hayes, "Securing Observance of UN Mandates," p. 111.
45. Jarat Chopra, "Introducing Peace-Maintenance," Global Governance, 4 (January-March 1998), 7. See also Jarat Chopra, ed., The Politics of Peace-Maintenance (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
46. For example, see Clement E. Adibe, "Accepting External Authority in Peace-Maintenance," ibid., pp. 107-22.
47. The signing of the Arusha Accords was witnessed by the Presidents of Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi; the Prime Minister of Zaire; the Secretary-General of the OAU; the Director of the Geneva UN office; envoys from Nigeria and Zimbabwe; and representatives from the remaining countries observing the peace talks: the United States, France, Germany, and Belgium.
48. The harmonization--of the political authority of the High Representative derived from the peace settlement, the force of coercion from the credible military forces of SFOR, and the incentives available through the development community--can be viewed in a political-military context as "sub-lethal warfare." Discussion with SACEUR, General Wesley K. Clark, 24 February 1998, Carlisle Barracks, Pa..
49. Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," p. 115; Whitman and Bartholomew, p. 171; and Ruggie, "The UN and The Collective Use of Force," p. 13. For the advantages of using the term, "full-fledged enforcement" instead of "peace enforcement" in these circumstances, see Daniel and Hayes "Securing Observance of UN Mandates," pp. 122-23. See also ibid., p. 110.
50. Bi-MNC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, 11 December 1995, p. 8. For counter arguments to the impartial use of force, see Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," Foreign Affairs, 73 (November-December 1994), 20-33, and Whitman and Bartholomew, p. 172, who see impartiality in the absolute terms that the British doctrine reserves for consent: "Once forfeit, impartiality is very difficult to recover; it therefore represents the Rubicon that lies between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement."
51. Mackinlay, "Improving Multifunctional Forces," p. 165; Tanner, pp. 138, 142.
Dr. David Jablonsky (Colonel, USA Ret.) is the professor of national security affairs in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. He is a graduate of Dartmouth College and the US Army War College, has an M.A. from Boston University in international relations, and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in European history from Kansas University. Dr. Jablonsky has held the Elihu Root Chair of Strategy and the George C. Marshall Chair of Military Studies at the War College. His most recent books are Churchill and Hitler, Selected Essays on the Political-Military Direction of Total War and Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New World Order.
Colonel James S. McCallum (USA Ret.) is an associate professor in the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, US Army War College. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy and received a master's degree in public and international affairs from Princeton University. He was a National Security Fellow at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, in 1987-88, and has held the Dwight D. Eisenhower Chair of National Security at the War College. He is currently collaborating with Jarat Chopra of the Watson Institute, Brown University, on Pillars of Peace: The Harmonization Handbook for Peace Operations.
Reviewed 1 March 1999. Please send comments or corrections to email@example.com