

The Mythology Surrounding Maneuver Warfare

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External events are stimulating our armed forces to think creatively about the future. Although the services are focusing primarily on how to cope with force reductions, the prospect of dramatically smaller forces should also prompt the military to think about ways to improve and increase capability to help offset loss of mass and combat power. Maneuver warfare is one way to increase combat effectiveness without increasing force size or budget outlays. However, many sincere and knowledgeable professionals view maneuver warfare with skepticism.

This essay seeks to clarify and refine the maneuver warfare debate. Many prominent figures, both in and out of uniform, have expressed reservations about maneuver warfare. Their criticisms deserve a substantive response. If the times do indeed demand fundamental change, the price of failure requires the most searching examination before we move to replace current methods and theories of war with new ones.

Much of the criticism of maneuver warfare does not seem to be based on a careful reading and analysis of maneuver warfare as a body of thought or set of concepts. In the past decade, a number of erroneous conclusions were drawn about maneuver which are now commonly accepted as fact. To fairly judge maneuver warfare on its merits, it is necessary to address some of these common misconceptions or “myths” which surround it. First, however, before addressing these misconceptions, it may be useful to inquire into the basic assumptions which inform the maneuver warfare argument.

Assumptions

For many military professionals, the label “maneuver warfare” itself evokes a certain measure of hostility. This is a product of the contentious debates of a decade ago, when the so-called “military reform movement” took

on the military establishment and asked it to revisit what was widely perceived to be a uniquely American style of war.¹ In the views of the military's critics and many historians, the American approach to war focused on a few simple themes: mass, fires, an overwhelming logistical effort, and a centralized and relatively methodical approach to battle²—or, aggregately, what we can call “attrition” warfare.

The first assumption, then, is that attrition warfare has been the American style of war. Of course, American forces have not always sought victory through massed fires and overwhelming force. We have had our share of Anthony Waynes, Nathan Bedford Forrests, Ranald S. Mackenzies, and George C. Pattons. But these outstanding American fighters were remarkable, perhaps, precisely because they departed from the military norms of the day. Yet, if one looks closely, it is possible to see in them and in others the outlines of a different way to fight, another way to look at war.

A second basic assumption, AirLand Battle doctrine notwithstanding, is that the emphasis on massed fires and the linear battlefield still retains a powerful hold on the institutional consciousness of the American military. The historical record supports this view, and so does a review of our performance at the National Training Center. Moreover, a first look at the analyses coming out of the Gulf War suggests that “victory through superior firepower” remains central to the American way of war.³ At least empirically, there is much to suggest that the physical destruction of the enemy by massed fire systems remains central to our style.⁴

A third assumption is that the American military is capable of evolutionary and even revolutionary change in its approach to war, contrary to the views of some detractors. We are not necessarily wedded to techniques, doctrines, and routines which descend from our defining experiences in northwest Europe in 1944, or the amphibious campaigns in the Pacific, or the strategic bombing campaigns over Germany and Japan.⁵ All militaries change over time. In the coming decade we may have no choice but to change, to

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reach out for new concepts which offer hope of maximizing the capabilities of what all agree will be a much smaller military establishment.

Such change is necessary and normal and natural. But what kind of change will it be? We have already begun to look at this question and attempt to formulate some answers. Before his retirement, General John Foss at the US Training and Doctrine Command published a series of papers which described a different kind of battlefield. He foresaw a future battlefield characterized by smaller forces, greater lethality, more mobility, and increasing complexity, and he called it the nonlinear or fluid battlefield.⁶

Against credible opponents, an ordered or methodical view of the battlefield probably will not reflect reality—if it ever did. As Clausewitz argued so tellingly a century and a half ago, the battlefield is a place of friction, of chaos and uncertainty, of error and bad weather and missed opportunities. Those who believe otherwise—and there are many these days who see perfect transparency and perfect target acquisition just over the horizon—are engaging in an old, familiar game. They see, in the next technological advance, or perhaps in the next doctrine, a way to bring about what all combat leaders desperately want: a tactical and operational universe that is ordered and understandable. They want a linear battlefield.

There may be times when the battlefield assumes a linear character. But even if this is so, we can be confident that the human dimension of battle will retain its traditional importance despite the age of rapid technological change. This is not to suggest that technology is not of great importance in war. But an emphasis on technology that neglects the role of human factors is fundamentally misplaced.

If the world is fated to remain a dangerous place (and all militaries are founded on the supposition that it is) and if the battlefields of the future continue to be dominated by friction and a relative absence of order, how can a smaller, less-robust force prevail? Maneuver warfare provides one promising answer. In its exploitation of the fluid nature of modern war, its recognition of friction, and its potential for rapid victory without the high casualties and enormous consumption of wealth which can attend modern war, maneuver warfare offers one answer to an increasingly compelling dilemma.

The Mythology of Maneuver

Keeping in mind these assumptions and observations, let us examine the more common criticisms of maneuver warfare.

- *Myth Number 1: Maneuver warfare is nothing more than another set of rules.* All theories are based on a set of organizing concepts. For maneuver warfare, these include: emphasis on how to think, not what to do; targeting the opponent's will to resist, not just his physical resources; a preoccupation with decisive battle; and the application of strength against weakness.

However, it is difficult to find a school of thought that argues so strongly against set rules as a guide to battlefield behavior. This does not mean that AirLand Battle imperatives or the principles of war, for example, should be ignored or that they are unimportant. It does mean that all rules, principles, precepts, or whatever we may choose to call them are meaningless except in the context of the present operation.

Combat situations cannot be solved by rules. The art of war has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice. Mission, terrain, weather, dispositions, armament, morale, supply, and comparative strength are variables whose mutations always combine to form new patterns of physical encounter. Thus, in battle, each situation is unique and must be approached on its own merits.⁷

Maneuver warfare eschews absolute rules absolutely. At Chancellorsville, Lee divided his force and divided it again, trusting to speed, deception, and a certain moral ascendancy over Hooker to retrieve his exceedingly dangerous situation. At Tannenberg, the Germans left a single cavalry division to oppose the Russian First Army while redeploying three full corps southward to envelop and crush Samsonov. They took the principles of concentration on the one hand and economy of force on the other to new heights. They did not think along methodical, tidy lines as Montgomery or Hodges might have done, but instead reckoned that the intangibles—speed, resolution, shock, and the enemy's lack of imagination—would work in their behalf. At Chancellorsville and Tannenberg, the situation, not the rules of the game, was supreme.

Maneuver warfare preaches the futility of formulaic rules more strongly than any theory of war. It is based on an intellectual tradition which stresses “how to think,” not “what to do.” The use of strength against weakness to break the enemy's will is the analytical framework which provides a guide to action. Possession of experience, talent, intelligence, will—and, above all, character—is the precondition for applying this thought process to local conditions. These essential characteristics distinguish those who can adapt the principles of war to the local situation and win, from those who will apply them by rote and lose—or win at great and unnecessary cost.

• *Myth Number 2: Maneuver warfare exalts the bold thrust while ignoring firepower.* Understanding the relationship of fire to maneuver is central to understanding war. Fundamentally, this relationship is not a function of the relative “quantity” of one vis-à-vis the other. Despite direct quotations from the literature stating unequivocally that “the importance of firepower in maneuver warfare cannot be overemphasized,”⁸ critics persist in the belief that maneuverists ignore or neglect the role of fires.

It is time to put this charge to rest. Armies fight with fires. Period. But some armies emphasize the use of massed fires to physically destroy

enemy forces for the purpose of assisting maneuver units in the occupation of terrain. Other armies use discrete fires to facilitate decisive maneuver against weak points in order to cause the collapse and disintegration of the enemy forces. Some armies do both, whether by accident or not. But generally speaking, armies fight in the spirit of the former—as France did offensively in 1914 and defensively in 1940, and as we did in Korea and Vietnam—or in the spirit of the latter—as reflected in the operating styles of the *Wermacht*, the Israeli Defense Force, and the North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong.

What is different in maneuver warfare is the *relationship* between fire and maneuver. In maneuver warfare, the object of maneuver is not to position fires for the ultimate destruction of the enemy. Ideally, fires are used to create conditions which support decisive maneuver—that is, movement of combat forces in relation to the enemy so as to destroy his will to resist. In the 1973 and 1982 wars, the Israeli Defense Force used battalion-sized units as a base of fire to support maneuver by other forces moving to deliver a decisive blow. But overall they possessed many fewer artillery systems and tanks than their opponents.⁹

Local conditions (for example, a holding operation) may dictate something different. But under normal circumstances the technique of choice should be decisive maneuver supported by fires, and not the reverse. Armies that emphasize maneuver will require a lesser degree of fire support because the objective is not the physical annihilation of enemy forces and equipment. Instead of the brute massing of fires, concentration and timing become the keys to effective fire support. Fire systems must of course exist in reasonable numbers, but it should not be necessary to overwhelm the enemy with artillery. It is illuminating that large numbers of massed fire systems breed in the Army's institutional mind a confidence that our maneuver capability does not.

• *Myth Number 3: Maneuver warfare is inconsistent with American military culture.* This is a favorite bromide with many critics who argue that America's predilection for "industrial" warfare is a cultural imperative. It can be summarized in the quaint allegation that the American military won't change because it can't.¹⁰

Whether or not this critique seems supported by history, we cannot conclude that other armies have somehow cornered the market on such qualities as boldness, initiative, decisiveness, or strategic and operational vision, leaving none for the plodding Americans. We rapidly absorb new technologies. Racial and gender integration in the Army and impressive progress in joint and combined doctrine demonstrate our capability to move beyond entrenched organizational routines. And so far as our own history is concerned, it yields abundant evidence of our propensity for innovation, flexibility, and initiative. These virtues remain an integral part of our organizational culture. They refute

the charge that American soldiers are hostage to a historical determinism that denies them the capacity for progress and change.

As an institution we have shown ourselves capable of absorbing the lessons of the past and applying them to the present. There is no reason why a military as professional as ours, with the kind of intellectual resources we dispose and the caliber of soldiers and leaders we can boast, should remain wedded to the practices of the past. If we as a profession see a path to a better way, our reach need not exceed our grasp.

- *Myth Number 4: Maneuver warfare promises bloodless war.* In conventional conflicts, the ideal outcome is the rapid collapse of the opponent without protracted combat. The United States and its coalition partners achieved such an outcome in the Gulf War, it can be argued, largely through the application of maneuver warfare at the operational level of war. But in a contest between rival states, where the contending parties are roughly equivalent and armed with modern, lethal weaponry, maneuver warfare promises no free ride.

The 1866 Prussian-Austrian War, the 1940 invasion of France, and the 1967 Six Day War each brought about the humiliation of worthy foes by rivals of approximately equal strength. In each case victory was achieved quickly and decisively. But these victories were not bloodless. Some victorious units suffered terribly, and strategic success overshadowed many tactical defeats and reverses. No doctrine, no methodology, no art can fairly promise overwhelming victory without cost.

Yet these three campaigns stand out in military history as brilliant examples of what can be accomplished through the dislocation in time and space of an opponent otherwise equal in numbers and weaponry. By avoiding known enemy strengths and striking at sensitive and vulnerable centers of gravity, the victors achieved the collapse and disintegration of their opponents' field forces in short order. They avoided a protracted series of debilitating battles, each with its inevitable casualties through grinding exhaustion, sanguinary fire, and head-on collisions with enemy force. While no war is bloodless, maneuver warfare offers the possibility of reduced casualties through the rapidity of operational and strategic success.

- *Myth Number 5: There is no such thing as attrition warfare.* One sometimes hears that no such school as attrition warfare actually exists, and thus that maneuver warfare throws its intellectual punch at empty air. Certainly there are few advocates of attritional warfare as such. Remembering the awesome meatgrinder campaigns like the Somme of World War I, few soldiers or commentators are willing to step forward and say with pride, "I am an attritionist." But there is a mass of historical data pointing to the existence of an endemic focus on firepower and attrition at the expense of maneuver.

Only in the past decade has published doctrine explicitly addressed this imbalance, and we cannot yet know how well we have absorbed the

philosophy of AirLand Battle. While its outlines seem clearly visible in Operation Desert Storm at the operational level of war, at the tactical level combat very much resembled traditional smash-mouth warfare, with huge quantities of firepower being poured on enemy formations in lieu of maneuver.

This is not necessarily a bad thing if our forces can quickly switch doctrinal gears in circumstances where such techniques are not effective. The historical record suggests, however, that many American commanders, with notable exceptions, could not. A maneuver-focused force can adapt when faced with equal or superior firepower. A mass-focused force cannot.

It is perfectly true that there is no systematically articulated or codified theory of attrition warfare. Yet the continuing outlines of an industrial approach to war, decade after decade and conflict after conflict, suggest that the mass vs. maneuver debate is both relevant and real.

- *Myth Number 6: Maneuver warfare is "just fighting smart."* Certainly there is nothing new or even particularly original about maneuver warfare. What is new is the attempt to organize successful concepts from the past around a unifying theme and then articulate that theme so it can be understood and applied more readily. Ardant Du Picq warned that while technology changes, human nature, and its influence in battle, does not. And while use of maneuver is indeed fighting smart, it is a whole lot more.

Most leaders have been schooled to solve battlefield problems through the application of techniques and a standard repertoire of tactical solutions. These solutions presuppose near-perfect control. The desire for control is nothing more than a natural desire to impose order on disorder. When we lunge for a flank we are trying to do the same thing. We have been taught that flanks are vulnerable places and we should go for them, thus imposing "order" on war by rule.

The problem is that often flanks are not vulnerable, as the Germans discovered to their chagrin at Kursk. The ability to discern strength from weakness is not a programmed response. It is largely an art, developed by years of thinking about such things, and it is mastered by some better than others. But it is, in fact, an intellectual discipline, practically derived.

In battle, many leaders will do one of two things. They will bring heavy fires to bear and attack frontally, or they will suppress the enemy and maneuver to a flank. Both options are conditioned responses. They reflect patterned behavior. When and if they succeed, we call it "fighting smart." Neither response, however, is based upon a bona fide thought process. Most leaders use the commander's estimate, the staff planning process, and mission analysis to plan an operation. While these are useful and necessary mental checklists, they are at best a mechanical planning process—a way to organize one's time and ensure the completion of necessary planning tasks—but not a true thought process. They do not provide a mental framework for the analysis

and solution of battlefield problems. They do not represent a theory or philosophy of warfighting, unless we consider the reduction of warfare to target lists, phase lines, and timetables a philosophy.

What, then, *is* the thought process he should employ? At a crude level, the process goes something like this: identify a decisive weakness, find or make a gap, ruthlessly exploit it, and continue to do so until the enemy collapses. The means used to do this—fires, maneuver, reconnaissance, intelligence, the will and vision of the commander, the courage and initiative of subordinates—are means to achieve the enemy's collapse. They are not ends in themselves. The terms we use are not important (for convenience I call it "maneuverist," but other terms could serve). What is important and defining is the thought process behind the methodology and the results achieved.

- *Myth Number 7: Maneuverists see maneuver as an end in itself.* This is a persistent claim whose origin is difficult to trace. Presumably it is a response to the label "maneuver warfare" and to criticism directed against the promiscuous use of firepower. A close reading of military history and of maneuver literature, however, quickly reveals the true end of maneuver operations.

Running throughout the memoirs of successful German generals of the First and Second World Wars is a preoccupation with decisive action. One cannot read Von Mellenthin, Von Manstein, Rommel, or Guderian without being struck by the constant emphasis on the decisive battle. Whereas attrition or industrial warfare "seeks battle under any or all conditions, pitting strength against strength to exact the greatest toll from the enemy,"¹¹ maneuver warfare seeks battle only under advantageous conditions *where a decisive result can be achieved*.

This obsession with forcing a decision is the defining characteristic of maneuver warfare. It undoubtedly descends from the experiences of the Prussian, German, and Israeli armies, which, when faced with superior numbers and enemies on all sides, developed a theory of war to compensate for numerical inferiority with intellectual and moral vigor. These armies could not afford to become locked in attritional exchanges where mass could dominate. Instead, they sought to create conditions where speed, tempo, focus, and initiative could be used to score a knockout.

These armies and others like them did not see maneuver as an end in itself, nor do maneuverists tout maneuver as an end in itself. To seek and gain the decision—as rapidly, vigorously, and economically as possible—is the true end of battles and campaigns. The Marine Corps' doctrinal discussion of the conduct of war in its principal warfighting manual captures the essence of maneuver warfare simply and succinctly: "This is how I will achieve a decision; everything else is secondary."¹²

- *Myth Number 8: We're already doing maneuver warfare.* This claim derives from the publication of doctrinal materials, chiefly the Army's FM

100-5, *Operations*, and the Marine Corps' FMFM1, *Warfighting*, and FMFM1-1, *Campaigning*, which incorporate a number of themes commonly associated with maneuver warfare. This doctrinal incorporation of maneuver concepts and thinking continues in the pending revision of FM 100-5, supported by other doctrinal publications and discussion in professional military journals.

Our recent experiences with armed conflict in Panama and Kuwait suggest that we may have grasped maneuver warfare at the operational level but not at the tactical. Furthermore, there is much to suggest that technology, among other things, will make maneuver warfare at the tactical level even less likely to take hold in the American military.¹³ And while maneuver warfare at the operational level of war represents a marked improvement in the effectiveness of the American military in the field, its absence at the tactical level forces us back to the familiar paradigm of mass and fires—whether or not this approach can work in a given theater, against a given opponent, or at a given point on the spectrum of conflict.

What is the evidence that the United States practiced maneuver warfare operationally during Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm? The strongest indicator in both cases was an evident determination to strike swiftly at an identified center of gravity and avoid force-on-force engagements with large enemy units, except on favorable terms. A distinctive feature in both operations was the attempt to stun or paralyze the enemy's ability to command



VII Corps, SGM Martin Shupe

Abrams tanks and other armored vehicles speed north into Iraq during Desert Storm. "Our recent experiences . . . suggest that we may have grasped maneuver warfare at the operational level but not at the tactical."

and control his forces—to shock the enemy’s nervous system at the outset and prevent a coordinated response. In both campaigns, the operational plan sought to create conditions that would force a decision quickly, without the need for extended combat.¹⁴

At the tactical level, however, American forces seem to have performed in the traditional manner. US soldiers were well trained and fought courageously. Their leaders proved themselves masters of the art of coordinating fire support, movement, and logistics. Allied officers serving in the Gulf were stunned at the ability of large US heavy forces to organize for combat and mass overwhelming combat power. One British officer observed: “At the big-unit level the Americans are simply not to be believed. Only a fool would get in their way.”¹⁵

While US forces may have carried traditional methods, techniques, and doctrine to new heights, they have not absorbed maneuver warfare at division level and below. Command and control remained rigidly centralized. Units moved in strict conformance to planned control measures. Fire control of artillery and close air support was consolidated at high levels; much was planned in advance.¹⁶ Units moved primarily to mass fire systems against enemy forces and expressed a clear preference for the use of fires over maneuver.

These methods worked well against a passive enemy. But they do not reflect the spirit of AirLand Battle doctrine at the tactical level, and they do not reflect a conceptual grasp of maneuver warfare.

• *Myth Number 9: Maneuverists have failed to define their terms.* This myth is sometimes colorfully packaged, as in the following: “Many discussants held that reformers had done their cause a great disservice by failing to identify and clarify the most significant empirical referents of the maneuver notion.”¹⁷ This kind of criticism is effective for at least two reasons. First, it deflects discussion from the real issues. Even though first-order concerns (“Is there substance to the critique of attrition?”) and basic terms (“Maneuver is purposeful movement in relation to the enemy”)¹⁸ are well defined, haggling over questions of precise definition, particularly when the critics do not agree among themselves on the definitions of many common terms, trivializes the debate. Second, the charge of “lack of clarity and precision” often masks an unfamiliarity with the literature or a failure to grasp the essentials of the maneuver warfare argument.

The study of war becomes more useful and relevant as its students strip away the peripheral to come to grips with the true nature of human conflict. Real progress becomes possible only to the extent that students and practitioners of the military art can focus on this essential concern objectively. Soldiers and scholars (as well as those who are both) have important roles to play in what is fundamentally a dynamic, Hegelian process. Neither has a monopoly on the truth.

By now, the important assumptions and the organizing concepts of maneuver warfare are well known and well articulated. There is a substantial body of literature on the subject and no lack of advocates and critics on both sides of the issue. Experts may disagree on the validity or applicability of maneuver warfare as a theory of war. But the charge that it has never been adequately defined is thin indeed.

• *Myth Number 10: If you've never done it, you can't theorize about it.* Regrettably, many of the early debates about maneuver warfare focused on personalities. While civilians and academics charged senior military leaders with lacking a real understanding and historical grasp of their profession, military professionals responded with harsh criticism of the reformers' lack of combat experience and understanding of the realities of modern warfare. In the exchange, both sides sometimes failed to listen to the other; both missed opportunities to further the study of the profession.

No civilian theorist or historian unbloodied by fire can answer the charge that he lacks practical experience in war. No officer who has never marched to the sound of guns can rebut the criticism that he has not commanded troops in combat. Nevertheless, the charges laid against such thinkers are criticisms of individuals, not of their intellectual contributions to the debate. These latter must stand or fall on their own merits, not on the resumes of their proponents.

Military history is replete with examples of outstanding military figures, such as Nathan Bedford Forrest, Wade Hampton, and Joshua Chamberlain, who possessed a flair for command but lacked practical experience or professional training. Others, such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Ardant du Picq, Liddell Hart, and Clausewitz himself, distinguished themselves as outstanding military theorists despite a lack of impressive credentials as wartime commanders. Their example suggests that it is vigorous debate carried on in a collegial and constructive manner—and not *ad hominem* barbs at the participants—that is most essential to the furtherance of the military art.

Conclusion

In this decade, budget realities and a rapidly changing strategic environment¹⁹ place extreme pressures on the military services. The motto of an earlier day—"More bang for a buck!"—may well regain its currency. But a smaller, poorer military might not be able to squeeze much more performance out of the force without changing some of the rules. The time is right to take a hard look at changing the rules—by looking at ways to improve the capabilities of those forces that survive the deep cuts which now appear inevitable.

It is natural to view the current organizational climate as a time of crisis. But it may also provide striking potential for positive change. Fundamen-

tally, maneuver warfare is not about personalities or politics. It is about a better way to fight. It deserves mature consideration and reflection as we look at the defining challenges and opportunities that await us in the coming century.

NOTES

1. A partial list of well-known figures who comment on American preference for mass and firepower includes Russell Weigley, S. L. A. Marshall, Max Hastings, Michael Michaelis, Samuel Huntington, T. R. Fehrenbach, John English, Arthur Hadley, Robert Doughty, and William Lind. J. F. C. Fuller was perhaps most outspoken in denouncing the American style of warfare as "ironmongery."

2. See Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1973), and Robert A. Doughty, "The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine 1946-1976," *Leavenworth Papers*, No. 1 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1979).

3. *The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* (Washington: Department of Defense, April 1992) provides a good general overview of the Gulf War. The author also bases this conclusion on numerous interviews, personal conversations, and written correspondence with a large number of Army and Marine Corps officers from the ranks of captain to lieutenant general. Analyses of tactical methods used in the Gulf War support the view that American emphasis on firepower and attrition is alive and well: "Maneuver commanders directed that when lead maneuver elements detected an Iraqi position, the artillery was to stop and plaster it with devastating fire. The object was to pound them to jelly." Paul F. Pearson and Glenn K. Otis, "Desert Storm Fire Support," Association of the United States Army *Landpower Essay Series*, No. 91-2, June 1991, p. 1.

4. "I saw the US mass firepower better than any other nation in the world. . . . Maneuver merely got our firepower assets into position to annihilate the Iraqis, whether on the ground or during the preparatory air offensive—it's the American way—in spite of AirLand Battle Doctrine!" Letter from a field-grade armor officer who participated in the 1991 Gulf War.

5. Carl Builder, *Masks of War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1989).

6. See Stephen Silvasy, Jr., "AirLand Battle Future: The Tactical Battlefield," *Military Review*, 71 (February 1991), 3.

7. *Infantry in Battle* (Washington: The Infantry Journal Incorporated, 1939), p. 1.

8. William S. Lind and M. D. Wyly, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), p. 21.

9. Interview with Colonel Giora Eiland, Israeli Defense Force, January 1986.

10. Samuel Huntington, "Playing to Win," *The National Interest* (Spring 1986), 8-16.

11. US Marine Corps, *Warfighting*, FMFM1 (Washington: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1989), p. 28.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

13. See Robert Leonhard's *Art of Maneuver* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1991), p. 120.

14. The Department of Defense official after-action report for Desert Storm cites the following statement of commander's intent, published by Commander-in-Chief Central Command prior to the commencement of the offensive ground campaign: "Maximize friendly strength against Iraqi weakness and terminate offensive operations with the Republican Guard Forces destroyed and major US forces controlling critical lines of communications in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations." See *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, p. 317.

15. Interview with a British troop commander of the 17/21st Lancers detached for service with the British armored division in the Gulf War, 27 July 1991.

16. A number of field-grade officers interviewed for this paper reported that in the Gulf their battalion commanders were unable to call for artillery fires, as fires were planned or reserved for use at higher levels. See also Leonhard, p. 286: "From my own observations and my interviews with officers from the 3d Armored Division, 24th Mechanized Division, 1st Armored Division, and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, battalions in battle had virtually no integrated fire support during the four-day operation."

17. "The Military Reform Debate," *Final Proceedings: Senior Conference XX* (West Point, N.Y.: US Military Academy, 1982), p. 37.

18. Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1987), p. 93.

19. For a discussion of the shift in national security paradigms, see the author's "The Future of Conventional Deterrence," *Naval War College Review*, 45 (Summer 1992), 78-88, with Ricky L. Waddell. See also *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, August 1991).