Nation-Building:
A Joint Enterprise

 

GREGORY L. CANTWELL


From Parameters,  Autumn 2007, pp. 54-68.


“Battles are won by the infantry, the armor, the artillery and air teams, by
soldiers living in the rains and huddling in the snow. But wars are won by
the great strength of the nation—the soldier and the civilian working to-
gether.”
                                                                            — General Omar N. Bradley
1

 

Consider the following questions. The Army is at war, but is the nation at war? Has the nation sufficiently mobilized the elements of national power in support of a global war effort? Have average Americans changed their lives because of the war? Is popular support for the war in Iraq high enough to mobilize the nation? Public opinion polls in January 2007 showed that support for President Bush’s handling of the war was at an all-time low of 26 percent.2 Similar polls suggested that 54 percent of the American public believed that the United States was losing the war in Iraq.3 Then-Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, began his remarks to the House Armed Services Committee on 27 June 2006 with these words.

America’s Army remains at war. And we will be fighting this war for the foreseeable future. This is not just the Army’s war. Yet in light of the scale of our commitment we bear the majority of the burden, serving side by side with Marines and our other sister services and coalition partners.4

General Schoomaker identified the crux of the issue; America relies upon the Army, and from a joint perspective, the Department of Defense, to fight and win the nation’s wars. The American people have every expectation that the military will succeed when committed. They hold the military accountable for achieving victory. Yet the military does not command or control

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the elements of national power (diplomatic, information, and economic) essential for achieving victory.

Intellectuals argue that wars are won or lost by nations and not by militaries. The military does, however, make a significant contribution to any eventual outcome of a conflict. Many observers believe the military is responsible for the final outcome of any conflict despite a multitude of related factors.5 For example, there are those who contend that America lost the war in Vietnam even though, from a tactical standpoint, the Army did not lose a battle. Many blamed this loss on the lack of a coordinated national strategy, but continue to hold the military accountable for failing to develop a winning strategy.6 Similarly, in Iraq, many claim the war is being lost and blame the leadership of the Department of Defense for any number of strategic errors.7 This harkens back to the issue that the military is accountable to fight and win America’s wars.

Others question why the military needs to support such missions as nation-building. The fact of the matter is the military as an element of national power is employed to protect the United States’ national interests. The military is exercising that role in Iraq because national leaders believe that critical interests are at stake.8 The United States performs nation-building activities to establish conditions that further our national interests. There are a number of countries needing assistance with nation-building, but the military is not capable of providing direct assistance to all in need. The nation’s leaders apparently do not consider national interests sufficient to warrant military deployments to all of these regions.9 Africa has a predominance of the poorest nations in the world. Genocide, famine, disease, and failed governments are often cited as sufficient justification for the US military’s nation-building assistance.10 Yet, because vital national security interests are not at stake, the military is not substantially engaged throughout Africa. It goes without saying that the world has more needs than the United States has the capacity to provide solutions. National interests serve to prioritize the employment of America’s military.

A pragmatic approach might suggest that the military take the lead in developing the capabilities needed to succeed across the spectrum of conflict, even if those capabilities exist in the other elements of national power. The

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American military has already adopted numerous measures to enhance its capabilities in time of war and is transforming and reorganizing itself to meet the realities of today’s global environment. Examples of these initiatives include Army Modularity, Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element, Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, and Civil Military Operation Centers. These organizational initiatives are aimed at improving command and control and facilitating coordination. In short, they seek to improve unity of effort and provide the greatest impact in the shortest period of time. The military has made significant strides in developing these programs through the leveraging of existing capabilities.

The counter-argument to this approach is that the military needs to concentrate exclusively on its warfighting capabilities that are not found in the other elements of national power.11 Keeping the armed forces strictly focused on combat missions appeals to those who dislike a large standing military and the associated expense. It may be more cost effective, however, if the American military integrates the organic capabilities required for nation-building. Such capabilities would be of major importance at the conclusion of military operations. In fact, history is replete with examples of the US military performing post-conflict operations, to include building government capacity following regime change. The Iraq conflict is not the first theater where the military has faced the challenges of nation-building, reconstruction, or counterinsurgency operations.

The debate related to the missions of the military centers on the role played by the Department of Defense in achieving national security objectives. The nation tries to maintain a balance between the missions assigned to the military and the resources allocated. Equally as important is the need to maintain a balance between authority and responsibility. Military professionals are important participants in this debate. This article explores the associated joint implications, to include resources, for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. It will explore the related strategic guidance, joint doctrine, and unity of effort challenges, as well as provide recommendations—specifically, the Department of Defense should establish joint nation-building organizations, leverage existing initiatives, and establish regional training centers—designed to rapidly improve the nation’s ability to perform SSTR operations.

Strategic Guidance

The President has significant latitude in determining how to develop and execute foreign policy. Article II of the United States Constitution establishes the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces

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and gives him broad authority in international affairs. Congress established the National Security Council in the Executive Office of the President with the implementation of the National Security Act of 1947.12 The President organizes the Cabinet to best accomplish his agenda. Presidential directives are issued in an effort to establish the structure and authorities needed to enact the administration’s priorities. President William J. Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive-56 in May 1997 formalizing the roles and responsibilities of government agencies in dealing with contingency operations abroad.13 This directive is often cited as a result of the lessons-learned from stability operations in Bosnia, Africa, and Iraq during the 1990s. These operations demonstrated a trend of increasing demand for humanitarian assistance operations and the need for better interagency coordination.14

President George W. Bush rescinded this directive in 2001 and established National Security Presidential Directives to enact his priorities.15 National Security Presidential Directive-1 established the current administration’s Cabinet organization for national security. Management of interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization is addressed in National Security Presidential Directive-44.16

Prior to NSPD-44, confusion existed concerning who should be in charge of nation-building efforts in Iraq.17 NSPD-44 designates the Secretary of State as the lead for coordinating and integrating efforts among government agencies.

The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.18

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Responsibility for coordination does not mean the Department of State necessarily has all the capabilities required to perform stabilization and reconstruction operations. Many believe, in accordance with this directive, that the Department of Defense is responsible for reconstruction efforts associated with combat operations in Iraq. There appears to be ample support in the law for this assertion.

The responsibilities for military services in the Department of Defense are identified in Title 10 of the United States Code. Chapter 307 specifically states the Army “shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.”19 This reference is the cited source that suggests the military should conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations as a logical extension of combat operations on land.

DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, dated 28 November 2005, outlines SSTR operations as core military missions. It further directs the Department of Defense to include plans for SSTR operations in all its military planning. The following excerpt illustrates the meaning of this directive.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.20

Many of the tasks addressed in the directive call for the development of representative governments; rebuilding indigenous institutions to include various security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems; reviving private sector economic activity; and constructing necessary infrastructure. These tasks are all part of nation-building. The intent of this directive is to ensure the Department of Defense has the capabilities required to succeed in SSTR operations without the immediate assistance from other agencies. The directive clarifies a debate within the military on whether nation-building should be a core task. It does not, however, provide any of the resources required to accomplish this type of mission.

Joint Doctrine

Joint doctrine is authoritative within the military. Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, establishes the fundamental principles to facilitate coordination between the Department of Defense and other agencies. This document advances the discussion of the challenges facing the military and the joint task force commander in achiev-

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ing “unity of effort” in coordinating the elements of national power. Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, also addresses the challenges of achieving unity of effort, but focuses on coordination with civil authorities, the general population, and institutions to facilitate military operations.21 It contains a greater emphasis on civil affairs than Joint Publication 3-08. Both publications highlight the fact that unity of effort is critical to achieving stated objectives, but the method utilized to achieve them is less clear.

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, released 14 May 2007, defines unity of effort as “coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action.”22 It further states unified action is “synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.”23 Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, published 26 December 2006, proposed different language. It states:

Unified action—a broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization and/or integration of joint or multinational military operations with the activities of local, state, and federal government agencies and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands.24

These definitions describe in sufficient detail what is required, but fail to adequately define the terms. Joint Publication 1, however, provides a more in-depth analysis of the challenges associated with unity of effort and unified action than its predecessor, Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

It is a fact that unity of effort does not rely solely on unity of command. Many organizations and governments provide assets for a common purpose without entering into formal command relationships. The military, US government agencies, and civilian organizations coordinate resources without the strict senior/subordinate relationships common in a bureaucracy. However, these relationships often can create challenges leading back to the initial issue of balance between authority and responsibility.

Unity of Effort

Several factors complicate achieving unity of effort. First, unity of effort is convoluted by the diversity of organizations that require synchroniza-

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tion. Representatives of these organizations need to have the authority to make policy decisions that channel their resources in a common direction. The authority over such resources is often fragmented among different departments in any bureaucratic organization. Representatives from various organizations may only have the ability to commit resources within their department. Often they are detailed to support the military but lack decisionmaking authority and can only serve as a liaison for coordination. This lack of authority complicates the timely synchronization of efforts. Additionally, most organizations have unique cultures that do not mirror the military model of providing direct command authority to facilitate unity of effort. Further, many nongovernmental organizations are primarily interested in performing niche roles. Their organizational goals may not coincide with broader military objectives. These organizations and departments may prefer to remain separated from the military in an effort to maintain the perception of neutrality. Many outside the process may believe an organization that cooperates with the US military may be at risk of attack.

Second, the scope of the mission further obscures synchronization of efforts. The challenge of reestablishing order to facilitate civilian authority is complex, vast, and difficult to quantify. For example, the area in Iraq is inhabited by more than 27 million people who have historical ethnic and religious clashes that may be irreconcilable. No organization, other than the military, has the equipment, personnel, and resources to address a problem this complex. Traditional dependency upon a single lead agency to resolve the problems is probably not appropriate. Resolution of such conflicts may be beyond the capacity of any lead agency. The SSTR operations challenge requires unity of effort at the national level and incorporating all elements of national power. By law, the President is responsible to the American people for national strategic unity of effort functions.25 It goes without saying that the President has other issues to deal with beyond Iraq. Therefore, he is often required to delegate to members of the Cabinet the coordination and execution required to achieve unity of effort. Various agencies and departments have requirements of equally high importance that vie for resources with contending operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most agencies do not have the resources to provide liaisons or dedicate project teams solely for the purpose of coordinating with the military on operations in Iraq. Representation at the geographic combatant commander level is often the only support many organizations are capable of providing.

Third, theater diversity inhibits unity of effort. Theater diversity prevents the combatant commander from developing standard solutions. Standard solutions facilitate unity of effort if they are applied throughout the region. Programs that are successful in one province or district may not be ef-

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fective in another area. Many theaters have non-homogeneous populations that create unique regional challenges. The combination of these factors makes it difficult to centrally control an approach that requires near-unique solutions. This diversity complicates unity of effort by placing a premium on situational awareness at the local level, even down to the village level, in an effort to determine effective actions. Many organizations lack the broad regional focus of a geographic combatant commander. The Department of State, for example, organizes by country rather than by region. These factors suggest the military is best suited for a comprehensive approach if unity of effort is to be achieved.

The military has a clear requirement to prepare for the conduct of nation-building tasks. The debate does continue, however, over whether the military should be the lead agency for all operations or just those associated with conflict. Since the military is required to perform across the spectrum of conflict, the result of this debate is largely inconsequential. The military must have the capability to perform SSTR operations on a global basis. Other organizations can augment these capabilities, relieve the military of tasks as the situation matures, or be the lead agency for coordination. These organizations will, however, continue to rely upon the military for the mission of restoring stability.

Recommendations

The new joint doctrine should develop a common understanding of unity of effort and provide a common vocabulary for the discussion of future challenges. This vocabulary does not, however, provide all the resources and capabilities to perform the tasks associated with SSTR operations. The Department of Defense needs to take positive and immediate action to address this problem.

Establish Joint Nation-Building Organizations

The Department of Defense could develop joint nation-building organizations as a way to improve unity of effort. President Bush has already initi-

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ated a serious national security dialogue addressing the balance between military missions and resources. This debate provides an opportunity to address the resource requirements associated with SSTR operations. The military should provide a comprehensive proposal of what resources are required in an effort to establish the capabilities outlined in DODD 3000.05 and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. A joint functional area analysis would identify the changes required for SSTR operations considering doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).26 This analysis needs to be a joint endeavor if we are to take advantage of the unique strengths inherent in each of the services.

These new organizations need to be organic to the military so the combatant commander can immediately begin SSTR operations prior to the response by other organizations, agencies, or governments. Any occupying military loses popular support when basic services are destroyed by combat and not quickly restored. Restoring these services and infrastructure is critical to winning the “hearts and minds” of the population and achieving a lasting victory.

Once the functional area analysis establishes the required capabilities, military force development specialists can design the joint nation-building organizations. This term is not intended in any way to imply the size of the organization. Analysis may recommend an organization approaching the typical 3,500-member Army brigade. Once designed, each geographic combatant commander should be assigned one of these organizations so they might develop a regional specific focus.

Current Army initiatives use the metaphor of developing Army officers to be “pentathletes” or “multi-skilled athletes” rather than experts in a specific area. These terms suggest that soldiers must be flexible and prepared to perform across the range of military operations. Such terms and definitions do not, however, address the specific training required to perform SSTR tasks. Soldiers are not currently trained on any large scale to establish governance, judicial systems, or create economic growth. This lack of institutional expertise reinforces the need for a thorough assessment of the implications of SSTR operations and the establishment of joint nation-building organizations, capable of meeting the immediate needs of a combatant commander following combat operations.

Developing such estimates and force capabilities can take time, resulting in a long-term solution. Force structure changes may not occur quickly enough to be effective in the conflict in Iraq. Nevertheless, it is still essential that the military have the equipment, manpower, and resources to accomplish the national military strategy. It is also imperative that we start the process to change the force structure as soon as possible. If Congress and the President

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agree, initiatives could be completed in time to make a difference in Iraq. For example, the Air Force is releasing personnel as it downsizes; potentially, some of these individuals could staff the joint nation-building organizations.

For the last decade, military experts have argued that the assigned active component force structure was inadequate to conduct two near-simultaneous major combat operations.27 Further studies suggested that the Army required 671,000 ground forces to accomplish the national security objectives.28 Current Army active component strength is approximately 512,000. Additionally, the protracted conflict in Iraq requires the military to develop a larger rotation base or amend deployment policies. These challenges are magnanimous. The nation will have to adequately resource the Department of Defense to perform all assigned missions. Former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, repeatedly stated that the defense budget and manpower levels were inadequate for mission accomplishment.29 His estimates suggested that the Army can increase at a rate of 7,000 personnel a year.30 Capacity of the industrial-base and the accession-base further limit how fast the Army and the other services can grow. Funding increases alone will not fix these complex problems. The task is not impossible; Congress and the Department of Defense are encouraged to initiate actions previously outlined if we are to be successful in the future defense of the nation.

Leverage Initiatives

Command and control changes can provide a great foundation to leverage existing capabilities within the government. The Department of Defense could further develop several of the existing command and control initiatives centered on the example of the geographic combatant commander’s headquarters. Increasing headquarters capabilities to coordinate SSTR operations can have a significant impact in the shortest amount of time.

The Department of Defense should fully support the creation of Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) (SJFHQ [CE]) at each of the combatant command headquarters. Incorporating SJFHQ (CE) in previous situations has advanced joint understanding and increased operational preparedness. The SJFHQ (CE) concept was established in an effort to reduce the time it takes to organize and equip a joint task headquarters.31 Prior to this initiative, most joint task force headquarters were assembled as ad hoc organizations after a crisis occurred. This method of establishing a joint task force led to headquarters trying to execute missions while they were still being assembled. Although many are in agreement on the benefits of permanent SJFHQ (CE), commanders have been directed to resource this requirement with existing manpower. This practice leads to a discussion of what responsi-

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bilities commanders should abandon when new requirements are added. DOD should address this concern before the requirement for the SJFHQ (CE) creates unintended problems. An unresourced mission leads to dual-tasking of personnel and detracts from organizational efficiency. The Department of Defense should take immediate steps to increase service end-strengths to account for this increase in joint mission requirements and the associated growth in manpower. The result needs to be an increased acceptance of the joint initiatives associated with SJFHQ (CE) and increased efficacy. Further, these initiatives will provide a cadre of trained personnel that commanders can rely on in future operations; individuals who have established habitual relationships within their respective disciplines.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) also suggested expanding the concept of SJFHQ (CE) to additional two- and three-star component headquarters.32 This initiative would greatly enhance the component commanders’ ability to rapidly form joint task force headquarters. Similarly, this initiative would require additional joint growth, and consequently, service end-strengths should be increased to fully account for the expansion. Many of the SJFHQ (CE) billets require field-grade officers. Although it takes years to develop a field-grade officer, promotions and retention can still influence the available inventory in the short-term. Regardless of the inventory, DOD should establish the requirements as a first step in providing a resourced solution. Commanders have already increased capabilities from within existing resources. At some point, the mission increase needs to trigger a corresponding increase in resources. The service force management processes need to account for the expansion of these joint requirements.

The Department of Defense should expand the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) much like the SJFHQ (CE) to each of the two- and three-star component command headquarters in an effort to enable better coordination of all elements of national power. Regardless of the resources available, DOD should establish requirements that enhance capacity and address current security challenges. Arguments for incorporating a JIACG at the combatant command level are similar to those made for the SJFHQ (CE). Again, enacting this concept would require an integrated joint DOTMLPF solution that is fully resourced. The Department of Defense could leverage the development of the QDR’s Joint Command and Control Roadmap to accomplish this effort. Providing the personnel, equipment, and expertise to coordinate all elements of national power organic within a joint task force headquarters would greatly increase the commander’s ability to achieve unity of effort.

The Department of Defense should develop Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC) in much the same way as the SJFHQ (CE) model. Doctrinally, the Executive Steering Group recommends the organization of a

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CMOC to the joint task force commander based on an assessment of the mission.33 As a result, the CMOC is formed after the initial requirements are determined. Much of the rationale that led to the formation of SJFHQ (CE) should apply to the CMOC. All organizations would be better served by having a core element that is resourced, trained, and equipped within the military and capable of establishing a CMOC. As commanders clarify mission requirements, the appropriate organizational representatives can assemble using a preexisting organic, interoperable structure. Combatant commanders can develop habitual relationships and exercise these relationships in training environments to further enhance the military and civil coordination. Again, this would require a joint DOTMLPF recommendation to identify the resources needed. Once identified, DOD will be required to ensure resources are provided to the combatant commander. It is also likely that future joint operations will continue to involve coordination with a number of civilian elements within areas of operations. Therefore, it is increasingly important that the joint task force commanders enhance their civil-military coordination capabilities.

Regional Training Centers

The Department of Defense should develop regional training centers to facilitate the coordination of all elements of national power in each of the geographic combatant command areas of responsibility. These centers can be as elaborate or as basic as the commander deems necessary. At a minimum, the centers should be able to offer a full multipurpose range facility, maneuver space for training and operations, and academic facilities for institutional training. Military training may be an excellent starting point to initiate this concept; however, the centers need to take on training tasks beyond military training. The military should lead planning for this initiative while inviting other agencies to participate. Likely participants include elements of the Departments of State, Justice, Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, and Energy, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Army Corps of Engineers. These centers would become a vehicle for coordination and execution of regional national security objectives across departments and agencies. The synergistic effect of this cooperation could create centers of excellence for regional awareness training throughout the US government. As foreign partners increase capabilities, they too would be expected to relieve stress on US resources. Additionally, investing in this type of facility reinforces the perception of an American regional commitment resulting in an increase in regional cooperation.

International partners also stand to benefit from these centers. Combatant commanders could develop centers as a multinational shared endeavor in regions capable of contributing to their construction. The George C. Mar-

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shall European Center for Security Studies exemplifies this concept. This center promotes a dialogue between nations of North America, Europe, and Eurasia on contemporary regional security issues. It is based on United States-German bilateral agreements and is distinct from NATO institutions.34 A number of regional security centers currently exist. They are largely academic institutions, for example, the Marshall Center, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and African Center for Strategic Studies.35 The mission of the proposed regional centers needs to be much broader than many of those already in existence. They need to offer skill training as well as academic instruction and conferences. Just as these academic institutions foster dialogue and cooperation, the new training centers could add to regional cooperation. It would be advantageous if the regional centers did not appear to be United States-led projects. In fact, it is better for the world to perceive the United States as a supporting player in such efforts if the initiative is to succeed.

The military institutional training model employed at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) at Fort Benning, Georgia, provides an excellent example of an effort sponsored by the military. Instruction is provided on a variety of subjects from basic military skills to helicopter pilot training.36 All instruction is conducted in Spanish. Conducting training in the regional language enables the countries of Central and South America to send the most highly qualified personnel. Many of these countries have applauded the advantages of this approach in contrast to other resident schooling in the United States. It enables the foreign governments to select their best leaders for the training, as opposed to leaders who speak English. WHINSEC has guest instructors from many Latin American countries who are subject matter experts. A number of the students participating in the Army’s mid-level officer education process have completed their nation’s command and general staff course and actively compete with their classmates for attendance at WHINSEC. The potential benefits of bringing the future leaders of each foreign nation’s militaries and agencies together to study and build relationships are difficult to quantify, but logically such endeavors should enhance regional cooperation.

A multinational regional training center of excellence for SSTR operations with all elements of national power participating would have unlimited potential. Many militaries and foreign government agencies have a long history of successfully conducting SSTR operations and could lend significant credibility to these regional centers. Regional experts might join forces in an attempt to address regional challenges. Additionally, through active participation US agencies could advance their regional goals. The initial ef-

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fort could start with a small cadre of personnel from each agency that provides a base for future growth. As these centers develop, each agency would gain an increased understanding of the others, also improving future coordination. The United States stands to gain at least as much as its partners in this effort. The combined effects of establishing these training centers as a collaborative effort will enhance a commander’s ability to achieve the desired unity of effort. Again, this would require a joint DOTMLPF recommendation to identify the resources required. The greater the investment in this effort, the greater the potential returns for the nation.

Conclusion

The Department of Defense is the best agency to lead the coordination of the elements of national power for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. Faced with the reconstruction of Europe in 1949 Winston Churchill stated, “It is quite impossible to draw any precise line between military and non-military problems.”37 Similarly, today’s nation-building challenges require an integration of all the elements of power, civil and military. Embracing this reality will enhance DOD’s chances of success. The Department of Defense should leverage each of the geographic combatant commander’s regional power-bases to integrate all the elements of national power, while providing a sound foundation for future military operations. Further, there is value in ensuring that the national security debate includes an understanding of the military resources necessary to defend the nation. Finally, America needs to be committed to efforts to fully resource the critical coordination elements required for SSTR operations.


NOTES

1. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-65, Leadership Statements and Quotes (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1 November 1985), 4. Also Field Manual 1, The Army (Washington: Department of the Army, 2005), 2-8.

2. Associated Press/Ipsos poll conducted by Ipsos Public Affairs, 8-10 January 2007, http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq7.htm.

3. Ibid.

4. Opening remarks of General Peter Schoomaker before the House Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., 27 June 2006.

5. Jim Malone, “Bush Faces Challenge in Changing Public Opinion on Iraq,” Voice of America, 11 January 2007.

6. Clark D. Neher, “Vietnam War,” lecture slides with commentary, Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois Univ., http://www.seasite.niu.edu/crossroads/cneher/cn.vietnamwar.htm.

7. Thomas Ricks, “Dissension Grows in Senior Ranks on War Strategy, U.S. May Be Winning Battles in Iraq but Losing the War, Some Officers Say,” The Washington Post, 9 May 2004, A1.

8. Joyce Battle, ed., “Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts Toward Iraq, 1980-1984,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82 (25 February 2003), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm.

9. Linda D. Kozaryn, “When Should U.S. Troops Deploy?” American Forces Press Service, 9 October 1996, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct1996/n10091996_9610094.html.

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10. Jimmy Carter, “Let’s Bridge the Rich-Poor Gap,” National Academy of Engineering, 12 January 2007.

11. Jonathan Chait, “Defense Secretary: The Peculiar Duplicity of Ari Fleischer,” The New Republic, 10 June 2002, 20-22, elaborates on comments by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer at an 18 April 2002 press conference, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020418-14.html.

12. George W. Bush, “Organization of the National Security System,” National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1), the White House, Washington, D.C., 13 February 2001.

13. William J. Clinton, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD/NSC-56), the White House, Washington, D.C., 17 May 1997, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm.

14. Ibid.

15. Michael Donley, “Rethinking the Interagency System,” Occasional Paper #05-01 (March 2005), http://www.hicksandassociates.com/reports/HAI-occasional-paper.pdf.

16. George W. Bush, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44), the White House, Washington, D.C., 7 December 2005.

17. Many claim the Department of State is too small to coordinate SSTR operations citing that only one ambassador is assigned to a country. The author makes no assessment of the ability of the Department of State to coordinate operations as currently organized.

18. Bush, NSPD-44.

19. Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 307, Sec. 3062. (b).

20. Gordon England, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, 28 November 2005, Sect. 4.

21. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, Joint Publication 3-57, 8 February 2001, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpoperationsseriespubs.htm.

22. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1, 14 May 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpcapstonepubs.htm, GL-11.

23. Ibid.

24. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0, 26 December 2006, II-7. This term and definition are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 1, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp5_0.pdf.

25. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action for Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Publication 0-2, 10 July 2001, I-3, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp0_2.pdf. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 May 2007, states “the President is responsible for national strategic direction.” The decisionmaking authority of the President to coordinate elements of the US government is unchanged, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpcapstonepubs.htm, II-1.

26. Functional Area Analysis (FAA) process described in How the Army Runs, a Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2005-2006 (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, October 2005), 40.

27. Congressional Budget Office, Structuring the Active and Reserve Army for the 21st Century, December 1997, Sect. 2.

28. Ibid.

29. General Peter Schoomaker, “Chief: Army Needs to Grow,” Association of the United States Army News, February 2007, 2.

30. Ibid., 3.

31. Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 3 (Suffolk, Va.), 16 June 2003, 4.

32. Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 February 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr.

33. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-08, vol. 1, 17 March 2006, III-6, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpoperationsseriespubs.htm.

34. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, “The Marshall Center Mission,” June 2004, http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-mc-about-1/static/xdocs/mc/static/fs-gcmc-en.pdf.

35. Information is available from http://www.apcss.org (Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies), http://www.ndu.edu/nesa (Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies), http://www.ndu.edu/chds (Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies), and http://www.africacenter.org (African Center for Strategic Studies).

36. Information is available from https://www.benning.army.mil/whinsec (Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation).

37. Winston Churchill, “Their Finest Hour,” quoted in Tom Barrows, “Terminology,” A Common Perspective, 13 (October 2005), 29, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/comm_per/acp13_2.pdf.


Colonel Gregory L. Cantwell is an Army Strategic Plans and Policy Officer. He is a graduate of the US Army War College, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, and US Military Academy. He holds master’s degrees in international relations, business administration, military art and science, and strategic studies, and is currently completing his Ph.D. at the University of Kansas.


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Reviewed 30 August 2007. Please send comments or corrections to usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil