


The final two essays examine preparations for the occupation of Japan and pacifist and antinuclear commemorations of Hiroshima Day.

Anthology is a fragile genre, depending as it does upon the skills of many to produce one work. The authors and editors are praiseworthy for the depth of their research and the general lucidity of their prose. Half the essays could stand on their own as articles in scholarly journals. Yet the question for readers is how well the chapters work together to form a book. The authors, joined in a *fest-schrift* to John Whiteclay Chambers II, are touching various parts of an elephant called World War II, and some have described those parts quite well. Alas, their collective efforts don't provide a clearer understanding of the animal itself.



Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2010

273 pages

\$37.95

Stockpile: The Story Behind 10,000 Strategic Nuclear Weapons

by Jerry Miller

Reviewed by George H. Quester, Professor Emeritus of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, Shapiro Visiting Professor, George Washington University

This is in part a history of why the American (and Soviet) nuclear weapons stockpiles grew so spectacularly large, presented by someone who was a first-hand observer and participant in many of the crucial choices on strategy and targeting. As an eyewitness account of the decisions and of the decisionmakers, this book will be indispensable for anyone doing advanced research on the subject. Clearly written (if somewhat repetitious in places) with a view to making the physical choices clear for someone untrained in physics, it might also serve as a very useful text for undergraduate courses or graduate seminars in national security.

As with any eyewitness reconstruction of a memoir, there are points where some reader caution may be in order, as the author's opinions on the character of the people involved, and on the big issues at stake, come through sometimes with a bit of an opinionated tone. And memory can fail anyone four or five decades later, on the complete logic of the strategic decisions made, and on the paths that were chosen or not chosen.

The author spent an important portion of his career with the United States Navy's team in Omaha making inputs to the Single Integrated Operational Plan for waging nuclear war, and he has interacted with a wide variety of civilian arms control and strategic research centers since his retirement. He can thus in no way be typecast as a simple "retired admiral," for he is very attuned to the criticisms that civilians have made of the nuclear arms race. While some of his prose indeed betrays the normal biases of a military professional about civilian academics who have never been in uniform or in combat, he at the same time endorses the normal outsider's criticism that the nuclear arsenal was allowed to grow much too large.

The depictions of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and some of his major assistants, for example Alain Enthoven, reinforce the standard picture of excessively self-assured civilian academics. The fact is noted several times that the American arsenal grew the most in the McNamara years. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson is also depicted somewhat negatively, while Paul Nitze and Andrew Goodpaster are given a much more positive image, and President Eisenhower is also seen this way. Showing some of the possible pitfalls in memory, and a perhaps incomplete synthesis of all the strategic factors involved, the author portrays Eisenhower as someone who had decided never to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Admiral Miller also details the extent to which Eisenhower chose to rely on extended nuclear deterrence, with the threat of escalation, for the protection of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than choosing a costly erection of conventional defenses to counter the forces of the Warsaw Pact.

The author's account of the sheer growth in numbers indeed hardly settles on a single causal factor. Included in the account are the needs generated by various strands of strategic reasoning, and by various theories of targeting, but also the in-fighting between the Navy and the Air Force on who would have the larger role to play with nuclear weapons, and the role of the nuclear weapons laboratories. An entire chapter is devoted simply to the role of scientists. Some portions of the account thus would seem to be reinforcement for "bureaucratic politics" theories that have been so critical of the defense decision process, theories by which the taxpayer-citizen is badly served; as defense expenditures grow too large. Other portions of the account, however, seem to relate decisions about the numbers and characteristics of nuclear weapons much more to real defense issues. The reader is left with an interesting survey of bad reasons and good reasons why the nuclear arsenal evolved as it did, along with evidence that substantial cuts can now be made, and some cautionary notes against anyone's current dream of moving to "global zero" in nuclear weapons.


In later portions of the account, the author offers some strong support for the kind of unilateral reductions in nuclear forces that were undertaken by President George H. W. Bush (where either side makes a reduction, and then watches what the other side does), as compared with the kind of reductions that require the tedious litigation of a formal arms reduction treaty with the Russians.

The book is clearly written, in a very engaging and personal style. As an exercise in memory, it sweeps several times through a long period of nuclear history on varying themes. This style of presentation will help the reader new to the subject, but at other times will seem repetitious or even confusing. The book's bibliography is extensive and therefore valuable in itself for anyone researching this subject.

This book cannot be taken as a definitive primer on the choices and concepts of "nuclear strategy," even though the author is aware of all these important concepts and trade-offs, because Admiral Miller too often characterizes or dismisses one side or another of an argument without parsing it through to the end. But the author's memories of the various choices made, and of

the personal attributes and styles of the major decisionmakers, are indeed well worth reading, and important to take into account.

At a time when the public, professional military men, the Congress, and President seem much less interested in nuclear weapons and “nuclear strategy,” the book amounts to another relevant “wake-up call.”



Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Univ. Press, 2010

260 pages

\$35.00

The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations

By Christopher P. Twomey

Reviewed by Lauren Hickok, Student of International
Politics and Security

In *The Military Lens*, Christopher P. Twomey greatly advances the scholarly literature on deterrence, doctrine, and the causes of war. He warns that the risk of a great power war between the United States and China is considerable—mainly because the two countries have very different ideas about how wars should be fought and won. As such, *The Military Lens* is of great practical interest to policymakers and senior members of the defense community—in both the United States and China.

Throughout the first third of the book, Twomey establishes the theoretical model he plans to test. Most importantly, he acquaints the reader with two related hypotheses: (1) the Doctrinal Difference Misperception Hypothesis, and (2) the Doctrinal Difference Escalation Hypothesis. According to the first hypothesis, nations with divergent theories of victory—to include military doctrine—are likely to misperceive and underestimate each other’s capabilities. According to the second hypothesis, this underestimation is likely to result in failure of deterrence, escalation, and conflict.

The real substance of *The Military Lens* is presented in Part II, “Chinese and American Puzzles.” Twomey begins by characterizing the doctrinal differences that led to the Korean War. American thinking emphasized the utility of air power and general war—whereas Chinese strategic thinking emphasized ground forces, limited war, and the trading of space for time. Ultimately, these doctrinal differences resulted in two separate cases of deterrence failure—the US decision to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea and Mao Zedong’s decision to cross the Yalu River. Next, Twomey provides an example of a deterrence success—China’s decision in 1950 to postpone the invasion of Taiwan. Here, deterrence was successful because the United States and China had similar theories of victory. In the Taiwan Strait, the relevant forces were naval forces for amphibious operations—and the amphibious operations doctrine of the United States was in fact very similar to that of China.

The final third of the book presents the reader with two additional cases describing doctrinal differences between Egypt and Israel—a fascinating