

THE JERUSALEM QUESTION: CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT

by

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The Gordian Knot of the 20th century may be the Jerusalem question. Thus far we have witnessed no reincarnation of Alexander the Great, who cut the original knot, and those who would play the role of a modern Alexander—whether Moslem, Christian, or Jew—seem merely to pull the knot tighter.

Nevertheless, the Jerusalem question deserves new study. The situation has changed significantly since the 1948 partition and the 1967 reunification. Many of the old proposals to resolve the Jerusalem question no longer apply, yet they remain in the forefront, clouding the judgments of negotiators and politicians who face difficult choices among seemingly irreconcilable alternatives.

Jerusalem is now a major city, encompassing a region that has tripled in population since 1948. This beautiful, teeming, and complex city, whether it has reached its present status through natural growth or deliberate self-serving policy on the part of the Israelis, now presents a series of hard realities that must be reckoned with. The Arabs have changed in political, economic, and social outlook as both the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel have made inroads into the mentality of the citizens of East Jerusalem. Most significantly, Israel has made peace with Egypt, and both sides have "A Framework for Peace" upon which to build. The old "solutions" for Jerusalem need reexamination in light of these new events.


This article will suggest an approach to this intractable problem through an examination of the current issues that must be addressed in

a possible Jerusalem settlement after four bitter wars and 13 years of government under unified rule. Previous studies have generally concentrated on single issues or else blended all issues together. This latter approach tends to create the impression that the problem is indeed insoluble and that no compromise is possible. Through an examination of three predominant and distinct issues—sovereignty, municipal government, and the holy places—it will be possible to understand the contribution, or complication, that each brings to a possible settlement.¹ Approaches to a compromise solution will then become clearer. Finally, after reviewing the pressures influencing a settlement we will be in a position to anticipate what lies ahead for Jerusalem.

THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Territorial sovereignty is the overriding issue in any settlement. The return or retention of lands rightly owned has been at the heart of the Arab-Israeli dispute since the conclusion of the 1948 war. Following UN Resolution 242, in which most Arab states agreed to recognize Israel, control of territory has been the core of the problem. In the case of Jerusalem, the issue is further complicated by the deep attachment of both Jews and Muslims to the holy places, with the added concern of Western states for the same holy places.

The Israelis have expressed their views on this issue many times; they speak with a common voice. Teddy Kollek, from his special perspective as mayor of the city, summarizes their feelings eloquently:



I do not think you can find any Israelis who are willing to give up Jerusalem. They cannot and will not. This beautiful golden city is the heart and soul of the Jewish people. You cannot live without a heart and soul. If you want one simple word to symbolize all of Jewish history, that word would be Jerusalem.²

The roots of the Israelis' attachment to Jerusalem are well known. Their political images of Israel date from the First Temple, circa 1000 B.C., when Jerusalem became the capital of the Jewish nation. Their historical association with the city, though broken repeatedly, has always been reestablished. Scriptures, prayer, and poetry preserved the memory of Jerusalem for those who did not live there. The claims to Jerusalem of Moslem or Christian, Arab or Westerner, do not have the same validity, the same exclusive attachment, as do Jewish claims.

To strengthen their hold on the city through "irreversible" changes in the city's life, the Israelis have closely united East and West Jerusalem. They speak with considerable pride of their accomplishments.

For example, free access to self-administered holy places in a completely open city is now possible. Further, Arabs and Jews enjoy a high rate of development. In particular, social and municipal services available to Arabs—including water, electricity, roads, sewage, health, welfare, and education—far exceed those that they enjoyed under Jordanian rule. Arab labor is organized and enjoys higher wages and benefits, as well as better living conditions, than under Jordanian rule. Jobs for professionals are either available or generated. All these accomplishments are real and, in Western eyes, of considerable value.

The reader familiar with the Arab viewpoint quickly sees, however, that the Arab longing for sovereignty is not satisfied by these benefits. Forty years ago an Arab told the Peel Commission:

You say we are better off: you say my house has been enriched by the strangers who have entered it. But it is my house, and I did not invite the strangers in, or ask them to enrich it, and I do not care how poor or bare it is if only I am master in it.³

The same feelings are prevalent today in Arab-inhabited East Jerusalem, despite the unquestioned material progress.

Nor is the fact lost on the Israelis who deal directly with the Arabs in East Jerusalem. Mayor Kollek and his former assistant for Arab affairs, Meron Benvenisti, admit openly to the refusal of the Arabs to accept improved living conditions as a substitute for sovereignty. Following the euphoria attending unification after the 1967 war, Israeli optimism that the Arabs would accept a benign Israeli rule faded. General strikes by East Jerusalemites, their public enthusiasm over the initial Arab victories in the October War of 1973, and their sullen attitudes over Israeli occupation policies eventually made it clear that the Arabs had not accepted the unification of Jerusalem.

To the extreme Israeli nationalists, who believed they were in Jerusalem by right, Arab objections were of little consequence. To the moderate center,

however, there was concern and even anguish over the plight of the Arabs, even though the moderates agreed fully with the nationalists that Jerusalem was rightfully an Israeli city. The Arab rejection of this position seemed to the moderates to be a rejection of their sincere wishes for reconciliation and peace. Consequently, they rationalized Israeli control of the city on several bases:

- The stronger Israeli ties to Jerusalem, compared to those of the Arabs, justified the Israeli presence.

- Democracy and self-determination permitted the Israeli majority to rule in the city.

- Considerable efforts could be made to extend the benefits of economic and social development to the Arabs in recompense for Israeli rule.

- Since the Arabs' real concerns were religious, not nationalistic, satisfaction of their religious requirements alone would solve the problem.⁴

In effect, the Israelis attempted to avoid viewing the conflict with the Arabs as a question of sovereignty: "All of these approaches shared a common element: the desire to avoid the focal point of the problem, which is a deep-seated national and political conflict and a head-on collision between two legitimate, but conflicting, attachments."⁵ Despite the air of unreality clinging to its rationalizations, however, there is no question that Israeli policy clearly continues to insist on a unified city, under exclusive sovereignty of Israel, with no room for a compromise granting political or sovereign status to any Arab political entity.

The Arab point of view is equally adamant. On their side, the attachment to Jerusalem is strong and deeply felt. For Arab citizens, this attachment has both religious and emotional roots. It is not measured against Israeli claims of *greater* attachment, which Arabs see as Israeli self-delusion, but rather against an absolute standard of hundreds of years of unbroken life in the city. Allusions to Jordan's neglect of East Jerusalem from 1948 to 1967, or to Jerusalem's status as the third holiest city in Islam (while it is Judaism's only holy city), mean little to them. They have always cared for their city and have always

worshipped in its holy mosques. They do not accept claims that Israeli sovereignty is more justified than their own.


During the British Mandate from 1922 to 1948, Arab Jerusalem served prominently as a social, cultural, and economic center of the region. A Palestinian national consciousness developed there in the latter stages and accelerated under subsequent Jordanian rule. At first, this consciousness reflected dissatisfaction with Jordanian discrimination in economic and political spheres; later, with limitations on political freedom that led to suppression and armed clashes, the consciousness deepened. Jerusalem then became the center of active Palestinian opposition to the Jordanian Government.⁶

Under Israeli rule of the city, this same Palestinian nationalism continued its rise with a new and stronger focus. Mistreatment by Israelis (as perceived by Arab eyes), the growth of Jewish communities in East Jerusalem, and the lack of progress toward a return to sovereignty have all conjoined to defeat the sincere and strenuous efforts of Mayor Kollek to secure harmony with the Arabs. Acts of civil disobedience and the avoidance of nearly all forms of political cooperation are the outward manifestations of this nationalism. The PLO has of course contributed its efforts to these ends, both in Jerusalem and in the West Bank. In the process, it has added a new dimension to Palestinian nationalism, greatly complicating Israeli hopes of an accommodation.

As a result, continued Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem is just as intolerable to the Arabs as a new partition of the city would be to the Israelis:

Without East Jerusalem, there would be no West Bank. It is the navel, the pivotal link between Nablus to the north and Hebron to the south. . . . It evokes the proudest Palestinian and Arab historical memories. . . . It is the natural capital of Arab Palestine.⁷

The hard truth, however, is that the Israelis control the city and will not give back East



Jerusalem at least until the Arabs negotiate a final overall settlement of the conflict, if even then.

For the moment, the Arabs' only choice is to hold out. In the long term, they see that their strength lies in their growing population, approaching 100,000 in East Jerusalem and 1.1 million in the West Bank and Gaza areas as a whole. According to one Arab leader:

We shall continue to live in Jerusalem; we shall beget children and take your National Insurance Grants for them; we shall educate them at your expense; we shall do business with you and make money; we shall take advantage of your freedom of speech to call to our people to hold out We won't give you any excuse to throw us out. By the mere fact of being here, we shall remind you every day that the problem of Jerusalem has yet to be solved.⁸

But holding out is not easy; the feelings of despair and frustration remain strong.

In sum, there is no simple solution to the question of sovereignty. The issue turns on the reestablishment of a partition line or a compromise—perhaps partaking of the miraculous—that will permit the Israelis to claim they control a unified city while providing tradeoffs to the Arabs that meet their legitimate aspirations. Is this possible? What are the best offers on record from the two sides in the search for a compromise solution? If these offers are still far apart, do they provide a basis for further discussion?

On the Arab side, Walid Khalidi has spoken directly to the Jerusalem question. While not an official spokesman for the Palestinians, Khalidi is a native of Jerusalem and a respected academician who has published widely on the Palestinian problem. Central to his approach is this claim:

A partition solution does not mean the erection of a wall. The frontiers could remain open between the capital of Israel in West Jerusalem and the capital of Arab Palestine in East Jerusalem.⁹

He insists, however, that Arab sovereignty as it existed prior to 1967 must return to East Jerusalem and that the military occupation of this portion of the city must end.

The return to partition in its original state, with walls, wire, mines, and no access to the Western Wall for the Jews, is not part of this proposal. Rather, an interstate municipal council would operate and supervise essential city services. Provisions for freedom of movement and residence would be established. An interfaith council of officials representing the three religions would oversee operation of the holy places. Special provisions would allow an irreversible right of access to the Western Wall, also known as the Wailing Wall.¹⁰ The underlying assumption of this proposal is that return of Arab rule would be accompanied by every possible concession to Israeli interests that did not abrogate Arab sovereignty.

The most serious and balanced Israeli suggestion for compromise with the Arabs comes again from Teddy Kollek:

Everything possible shall be done to ensure unhindered development of the Arab way of life in the Arab sections of the city and to ensure the Arabs a practical religious, cultural, and commercial governance over their own daily lives.¹¹

These measures include a free press, freedom to travel, an Arab curriculum in the schools, economic opportunities in Israel, and a choice of citizenship. Every effort would be made to provide equal municipal services. The cultural and social contacts among the communities would be increased. Finally, Kollek specifies that all holy places would be freely accessible and administered by their adherents.¹²

The most striking aspects of this proposal are that it is already Israeli policy in Jerusalem, it is the maximum the Israelis have conceded, and it has not proved acceptable to the Arabs. Several additional Israeli concessions regarding Arab sovereignty over the Temple Mount and the degree of municipal autonomy can be predicted, but Israeli control over East Jerusalem will not be yielded. Sovereignty is

clearly the overriding issue, and, if approached in isolation, it may be unsolvable. With compromises on the other two basic issues, however, there may be room to maneuver on the issue of sovereignty.

THE ISSUE OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

For many years, the form of peacemaking in the Middle East has been as difficult to find as the substance of the peace itself. In Jerusalem, a similar phenomenon persists. The choice of a municipal structure to govern the city—the form of government—can have a major impact on the resolution of the substance of sovereignty.

Jerusalem's needs in city management today are fundamentally different from those facing the city after 1948. In large part, this is because of deliberate Israeli policy to manipulate the city's growth and development into an interdependent, interlocking, unified urban area. A powerful Jerusalemite consciousness has arisen in which Jewish and Arab work patterns have been interwoven, with both sides depending heavily on a large labor pool from East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Arab and Jewish residential areas exist side by side in East Jerusalem as part of a carefully contrived yet controversial building program. Municipal, commercial, and educational services and facilities are steadily expanding, linking the two Jerusalems tightly.¹³

These realities have emerged from a comprehensive Israeli strategy for growth and development that has promoted settlement by its own citizens throughout the city as well as outside its limits. The legality of these acts is doubtless debatable. What is important to note, however, is that they must be dealt with by both sides, just as Palestinian terrorism and nonrecognition of Israel must be dealt with in the search for a settlement.

In this rapidly changing situation, several special features of city government must be preserved to provide a basis for joint rule. At the least, each side must be assured of a structure that allows free political expression at the local and the city-council levels. In

addition, the opportunities for friction in the city council or other joint bodies where decisions are made must be reduced to a minimum. The governing structure must be capable of managing a city of 400,000 while disallowing either side the ability to dominate or obstruct the government. One hopes that this municipal framework would be capable of providing sound urban management through balanced growth while coordinating the economic, ecological, aesthetic, and religious considerations that are so important to Jerusalem.¹⁴

Perhaps the hope of building such a framework seems wildly optimistic. If so, that is the measure of the challenge. To be acceptable, the governing structure must permit the Arabs to sense that they are masters in their own house, and it must give the Israelis confidence that Jerusalem will not again see a partition line of mines and wire.

Despite the enormity of the task, there are different forms of city government that might satisfy these requirements. For example, a centralized municipality could reflect elected and proportional representation on the city council and within the administration.¹⁵ Majority vote would guarantee a solid Jewish majority at every level and would thus be clearly unacceptable to the Arabs. Proportional representation, on

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the other hand, would solve one aspect of the problem—the Arabs' exclusion from the governing body—but it would still leave them with a Jewish majority at the seat of power and no guarantee of local autonomy.

This latter concern could be alleviated by shifting to a second approach, a two-tiered decentralized municipality that would create Arab and Jewish boroughs with specific and distinct jurisdictional authority, functioning under a "roof organization" or city council elected by the ethnic constituencies.¹⁶ Obviously, Jewish anxieties would increase with the prospect of free political expression for Arabs, even at the local level. Israeli-Arab friction in decisionmaking pertaining to those matters falling to Arab authority alone, however, would be considerably reduced.

Another approach to the municipal question was suggested earlier in the Walid Khalidi proposal:

A joint interstate great municipal council could operate and supervise certain essential common services, while residual services would fall under the separate municipalities of each sovereign state.¹⁷

Although sovereignty would be divided, the city would remain open. Lord Caradon, British representative to the United Nations in 1967, has offered a nearly identical proposal. The Arab and Israeli Jerusalems would become sister cities as part of a greater Jerusalem. Each city would be administered under its own sovereignty, but full freedom of movement and communications would obtain. An international high commissioner and a special statute for Jerusalem would provide for municipal services beyond the scope of the sister cities.¹⁸

Although common threads run through these proposals, each proposal is discrete, each has drawbacks, and none is acceptable to both sides. After treating the holy places in Jerusalem, we shall be able to see more clearly the role that compromises in the choice of municipal government could play in a future settlement.

THE ISSUE OF THE HOLY PLACES

The battle for control of Jerusalem's holy

places has lasted literally for centuries. The holy places, along with sovereignty and municipal government, are the three thorns in Jerusalem's crown, and no lasting settlement of the Jerusalem question and the Arab-Israeli conflict will be found until the issue of the holy places is resolved.

Although there are in fact 30 official holy shrines in the greater Jerusalem-Bethlehem area,¹⁹ three of these constitute the core of the problem. We begin with the Haram al-Sharif, the Temple Mount, where a solution will be the hardest to achieve. Israel holds sovereign control over this major Muslim shrine, which includes the Dome of the Rock and the Al Aqsa Mosque. The Arabs are allowed to administer and maintain the area independently. Israel provides a guard post, commanded by an Israeli Muslim, and Jews are prohibited by the Chief Rabbinate from praying at the site,²⁰ despite the fact that it is also the location of Israel's Second Temple, destroyed in 70 A.D., and quite possibly the site of the First Temple as well.

While religious conflict over the shrine is muted, deep and bitter conflict exists over its sovereign control. The Muslim Arabs do not possess what they view as even the minimum rights of sovereignty—authority to fly their own flag, to use Muslim currency, to cite the name of the Muslim ruler during Friday prayers, and to post their own guard.²¹ Israeli assertions that the Muslims have free access to the Haram miss the point. Access does not equal sovereignty, and for many Arabs outside the West Bank even access is encumbered.

The second of the major problematic holy places is the Jewish Western Wall. Until the Israeli unification of Jerusalem in 1967, it was the primary source of conflict over the holy places. From 1945 to 1967, the Western Wall and all of the Old City were in Jordanian hands, with access completely denied to Jews. The situation is reversed now, with this most holy Jewish shrine under Israeli control. It is inconceivable that Israel would accept any solution that returned this shrine to Arab or even international control.

The third major holy site is composed of the Christian shrines grouped in the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. Until the 1930's, the

Jerusalem question was largely a European, and thus a Christian, question. Now that the city responds mainly to Arab and Jewish interests, Christian concerns have moved to the background. Primary, and occasionally heated, attention centers on access to and internal control of the Christian holy places, with the issue of sovereignty important only to the extent that it would affect the requirements for access, internal control, or religious liberty in a broader sense. Participation by Christians in secular rule is not an issue. The status quo of 1852, honored by the Israelis as well as the Jordanians before them, provides for the basic Christian concerns. Their communities are self-administered, and external law and order is provided by the sovereign power. So long as the essential Christian needs for access and local autonomy are satisfied, any preference by local prelates for a particular sovereign power is largely irrelevant. Furthermore, a solution to the Jerusalem question which achieves Muslim and Jewish agreement should in all likelihood be acceptable to the Christian churches and, through them, to the states of Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

If the outward issue concerning the holy places is that of free access, the underlying problem is sovereignty. Control by one faith or one sovereign state, however administered, inevitably allows the others neither control nor confidence, particularly on the Jewish-Muslim sides of the triangle. To circumvent this impasse, proposals for internationalization of Jerusalem have developed. With competing nationalisms unable to agree on a solution, it has been argued that an impartial outside force must intervene, so that there is neither winner nor loser among the contending parties. Christians, especially, have argued that Jerusalem is holy to three faiths and should be superintended by a neutral international body.

One of the best summaries of the various proposals for internationalization is that of Evan M. Wilson, US Consul to Jerusalem

during the 1967 war.²² He outlines three general approaches: full, partial, and functional internationalization. Full internationalization would include the entire city of 100 square miles and nearly 400,000 people. UN resolutions of 1947-51 provided for this solution under the auspices of that international body. For different reasons, both Israel and Jordan firmly opposed this plan then and have since restated their opposition to it frequently.

Partial internationalization would make the first scheme more workable by confining the internationalized area to the Old City, also called the Walled City. The problems of an international municipal government would be far more manageable for this area, covering a single square kilometer which includes all the major holy places. On the other hand, both the Arabs and the Israelis would fiercely resist this loss of sovereignty over their shrines. Partial internationalization would be only a partial solution anyway, since the entire issue of Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem would still have to be addressed.

Functional internationalization is the third variation. A special authority would assume control of the holy places only and provide for their internal administration under international protection. The sovereign power would cede to this authority the power to conduct its affairs freely, within certain negotiated limits. This approach also would be only a partial solution. It might be more acceptable to both sides, since there would be much less loss of sovereignty, but the larger question of Arab-Israeli sovereignty over the city would remain unresolved.

No major actor seriously proposes internationalization as a solution to Jerusalem today, except perhaps Saudi Arabia. Israel's leaders have repeatedly stated, from Ben-Gurion to those of the present day, that this approach solves none of the major issues. Jordan has been equally opposed. In the Jordanian view, the Haram and East Jerusalem are not only Arab, they are Islamic and belong to Moslems everywhere. The Israelis stress that a

committee cannot run a large and complex city such as Jerusalem. They argue that officials appointed to an international ruling body would respond as much to the wishes of their own national sponsor as to Jerusalem's needs. In addition, the strong Christian support for internationalization in the 1940's, primarily from the Vatican, has diminished greatly.²³

TOWARD A SOLUTION

The three basic issues involved in a Jerusalem settlement—territorial sovereignty, municipal government, and the holy places—have been discussed separately to reveal more clearly their individual dynamics. The three are closely interrelated, however, and any realistic overall solution demands that they be considered in combination. The missing ingredients that have defeated all previous Israeli, Arab, and Western attempts at a solution—trust and willingness to compromise—are still missing. One may regret this fact endlessly, but it is more productive to accept this absence as a given for the time being and to search for ways to gradually create the enveloping trust that will permit a technically efficient solution to emerge.

Kissinger's diplomacy after the October War in 1973 produced the step-by-step agreements of Sinai I and II. These accords initiated a process of confidence-building between Israel and Egypt that permitted the two sides to sign a peace treaty six years later. The problems of Jerusalem can be similarly approached. The holy city need not wait for a single comprehensive solution that will resolve all issues at once.

The starting point must be Israeli willingness to share political power with the Arabs of East Jerusalem. Local autonomy for Arab neighborhoods is a logical first step. Then, after time proves to the Israelis that their control of a unified Jerusalem has not suffered, political power could be extended to East Jerusalem at the next higher municipal level, the borough (for example, Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah). While remaining subordinate to the Jerusalem City Council, these

boroughs would provide representatives to that body. Sovereignty over Jerusalem would still rest in Israel's hands while, one could expect, trust and a spirit of cooperation would be developing between Arab and Israeli leaders.

Ultimately, years later, the question of Arab sovereignty in an East Jerusalem without walls or barbed wire, could be raised and resolved by protagonists with a shared experience of governing Jerusalem together. In this manner the threads of sovereignty and municipal government might be woven into a settlement pattern.

Similarly, the threads of sovereignty and the holy places might be interlaced. The Haram al-Sharif is one of the most contentious issues in any potential Jerusalem settlement. There will be no solution until both sides are satisfied with the conditions of its control. Israel could begin by offering the Arabs symbolic sovereignty through the use of an Arab flag, guards, currency, and a Muslim ruler's name in prayers. Other options include the establishment of a nonpolitical Muslim regime to govern the Haram or the return of the mosques and courtyard to Arab sovereign control. Israel would experience difficulty offering even such token concessions, while the Arabs would have great difficulty accepting such half-measures unless it were clear that they were being taken in expectation of full sovereignty at some indefinite future date. However, no substantive accommodations will ever be possible in the absence of mutual trust, and mutual trust will not be possible until experience has been gained with modest incremental accommodations. Concessions by Israel which give ground on the control of the Haram without jeopardizing Israeli sovereignty over the city would help immensely in building confidence and in gaining time for trust to grow.

Other actions can also contribute to such a goal. The Arabs are extremely sensitive to the questions of education policy, business and banking operations, land expropriation, Israeli taxes, and dual citizenship. Israelis for their part are just as sensitive to the matter of cooperation with the Arabs concerning joint

development of the city's services and growth patterns. Mutual concessions and cooperation in these areas would help improve the climate for the more difficult decisions to come later. It cannot be emphasized too much that the essential ingredient in a final settlement is for the Arab leadership to sense positive and irreversible change in political control, while the Israeli leadership gains confidence that this power-sharing is accepted by responsible Arabs in the spirit of keeping Jerusalem a permanently open city.

True, public declarations of Arab and Israeli leaders offer no encouragement on this score. The widespread condemnation of President Sadat by the Arab world following his visit to Jerusalem, the even stronger outcries following the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the slow progress of US emissaries Strauss and Linowitz make it appear that we may have seen the last of peacemaking in the Middle East for some time. Positive signs do exist, however, both as part of long-term trends in the area and as part of the forces that have been set in motion by the progress toward peace in 1978 and early 1979.²⁴

For Israel, population trends argue against retention of the territories occupied in 1967. Currently, the proportion is 2.9 million Jews to 1.5 million Arabs, if all of the West Bank and Gaza are included. In Jerusalem, the ratio is 260,000 Jews to 100,000 Arabs. Israeli emigration figures and Arab birthrate statistics indicate that a gradual convergence of population sizes is inevitable. Several hard choices are approaching for Israel: What political and social status will be given the Arabs? Will it be "separate but equal," with Arab labor and Jewish management? What degree of physical coercion will be employed? These questions are painful to face and more painful to answer, but any postponement will only increase the degree of Arab demographic pressure on Israel's eventual decision.

Financially, Israel continues to require US support. The arms, air bases, and economic aid promised by President Carter in March

1979 will be delivered over several years. US leverage exercised in support of Israeli concessions can be effective over time. Israel's high rate of inflation puts that nation under further pressure. If inflation remains high, Israel may have to deal with major internal problems involving its own citizens as well.

The momentum from the treaty with Egypt remains potentially the most encouraging sign of all. The accomplishments of 1979 are genuine; some would call them miraculous. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Begin has consistently stated that Israel will not permit the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In regard to Jerusalem, he has been equally blunt: "Two sovereignties in Jerusalem are not possible. There will be one and only one sovereignty in Jerusalem—that of Israel."²⁵ On the other hand, he and Israel both are committed publicly to the search for "autonomy," whatever that may mean to each participant. If achieved, even in the most narrow interpretation conceivable, the creation of recognized Palestinian leaders with official channels of political expression will be a major event. From that point, it is difficult to see how Israel can halt the process permanently at the level desired by Prime Minister Begin.

Assuming that the new Palestinian leaders exercising such "autonomy" do not force Israel's hand through a virulent anti-Israeli regime, the dynamics of limited self-rule will produce a momentum toward a Palestinian homeland that Israel will not find easy to resist. The struggle to establish the state of Israel provides a telling historical precedent. In fact, as one scholar has noted, "There are a number of cases in this century in which a people has achieved political independence in circumstances less promising than those now accorded to the Palestinians."²⁶

Despite the absence of any reference to Jerusalem in the Camp David accords, the city's role in the West Bank process is critical. On one hand, the city's geographical location provides Israel control of both the dominant approaches from the Jordan River and the access routes between the northern and southern quadrants of the West Bank.

Retention of East Jerusalem by Israeli military forces during a phased sharing of political power would permit Israel to retain some of the security that it fears would be lost when autonomy passed to the Arabs in the West Bank. If peaceful relations with the Palestinian Arabs ensue, the Israeli forces in Jerusalem will become less important as the time approaches for resolution of the final question of sovereignty in the city.

On the other hand, the Arabs cannot proceed toward autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza without Jerusalem. The role of the city must be addressed at the same time. If simultaneous progress on the two issues becomes an Arab demand, Israel's willingness to yield ground on both will not come any easier. It is more likely that movement could begin in the West Bank and Gaza first, but the issue of Jerusalem must soon follow or the process will stop. Outside impetus, in particular from the US, will certainly be needed to maintain the momentum.

The roles of King Hussein, President Sadat, and the PLO are also critical, not to mention those of Syria and Saudi Arabia. Their interests, especially those of Egypt and the PLO, will vitally affect the outcome. And in the spring of 1980, it takes courage, if not foolhardiness, to be optimistic about this outcome. Egyptian-Israeli negotiations seeking autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza may finally produce an agreement. In the short run, it is more likely they will not. Whatever the results, however, the numerous pressures from all sides for a settlement that includes Jerusalem will continue. The forces for peace unleashed by Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty have undoubtedly gained ground. The distance gained for Jerusalem may be quite short indeed, but it has been sufficient to warrant this reexamination of the issues touching the holy city. Those bold enough to offer a final solution should read the closing paragraph of Meron Benvenisti's *Jerusalem: The Torn City*:

It is not enough that the elusive solution be a brilliant intellectual exercise, full of good

will and objectivity. Jerusalem has experienced many of these. The real test of a solution is its accord with the changing reality and its practicability, but most important is the readiness of the two parties to compromise and cooperate. Without a readiness to compromise, no plan, however balanced and inspired, will succeed.²⁷

The solution sketched out here may be far from the mark. It is meant to stimulate continued search, not to pronounce final judgment. Many more must give their hearts and minds to Jerusalem before it yields to a peaceful solution.

NOTES

1. This organization of issues was used by Meron Benvenisti in his essential study, *Jerusalem: The Torn City* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minn. Press, 1976).
2. Teddy Kollek, "Jerusalem," *Foreign Affairs*, 55 (July 1977), 716.
3. Great Britain, *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, July 1937 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937), p. 131, quoted in Richard H. Pfaff, *Jerusalem: Keystone of an Arab-Israeli Settlement* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1969), p. 47.
4. Benvenisti, pp. 342-43.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 343.
6. Naim Sofer, "The Political Status of Jerusalem in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1948-1967," *Middle East Studies*, 12 (January 1976), 81.
7. Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State," *Foreign Affairs*, 5 (July 1978), 705.
8. Benvenisti, p. 353.
9. Khalidi, p. 706.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Kollek, "Jerusalem," p. 704. See also Teddy Kollek, *For Jerusalem* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1978).
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 704-08.
13. Saul B. Cohen, *Jerusalem: Bridging the Four Walls* (New York: Herzl Press, 1977), p. 27.
14. Benvenisti, pp. 372-78.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 373.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 374.
17. Khalidi, p. 706.
18. Lord Caradon, "The Only Solution," *Reader's Digest*, 106 (March 1975), 134-35.
19. H. Eugene Bovis, *The Jerusalem Question* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p. 142.
20. Kollek, "Jerusalem," p. 705.
21. Benvenisti, pp. 379-80.
22. Evan M. Wilson, *Jerusalem, Key to Peace* (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1970), pp. 134-36.
23. Kollek, "Jerusalem," pp. 702-03.
24. For one such encouraging recent sign, see Christopher Wren, "Egypt and Israel Reach an Accord on Palestinian Self-Rule Councils," *The New York Times*, 2 February 1980, pp. 1, 13.
25. David K. Shipler, "Begin Maintains Autonomy Views Not Changed," *The New York Times*, 19 April 1980, p. 4.
26. Robert W. Tucker, "Behind Camp David," *Commentary*, 66 (November 1978), 33.
27. Benvenisti, pp. 367-68.