

Revitalizing the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

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In 2007, the US Navy, in conjunction with the Marine Corps and Coast Guard, promulgated the first new naval strategy since 1986 with the release of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*.¹ Only 15 pages, the new strategy proved to be concise and succinct. It defined six core capabilities that would contribute to national security by either preventing war or by building partnerships. The strategy also outlined maritime strategic imperatives and implementation priorities in a cogent and well-reasoned manner.²

No revisions to the *Cooperative Strategy* have been released despite significant changes in the domestic and international landscapes since 2007. In October of 2010, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, issued a guidance memorandum entitled *Executing the Maritime Strategy*. He stated:

We continue to be forward deployed and engaged around the world, delivering the core capabilities of our Maritime Strategy, which I released three years ago. Our Maritime Strategy remains relevant. It has been affirmed by events over the past few years and by the recent conclusions from the *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review* and the *Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel Report* commissioned by Congress.³

The 2007 *Cooperative Strategy* serves a purpose as the Navy's strategic base document, but it needs further development in four key areas in order to better guide naval acquisition decisions in an increasingly austere budgetary environment. First, the *Cooperative Strategy* needs to fully address the means (fleet requirements) necessary to connect the strategy's ways and ends. Second, it must better define potential maritime threats. Third, it needs to be completely aligned with the *National Security Strategy*. Fourth, it should outline a strategy for maximizing cooperative maritime capabilities with our partner nations. The *Cooperative Strategy* asserts that the US Navy will dominate in all forms of maritime warfare, but it does not prioritize capabilities or competencies in a way that informs lawmakers and the public about the future fleet.

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The purpose of this article is to address these issues and illustrate why it is crucial for the Navy to specifically justify and articulate its force requirements to Congress and the American people. In order for the Navy to be on the strongest possible footing in the future and to stay ahead of pending budget cuts, it is necessary to revitalize the *Cooperative Strategy* to include force requirements before defense reductions.

The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

Soon after its release, the *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* generated significant debate in the military, academic, and defense analytic communities. Some concerns that were expressed included criticism that the strategy was not really a “strategy” because it failed to define and link its ends, ways, and means.⁴ Another perspective asserted that the document “fails to differentiate clearly and prioritize present day threats, accordingly it lacks focus.”⁵ In a critique in the Spring 2008 *Naval War College Review*, William Pendley argued that this lack of focus resulted in a list of core capabilities in search of a strategy.⁶ Finally, a number reviewers pointed out that the maritime strategy had lost its linkage to the overarching *National Security Strategy*.

Analysts were principally concerned with the document’s omission of the specific means with which naval strategists intend to achieve the articulated ends. The ways were spelled out very clearly through six core capabilities:

- Forward Presence.
- Deterrence.
- Sea Control.
- Power Projection.
- Maritime Security.
- Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Response.⁷

The strategy stated that the “six capabilities comprise the core of U.S. maritime power and reflect an increase in emphasis on those activities that prevent war and build partnerships.”⁸ Professor Robert Rubel, Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, and a primary architect of the 2007 *Cooperative Strategy*, offered additional explanation stating, “the protection of the existing global system of trade and security (as opposed to the process of globalization) provided both the context for the new strategy and the intellectual glue that tied together all regions of the world.”⁹ That explanation helps clarify the strategic end—preservation of the current international system—but gets us no closer to the means. Professor Rubel also addressed the lack of an articulated means by explaining that an injunction on any discussion of the forces necessary to support the maritime strategy was in effect during strategy development.¹⁰ Rubel acknowledged that many were frustrated that the strategy failed to address forces, but he asserted that the strategy provides “an overarching logic from which future force structure could be deduced.”¹¹ It is now three years later, however, and the Navy has yet to formally deduce the means. We have at this juncture the ways and ends, but not the means, in the *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*.

A generally defensive strategy, the *Cooperative Strategy* never identifies specific threats. Indeed, there has been a heated discussion by critics about the pros and cons of the document's failure to identify threats. While nonstate threats surely exist in the maritime realm, state actors continue to wield the most power. Moreover, the advantage for the military in developing strategy is that it is expected to address potential future threats, and to propose the means of dealing with them. In order to fight and win the nation's wars, the Navy needs to know who its likely adversaries might be, and how they would act in the event of conflict.

Although US land forces currently struggle with the asymmetric tactics of state and nonstate actors, there has been little recent change in the conduct of maritime warfare. The current environment still requires naval vessels at sea to conduct the missions articulated in the six core competencies. Warships are still the tools of state actors. Some pundits may cite piracy as a maritime wildcard—something analogous to an asymmetric, nonstate actor threat in the maritime domain. But piracy is still countered with traditional maritime warfare principles and, even at its most aggressive, piracy only rises to the level of an “important” threat from a national security perspective.¹²

Rubel offered “that if the strategy's purpose is to prevent war among major powers and generate the widest possible maritime cooperation, why create hostility by singling out specific countries as threats?”¹³ But potential adversaries should be identified for planning since naval activity still falls within the province of states. The 2010 *National Security Strategy* states that the United States will “monitor China's military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that US interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected.”¹⁴ It is natural and indeed necessary for the Navy to follow up on this guidance with a more specific assessment of the strategic threat and the means to meet it.

Those who argue that the maritime strategy was written in isolation from national strategy have a point. The project, though, was undertaken at the end of the George W. Bush administration and planners understood that the resulting maritime strategy would not be a simple reiteration of existing strategic guidance. Professor Rubel added,

This may seem somehow subversive to those who are used to military planning processes in which guidance from higher headquarters is regarded as holy writ. However, consider our situation—the project was undertaken at the end of the Bush administration and our requirement was to look ahead twenty years.¹⁵

The larger point is that the *Cooperative Strategy* can easily support any national guidance. In the case of the 2010 *National Security Strategy*, the *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* arguably supports all of the United States' enduring national security interests:

- The security of the United States, its citizens, and US allies and partners.
- A strong, innovative, and growing US economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.

- Respect for universal values at home and around the world.
- An international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.¹⁶

The maritime strategy's concepts are aligned with enduring American interests, but they need to be specific enough to serve as a way forward for the Navy in the turbulent times defined by budgetary constraints. As is, the document is a "good start"—a foundation from which to sharpen a new strategy for relevance in the coming decades.

As a foundational document, the *Cooperative Strategy* has several important aspects. It defines the ways (six core capabilities) that the Navy will conduct operations in order to accomplish the six key tasks or "strategic imperatives" intended to "influence actions and activities at sea and ashore,"¹⁷ and limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power.

- Deter major power war.
- Win our Nation's wars.
- Contribute to homeland defense in depth.
- Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with international partners.
- Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system.¹⁸

The Navy is on solid doctrinal ground going forward by having defined the fundamental tasks it must be able to carry out.

The *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* also delivers a clear end state: "Our challenge is to apply seapower in a manner that protects U.S. vital interests even as it promotes greater collective security, stability, and trust."¹⁹ It then advances the goals of deterrence and the building of maritime partnerships, trust, and confidence with other nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats.²⁰ Another important aspect of the strategy is the observation that "seapower will be a unifying force for building a better tomorrow."²¹ This sentence is italicized in the original document, but it seems even more prescient now than when it was first written in 2007.

Academic realists advancing the concept of "offshore balancing" have argued that the long-term security interests of the United States are better served by keeping forces "near unstable or failed states but not actually stationing them there, where their presence provokes local resentment—and, ultimately, violent resistance."²² One recent articulation of this argument, Robert Pape's new book, *Cutting the Fuse*, explains that 87 percent of documented suicide attacks since 2004 can be associated with ground and tactical air forces based in insurgent-contested countries.²³

This argument has clear implications for naval forces and strategy. After years of US ground campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, political leaders will be attracted to strategic approaches that reduce perceptions of the United States as a unilateral actor, minimize American casualties, and, most importantly, reduce costs while still serving national interests. The American footprint is likely to shrink in the Middle East during the coming decade, and a transition to a maritime-focused presence inevitably will result.²⁴ But at this juncture the

US Navy needs to further articulate the means and mechanisms for reestablishing a dominant position in the realm of US national security against a backdrop of inevitable budget cuts.

Robert Kaplan predicted in 2007 that “Hulls in the water could soon displace boots on the ground as the most important military catchphrase of our time.” But then he pondered the inevitable rebuttal, stating, “How we manage dwindling naval resources will go a long way toward determining our future standing in the world.”²⁵ This concept is echoed in the *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*, “The future operational landscape could also portend significant long-duration air and maritime campaigns for which the US Armed Forces must be prepared.”²⁶ The *QDR* does not define whether these long-duration campaigns are an expectation for a move to “offshore balancing” or a veiled reference to a specific threat. Nonetheless, preparation for a long-duration maritime campaign means knowing what kind of fleet will be required to get the job done.

One of the concluding comments in the *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* reads, “The strategy focuses on opportunities—not threats; on optimism—not fear; and on confidence—not doubt.”²⁷ This statement comes in the wake of a generally positive recap of the Navy’s core capabilities and implementation priorities. The problem is that the lack of an outline of potential threats leaves decisionmakers and indeed the public without guidance for making hard strategic choices. This is a significant concern. In a 1954 article in *Proceedings*, the journal of the US Naval Institute in Annapolis, a young Samuel P. Huntington commented on this issue with the often cited advisory:

The resources which a service is able to obtain in a democratic society are a function of the public support of that service. The service has a responsibility to develop this necessary support, and it can only do this if it possesses a strategic concept which clearly formulates its relationship to the national security.²⁸

If the Navy wishes to win Congressional and public support for its most essential programs—and if it wishes to do so in tight economic times—then it will have to detail specific arguments and justify expenditures on those programs. On its own terms as a general strategy, the 2007 document was fine. But it needs to be supplemented with a specific set of requirements. If this budgetary argument is not made soon, the Navy will fall behind in the research and development process.

Seth Cropsey, a former deputy senior undersecretary of the Navy, concluded an analysis on what he describes as the slow decline of the US Navy with the following:

A maritime strategy of deterrence through ‘thinking locally and acting globally’, as the oft-seen bumper sticker advocates, matches the sensibilities of most Western European populations today. It will never command the same respect and support as a strategy based on the nation’s need to protect against multiplying ballistic missile threats and seaborne WMD. Its silence about the dangers of China’s rising naval power is a strategic blunder as well as a lost opportunity to educate and gather public support. Maritime strategy that seeks lesser goals threatens irreparable damage to our alliances, prestige,

and the international system that American policy has labored to create for the past century.²⁹

Cropsey's pointed commentary appropriately emphasizes the criticality of specifying potential threats and articulating a strategy to protect against them and, in the process, educating leaders and the public to establish that critical base of support. In October 2010, Admiral Roughhead began the process of articulating these needs, but thus far the progress has been only partial.

Executing the Maritime Strategy

Admiral Roughead released his guidance for 2011 in a message in October 2010. In it he made a few key statements regarding the *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* including, "Our *Maritime Strategy* remains relevant. It has been affirmed by events over the past few years and by the recent conclusions from the *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review*."³⁰

Admiral Roughead also pointed out that turbulence in the future global security environment could translate to an increased demand on the Navy.³¹ He further stated that the Navy requires a minimum of 313 ships to meet its operational requirements.³² Still missing is discussion about linking these means (assets) to the methods (six core capabilities) in a way that supports a long-term view.³³ Considering the long lead time in shipbuilding, the imperative for defining the future fleet requirements necessary to execute the *Cooperative Strategy* is clearly upon us.³⁴

A justification for 313 ships can be found in the Navy's *Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011*.³⁵ This naval construction plan provides a potentially forceful vehicle for articulating naval force structure and capabilities linkage. The Navy missed this opportunity in 2011. Instead, the 2011 naval construction plan only aligned naval shipbuilding with the strategic priorities outlined in the *2010 QDR* and with six key joint missions; it did not specifically link the force requirements to the *Cooperative Strategy's* core competencies.³⁶ The construction plan's naval force projections are described as a balance between expected requirements and anticipated resources.³⁷ Resource consideration is vitally important, but it only addresses half of the issue if the discussion does not directly tie the forces to capabilities and missions. Without this linkage the naval force projections lose their explanatory power. Going forward, the *Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels* could become the Navy's best means to integrate its force requirements with its desired strategic capabilities in a precise manner for Congressional (and public) understanding.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is on the record with numerous appeals for defense budget reform and with cautions about a coming environment of fiscal austerity. In a May 2010 speech, he argued, "Given America's difficult economic circumstances and perilous fiscal condition, military spending on things large and small can and should expect closer, harsher scrutiny. The gusher has been turned off and will stay off for a good period of time."³⁸ The coming budgetary constraints further underscore the need for the

Navy to link the forces it requires to the maritime missions conveyed in the *Cooperative Strategy*.

Naval leadership seems to understand this dilemma and is seeking options to rectify it. In 2009, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) commissioned the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) to evaluate a series of questions focused on maintaining US maritime dominance and retaining or building the forces required to do so.³⁹ CNA was asked to provide an evaluation of the characteristics of a “globally influential navy,” to define at what point the US Navy would cease to be globally influential, and to assess the impacts of a fiscally constrained force structure.⁴⁰ The resulting report, *The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake*, defined five potential basing and forward deployment options for the future navy, and defined a “global navy” as one that is “dominant, ready, and influential.”⁴¹ Of the five basing options, the Navy appears to favor a 2-Hub construct with the hubs being centered in the Pacific and Persian Gulf.⁴² This option could serve as the basis for the force structure discussion needed to revitalize the current maritime strategy and mature it as a foundational strategy document.

The *Tipping Point* article did not define specific numbers. It raises rhetorical questions but does not answer them, “Is a 285 ship-navy the tipping point or is it at 250, or 230? At what number does the Navy reach a point where it is no longer able to project combat credibility with constant forward presence? Is the Navy able to deter and reassure at 230 ships? It depends.”⁴³ Clearly, the CNO knows what he needs 313 ships for.⁴⁴ But he and the Navy need to link this requirement to the six core competencies; if not, then others may well do so. An example of this sort of outside help comes from the *Final Report of the 2010 QDR Independent Review Panel* (QDR IRP). The QDR IRP was commissioned by Congress to conduct an assessment of the assumptions, strategy, findings, and risks in the report of the Secretary of Defense on the 2010 QDR.⁴⁵ When addressing the current US force structure as it relates to Asia-Pacific stability, the panel wrote:

The Panel remains concerned that the QDR force structure may not be sufficient to assure others that the United States can meet its treaty commitments in the face of China’s increased military capabilities. Therefore, we recommend an increased priority on defeating anti-access and area-denial threats. This will involve acquiring new capabilities, and, as Secretary Gates has urged, developing innovative concepts for their use. Specifically, we believe the United States must fully fund the modernization of its surface fleet.⁴⁶

Panel members ultimately recommend an alternative of 346 ships to achieve the surface fleet modernization goal during congressional hearings.⁴⁷ The number 346 is a fairly long way from 313 and the “end” (strategic interests in the Pacific) has lost alignment from the global approach of the *Cooperative Strategy*. The QDR IRP comments seem to suggest that the Navy is not reaching decision-makers with its strategic message.

Another development illuminating the need for clarity in maritime force structure is the Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 directed “AirSea Battle”

concept development.⁴⁸ The QDR dictates that AirSea Battle will “address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains to counter growing challenges to U.S. freedom of action.”⁴⁹

The impetus for AirSea Battle is the growing anti-access/access denial (A2/AD) capabilities of Iran and China. AirSea Battle is intended to assess how US power-projection capabilities can be preserved against these direct challenges.⁵⁰ AirSea Battle is a joint Air Force and Navy program early in development.⁵¹ This type of multiservice discussion (and agreement) is essential for aligning future Defense Department acquisitions and potentially mitigating resource rivalries.

What is important for the Navy is to identify what, if any, changes are likely to be derived from this concept and then to ensure that the *Cooperative Strategy* force structure captures these needs. Given the goal of preserving access in the two regions likely to be part of the 2-Hub Navy construct, there should be plenty of efficiencies for the Navy to leverage in justifying its proposed force structure. With the Secretary of Defense’s QDR support and the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen’s stated public support for AirSea Battle, the *Cooperative Strategy* should directly support what becomes the expected long-term shape of the Navy.⁵²

The opportunity to reverse the paucity of resource specificity in the *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* may be found in the development of the AirSea Battle concept and assessment of the CNA *Tipping Point* analysis just addressed. Naval leadership should strive to identify any force-shaping impacts likely to result from the integration of air and land power capabilities developed for AirSea Battle. In addition, basing and forward deployment decisions resulting from the *Tipping Point* recommendations will undoubtedly inform future force requirements. With this better understanding of the future, the final potential influence on long-term US Navy acquisitions could rest on how well the Navy can coordinate complementary capabilities with its closest maritime partners. Leveraging allied combat and combat support capabilities provides an excellent opportunity for the Navy to take its Global Maritime Partnership program to a higher level.

Building Maritime Partnerships—Enhancing Complementary Capabilities

The CNO has emphasized developing maritime partnerships—especially since the release of the *Cooperative Strategy*. One example is the 2010 Global Maritime Partnership Game hosted by the Naval War College. The goals of the game were to:

Identify the catalysts to instability and the impediments to forming effective regional and global partnerships in the maritime domain from both the U.S. and international perspectives. Specifically, these catalysts for examination included piracy, human smuggling, illicit drug trafficking, gun running, terrorism, natural disasters, and oil spills.⁵³

What is missing in this partnership discussion is coordination between the United States and its closest allies regarding the division of capabilities

in the shrinking global defense budget environment.⁵⁴ Heretofore, maritime partnership meant shared information and enhancement of maritime domain awareness for all participants. While these are necessary goals for peacetime operations, at the end of the day many of our partners cannot afford the full spectrum of maritime capabilities needed for combat operations.⁵⁵ Perhaps the time has come to redefine what maritime partnerships mean, and to leverage allied naval cooperation more fully than we have in the past.

The Royal Navy and the French Navy are both facing their own budgetary crises. British planners have been hastily developing recommendations for the future composition of the Royal Navy. The common factor in all deliberations is fiscal restraint. The pain is so great in both countries that mutual discussion centers on ways to combine their shrinking forces.⁵⁶ Maritime partnership needs to include shared maritime domain awareness as previously described, but it also has to include complementary capabilities. It is unrealistic to expect our closest partners to give up all of their maritime competencies, but for our western and eastern partners that depend on the global commons, it makes sense for them to share their strengths. Maintaining high-end capabilities is overly taxing our closest allies, while maintaining effectiveness in the myriad supporting capabilities is challenging the United States.⁵⁷ This interrelationship could be the common ground, but it requires allies to trust in the United States and for the United States, in turn, to commit to supporting them. A look at perspectives from our Atlantic and Pacific partners may help.

Naval leaders throughout the world were asked in 2006 (prior to the release of the *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*) to answer the questions, “From your navy’s point of view, what elements do you think should be included in the U.S. strategy? What elements would you suggest that the United States avoid?”⁵⁸

Rear Admiral Jan Finseth, Chief of Staff, Royal Norwegian Navy, commented, “National commitments to real-life operations will always be directed by the political leadership, but any future strategy being devised by the United States or other nations should take on the challenge of integrating much-needed capabilities from other nations. Only then can we ensure that these capabilities are being identified and developed among all navies.”⁵⁹ The Royal Norwegian Navy is a prime example of a key enabler as a newly transformed navy tailored for littoral and coastal maritime operations with rapid response capability.⁶⁰

The sentiment of our strongest ally in the east is similar. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) maintains a significant fleet that is anchored by a destroyer force of 41 vessels that would be crucial for execution of contingency operations in Northeast or East Asia.⁶¹ The JMSDF CNO in 2006, Admiral Eiji Yoshikawa commented on the then-pending *US Maritime Strategy* stating:

Perhaps it is time for the United States to call upon and truly require its friends and allies to lend a hand. Perhaps this is a time for delegation and shared responsibility among partners. No one nation should have to bear the burden of global security alone. Japan and other

partners are ready to share this burden with their longtime friend, the United States.⁶²

Common ground for cooperative approaches obviously exists between Japan and Norway in the maritime domain and is representative of a growing international desire for similar arrangements. The best risk mitigation for this construct in the short-term is to restate the US commitment to existing treaty and alliance obligations. Whether using Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security obligations, this approach starts with a framework rooted in history and stability. From this beginning, more detail on requirements for all parties can be worked out to address future challenges. This international approach need not be limited to traditional US partners and could expand to include regional powers that benefit from maritime stability such as Indonesia or Chile. Most important, cooperative capabilities should be grounded on assumptions that are considered vital or matters of survival to all parties—such as removing an actor disrupting access to the maritime commons.

By failing to acknowledge the need for coordinating capabilities, the *Cooperative Strategy* overlooked a great opportunity. Clearly, the current fiscal environment makes this concept appealing, but it also opens the door for the US Navy to design a naval construction plan based on capabilities that can be augmented by our partners. Critics may cite the difficulty of achieving unity of effort in coalition environments and the natural tensions among allies. This is a valid issue, but the premise of complementary capabilities is achieving meaningful sea control and sea denial. The bottom line is that any actor threatening the global commons will threaten all of those who depend upon those resources and commerce. Since state actors still dominate the maritime arena, the scenarios are more easily envisioned, and the division of responsibilities can be done with much more rigor than perhaps is possible for other domains. In order to justify force requirements, maintain effective maritime capabilities in a period of reduced defense spending, and enhance our partnerships with allies, these risks seem worth taking. The time is fast approaching where taking zero risk will not be an option for the United States.

Summary

The *Cooperative Strategy* remains a relevant foundational strategy document. It clearly defines six core capabilities (ways) that the Navy will master to secure the end states of preventing wars and building partnerships. What it lacks is specification of the necessary force requirements (means) to achieve these end states and an outline of potential maritime adversaries and threat scenarios. By not defining these requirements, the Navy risks losing the initiative because it doesn't clearly articulate the strategy environment to policy makers and the public in order to create an essential base of support for a long-term shipbuilding plan in a period that is certain to see defense spending reductions. The approaching era of reduced defense spending is a global problem that can be mitigated in the maritime domain through close

navy-to-navy coordination. Coordinating capabilities with our closest partners will mitigate shortfalls for both sides, and will better define and justify US naval force requirements going forward.

Defense spending will decrease, but the Navy's operational tempo is certain to increase, especially as ground forces are reduced in the Middle East. The time for the Navy to act is now, lest it risk having these crucial decisions being made by others.

NOTES

1. Peter M. Swartz, "The Maritime Strategy Debates: A Bibliographic Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s" in *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986, Newport Paper 19*, John B. Hattendorf, (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004), 195. For more on the evolution of US maritime strategy through the 1990s, see John B. Hattendorf, ed., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s, Newport Paper 2*, (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006).

2. Gary Roughead, James T. Conway, and Thad W. Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, October 2007, <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf> (accessed December 19, 2010).

3. Gary Roughead, "Executing the Maritime Strategy," *CNO Guidance For 2011 Memorandum*, October 2010.

4. Joseph M. Keenan, *The Cooperative Seapower Strategy: Time for a Second Engagement*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 23, 2009), 6.

5. William T. Pendley, "The New Maritime Strategy: A Lost Opportunity," *Naval War College Review* 61 (Spring 2008): 63.

6. *Ibid.*, 66.

7. Roughead, Conway, and Allen, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, 12-14.

8. *Ibid.*, 12.

9. Robert C. Rubel, "The New Maritime Strategy, the Rest of the Story," *Naval War College Review* 61 (Spring 2008): 69.

10. *Ibid.*, 72.

11. *Ibid.*, 73.

12. Stephen M. Carmel, "The Big Myth of Somali Pirates," *United States Naval Institute, Proceedings*, Vol. 136/12/1,294 (December 2010): 35. Mr. Carmel is a senior vice president with Maersk Line, LTD, and is an experienced ship master. He provides an excellent comparison of the piracy threat in the Horn of Africa and that of the Barbary pirates in the 18th Century and concludes that "today the United States has no direct interests at stake and instead is acting for the overall common good, protecting everyone else's interests."

13. Rubel, *The New Maritime Strategy*, 77. Professor Rubel added the following rationale with regard to singling out China as a potential adversary, "... why create hostility by singling out specific countries as threats?" That is especially the case with China, with which we have a deeply interdependent economic relationship and which is working hard to conducting a "peaceful rise" foreign policy. It turns out that the strategy is getting some favorable reviews from the Chinese, which seems to me to be a small step forward that would not have taken place had we listed that nation as a threat. As the UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization] preamble says: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be erected."

14. Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 43.

15. Rubel, *The New Maritime Strategy*, 70.

16. Roughead, Conway, and Allen, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, 7.

17. *Ibid.*, 8.

18. Ibid., 9-10.
19. Ibid., 4.
20. Ibid., 9-10.
21. Ibid., 5.
22. Spencer Ackerman, "Navy Chief: After These Wars End, Come See Us," October 12, 2010, <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/10/navy-chief-after-these-wars-end-come-see-us/#more-33046> (accessed December 19, 2010).
23. Robert Pape quoted in Spencer Ackerman, "Navy Chief: After These Wars End, Come See Us," October 12, 2010, <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/10/navy-chief-after-these-wars-end-come-see-us/#more-33046> (accessed December 19, 2010). Other academic realists who have written about "offshore balancing" or "restraint" include Barry R. Posen, "Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy," *Orbis* 51, no. 4 (Fall 2007); Christopher Layne, "Who Lost Iraq and Why it Matters," *World Policy Journal* 24, no. 3 (Fall 2007), 38; John J. Mearsheimer, "Imperial by Design," *The National Interest* 111 (Jan-Feb 2011), 31; and Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," *International Security* 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997).
24. Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy*, 21.
25. Robert D. Kaplan, "America's Elegant Decline," *The Atlantic*, November 2007, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/11/america-8217-s-elegant-decline/6344/> (accessed December 15, 2010).
26. Robert M. Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2010* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 1, 2010), vi.
27. Roughead, Conway, and Allen, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, 18.
28. Samuel P. Huntington quoted in Robert Kaplan, "America's Elegant Decline."
29. Seth Cropsey, "The U.S. Navy in Distress," *Strategic Analysis* 34, no. 1 (January 2010): 43.
30. Roughead, "Executing the Maritime Strategy," 1.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 5.
33. Ibid.
34. Otto Kreisher, "Checkered Past, Uncertain Future," *United States Naval Institute, Proceedings*, 135/1/1,271 (January 2009): 38-43.
35. Director, Warfare Integration (OPNAV N8F), *Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, February 2010), <http://www.militarytimes.com/static/projects/pages/2011shipbuilding.pdf> (accessed March 12, 2011).
36. Ibid., 2-3, The Cooperative Strategy was mentioned twice in this report. First, the construction plan indicated that it "reflects" *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. Later, it indicates that it "supports" the maritime strategy. No specific linkage to the competencies articulated in the *Cooperative Strategy* was given. Instead, the construction plan states that the force structure was "shaped" by the QDR strategic priorities of: 1) Prevailing in today's war; 2) Preventing and deterring conflict; 3) Preparing to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and 4) Preserving and enhancing the All-Volunteer Force. Alignment with these strategic priorities is important, but it should not exclude showing the direct alignment of the construction plan with the core competencies articulated in the *Cooperative Strategy*.
37. Ibid., 4.
38. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Abilene, KS, May 8, 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechID=1467> (accessed December 11, 2010).
39. Daniel Whiteneck, Michael Price, Neil Jenkins, and Peter Swartz, *The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?* (Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analysis, March 2010), 1.
40. Ibid., 2.
41. Ibid., 6.

Revitalizing the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

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43. Whiteneck, Price, Jenkins, and Swartz, "The Navy at a Tipping Point," 41.

44. Roughead, "Executing the Maritime Strategy," 5.

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