

THE NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE AND POLICIES OF THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT

by

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The speed of Brazil's economic progress over the last decade lends considerable credence to the confident declarations of its civilian and military leaders: to realize the long-standing aspiration of *grandeza*—greatness, an outstanding position in the world. Foreign observers are beginning to take Brazil more seriously in world political and economic assessments and are speculating on the kind of foreign policy it may pursue in the future as its capabilities and interests grow.¹ In a recent attempt to quantify international "perceived power" relationships, Ray Cline, former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence and former Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, ranks Brazil sixth, just below France and China, and above Iran, the United Kingdom, and Canada.²

Recognition of Brazil's new status by the United States came in February 1976, when then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signed a ten-point accord in Brasília. In effect, it recognized Brazil as a major power, established mechanisms for semiannual consultations on global issues at the foreign minister level, and set up procedures and a binational governmental commission to advance cooperation in many areas and to prevent small frictions from developing into larger tensions. Brazil is the only Latin American country to receive such special treatment from Washington; previously, this was only afforded to our major European allies, Canada, and Japan.

The authoritarian military regime which has governed Brazil since 1964 and has

accomplished this more dynamic economy, internal political stability, and consequent international presence is substantially motivated by a pervasive guiding philosophy referred to as the "national security doctrine." This doctrine conditions the leadership's view of the world and its definition of the domestic and international interests and priorities of Brazil. Although the doctrine is not accepted by all politically relevant groups, its application by those holding power is so thorough that acquaintance with its origins, contents, diffusion, and impact on society is central to an understanding of civilian-military relations and the formulation of policy in Brazil today.

THE DOCTRINE: A PROGRAM FOR MAJOR POWER STATUS

Most of the national security doctrine which guides the present government is the intellectual product of the War College, or Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), of which one writer has said, "Rarely if ever has one educational institution . . . had so profound an impact upon the course of a nation's development."³

The ESG was founded in Rio de Janeiro in 1949 by officers of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) which fought with the Allies in Italy in WW II. The social philosophies of FEB officers were shaped and broadened by that international combat experience and by visits to the United States, where they were impressed with the American level of development, technical capabilities,

and style of cooperation. The advantages which they saw in this model influenced the ESG founders toward strong identification with democracy, the West, and the United States; support of capitalism; preference for a moderate variety of nationalism; distrust of emotional appeals; and cooperation with the United States for Brazilian defense and development.⁴

When Brazil created its Armed Forces General Staff in 1946 to coordinate the three services, a common command school was needed. With assistance from the US Army and the adoption of ideas from France's "Institut des Hautes Études de la Défense National," the ESG was organized as Brazil's highest senior service college for all the armed forces. It was structured along the general lines of the National War College in Washington, but with greater curriculum emphasis on internal developmental matters rather than on foreign or international military affairs. Also, given its Brazilian organizers' views of the military as a source of informed nationalism and a legitimate participant in the political process, from the first, the ESG's classes included a high percentage of university-trained civilians selected from a wide variety of professions to afford deliberate coverage for the school's teachings throughout the national leadership ranks.⁵ The US advisory mission remained until 1960, although a US military liaison officer was assigned to the ESG until 1973.

Through analysis, organization, and planning, the ESG became Brazil's first "think tank," aimed at national elites and reinforced in its purpose by its select corps of students and professors. No civilian institute or university could hope to compete with it in effectiveness. According to its directive, the goals of the ESG are:

To discuss and publish objective studies on theoretical and practical aspects of national security; to study and test a methodology for formulating and developing a policy for national security, including the relevant planning techniques; and to develop the practice of cooperation between sectors, thereby fostering a high

degree of understanding between the individuals concerned, and promoting effective collaboration between the various sectors responsible for national security.⁶

From the beginning, according to secret documents made public after the 1964 revolution, one of the main purposes of the ESG was to serve as a "school for statesmen," to educate national leaders, civilian and military, in technocratic management techniques and a philosophy which would unify the national elite and rationalize the decision-making process. By planning the proper reforms, the founders believed, Brazil's promise of greatness could be achieved.⁷

Two different types of courses are currently taught at the ESG: The Graduate War Course (for officers and civilians) and the Armed Forces General Staff Course (for military officers only). By March 1976, the ESG had a total graduate body of 2915—55.6 percent military and 44.4 percent civilian—including many who had reached governmental positions such as the presidency, minister of state, National Security Secretariat, National Intelligence Service, Armed Forces General Staff, ministerial officials, and executive advisory bureaus, and those who had scattered as well into a wide variety of private sector activities.⁸ By the early 1970's, nearly all active-duty generals and over half of the colonels in the army had graduated from the ESG.

The intensive Graduate War Course, actually more of a graduate level course on national security and development in the international context, is the most prestigious and has the most societal effect. It requires a full academic year, with major small-group research policy projects and domestic and international field trips. Speakers include top government officials, military leaders, Brazilian and foreign scholars, and foreign ambassadors. The course is divided into 9 weeks of doctrine, 25 of analysis of contemporary national problems, and 6 of policy orientation and planning methodology.⁹ Although the doctrine section

is orthodox in approach and is taught by the permanent staff, the remaining portions—more than three-quarters of the program—present the students with a wide variety of viewpoints and opportunities to elaborate on their own views without being restricted by a school solution. The doctrinal portion is intended to provide a common system of analysis rather than a set of predetermined solutions, but it still serves to make clear the official interpretations of national security and national interest.

The didactical organization of the doctrine is taken from the field of political philosophy of the state, interrelating concepts such as the components of national power (political, economic, psycho-social, and military), national objectives, national development, national security, war, politics, policy, and national strategy.¹⁰ The resultant logical system is known as the “method of national policy formulation,” used to arrive at the “national strategic concept,” or action plan for the most effective use of national power to attain national objectives (a plan first fully elaborated by the ESG in 1968). These principles are presented in a problem-solving, management-oriented manner relevant to the second and third parts of the course. Students learn evaluation of the political, economic, psycho-social, and military aspects of a problem and the essence of the planning-programming-budgeting system, with emphasis on practical application in their careers.

Former ESG Commander General Augusto Fragoso distinguishes two phases in the evolution of the doctrine, with the revolution of 1964, which installed the present system of government, as the watershed.¹¹ In the Cold War atmosphere of the 1950's, doctrinal and methodological attention was devoted largely to classic external defense, logistics, and Brazil's role in a possible WW III; the domestic side was seen in the narrow aspects of a national base for defensive war-making power, probably against Communism. During these years the school developed—as charged in its regulations—a truly national focus, a method of national

interest analysis, a teamwork approach, a doctrine, and a system to publicize it, all innovations for Brazil. Its emphasis upon planning aided general acceptance of the concept by the government. Fidelity to democratic ideals was its chief political stance, to reinforce ideological identification with the “Christian West.” The strongest ESG intellectual current during the 1950's was the geopolitical thought of Golbery do Couto e Silva, then a member of the ESG staff, later the founder and first head of the National Intelligence Service, and presently, as a retired General, the minister coordinator and key advisor to the presidency of General Ernesto Geisel.¹²

The study of subversion and internal revolutionary warfare was begun in 1959. Within several years, under the pressure of domestic political events and Communist tactical changes, the doctrine greatly downplayed the threat of major foreign war and sharply upgraded the salience of the threat of subversion, implying greater consideration to internal security matters and therefore to the entire domestic social system. Increased urgency was given to the military's

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self-image as guardian of society, leading most of the strategists to conclude that security-conscious anti-Communist surveillance, control, and direction should spread throughout democratic society to protect it from its own most destructive elements and excesses. They found civilian politicians sadly deficient in "proper" understanding of the new security problem and the vigorous measures needed to solve it. Increasing attention was paid by the War College to the "psycho-social" portion of the curriculum. In emphasizing reforms to undercut support for Communism, the ESG developed the viewpoint that national development and both internal and external security are inseparable and mutually reinforcing.

The ESG group was one of the most active forces in the 1964 overthrow of the civilian government of João Goulart, who the military believed was recklessly creating, through demagoguery, inefficiency, and corruption, the conditions which encouraged subversion. ESG anti-subversion doctrine was widely accepted among the officers, and the shared perception of Goulart and his advisors as a threat to the military and national stability coalesced them into taking action against his government. Possession of a common doctrine for national administration and well-being led the revolution and its civilian supporters to feel competent, responsible, and legitimate in the kind of rule they planned for Brazil, which extended security concerns and military jurisdiction to widening areas of national life.¹³

The revolution of 1964 marked a new phase in the security doctrine and in civilian-military relations. Whereas previously the armed forces served as a "moderating power" among civilian factions and kept interventions short by return of power to a civilian government, the four military regimes governing Brazil since 1964 have shown a willingness to accept responsibility for national security, very broadly defined, and for national development, which has come to mean unusually high rates of economic growth.

In addressing the ESG class of 1967, President Castello Branco, former ESG deputy commandant, declared the essence of the doctrine to be that "Security and development are linked by a relationship of mutual causality."¹⁴ His government was greatly influenced both by the methodology of the doctrine in establishing government planning in the social and economic development and the security areas, and by its substance in the tenor and goals of the numerous executive decrees, punitive actions, and the wording of security sections of the Constitution of 1967. While consolidating the policies of the revolution, Castello Branco (1964-67) tended to stress the security side of the pair. Costa e Silva (1967-69) attempted to ease security restrictions somewhat, but abandoned the slight liberalization for more severe repression in late 1968. Médici (1969-74) successfully took on the difficult task of maintaining internal order against urban terrorist revolutionaries and spurring Brazil to record rates of economic growth. The present Geisel government defends the normal predominance of development over security, except for short periods of political crisis, by striving for "maximum possible development with the minimum amount of indispensable security."

For clarity, it should be noted that the ESG differentiates between national defense, which is defined as an *act* of repulsion of foreign attack, and national security, which connotes the *condition* of preservation of national institutions and interests against all threats of any origin and hence is not merely military:

National Security is the relative degree of guarantee, by political, economic, psychological, and military actions, that the State provides at a given time to the Nation which it rules, for the realization or maintenance of National Objectives in spite of existing or potential oppositions or pressures.¹⁵

Security, then, has the function of creating a climate of tranquility and order to facilitate

attainment of national interests, chief among them development. The rate and potential of economic growth, in turn, condition the level of security. To the Brazilian military, the primary political characteristics of security are continuity in decisionmaking and general obedience to the national authorities.

Military strategists see an underdeveloped Brazil beset by unsolved crises as a most vulnerable nation, subject to general unrest and Communist subversion. It is held that real security can be gained only by rapid industrialization and national integration under closely planned technocratic governmental guidance to speed the country stably through the hazard-beset developmental process. Strict control is to be retained over the process of change in order to minimize the usual unpredictabilities of the transition. Because security is linked to development, and both of them to the regime's legitimacy, any obstacle to or disruption of development becomes a national security issue, just as disruption of national unity or public order are more obviously security issues. Implementation of present strong internal security measures and political limitations are thus explained as unpleasant requisites for continued development, which in turn will contribute to the national security through enhanced national power and greater international freedom of action.¹⁶

DIFFUSION OF THE DOCTRINE

Diffusion of the doctrine, of which just the core has been given, is accomplished in a number of ways. An ESG graduates' association (ADESG) keeps alive contacts between the college and its graduates, furthers professional bonds and esprit de corps among civilian and military participants, and publishes a quarterly journal, *Segurança e Desenvolvimento (Security and Development)*, which contains conference reports and documents from current proceedings of the ESG. For both graduates and those leaders unable to take the ESG course in Rio, short courses are offered throughout the nation. The graduates themselves, as well as the school, have

published numerous works on national problems analyzed from the doctrinal standpoint. The ESG has informal working ties with civilian groups. On the military side, the doctrine became the basis of study at the Army Command and General Staff School (ECEME) as early as the late 1950's and is being employed in social science courses at the service academies.¹⁷

Under the revolutionary governments, the ESG has served the functions of operating a wide-ranging graduate seminar on national problems, generating possible solutions within the context of the doctrine, and providing a mechanism for general elite indoctrination in socio-political principles accepted by the regime. It has also been a laboratory for new security schools; an intelligence course gave rise to the National Intelligence School, and a national mobilization course to begin in 1977 will eventually become a separate entity. The ESG, however, does not make security policy, nor does it have the last word on evolution of the doctrine. Its function is one of research, suggestion, and advice to the president and the highest executive agencies, including the Armed Forces General Staff, which may take its recommendations or options into account in their decisions.

The agency most responsible for making national security policy has been the National Security Council (CSN), composed of the president, vice-president, all cabinet ministers, the heads of the civil and military cabinets and of the National Intelligence Service, the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, and the chiefs of staff of each of the three service branches. The head of the military cabinet serves as secretary-general to the secretariat, a study and planning group, and an intelligence planning board. The 1967 Constitution provides the CSN, under the chairmanship of the president, the highest level authority for planning, coordinating, and supervising all matters related to national security in cooperation with intelligence, mobilization, and military authorities. A constitutional amendment in 1969 further attributed to it the power to "establish the permanent

national objectives and the bases for national policy.”

The CSN has an oversight function in areas declared “indispensable to national security,” in which its approval is required for land sales, road openings, communications links, airport construction, and bridge and international road-building. Prior CSN approval is also needed for establishment of national security-related industries. The CSN has the powerful but little-discussed function of security oversight of the civilian and military bureaucracy. CSN representatives in the ministries prevent security leaks and monitor their agencies’ and employees’ efficiency, loyalty, proper behavior, and congruence of performance with the national plan. They are now moving away from the repressive or punitive actions which marked the institution of this system.¹⁸

The National Intelligence Service (SNI) is responsible for domestic and foreign intelligence and counterintelligence gathering, evaluation, and advising, but has lately been involved mainly with domestic activities. Its founder and first director was General Golbery, while its second director was General Médici, an officer unconnected with the ESG, who became president in 1969 largely because of his SNI experience.

Internal security forces include the state and federal police (for civilians) and counterintelligence in the three services (for the military). The most controversial is the Department of Political and Social Order (DOPS), sometimes accused of human rights violations in its zeal to extract information from suspected subversives.

The comprehensive, anti-Communist view of national security has been incorporated pervasively into the legal system, starting with the Constitution of 1967, which has a section on the topic. Article 86, as an innovation, makes all legal persons “responsible for national security, within the limits defined by law”—which is to say, within the limits of their power and possibilities for action. Other constitutional law provisions on security which have been frequently employed include:

- Executive power to designate sensitive municipalities as national security areas, with presidential selection of their prefects.

- Provision for martial law (state of siege).

- Competence of military courts to judge civilians, including state governors and their cabinet officials, accused of crimes against national security or the military.

- Competence of the president to issue immediately valid decree laws on matters of national security, subject to congressional approval within 60 days.

- Right of the federal government to intervene in the states to restore order or prevent disruption.

- Suspension by the Supreme Court of political rights of those attacking the regime or guilty of corruption.

Numerous Institutional Acts and Complementary Acts, decreed by the president in response to specific political crises, have given federal executive authorities more repressive, extraconstitutional power against those who are deemed to be threats to the national security. For example, the sweeping Institutional Act Number 5 (IA-5) of 1968—described by supporters as the essence of the ideology of the Revolution—allowed the president to close the national congress and state and local assemblies until he should reconvene them, to decree federal intervention in the states without constitutional safeguards, to suspend the political rights of any citizen for ten years, to cancel electoral mandates, to suspend habeas corpus in political or national security crimes, and to expand sanctions on those who had already lost their political rights. Further, all acts practiced in the enforcement of IA-5 are exempt from judicial review. Other Acts have regulated elections, allowed presidential retirement of recalcitrant officers, reorganized the courts, convoked a constitutional convention, made counterrevolution a crime, and brought about many other abrupt changes.

The National Security Law of 1969 also shows the stamp of ESG doctrine. This wide-ranging anti-subversive measure, which was to see much use and become a symbol of repression to regime opponents, stipulates that:

National security encompasses, essentially, methods designed for the preservation of external and internal security, including the prevention or repression of psychological warfare and of revolutionary or subversive warfare.¹⁹

APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE: THE PERMANENT NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Politically relevant divisions occasionally appear within the military ranks, especially during times of political crisis, such as presidential succession. Those with ESG ties may tend to align against those without, hardliners against legalists, nationalists against internationalists (regarding foreign investments), well-paid generals against their juniors, or ideologues against pragmatists. Interservice rivalries may be expected to increase. In security matters, however, the ESG's strategic and methodological formulations are so widely accepted that they are the dominant vocabulary and frame of reference. The armed forces, in an oversight function, set the tone of and limits to debate on security-related issues and exercise a veto over decisions which could have negative effects on security; this is usually done through a decision of the National Security Council. The army is the predominant military voice in such judgments.

Very little is known about the operation of the National Security Council, which determines the national objectives, but an appreciation of how the national security doctrine is operationalized into policy can be gained from examination of the "permanent national objectives" of the ESG. These permanent objectives are said to be stable, long-term national goals which give specific content to the security doctrine. "Current national objectives" are those which are expressed as working details of the basic ones.²⁰

The permanent national objectives, with the year of their adoption for ESG purposes, are as follows:

- National Integration (1953)
- Sovereignty (1953)

- Development, Progress, National Prosperity (1953)
- Democracy (1958)
- Territorial Integrity (1960)
- Social Peace (1962)²¹

Although the ESG implies no rank ordering of these, claiming that they are interdependent, one authority, Professor Amaral Gurgel, has provided an analysis which could allow a tentative ranking, at least at the level of rhetoric. Through a "key thoughts" form of content analysis of the speeches of President Médici (1969-74), Gurgel discovered the following order, established in terms of percentage of presidential references:

1. National Prosperity (35%)
2. Social Peace (25%)
3. National Integration (18%)
4. Democracy (8%)
5. Sovereignty (8%)
- International Prestige (5%—Not on ESG List)
6. Territorial Integrity (1%)²²

Social peace ranked second because maintenance of order against terrorists was a major problem from 1969 to 1972. If such a list were made in 1977, national integration would probably lie in second place and social peace in third. In the paragraphs to follow, the significance given by policy to the six objectives of the ESG—excluding the "international prestige" item added by Gurgel—is examined to provide a delineation of how the military consensus and hence the government interprets national security.

1. National Prosperity

The major effort of the revolution has been economic growth to advance national well-being and strength, which is to raise living standards, lessen the potential for subversion, increase military capabilities, and achieve the major power status which has been sought for generations. A principle of nationalism encouraged by the military is the envisioning of future greatness of the country, practically an article of faith among the

population. Although growth pretensions have been forced downwards by adverse international economics, the Second National Development Plan's goals for Brazil in 1979 show the ambitions of its leaders:

- Gross domestic product of \$125 billion (eighth largest in the West); per capita income over \$1,100; 8-10 percent annual growth rate.

- Increase of jobs sufficient to reduce underemployment and raise living standards of poorer classes and regions.

- Economically active population of about 40 million; total population of 120 million.

- Substantial reduction of regional and class disparities.

- Federal budget of about \$9 billion a year.

- Foreign trade flow to exceed \$40 billion yearly.

In the Brazilian model of state-led capitalist market economy managed by civilian technocrats, production has been heavily favored over distribution and societal structural change. It has been argued that the "pie" must grow before it can be divided, that present injustices are the inevitable but temporary results of normal rapid economic growth. Official policies heavily favor business, but labor unions are tightly controlled by government, and the meager minimum wage increase has been kept below the rate of price rise for over a decade. Levels of welfare for the workers are rising slowly, if at all. Inequality of income distribution between social classes and regions continues to be aggravated by the ways in which rapid industrialization favors some groups and regions. Brazil's present income distribution can be likened to a small Sweden or Belgium inside a giant Indonesia; according to one characterization, about 5 million live at average European levels, about 15 million live at the standard of rich underdeveloped countries, and over 80 million live at a standard which is among Latin America's lowest.²³

Although national development is the prime permanent national objective and is said to be reinforcing of security, the unbalanced development which Brazil has been pursuing and the unwillingness or inability of the government to allocate the

benefits of development more broadly and to foster more general well-being are the greatest threats to stability over the long run. Even though ESG formulations and government pronouncements customarily speak of "general development" or the "general welfare of the nation," the progress of the "miracle" has, until now, been for a small fraction of the population at the calculated expense of the majority.

2. National Integration

In mid-1970, programs were begun to speed both societal and spatial integration, to forge national unity and widen the share of prosperity, and to weaken the dualism of city-backlands and rich-poor which has hindered Brazil's full operation as a modern nation by restricting its progress to a few zones or classes.

The Program of Social Integration is designed to further a sense of economic participation through a profit-sharing system to provide cash for major financial needs of employees and somewhat offset the wage restraint policy. Stricter tax collection and fiscal incentives for investment in specified development projects have had some success in the regional redistribution of investment. Educational expansion is impressive at all levels, from the community-based literacy campaign (MOBRAL), to the growing number of universities, enlivened by reforms for full-time teaching, development-related coursework, and community participation. Job-related educational opportunities for workers are being expanded. Increasingly popular are Operation Rondon (a VISTA-type extension of university students into the urban slums and the backlands) and Operation Mauá (an internship for young people interested in business careers), both designed to train future leaders. Significantly, the slogan of Operation Rondon is "Integrar para não entregar" ("Integrate in order not to lose sovereignty").

Government planners are seeking national unity through the creation of national consciousness within a political and economic community linked by a value consensus on

the advantages of progress and modernization. Harmony between labor and management is expected to yield less class-consciousness, a more stable political system, more rapid economic development, greater well-being for all, enhanced national security, and, consequently, commensurate international status. National power will benefit in its intangible elements: the upgrading of human resources, internal cohesion and national spirit, and the preparation of the population to handle the attitudes and technology of modernity.


Spatial integration under the Program of National Integration is engineered to minimize regional diversities, unite the disparate regions into a truly national life, and occupy the vast empty tracts to maximize discovery and accessibility of natural resources. This involves transportation, communication, and settlement programs. The two regions

receiving preferential treatment are the Northeast and the Amazon, with some attention given to the Center-West. Industrial development of the Northeast is to be accelerated to make the region more self-sufficient and less likely to induce migration to the Center-South. Both the interior of the Northeast and the Amazon are the objects of colonization and agricultural experiments.

The dramatization, speed, and extent of the Amazon project make it of strategic significance and prestige value. The new all-weather east-west 3,350 mile

Transamazon Highway runs from extreme eastern Brazil to Peru, and the 900 mile Cuiabá-Santarém north-south line links the main trunk to the Center-West and the industrialized population centers of the South. Occupation of the adjacent forest and plains takes the initial form of agricultural colonies and small cities within the government-owned strips on each side. Brasília encourages immigrants and supplies them with training, equipment, and outside support, but no great number of colonizers has appeared.

Although private enterprise has been invited to collaborate, capital risks are so high that the government, and particularly the military, has had to do most of the work. Because of the strategic significance of the mission, the headquarters of the army's Amazon Command was moved from Belém westward to Manaus. The army takes the lead in building roads, constructing bridges,



installing sanitation systems, providing public health centers, establishing communications networks, clearing land for planting, teaching agricultural and building techniques, carrying out airfield construction, providing transportation, and establishing security. The navy (with a base near Belém) is involved in control of the sea and the 12,000 miles of navigable rivers, search and rescue, medical and social assistance to riverbank dwellers, maintenance of navigational devices, and riverine transportation and support for other government and private organizations. Transportation, aerial mapping, search and rescue, and mail delivery into isolated areas are the province of the air force's C-47's, C-130's, and amphibious planes; high priority is given to developing new airfields and acquiring aircraft and flight control systems suitable to the Amazon. In conjunction with the Ministry of Communications, all three services contribute to the rapid expansion of the national telecommunications network.

Brazilian leaders argue that a military security presence must be maintained in the Amazon to guarantee effective occupation of a vast and impoverished territory with less than 5 percent of the population but with great resources at a time when world resources and land are rapidly being depleted by population and economic growth. Rumors and reports of scattered misdeeds of scheming foreigners helped convince the armed forces toward the end of the 1960's that they should move decisively in the Amazon to protect Brazilian interests. The Amazon Military Command has given priority to implantation of garrisons and colonies along the new highways, across the border from viable settlements in neighboring countries, at easy access points to the national territory, and near mineral resources or agricultural holdings (especially those worked by foreigners). The army's Jungle Warfare Training Center at Manaus has gained a reputation for mobility and effectiveness in the jungle, and a number of officers from other countries are now training there.

The strategic significance of the integration of the Amazon is great, representing occupation of the interior of South America

which acted as a *de facto* empty buffer zone between coastally-oriented Brazil and five surrounding independent countries. The planned highway network will not only integrate Brazil, but also link it by ground with population centers of Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, and French Guiana. The Transamazon is to tie into the Peruvian system at Pucallpa (and hence to the Pacific) and intersects the major southern tributaries at about the limit of their navigability, creating cross-continental land-water ties which will be furnished with ports and boat service. In conjunction with the Brazilian highway network, this new cross-linked system provides greater troop mobility to the interior and the distant northwestern borders, which has made some of the neighboring military establishments nervous, especially that of Peru.

Even if the new highways do not raise border tensions or tempt Brazil into foreign interventions, they will serve as channels for expansion of Brazilian goods and influence into all surrounding states, sometimes in areas remote from their population centers. Brazil could thus influence the course of development in the Amazonian regions of neighboring states via cross-border economic attraction. Much of this future relationship depends on the style and speed of Brazil's advance into its hinterland, as perceived by its neighbors. The integration as carried out so far has appeared an exercise in healthy, non-aggressive nationalism and a source of pride in an engineering feat of the first magnitude.

3. Social Peace

Because direct foreign attack is improbable, much of the mission of the armed forces concerns maintenance of the political stability and order which the National Security Council sees as necessary to economic growth. Social peace means not only the avoidance of political violence and disruption, such as in the 1967-72 fight against terrorists, but also contained social change, uninterrupted production, strong social organization and discipline with moralistic overtones, and stress

on traditional values. Administration takes precedence over politics. This is all maintained via incontrovertible, supposedly apolitical motives equated with patriotism and nonsubservience to any subnational interest.

Limited participation is channeled by the state, while open opposition to the system itself is not tolerated. Press censorship and warnings have sporadically been used to discourage both press sensationalism and full public knowledge or debate about topics such as the 1974-76 meningitis epidemic, frequent high clerical criticisms of the government, rumored political openings, torture of political prisoners, financial scandals, expulsion of urban squatters or peasants from land, terrorist and guerrilla activity, and presidential succession, all in the name of national security. Congress and the judiciary have been cut off from effective power as unreliable. Students, intellectuals, old-line politicians, priests, union leaders, journalists, and others have been either depoliticized or co-opted, as security forces search for subversive agents secreted in the media, unions, universities, Church, and political parties.

This definition of social peace came about as a reaction to the chaos of the period immediately preceding the 1964 revolution, a time which the revolutionary leaders saw as characterized by manipulated mass participation and demands, economic stagnation, and Communist infiltration in the government. The response since 1964 has consisted of polar opposites—limited participation and demands, conservatism, economic growth, and stress on moral values and the family (involving film censorship, patriotic displays, and anti-drug campaigns). Military participation in civics education is organized around local patriotic meetings, pro-Christianity anti-Communist courses, indoctrination in the ideals of the 1964 revolution, and lectures on international relations and revolutionary war—all preaching to civilians and recruits the need to defend the country against Communist subversion and psychological war. Another goal is to

present the military as the principal bastion against the erosion of national life by Communist propaganda.

In the interpretation of the government, the growth experienced and the wider range of options now open to the country justify the stern measures taken by the succession of revolutionary governments. The exclusiveness with which the military has arrogated to itself the right to decide national interest and public policy, however, does entail difficulty in differentiating between legitimate political opposition and outright subversion. Strong criticism of the revolution or its policies is taken as evidence of unpatriotic attitudes voiced by one under the influence of anti-national forces. Subversion, then, receives a broad definition—sustained opposition to the government—and national security laws become the ultimate reply to those who persist in trying to participate in politics in ways other than the approved and narrowly circumscribed ones.

4. Democracy

One purpose of the 1964 revolution was to sanitize the political system to remove the corruption, dissension, demagoguery, and narrow self-interest which had immobilized the nation under the name of representative democracy. Thirteen years later, the predominant military opinion is that this restructuring is not yet complete, and that a return to full civilian leadership and public liberties must be delayed further until long-range development plans are assured and civilian leaders are inculcated with a "proper sense of national security." Return to democratic normality is postponed as officials speak of democracy, development, and sovereignty as qualities to be sought, built, and perfected with time.

The government has not yet articulated a complete ideology of the revolution, so just what sort of democracy is being incubated is unclear. A 1971-72 attempt to institutionalize an extreme right wing political model in reaction to terrorism failed because of opposition within the military, but some of the forces behind it still remain active in

regimes, the military governments of Brazil since 1964 have accepted the national security doctrine as the basis of a strategy of development, prescribing strong centralized administration, rational and gradualist solutions, state-led growth with private enterprise collaboration, a technocratic managerial approach to "do away with" politics, efficiency and productivity, nationalism and great power ambitions, broad significance to national security, and the spread of military surveillance and activity in defense of what is described as a still vulnerable democratic and open society subject to Communist subversion. Military rule under the doctrine has had the modernizing effect of moralistically imposing social discipline, national consciousness, and economic responsibility on the middle class, in return for benefits of economic growth, much as the expansion of the suffrage imposed restrictions on the economic power elites during the industrialization of the United States and Europe.²⁵

The doctrine provides the regime with sufficient unity and confidence to persist—the only military rule in a major South American nation to have passed the decade mark in the last century.²⁶ The "Security and Development" motto is the government's chief legitimizer and gives the military such a stake in the success and continuation of present official policy that retreat to the traditional arbiter role may be difficult. The military sees itself charged with the national destiny and the drive to great power status within a single generation, requiring extended authoritarian rule to guarantee continuity in what Alfred Stepan has termed the "new professionalism."²⁷ Military, not civilian, groups are the president's principal constituency and have exercised considerable influence in recruitment of civilians to high administrative posts such as the cabinet.²⁸ Military officers assume managerial and executive duties in a wide variety of government ministries, agencies, and corporations (civil aviation, nuclear energy, oil, telecommunications, steel), either for security reasons or because

those agencies require technical competence in which the military excels.²⁹ Civic action is well-established on a wide front, and military contributions range further into cartography, weather reporting, oceanography, professional training, and research and development. A return to civilian rule would still be likely to continue military participation in most of the permanent national objectives.

Mission expansion has required a higher level of performance over an expanded territory, for which quantity and quality of equipment proved inadequate. Although the War Materials Industry (IMBEL) was recently created, and procurement of sophisticated equipment was made from abroad, national military expenditures for the 210,000 men under arms have been relatively low and heavily directed toward personnel costs (83.5 percent of the 1950-69 budgets, for example) and civic action.³⁰ From 1964 to 1973, Brazil's military expenditures averaged 2.4 percent of its GNP, with average annual expenditure growth in constant dollars at 9.8 percent.³¹ Brazil's 2.4 percent of the GNP in military expenditures, 1964-73, can be compared with all developing countries (4.9 percent), Latin America (1.9 percent), and individual developed countries with pacifistic reputations, such as Sweden (3.8 percent), Norway (3.5 percent), and Switzerland (2.2 percent). With a defense budget of \$1.55 billion in 1973, Brazil ranked twenty-first in the world and first in Latin America. The 1974 military budget was 11.1 percent of the central government's expenses for that year.

Much has improved since the decline of terrorism in 1972, but negative effects of the doctrine's application still include an authoritarian rigidification of the political system in terms of absolutes and consideration as "provocation" any reassertion of countervailing congressional, judicial, or public opinion/electoral power. Many Brazilians were apparently willing to accept restrictions on freedom as long as there was a clear security threat and strong economic growth for betterment in the long run, but the declining economy and increased political restrictions since early 1975 have

called this system of trade-offs into serious question. Much of the middle class, observing political arrest and detention patterns of the past year, now believes the "Communist menace" to be a bogeyman of governmental convenience. At the same time, under heavy pressure from hardliners since opposition party gains in the November 1974 congressional elections, President Geisel has given up earlier pledges hinting at liberalization and has increasingly relied on ad hoc political restriction expedients; amid expansion of the state's role in industry and reaffirmations by the Minister of Justice of the need to be vigilant against subversives. It remains to be seen what might happen to the elitist conception of "Security and Development" if both the economy and the political gimmickry falter simultaneously.

What might too easily escape us as these developments run their course is the profound psychological impact of one of the oldest and most enduring military regimes on other developing nations, particularly in the southern cone of South America. As more and more Third World nations turn to military rule, it becomes increasingly necessary that we understand and appreciate the Brazilian experience, and that we clearly recognize and intelligently address both the force which it will exert and the model which it will provide for these emerging governments.

NOTES

1. An optimistic assessment of the regime and possibilities for Brazil's integration into the Western community is given by former US Ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, in his "Brazil's Future World Role," *Orbis*, 16 (Fall 1972), 621-31. Also see: H. Jon Rosenbaum, "Brazil's Foreign Policy: Developmentalism and Beyond," *Orbis*, 16 (Spring 1972), 64-77; Norman A. Bailey and Ronald M. Schneider, "Brazil's Foreign Policy: A Case Study in Upward Mobility," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, 27 (Spring 1974), 3-25; and Riordan Roett, "Brazil Ascendant: International Relations and Geopolitics in the Late 20th Century," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1975), 139-54.

2. Ray Cline, *World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1975), p. 124. Cline's formula is $P_p = (C + E + M) \times (S + W)$, or Perceived Power = (Critical Mass + Economic Capability + Military Capability) x (Strategic Purpose + National Will).

3. Ronald M. Schneider, *The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime,*

1964-1970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 244.

4. Luigi R. Einaudi and Alfred C. Stepan III, *Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1971), pp. 102-05.

5. Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 175-76.

6. Quoted in Thomas G. Sanders, "Development and Security are Linked by a Relationship of Mutual Causality," *American Universities Fieldstaff Reports*, East Coast South America Series, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1971), 3.

7. Philip Raine, *Brazil: Awakening Giant* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1974), pp. 109-10.

8. General Antonio Jorge Corrêa, "A influência da Escola Superior de Guerra no pensamento político e estratégico das elites brasileiras," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, Vol. 25, No. 163 (1976), 64.

9. Sanders, p. 3.

10. General João Bina Machado, "A Escola Superior de Guerra: Origem-Evolução-Tendências," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, Vol. 22, No. 153 (1973), 15-18.

11. General Augusto Frago, "A doutrina de desenvolvimento e segurança: Origem-Evolução-Atualidade," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, Vol. 24, No. 160 (1975), 89-110.

12. Golbery's *Geopolitics of Brazil (Geopolítica do Brasil)* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1967), for example, is largely a compendium of his lectures and writing of the 1950's. Also see his *Strategic Planning (Planejamento Estratégico)* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1955).

13. Stepan, pp. 186-87.

14. Frago, p. 100.

15. Professor Tarcisio Meirelles Padilha, "Segurança nacional," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, Vol. 20, No. 147 (1971), 36.

16. Although early formulations of the security-development nexus are latent in Brazilian strategic thought of the 1950's, it was the theory of revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency which really brought them into greater elaboration. According to this author's observations at the ESG and perusal of its literature, American defense doctrine on developing countries had a considerable impact in Brazil, although not in its most sophisticated form. The speeches and writings of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on the societal prerequisites of security policy made an impression on leaders of the armed services during the 1964-75 period. See ESG Commandant General Walter de Menezes Paes' "A Escola Superior de Guerra," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, Vol. 24, No. 159 (1975), 28, which cites McNamara's *Essence of Security: Reflections in Office* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

17. Schneider, pp. 250-52. On the functioning of ECEME, see General J. Bina Machado, "The Making of Brazilian Staff Officers," *Military Review*, 50 (April 1970), 75-81.

18. Alexandre de S. C. Barros, "The Changing Role of the State in Brazil: The Technocratic Military Alliance," paper presented at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, March 25-28, 1976, pp. 16-17.

19. Mário Pessoa, "Legislação brasileira e segurança nacional," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, Vol. 24, No. 158 (1975), 148.

20. Although the ESG's current national objectives list is public, according to a student of the topic, the substantive results of NSC national interest deliberations (on both permanent and current objectives) have not been revealed for security reasons and are implemented by secret executive

decrees available only to a restricted number of responsible officials, as regulated by a decree of November 1971. (Pessoa, pp. 148-49). Given the coherence of the regime's policies, however, the pattern of these objectives can be traced in major public statements such as the Second National Development Plan.

21. Fragoso, p. 93.

22. Amaral Gurgel, *Segurança e Democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora e Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1975), cited in Fragoso, p. 104.

23. Peter Evans, "The Military, the Multinationals, and the 'Miracle': The Political Economy of the Brazilian Model of Development," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1974), 35-36.

24. One of the best comprehensive treatments of the corporativistic Brazilian political style set within its society and history is Riordan Roett, *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972).

25. Irving Louis Horowitz and Ellen Kay Trimberger, "State Power and Military Nationalism in Latin America," *Comparative Politics*, 8 (January 1976), 234-35.

26. An excellent analysis of the regime's staying power in its first decade is given by Bruce R. Drury, "Civil-Military Relations and Military Rule: Brazil Since 1964," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 2 (Fall 1974), 191-203.

27. Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in *Authoritarian Brazil*, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 47-65.

28. Max G. Manwaring, "Career Patterns and Attitudes in Four Brazilian Military Administrations: Similarity and Continuity, 1964-1975," paper presented at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, March 25-28, 1976.

29. Barros, pp. 13-14.

30. General Antonio Carlos da Silva Muricy, "O exército como instrumento da ação política nacional," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, Vol. 20, No. 143 (1971), 75.

31. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1963-1973* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 23.

