

The Bosnian-Serb Problem: What We Should and Should Not Do

MICHAEL G. ROSKIN

The urge of many persons of good will, hawks and doves alike, to curb Serbian expansionism and atrocities is praiseworthy but often poorly informed.¹ Direct military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina,² for example, lacks clear political aims and ignores the complexities of terrain and regional tensions. Quite conceivably, even the most well-intentioned military action could make things worse in Bosnia. What starts as protection for food convoys would quickly escalate to de facto engagement on the side of Bosnian independence, a cause that historically has never been a US national interest. The terrain is among the most rugged in Europe. Tito's Partisans kept several German divisions³ busy for years in those same mountains; the Germans never caught Tito, and the Partisans emerged at the end of the war as the strongest force in Yugoslavia.

Air strikes would not easily locate the Serbian artillery tucked away in the folds and woods. The US Air Force may have done too good a publicity job in Desert Storm, making it look easy to destroy targets with pinpoint accuracy. But targeted buildings don't move; Serbian howitzers and mortars do. The US Army has radar-controlled counter-battery artillery that can quickly trace the trajectory of incoming shells and silence the guns that fired them. But these units have to be on the ground, and getting them, say, to Sarajevo in Bosnia and sustaining them there would be difficult. Control of highways from the coast could require tens of thousands of troops who would come under attack from Serbian forces. Chasing them through the mountains would quickly turn a limited involvement into an unlimited one.

Even if we lifted the siege of Sarajevo by military intervention, little benefit would result. There are a hundred other towns the Serbian nationalists

have marked for takeover. Would we defend every one of them? By blocking the Serbian takeover of Bosnian towns, we would in effect be fighting for Bosnian independence. Our interest lies rather in stopping expansionism and atrocities, not in creating small new countries. An indirect approach, it will be argued here, might contain Serbia not only at lower cost but in a way that encourages pan-European solidarity in the face of outlaw states.

The Origins of Serbian Nationalism


Medieval Serbia, Eastern Orthodox in faith and centered in the Kosovo region (south of the present Serbian core area), was an impressive kingdom from the 12th to 14th centuries, but the Ottoman Turkish victory in Kosovo in 1389 initiated nearly five centuries of Serbian subjection.⁴ The Serbs never forgot their kingdom or forgave the Turkish occupiers. Embellished by legend, the figures of the *haiduk*, the anti-Turkish bandit, and the *chetnik*, the anti-Turkish guerrilla, commanded respect among the Serbs. To fight Turks was a noble task, no matter what the odds. Montenegrins, a branch of Serbs, still note proudly that the Turks never subdued them.

Starting in the 16th century, as Austria pushed back the Turks, Serbs fled Ottoman control for protection under the Hapsburgs. They were welcome; land was available since local populations had been decimated by the Ottomans, and the Serbs, who had been fighting the Turks for centuries, were tough settler-soldiers on the military frontier between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. This accounts for the many Serbian enclaves deep in Croatia and Bosnia. The longstanding problem—the connecting link between the Serb-engineered assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz-Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, the rise of Tito's Partisans in World War II, and the siege of Sarajevo in 1992—has been Serbs living outside of Serbia.

In these mixed areas, Serbs generally got along with their Croatian Catholic and Bosnian Muslim neighbors. They spoke the same language, what came to be known as Serbo-Croatian, although Serbian is written in Cyrillic (the Slavic alphabet) and Croatian in Latin, because the former were Christianized from Constantinople, the latter from Rome. The Bosnian Muslims originated in a heretical Slavic Christian sect, persecuted by both Christian

Dr. Michael G. Roskin is a visiting professor of foreign policy in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. He took his A.B. from the University of California (Berkeley), M.A. from the University of California (Los Angeles), and Ph.D. from American University. A former USIA Foreign Service officer, with postings in Munich and Bern, and a former AP world desk editor, Professor Roskin is the author of five books on international relations and comparative politics. He speaks Serbo-Croatian among his six languages, and has traveled extensively in the Balkans, including Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Ethnic Groups of Yugoslavia



branches. Under the Turks, they converted to Islam, giving rise to the blond, blue-eyed Slavic Muslims and alpine mosques one finds in Bosnia today.

The three groups—Bosnian Muslims, Croatian Catholics, and Serbian Eastern Orthodox—lived without much hatred under Ottomans and Hapsburgs because sovereignty lay far away, either in Istanbul or Vienna. There was no quarrel over who was to be boss on a given piece of turf or who had the last word in law; laws came from afar, for some centuries in the Turkish language and then in German (or, for Croatia, in Hungarian). The difficulty came when these people had to rule themselves. As the Ottoman Empire weakened, the Serbs of the Shumadiya region of central Serbia revolted against the Turks and by 1830 won autonomy as a principality within the Empire. The major Russian victory over the Turks in 1878 brought independence to most of the Balkans, including Serbia (with Bosnia coming under control of Budapest of the Austria-Hungary pairing). The core of the

new Serbian kingdom was much farther north than that of the old kingdom, the capital now being Belgrade, right across from Hungarian territory on the Danube. In 1908, control of Bosnia shifted to Austria, and there the trouble started, for Serbia claimed Bosnia as well.

Then, as now, an appreciable fraction (but never a majority) of the Bosnian population was Serb. At times the ancient Serbian kingdom had been tied to Bosnia, but this could not constitute a valid historical claim. The new Serbia was fired by the modern notion of nationalism, taking its cues from the unification of Italy under Piedmont. Serbia was to be the Piedmont of the South Slavs, liberating them from foreign rule and gathering them under its own benevolent rule. Serbs saw themselves as entitled to this role as the preeminent anti-Turkish fighters. At this same time, pan-Slavism deepened ties between Serbia and Russia, a tie that exists to this day, complicating UN efforts to secure a united front against Belgrade.

Austria's annexation of Bosnia enraged Serbian nationalists in both Serbia and Bosnia. At the University of Belgrade, Serb students from Bosnia joined the underground nationalist society Unity or Death, which included Serbian officers. Much like modern terrorists quietly receiving state sponsorship, the students received revolvers and grenades from Serbian officers. On 28 July 1914, they assassinated visiting Austrian Archduke Franz-Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo, thus igniting the chain of events that resulted in World War I. The day was the hallowed anniversary of the Serbian defeat in Kosovo and the day of Serbia's patron saint, St. Vitus.

The First Failure of Yugoslavia


Yugoslavia began falling apart almost as soon as it was born after World War I. Croatia and Bosnia did not like being ruled by Hungarians and Austrians, respectively. With a measure of good will mustered on all sides, the Serbian monarchy in 1918 pulled together the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (the Slovenes being another Slavic nationality with a somewhat different language who occupied the northwest corner of the country, having been part of Austria for centuries). Quickly Croats discovered that being ruled by Belgrade was no improvement over being ruled by Budapest, their previous suzerain. Croat politicians complained about biased and indifferent Serbian administration. Serbian nationalists saw them as disruptive ingrates; one fanatic Montenegrin deputy shot down Croatia's top representatives on the floor of parliament in 1928. Exasperated, King Alexander proclaimed a royal dictatorship in 1929, renamed the country Yugoslavia (Land of the South Slavs), and divided it into artificial administrative districts named after rivers (on the French revolutionary model).

By now, most of Yugoslavia's nationalities harbored extremist independence groups. Ante Pavelic, a Croat admirer of Mussolini, founded the

Ustasha (Uprising), a Croatian fascist movement. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, with Bulgarian backing, launched a terrorist campaign in an effort to recover a unified Macedonia from the Serbs and Greeks. Bulgarian Premier Stambuliski became its victim in 1923. King Alexander himself was assassinated by the same organization, abetted by other alienated nationalist groups, in Marseille in 1934. The Serbs, despite such divisive ferment, continued to see Yugoslavia as simply a Greater Serbian monarchy.

It took the Germans all of 11 days to conquer Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941; many Croats welcomed the Germans, who indeed set up Ante Pavelic in a Croatian puppet state with greatly enlarged borders that included Bosnia and some of Serbia. Ustasha massacres of whole Serbian villages in Croatia and Bosnia, along with the maintenance of a brutal concentration camp, killed at least 350,000 Serbs.⁵ (Some claim the true number is closer to 750,000; the Partisans murdered some 100,000 Croats, alleged Ustashes, in revenge in 1945.) Serbs have never forgotten their own holocaust and act in many ways like Israelis, determined to shoot first rather than let themselves be put at the mercy of their enemies. Some people suppose that the violent enmities that

Southeast Europe on the Eve of World War I



characterize today's Yugoslavia trace back to ancient hatreds. This is not true; for most of history the several nationalities got along. Current hatreds trace back only to the killings of World War II.

Neighboring states had little regard for Yugoslavia, which they considered artificial and an intrusion on their former holdings, so that Germany's victory set the stage for a massive dismemberment. Hitler remembered that Slovenia had been part of Austria and ordered it returned to the Reich. Italy took the Dalmatian coast, most of which had long been under the Republic of Venice. Bulgaria hearkened to its medieval kingdom and took Macedonia, where indeed the language is virtually Bulgarian. Albania took the Albanian-inhabited part of Kosovo, and Hungary took the part of the Vojvodina that was most heavily settled by Hungarians. All the neighbors except Greece and Romania took a piece of the Yugoslav pie.

Was Yugoslavia, then, simply not meant to be? The idea of uniting the small, Slavic-speaking nationalities of the region was not a bad one, for most were too small to stand on their own. What killed the idea was Serbian domination. The Serbs, after all, were never a majority of the country's population, but all power was centralized in Serbia's capital of Belgrade. The Yugoslav communists thought they had the cure: a federation in which no one group would dominate. This was the vision they sold to Yugoslavs of all nationalities and used to build their Partisan units. Their chief recruits were Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia,⁶ the victims of fascist extermination efforts, but Partisan units could be found in every part of the country. By the war's end, the Partisans had liberated roughly half of Yugoslavia; the Red Army swept the Germans out of the northern portion in 1945.

The Second Failure of Yugoslavia

Why did communist Yugoslavia appear to work for some decades? First, Tito was a genuinely charismatic figure whom even anti-communists respected.⁷ With a Croat father and Slovene mother, Tito was above the nationalities quarrel and could assure the other nationalities that he would not restore Serbian hegemony. Second, Tito ruled with a network of Partisan veterans, the elite of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, who were inserted into all important positions. Third, Stalin's 1948 blunder in expelling Yugoslavia from the communist camp—Stalin thought Tito was insufficiently obedient⁸—rallied Yugoslavs of all nationalities against the Soviet threat. Fourth, as a result of this expulsion, Tito experimented with a "middle way" economic system that brought more freedom and economic improvement for some years. This created a sense of confidence and unity, bringing in abundant foreign credits. And fifth, Tito encouraged a federalism far more genuine than the Soviet variety. Yugoslavia's six republics were staffed by local talent and made highly autonomous decisions.

*Yugoslavia began falling apart almost
as soon as it was born.*

Why then did Yugoslavia survive Tito by only a decade? On closer examination, the unifying factors described above were either short-lived or inherently flawed. Charismatic leaders do not groom charismatic successors. Yugoslavia's constitution named Tito president for life; a Swiss-style collegial presidency with a rotating chairman succeeded him. In effect, no one was in charge after Tito died in 1980. Further, by the late 1980s the Partisan network had largely been replaced by younger leaders—many of them nationalists at the republic level—and the cohesion forged in battle fell apart. Yugoslavia's "market socialist" economy, chronically unstable and constantly "reformed," careened back and forth between relative freedom and central control. Inflation was endemic. Much depended on foreign loans, and Yugoslavia's debt climbed to dangerous levels.

Worst of all, Tito had not solved Yugoslavia's nationalities problems after all.⁹ There was, to be sure, federalism, perhaps too much of it. Each republic had its own steel mill, railway network, and jealous regard for its rights. Belgrade, however, attempted to retain fiscal and monetary control, including money supply and foreign exchange, and this is where tempers flared. Slovenia and Croatia, the most advanced and productive republics and the biggest earners of foreign currency, argued that they should keep their gains. The backward republics, led by Serbia, argued that they needed major capital investments to bring them up to standards. Croats and Slovenes argued that such investments were inefficient and wasteful.¹⁰ (Similar regional resentments are found in Italy, where the prosperous north does not like being taxed to develop the poor south.) The break came when Zagreb and Ljubljana could no longer tolerate the profligate printing of money by the Serbian-controlled federal government in Belgrade, which produced hyperinflation in the early 1990s. The Titoist slogan, "Brotherhood and Unity," by then rang hollow.

In 1990 republic elections—there never were nationwide elections—Franjo Tudjman, a former communist general turned Croatian chauvinist, won in Croatia, and Slobodan Milošević, a former communist banker turned Serbian chauvinist, won in Serbia. By that point, with the two strongest and most nationalistic personalities of Yugoslavia's two leading republics glaring at each other, breakup was inevitable. The immediate cause of Milošević's victory was agitation by the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo for greater autonomy. Milošević crushed them with a heavy hand, and most Serbs approved. After some efforts to hold Yugoslavia together as an even looser confederation,

Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in 1991. But at this same time, or even a little before, Serbian areas of Croatia (Slovenia has few non-Slovenes), and then of Bosnia, which had been accumulating weapons for some time, declared their self-rule.

Implications for Policy

In this difficult situation, what should we be trying to accomplish? First, we must realize that no particular territorial or national arrangement in what used to be Yugoslavia now speaks to US interests. Futile US diplomatic attempts to hold Yugoslavia together were based on a Cold War mentality and a misappraisal of the situation. During the Cold War, we had a clear interest in keeping Yugoslavia together and out of Soviet hands. Soviet use of Adriatic ports would have given a Soviet fleet direct access to the open seas for the first time. They would have leaped over the NATO-controlled strategic waterways of the Turkish Straits, the Skagerrak, and North Cape. This would have been a severe blow to NATO and the entire Mediterranean littoral. But now both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have fallen apart, and the Adriatic ports have lost some of their importance.

Further, whether there should be an independent Bosnia and its ultimate size and shape are none of our business. The fact that borders are being changed by force, on the other hand, is very much our business, as this undermines the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which upheld the inviolability of Europe's borders. International lawyers may quibble over whether the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe covers Yugoslavia's internal borders, which have now become international borders. (The US State Department unilaterally recognized the republic borders as permanent, but this has no binding effect on anyone, including us.)

By the same token, the borders Serbs have carved out for themselves are not our uppermost concern. Although enveloped in the fog of war, the Serbs' overall plan now seems clear. As Croatia and Bosnia moved toward separation, the largely Serb-officered Yugoslav army left large stocks of weaponry in Serbian villages in these two republics. These regions declared their independence from Croatia or Bosnia as the "Serbian Republic of Such-and-Such." Most Yugoslav males are familiar with arms, having served either in the national army or in territorial defense units. Village Serbs, often aided by the regular army or by self-styled *chetniks* (some of them nationalist fanatics, some simply criminals, and some both) disarmed and expelled or shot local policemen. They then began forcefully persuading Croats and Bosnians to leave. Hundreds were murdered. Serbian forces, with Belgrade's unpublicized but obvious backing, then consolidated these Serb-held regions by thrusts westward, across the northern part of Bosnia and into Croatia, and southward, down the eastern part of Bosnia to the sea, forming a de facto

“Greater Serbia.” The government in Belgrade all the while denied that it was directing anything; these, it was alleged, were mere “spontaneous” actions of Serbian communities fighting for their lives.

The appalling manner in which Serbs have enlarged their borders—indiscriminate shelling of cities, property seizures, forced emigration, and outright murder, all under the label of “ethnic cleansing”—approaches genocide and should thus concern us deeply. Not only does it violate our conscience and all international norms, it sets a glaring example for an Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union riven with similar problems. If not stopped in ex-Yugoslavia, it will likely inspire others.

Russian chauvinists, of whom there are many, look upon Serbian actions with approval, for they face situations analogous to that of the Serbs.¹¹ In many areas ethnic Russians living outside of Russia—some 25 million of them—have come under local nationalist pressures. The Russian army has already come to the aid of Russians in Moldova, the largely Romanian-speaking republic that borders Romania (and will someday likely join it). Over 400 were reported killed.

A strategy with some hope of success should start with recognition of what the Serbian nationalists—and not all Serbs are nationalists—wish to accomplish. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević made no secret of his goal. If Yugoslavia is to fall apart, he has argued for the last few years, Serbia must protect all Serbs, no matter where they live.¹² This self-imposed mandate leads to the construction of a Greater Serbia that includes most of Bosnia and much of Croatia. During World War II, Serbs were indeed massacred in these areas by local fascists, the Croatian Ustasha. When Croatian President Tudjman in 1990 announced his plan for a “Greater Croatia,” it sounded to Serbian ears exactly like the Nazi puppet state where these atrocities occurred. Serbs see themselves—like nationalists everywhere—as the aggrieved party, entitled to preemptive, compensatory justice in the form of secure lands under exclusively Serbian control.

What We Can Do

An indirect strategy of putting pressure on Serbia by political and military support for Serbia’s neighbors—Albania, Hungary, and Bulgaria—might contain chaos in the Balkans and set an example for Europe-wide security carried out chiefly by Europeans.

Several of the borders of ex-Yugoslavia could be contested.¹³ Bosnia is not the only territory that concerns Serbian nationalists. Kosovo, the heart of the ancient Serbian kingdom that was destroyed by the Ottomans in 1389, is now 90 percent Albanian. Serbian nationalists swear they will never relinquish Kosovo, and Serbian commanders in Bosnia boast gleefully that when they are finished they will subject Kosovo to a far bloodier ethnic cleansing. Arms are

The appalling manner in which Serbs have enlarged their borders —indiscriminate shelling of cities, property seizures, forced emigration, and outright murder, all under the label of “ethnic cleansing”—approaches genocide.

arriving in both the Serbian and Albanian communities of Kosovo. Albania would be powerless to stop the slaughter. A Western political and military presence in Albania, however, would warn Serbian nationalists against the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. Hints of a “Greater Albania,” precisely what Serbs have long feared is the Albanians’ ultimate intention, would also give Serbs pause.

Kosovo is clearly the flashpoint. If violence erupts here, Albania would surely be drawn in. If the violence were to spread to the Albanian areas along the western border of Macedonia, Macedonia would be drawn into the fray, and Bulgaria would surely take an interest. We could be witnessing the start of a Third Balkan War; the first two narrowly preceded World War I.

Even worse, this “Balkan War” scenario could spread to the north, where there is a parallel to the Kosovo situation. The Vojvodina north of Belgrade is simply a continuation of Hungary’s Pannonian Basin and for centuries was Hungarian. A substantial Hungarian minority (officially 341,000 but unofficially perhaps 500,000, as some Hungarians are fearful of stating their ethnic origin) still lives there.¹⁴ A smaller number live in Slavonia, the part of Croatia south of the Drava River, some of which was seized recently by Serbs. Both Croats and ethnic Hungarians fled to Hungary. If Serbs enlarge their “ethnic cleansing” in the Vojvodina and Slavonia, there will be many more refugees. Hungary has assisted the refugees but is financially strapped. Its army is small and poorly equipped,¹⁵ unable to defend its southern border. Yugoslav (i.e. Serbian) jets have repeatedly intruded into Hungarian airspace, knowing the Hungarians can do nothing.

The plight of ethnic Magyars living outside of Hungary’s pre-World War I borders--some three million of them--looms large in domestic Hungarian politics. Hungarians feel that two million of their brothers are under threat in Transylvania. The 600,000 in breakaway Slovakia likewise feel threatened by the Slovak nationalist regime. How will Budapest react to the mistreatment of ethnic Hungarians on three sides?¹⁶ The possibility of a Balkan War engulfing every country from Slovakia south cannot be discounted. The trigger would likely be Serbian mistreatment of Hungarians in the Vojvodina. One way to dampen this prospect would be to deliver European and American

political and military aid to Hungary. This would put pressure on Serbia's northern flank and remind Serbs that Hungary felt entitled to seize these areas in World War II. The point is not to support Hungarian irredentism but to get the Serbs' attention and deliver the message: "You are vulnerable. If you try ethnic cleansing here, you will pay for it."

Fuel has arrived in Serbia by barge up the Danube, possibly from a Russia that still remembers the Serb-Russian pan-Slavic ties. Russia, of course, does not border the Danube, and it is also possible that the materials were purchased from Romania, which has no territorial or ethnic quarrel with Serbia. Control of Danube River traffic by international inspectors has already begun.¹⁷

Bulgaria could be offered a sweetener for its cooperation in controlling Danube traffic. Europe and the United States could "view with understanding" Bulgaria's historical and linguistic ties to Macedonia, which was never independent but was part of the medieval Bulgarian kingdom. The language is virtually Bulgarian, although in the interwar years Serbs said it was simply bad Serbian. Macedonia has declared a problematic independence. Sofia has recognized Macedonia as an independent state but not, significantly, as an independent nation, thus holding the door open for eventual absorption. The West need do nothing more than "understand" Sofia's viewpoint. The object here would be to dissuade Serbia from trying to recover Macedonia by force.

In sum, an indirect strategy of political and military pressure around Serbia would deliver the message: "You have a lot to lose. Cease your ethnic cleansing or we will support those countries who have kinfolk in the lands you claim."

Now, can or should anything be done for Bosnia-Herzegovina? Historically, it has never really been independent but was a province, successively, of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. The Nazis gave most of it to the Croatian puppet state during World War II and raised a Bosnian Muslim SS division. (There are few angels in the Balkans.) An independent Bosnia has nothing to do with US national interests. A stable Balkans does have something to do with US national interests in the general sense that chaos anywhere is a potential enemy. Fighting for Bosnian independence would mean a wrong-headed and nasty war that would merely bring greater instability to the region and more civilian casualties. An indirect approach of constraining the Serbs by putting political and military pressure on Serbia's borders, on the other hand, would set an example of multilateral European and American commitment to stability.

Some may object that even an indirect strategy of pressure on Serbia is fraught with the peril of open-ended involvement. Support for Serbia's neighbors could trigger the Third Balkan War that we wish to avoid. This scenario could start to unfold, with no help from us, the minute "ethnic cleansing" begins in Kosovo. True, if we are on the scene, we may get caught

up in conflict that has little direct relationship to US interests. But if we are not on the scene, we will be unable to stabilize a dangerous situation. The bottom-line question: Is there a general US interest in opposing chaos and genocide? If the answer is yes—and I believe it is—then the modest steps recommended above are indicated.

NOTES

1. For an argument in favor of direct Western military involvement, see George Kenney, "Blueprint for a Wider War," *The Washington Post*, 30 September 1992, p. A25.

2. Referred to hereafter simply as Bosnia. Herzegovina is the southernmost fifth of the republic, roughly triangle-shaped, whose chief city is Mostar.

3. The precise number of German divisions occupying Yugoslavia varied over the course of the war but was never more than half a dozen. Canadian Major General Lewis MacKenzie (USAWC '83), when in charge of UN relief efforts in Sarajevo, mentioned 30 German divisions (*Time*, 17 August 1992, p. 25), but this was likely the peak number of German divisions in the entire Balkans.

4. Standard sources for Serbian and later Yugoslav history include Rebecca West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* (New York: Viking, 1941); Robert Lee Wolf, *The Balkans in Our Time* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1956), and Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia* (New York: Praeger, 1971).

5. The estimate was compiled by Jozo Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia During the Second World War," in Wayne Vucinich, ed., *Contemporary Yugoslavia—Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1969), pp. 78 and 367.

6. The best explanation for who joined the Partisans and why is to be found in Richard V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 121-22.

7. For a close-up portrait by the British brigadier who advised Tito during the war, see Fitzroy Maclean, *Josip Broz Tito: A Pictorial Biography* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980).

8. Although old, perhaps the best analysis of the Tito-Stalin split is Adam Ulam, *Titoism and the Cominform* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952).

9. For recent works on the failure and breakdown of Tito's nationalities policy, see Sabrina Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991*, 2d ed. (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1992) and Alex N. Dragnich, *Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia*, (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1993).

10. An excellent study that anticipates later developments is Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1968), especially chapter 6, "Economics and the National Question."

11. A frightening estimate of how the Yugoslav model might influence Russians was offered by Soviet nationalities expert Paul A. Goble, "Serbians' Success Echoes in Russia," *The New York Times*, 13 August 1992, p. A23.

12. See, for example, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, East Europe, 16 May 1992, p. 79, and 26 June 1990, p. 51. Stephen Engelberg also has some blunt quotations from Milošević in "Carving Out a Greater Serbia," *New York Times Magazine*, 1 September 1991, pp. 19-20.

13. The former Austrian military attaché in Belgrade, Colonel Gunther Wolfframm, studied the status of Yugoslavia's borders in "The Implications for Yugoslav Borders of the Dissolution of the Yugoslav State," Individual Study Project, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pa., 1992.

14. Edith Oltay, "Hungarians in Yugoslavia Seek Guarantees for Minority Rights," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Report on Eastern Europe*, 20 September 1991, p. 40.

15. The Hungarian army was always the smallest of the Warsaw Pact. In conditions of financial exigency, the new democratic government has shrunk the army even farther, to about 60,000. See Ivan Volgyes and Zoltan Barany, "Hungarian Defenders of the Homeland," in Jeffrey Simon, ed., *European Security Policy after the Revolutions of 1989* (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1991), p. 360.

16. Michael G. Roskin, "Slovak Separation and Central European Security," paper delivered before the Northeastern Political Science Association, Providence, R.I., 12 November 1992, to be published in *East European Quarterly* in 1993.

17. David Binder, "U.S. Sending Officials to Balkans as Monitors," *The New York Times*, 17 September 1992, p. A15. The story did not discuss the source of the oil-laden barges, but it did point out that Romania had agreed to cooperate in the inspection, suggesting that some country other than Romania in the Black Sea region is the source.