Transformation and Homeland
Security: Dual Challenges
for the US Army

 

TERRENCE K. KELLY

2003 Terrence K. Kelly


From Parameters, Summer 2003, pp. 36-50.


The Army exists to win the nation’s wars. That is and always should be its principal mission. The Army’s transformation White Paper, “Concepts of the Objective Force,” states, “The Army must remain optimized for major theater war,”1 with the presumption that this theater of war is overseas. But the Army has other priorities as well. The preamble to the Constitution tells us that among our founding principles, our government exists to “insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” This statement of existential purpose implies a domestic emphasis—that we must be prepared to fight significantly different kinds of wars from what we think of today. Even after 11 September 2001, the modern concept of war for most American soldiers is something that is fought elsewhere for national security reasons, does not directly affect domestic safety, and does not affect the lives of the average citizens (other than our national preoccupation with 24-hour news stations). Yet homeland security is now a major focus of the nation, the Administration, and Congress, and the Army will play a major role in it.

This new security situation, dominated not just by the need to project exceptionally lethal force overseas, but also to assist in homeland security, will force change on the military. While once a significant mission of the Army, protecting US citizens from attacks at home has not been a major concern for generations, and the Army has not organized or actively planned for this mission in recent memory. Yet the events of 11 September 2001 have caused us to recognize that many of the asymmetric attacks we prepare to confront in distant combat

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zones also can be perpetrated against our citizens at home. Homeland security is once again a front-burner issue for the nation.

From a formal policy perspective, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) arguably made homeland defense the Department of Defense’s primary mission, and the QDR report states that “preparing for homeland security may require changes in force structure and organization.”2 For over a century and a half, from the formation of the nation until World War II, defending the nation-proper from foreign or domestic attack was arguably the primary mission of the Army.3 Strategists, primarily outside the Pentagon, are once again focusing on the military’s role in homeland security, with such issues as the control, composition, and missions of the National Guard receiving significant attention.4

Juxtaposed to this, almost the entire focus within DOD before 9/11 was on changing the structure, doctrine, equipment, and supporting institutional functions of the military—what the Army used to call DTLOMS and the joint community now calls DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities)—through a process called transformation, with the purpose of being better able to fight future wars in faraway places.5 Since 9/11 this has not changed substantially. For the Army, the ability to project transformed power to distant theaters of war is the major focus. Additionally, the Objective Force concepts for fighting future wars envision nonlinear battlefields, significantly faster operational tempo (optempo) and speed on the battlefield, nearly omniscient commanders and forces with a “god’s eye” view of the battlefield based on almost perfect intelligence, and more sophisticated technology, including the expanded use of robotics.

These two strategic focuses create institutional forces—transformation and homeland security—which will drive change in the Army. To date, indications are that they are being considered separately, without regard for their interactions or the realization that, together, they define the military capabilities needed in the new security environment.

In this article, I briefly examine each and discuss how they affect expectations and capabilities, using the DOTMLPF model as a template. Each of the DOTMLPF areas deserves a full and detailed analysis, but that is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, I’ll briefly consider each and propose likely de-

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mands and circumstances which, if realized, will force the Army to modify some DOTMLPF components. As with any effort to predict the future, some of these changes may not be realized. In particular, my hope is that this article will help the Army recognize and anticipate potential problems, make wise choices, and contribute to avoiding potential mistakes that would detract from the nation’s ability to concurrently defend the homeland and further our national security interests overseas.

Preview of Recommendations and Conclusion

This article presents arguments designed to show that military transformation, in its essence, is the act of changing the shape and functions of the military to meet the challenges of the future security environment. As originally foreseen, this involves using advances in technology to make possible heretofore unheard-of capabilities for projecting power and fighting enemies on future battlefields. Yet it is now clear that a critical component of future security situations will be homeland security. The transformation process should be rethought in this context. Transformation must explicitly include the demands of homeland security as a key component so that all DOTMLPF implications are examined holistically and the transformed force can accomplish all missions demanded of it by the National Command Authorities.

Some simple observations and conclusions, organized along the DOTMLPF categories, make it clear that a holistic approach is needed. They tell us:

  Doctrinal changes for homeland security and transformation will appear mutually exclusive at face value, but will have significant implications for training, leader development, organization, and personnel support that affect both missions.

  The training burdens of transformation and homeland security may be significantly different and to some extent divergent. Reserve component units, with limited available time, will find it difficult if not impossible to train well for both missions, making it necessary to seriously consider designating separate units for homeland security missions and warfighting.

  The leader development demands of homeland security and transformation will appear different in form, but may be substantially similar in character. Both will place a premium on intellectual capability, maturity, and the ability to act appropriately without explicit direction.

  The training demands outlined above; the needs of governors for trained, well-led, and appropriately organized forces to defend against terrorist threats; and possible political pressures to not deploy some Army National Guard (ARNG) units during times of heightened terrorist threats may demand a fundamental reexamination of Army organization. End-strength levels may also be affected.

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  Materiel development and facilities requirements will not be significantly affected by the homeland security/transformation divergence.

  Personnel issues—in this case primarily soldier and family support issues—will be of increased importance in both the homeland security and transformation frameworks, and will require a focused examination to determine specific needs.

Homeland Security, Briefly

Before 9/11, the role of the military in response to domestic incidents was articulated in DOD Directives 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities; 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances; and 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. The Secretary of the Army was designated as the DOD Executive Agent in recognition of the fact that the majority of support would come from the Army, and in almost every case government policy envisioned military formations supporting a domestic lead federal agency. The unwritten Army policy was that forces organized, trained, and equipped for overseas conflicts could handle these missions without significant additional training or preparation.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 brought to the attention of the American people and leaders a threat that had been developing for some time. In the aftermath of this disaster, many efforts were undertaken—most are still developing— to better prepare the nation to face threats of this nature across a spectrum of actions from preparation, through deterrence, detection, prevention, and response, to recovery and reconstitution. The President established the Office of Homeland Security (now the Homeland Security Council Staff), Congress established the Department of Homeland Security, and each state established some office to plan for and coordinate homeland security efforts, or gave that task to an existing office in the state government.6 These organizations focused initially on issues requiring immediate response, but they are now looking further out and developing strategies for their efforts.7 Internal and external investigations were and are being conducted to determine what went wrong with intelligence functions and government preparations. It can be safely asserted that homeland security thought, organization, and preparedness have begun to mature, but must still progress before they can be viewed as fully developed.

On the military side, the President established Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in October 2002 as the first-ever combatant command with an area of responsibility that includes the North American continent.8 NORTHCOM will be the principal point of contact for military support during homeland defense and security operations for active and federalized forces. Its missions, as described by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Verga, will be in three areas:

[1] Traditional military missions performed inside the United States, called “extraordinary circumstances.” [Examples] would be the current combat air patrols,

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during which military aircraft might be ordered to shoot down a terrorist-hijacked airliner that’s en route to a target. [2] Emergency circumstances, where the military aids civil authorities or other federal agencies with logistical and other support in, for instance, disaster relief missions after hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods. [3] Temporary circumstances, such as DOD support to the Olympics.9

At the department level, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a 1 July 2002 memorandum, changed much of this organization and authority by giving the lead role for domestic disturbances to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Homeland Defense Policy. The Defense Authorization Act of 2002 created the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD/HD), and DOD transferred these functions as well as the functions previously performed by the Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) to the Office of the ASD/HD.10 The Office of the ASD/HD is new, and NORTHCOM is not yet at full operating capacity, but both will be taking on these responsibilities in FY 03.

The Army’s role in homeland security is also evolving.11 Some specific roles for which it must prepare are captured in doctrine and plans, but other significant tasks are not and are determined instead by experience, research, and history. National Guard troops were called upon to perform many manpower-intensive duties following 9/11, some more meaningful than others.12 But of equal importance are those they were not called upon to perform, due to the singular nature of the events.13 Army National Guard forces were used extensively in security efforts initiated after the attacks, but not significantly in the response to the attacks themselves. Future attacks in areas less well prepared than New York or Washington, or attacks that involve chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or enhanced explosive (CBRNE) devices, would implicate a larger and more comprehensive response by the military in general, and the Army in particular.

Homeland Security Implications

This section and a later section on transformation implications address issues related to the likely changes in DOTMLPF areas. The elements are discussed slightly out of order, considering leader issues directly after training, since those factors are related.

Of importance is a likely, though indirect, increased demand for Army National Guard units. Almost any foreseeable overseas contingency in the near future outside of the Korean Peninsula will involve conflict in areas with large Muslim populations, creating a heightened threat of terrorist attack from Islamist terrorists in response to US military action. While any such situation will likely not take the form of a military attack on American soil that would require forces to engage an enemy in combat, and need not even involve an actual attack, it would likely tie up significant components of the National Guard. Merely the increased likelihood of terror attacks and the requisite and likely prolonged in-

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crease in the Homeland Security Advisory System threat levels will place a significant burden on state governments.14 Protection of critical infrastructures such as airports, dams, nuclear generating facilities, and chemical plants will be first-order issues for the nation’s governors. Manpower will be at a premium, and the National Guard is the primary source of readily available, trained, organized, and well-led emergency manpower for the nation’s governors. Should another major terrorist attack occur within the United States, the Army should expect that governors will not willingly acquiesce to their National Guard forces being deployed overseas during contingencies, and might appeal to the President should they be mobilized. Should this situation occur, combatant commanders must be prepared to change operations plans that rely heavily on National Guard units.15 In the longer term, other, more fundamental changes must be considered, some of which are discussed below.

Doctrine is being developed for homeland security operations, with an emphasis on working as part of a multi-agency team that includes federal, state, local, and private-sector organizations. At the federal level, the military will almost never be the lead federal agency in response operations that fall outside the traditional military role articulated by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Verga above, and will be directed by an “on-scene commander” from a civilian agency.16 When deployed, they will likely fall under the command of NORTHCOM, but NORTHCOM will not run the operation. The National Guard forces under state active duty or Title 32 status may be given independent roles, such as securing a physical site to prevent terrorist attacks, but also will work in coordination with and perhaps under the direction of other state organizations (e.g., the state police or emergency management agencies). These nonmilitary operational modes will demand new doctrine to guide training and planning.

As the homeland security requirements of the states increase, the organization of the Army and indeed all military forces will need to be reexamined.17 The organization of the Army National Guard in particular—what type of units are in the Guard, and where they are located—will almost certainly be called into question. It could be proposed that National Guard units organize and train to meet the governors’ homeland security needs. This would imply that the mix of unit types in the ARNG and US Army Reserve (USAR) should be reexamined to consider providing more combat support and combat service support units in the Guard for homeland security missions. Likely candidates would include military police, chemical,18 medical, ordnance, and other units that traditionally fall in the USAR, as well as the more traditional infantry units for security operations. Governors might find tank and artillery battalions, for example, less useful than these other units as they plan to respond to terrorist activities or threats.

Training efforts will create readiness issues for the Army, in that Army leaders will have to make decisions on how much training time to devote to traditional and transformation “warfighting” areas versus homeland security areas (e.g., civil support missions). Reserve component units, in particular, will find

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competing demands for training to be difficult to handle as they anticipate homeland security missions and seek to prepare for them. With very limited training time, and the requirement for Army units involved in homeland security to work effectively with civilian agencies at various levels of government, their challenge will be particularly difficult to meet. Indeed, the Gilmore Commission’s most recent report states,

The Panel is concerned that there is no assurance that specially-trained forces will be available to NORTHCOM prior to a crisis, and that current civil support training across the armed forces in general is insufficient. . . .

The problem has been that insufficient attention has been paid to and resources made available for civil support training. We now know the pervasiveness of the threat, the increased probabilities of terrorist acts, and the need for enhanced preparation for effective response. Therefore, the Advisory Panel suggests a significant increase in the emphasis on civil support missions for all hazards incidents, with special emphasis on response to acts of terror. Specifically, the Department of Defense should increase the planning, training, and exercising of Active, Guard, and Reserve forces to execute civil support missions.19

This conflict in training demands will be made more acute by likely increases in the frequency and content of homeland security exercises in the near future.20

Leader skills for homeland defense will likely be different from those currently developed by the Army. While strong leaders who can train and lead military units will remain a consistent requirement, the need to work with state and local agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the press will create a new set of skills not previously required (or at least not prominently required below the general officer level). Leaders will need to understand not only that in most cases the Army will be a support agency, but also that they will frequently not be the experts in the circumstances they encounter (e.g., local leaders will know the area, understand the people, and understand the mission better than any federal agency could). An added appreciation for civilian counterparts, and sensitivity to public opinion and political considerations, will, as a minimum, need to be part of the makeup of commanders and other leaders in homeland security situations—skills not currently cultivated.

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The Army’s materiel and facilities requirements for homeland defense would not be significantly different in kind than for future combat, but will likely be different in mix. Specifically, instead of materiel to support high optempo warfighting concepts, homeland security will require small arms weaponry, corps of engineers and medical equipment and supplies, and items needed for CBRNE operations. It is unlikely that any major new items would need to be developed or supplied for such operations, but stockage levels will have to be adjusted for changes in mission and organization.

Personnel support issues will likely be of great importance, particularly in the reserve components. Increased time in active service performing homeland security missions will put a strain on the reserve components (primarily the Guard), and cause a continued realignment of who is willing to serve in what type of positions. Reserve component soldiers who earn significantly more in their civilian jobs than in the Army will find it difficult to make the commitment. Civilian employers may find it increasingly difficult to do without reserve component soldiers who are frequently deployed, a particularly acute problem for those who employ soldiers in high-demand, low-density specialties. Civilian career progression may also be adversely affected by increasing time on active duty. Family support activities will be of increased importance, as will organized preparation of soldiers and families for prolonged duty and separation. This list of possible considerations is brief, but continued analysis and attention from Army leaders is needed.

This illustrative collection of likely DOTMLPF demands made by the homeland security mission implies a certain strategic approach. Decisions may need to be made on organization and missions if the Army is to meet its commitments under current and future war plans, while supporting federal and state homeland defense missions. The Defense Department, in conjunction with state governors, may need to designate units that will not be permitted to deploy during certain contingencies, and active and USAR units may similarly need to be considered. The mix of forces in USAR and ARNG units may need to be examined, and the authorized level of organization (ALO) of units may have to be reconsidered to ensure that homeland security-oriented units are sufficiently manned to accomplish their missions, at the same time that enough soldiers are made available for overseas contingencies. These changes might also imply a reexamination of the active/reserve component mix, to provide more readily available assets of appropriate types for the governors and combatant commanders. Any such effort, however, should be undertaken with the explicit acknowledgment of the 1973 philosophy elucidated by then-Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams: that the reserve components must be an integral part of the go-to-war Army, so that any decision to commit American troops would necessarily involve the active participation of the whole nation. Operations plans and contingency plans will need to be reexamined to determine if sufficient forces exist to execute them given the likely demands of homeland security; if not, adjustments

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to structure and end strength will need to be considered.21 The Army’s mix of military occupational specialties will also need to be reexamined in light of the force structure changes and governors’ likely concerns outlined above. Finally, these and other changes have implications for Army institutions and investment strategies in general.

Transformation, Briefly

Army transformation is contained in the larger DOD transformation effort,22 in which a premium has been placed on strategic mobility, smart weaponry, and optimizing forces to fight very high-tempo engagements that rely on speed, precision, communications, intelligence, lethality, and seamless coordination across the joint force. DOD’s focus is not primarily on ground forces, but on smart weapons, space-based systems, C4I capabilities23 that can be used to synchronize and “leverage” the capabilities of the entire force, and technologies and practices that have improved potential for increased lethality, survivability, and manpower savings. The forces of all services are being integrated to a greater degree than ever before, and in many ways technology is replacing manpower as the capabilities of the individual warrior, team, unit, and joint force are expanded.

For the Army, transformation is largely embodied by the Objective Force organization and concepts under development.24 These concepts envision technology that will permit significant increases in strategic mobility, made possible by the 16- to 20-ton vehicles that will replace tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery pieces, and many other items of equipment, without sacrificing lethality or survivability. This will, in theory, permit deployment by air of a sizable portion of an early entry force.25 Furthermore, tactical and operational employment concepts envision a nonlinear battlefield in which near-perfect intelligence, robots, and extremely capable information networks allow the Objective Force to move extremely fast, and to “see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively” to overwhelm enemies before they can react.26 These capabilities will rely not only on sophisticated communications and intelligence technologies, but on large numbers of robots and the automation of many functions currently performed by soldiers.

The Objective Force, as envisioned, would fight in a significantly different manner than traditional, industrial-age forces. According to developing Objective Force doctrine, near-perfect intelligence, automation and robotics, smart munitions, and greatly increased C4I capabilities will result in a nonlinear battlefield making possible greatly increased freedom of movement. This will permit units to operate without rigid boundaries or rear areas, allowing them to attack the enemy from the direction and with the elements of combat power most likely to produce swift and overwhelming victory.27 This revolutionary concept has significant implications for every aspect of the Objective Force, from the equipment and unit organization that will be required to support

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this type of warfare, to the training and leadership skills needed for every soldier on the battlefield.

To make all this work, Objective Force commanders, leaders, and soldiers will be critical components of this system. In many ways, technological advances will reduce the requirement for soldiers and leaders to understand large amounts of mechanical information and procedures. This requirement will be replaced by other technical skills. The ability of every soldier on the battlefield to understand his surroundings and his commander’s intent, and to act accordingly, is important today, but it will be much more important in this more fluid and less rigidly controlled environment.28 Indeed, the maturity and amount of initiative that will be required not only of leaders, but of every soldier on the future battlefield, will dictate a very different set of skills and demand changes in the Army leader development processes.29

One implication of this is that the soldier of the future will need additional skills to fight as an effective member of the transformed force. Intellectual and leadership skills will be at a premium, and numeric manpower requirements are likely to decline or at most remain stable. The envisioned battle space an Objective Force “division” will traverse and dominate will be orders of magnitude greater than today.30

Transformation Implications

As indicated by the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) “the areas of doctrine, training, and leader development will constitute the preponderance of the transformation effort,” yet there also will be effects on other aspects of DOTMLPF, and independent effects as well.31 The following paragraphs briefly address some of these areas, and note the likely implications of the changes made necessary by the homeland security missions outlined above.

Significant work has taken place at the Training and Doctrine Command to begin developing the doctrine required to fight the Objective Force, but these efforts also recognize the need for increased flexibility and responsiveness in the doctrinal development process, to better respond to the quickly changing needs of the operational Army.32 Significantly, these efforts have focused almost exclusively on future combat. Of general interest, this doctrine must also mesh within

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the joint doctrinal framework, and while joint doctrine for warfighting is mature in content and process, for homeland security it is not. The doctrinal development process will force consideration of both transformation and homeland security in the Army and joint communities. Care must be given to ensure that these separate statements of doctrine take into account the differing requirements they will place on the force and for the other elements of DOTMLPF.

The organization of some Objective Force units is currently being finalized in anticipation of an upcoming Milestone B decision for the Future Combat System (FCS) in 2003.33 Lower-level units will contain combined-arms elements to integrate those capabilities thought to be essential for the fast-tempo, nonlinear battlefield of the future. As an isolated matter, this has no bearing on homeland defense, but as stated in the Objective Force White Paper, deploying forces are envisioned to include ARNG, USAR, and active component elements. In light of the requirements of homeland security outlined above, the issue of unit missions, the availability of units and individuals, and even what type of units exist in each component must be explicitly addressed.

The far greater intellectual and leadership demands placed on soldiers in Objective Force units will have significant training implications. In general, the more complicated the task of an organization, the greater the skills required of organizations and their members, and so the greater the training burden. The added complications of the nonlinear battlefield will be heightened by the integration of combined arms at lower organization levels, and by the requirement for small Objective Force units to fight as part of the joint team.34 In the Objective Force, these greater requirements will fall predominantly on leaders, but in combat all must be prepared to step up into leadership roles.

Great training emphasis will be placed on developing leader and team capabilities, and exemplary competence at all levels will be needed for success. Training aids and simulators are likely to be embedded in Objective Force equipment, and there will likely be a strong emphasis on broadening skill sets and tactical proficiency.35 These aids will save time and ease the training burden, but the time and resource demands of training to meet these new mission requirements have yet to be determined. However, one thing is clear. The training required for units to fight in the nonlinear, joint, and dynamic battlefield envisioned for the Objective Force will be greater than it is currently. Juxtaposed with this increased training requirement for transformation is the increase called for by the Gilmore Commission in civil support (and other homeland security) training. It should be noted that while the training tasks required of individual soldiers may not differ significantly in kind between many Objective Force and homeland security missions (e.g., guarding a facility or driving a vehicle would be the same in both cases), the unit tasks and the emphasis on tasks could differ significantly (e.g., communications and intelligence-related tasks in the case of the Objective Force versus patrolling with local police in the case of homeland security). These competing demands will be particularly difficult for reserve component units to meet.

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As mentioned earlier, leaders and soldiers in the Objective Force will be expected to act with greater autonomy, maturity, and knowledge than at any time in the past. The nonlinear battlefield and advanced technology envisioned imply that units will cover much larger areas, and independent action will be required of much smaller units. Leaders at every level will be further removed from their superiors, and will be expected to know the commander’s intent and to take the actions required to further mission accomplishment. They “must know ‘how to think’ versus ‘what to think.’”36 Leaders of this type are developed throughout a career, not through unit training alone. This will require reexamining leader development programs from the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course through the Sergeants Major Academy; from the Officers Basic Course through Senior Service Colleges; and within individual units. Furthermore, developing this new type of leader may require more time. Objective Force leaders will require increased maturity, thoughtfulness, and ability to act appropriately without explicit orders or guidance. If we think of leader development as the instilling of characteristics a leader should have (as opposed to technical skills, which fall into the domain of training), then leader development for both transformation and homeland security appears to be quite similar.

The material requirements of the Objective Force are significant. If it comes into being as currently envisioned, it will require multiple technologies that are still in the R&D process to mature quickly. In addition to significantly lighter armor and more capable intelligence and communications platforms, current versions of Objective Force draft doctrine and plans envision significant numbers of very capable robots, significantly greater levels of lethality and survivability with less size and weight, and organic intra-theater vertical lift transport capable of moving large formations equipped with the Future Combat System. Projected funding requirements for this collection of technologies and capabilities far exceed projected budgets. This could have implications for resources and facilities across the board (as well as on every other aspect of DOTMLPF), but should not otherwise negatively affect the homeland security mission.

Personnel support functions are of great importance in the transformed force. The drastically increased optempo and nonlinear battlefield of the future create a situation so stressful, both psychologically and physically, that methods for supporting soldiers (and their families) must be seriously studied. Little has been published on this to date, but it, too, seems to be an area in which the demands of the transformed force and homeland security could be harmonious. Finally, family support issues will likely be of increased importance to the reserve components in both the transformed and homeland security missions.

Recommendations

The Objective Force White Paper states, “The Objective Force will require higher levels of integration between the active and reserve components to the point of truly being The Army, not three separate components. This has to

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be accomplished in order to achieve strategic responsiveness and dominance across the spectrum of military operations and to simultaneously provide for homeland security.”37

The foregoing discussions make clear that there are significant and problematic implications with this statement. The demands of homeland security and transformation may in many cases force specialization upon the components, rather than increase cooperation. Indeed, logic and such prestigious bodies as the Gilmore Commission urge this approach. Yet a first-order perspective on these issues brings us to a logically simple, yet logistically difficult conclusion.

Military transformation, in its essence, should be the act of changing the shape and functions of the military to meet the challenges of the future security environment. As originally foreseen, this involves using advances in technology to make possible heretofore unheard-of capabilities for fighting enemies on future battlefields. It is now clear that a critical component of future security situations will be homeland security. The transformation process must be rethought in this context. Transformation must explicitly include the demands of homeland security as a key component so that all DOTMLPF implications are examined holistically and the transformed force can accomplish all missions assigned to it by the nation’s leadership in the envisioned security environment.

Some simple observations and conclusions, organized along the DOTMLPF categories, make it clear that a holistic approach is needed. They include these:

  Doctrinal changes for homeland security and transformation will appear mutually exclusive at face value, but will have significant implications for training, leader development, organization, and personnel support that affect both missions.

  The training burdens of transformation and homeland security may be significantly different and to some extent divergent. Reserve component units, with limited available time, will find it difficult if not impossible to train well for both missions, making it necessary to seriously consider designating separate units for homeland security missions and warfighting.

  Leader development demands of homeland security and transformation will appear different in form, but may be substantially similar in character. Both will place a premium on intellectual capability, maturity, and the ability to act appropriately without explicit direction.

  The training demands outlined above; the needs of governors for trained, well-led, and appropriately organized forces to defend against terrorist threats; and possible political pressures not to deploy some ARNG units during times of heightened terrorist threats will demand a fundamental reexamination of Army organization. End-strength levels may also be affected.

  Materiel development and facilities requirements will not be significantly affected by the homeland security/transformation divergence.

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  Personnel—in this case primarily soldier and family support issues— will be of increased importance in both the homeland security and transformation frameworks, and require a focused examination to determine needs.


NOTES

1. US Army White Paper, “Concepts of the Objective Force,” http://www.objectiveforce.army.mil/pages/ObjectiveForceWhitePaper.pdf, 5 October 2001, p. 3.

2. US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001, pp. 17-19, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.

3. Even as late as 1951, in his farewell address to Congress, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur made reference to the chains of Pacific islands as the perimeter of our national defense, with the clear implication that control of them would prevent future enemies from invading the United States.

4. See, for example, Jeremy Feiler, “National Guard Association: Governors Should Control Deployments,” Inside the Pentagon, 10 October 2002, p.1. Also, note that there has been a tremendous amount of focus on the programmatic and budget implications of transformation, but this has been on financial and defense industrial base issues, not on issues of structure to perform these competing strategic functions.

5. DTLOMS stands for “Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldier Support,” and has been a model for developing a professional force for 25 years. Under this model, all components of DTLOMS must develop synchronously for the Army to be effective. The same holds true for DOTMLPF.

6. State Adjutants General and National Guard personnel are leading or involved in almost all of these efforts.

7. See, for example, George W. Bush, The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington: Office of Homeland Security, July 2002), www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html.

8. See Department of Defense, News Release, “Unified Command Plan,” 17 April 2002. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Joint Forces Command set up a provisional Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security, which has operational control of Joint Task Force Civil Support, the Consequence Management Headquarters for CBRNE, and Joint Task Force-Six, which has responsibility for counter-drug support to civil authorities in the United States. These organizations or functions have been moved to Northern Command.

9. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Verga, as quoted by Gerry J. Gilmore in “Verga Clarifies DoD’s Homeland Defense Role,” American Forces Press Service, Washington, D.C., 11 December 2002.

10. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: DOD Homeland Defense Policy (HDP) Responsibilities, 1 July 2002, and PL 107-314.

11. According to The Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (the “Gilmore Commission Report”), December 2002, p. 90, homeland security, from DOD’s perspective, consists of two missions, “homeland defense” and “civil support.”

12. For a simple but illuminating enumeration of many of the tasks performed by Army units after 11 September 2001 and the number of soldiers involved, as well as a methodology for estimating homeland security force requirements, see Lynn Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy (MR-1657A) (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, forthcoming), ch. 4.

13. There are many reasons why the Guard was not called on to perform some of the duties one might have expected—e.g., provide assistance to law enforcement, deliver aid, or provide medical and other logistical support. New York, in particular, was exceptionally well prepared (for the time) to handle a disaster, and there were no problems with crime or violence that required military assistance on the scale of the Los Angeles riots of 1993—in fact, crime rates decreased temporarily. Most important, no chemical, biological, or radiological contaminants were released.

14. See The National Strategy for Homeland Security for an explanation of the Homeland Security Advisory System.

15. See, for example, “National Guard Association: Governors Should Control Deployments,” Inside the Pentagon, 10 October 2002.

16. The term “on-scene commander” is used to designate the leader of the response at a terrorist or other domestic crisis site, even though different agencies use different terms. It has long been US policy that the military will not be the lead federal agency in domestic operations. A good example was the attack on the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, where, even though the Pentagon is a military installation, the on scene commander was the Arlington, Va., fire chief for the initial phases of the operation, and the FBI for the subsequent law enforcement phase.

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17. See, for example, John Traylor, Thomas Murray, and James Kievit, “Examining Transformation of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard for the 21st Century,” in Issue Paper 12-02 (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, November 2002), http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/CSL%20Issue%20Paper%2012-02.pdf, p. 3.

18. Units that address nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons are called chemical units. This designation does not imply that chemical threats are all that they are capable of responding to, although that has traditionally been the emphasis.

19. The Gilmore Commission Report actually gives more detail than stated here. In addition, it states (pp. 99-100):

Although the military trains extensively for combat operations, training for homeland activities differs in essential ways. Compared to coordination within a purely military command structure, coordinating homeland operations with other federal, state, and local authorities will require comparable skills but different applications. Liaison activities among the elements involved in planning, training, and exercising will take on greater importance. For response operations, command and control processes may be different. Requirements for joint training will take on a new meaning, as joint exercises with state and local responders will be very important. Finally, certain homeland missions will require support to civil law enforcement and the execution of law enforcement tasks. Military personnel will require specific training to support local law enforcement agencies in performing law enforcement missions.

20. See Traylor, Murray, and Kievit for a good discussion of issues that could be addressed through homeland security training and exercises.

21. Note that this may differ somewhat from the normal Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, in that “below the line” forces will in some homeland defense missions have significant priority, and may need to be considered “above the line” and perhaps outside of the mechanized process.

22. See the US Army White Paper “Concepts of the Objective Force” for a good, short exposition of many of the key concepts articulated in this section.

23. C4I is an acronym that stands for “command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence.”

24. See TRADOC PAM 525 (Draft), United States Army Transformation Campaign Plan (FOUO), 22 June 2001.

25. Significant obstacles to achieving the Army’s rapid, strategic deployment timelines are raised in Alan Vick, et al., The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Opinions (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Project Air Force, 2002).

26. US Army White Paper, “Concepts of the Objective Force,” p. ii.

27. These concepts are laid out in great detail in TRADOC’s 525 series of pamphlets, and in the US Army White Paper, “Concepts of the Objective Force.”

28. Good examples in today’s Army of technical skills that no longer need be mastered are fire direction and survey. These functions are all computerized, or taken care of by global positioning system (GPS) technology. The ability to operate the computers that replaced older equipment, however, requires a different set of skills. Similar changes will occur as the Objective Force comes into being.

29. TRADOC’s Center for Army Leadership is examining the issues of what characteristics and skills will be needed in the future force, and how to develop them.

30. The term “division” is used here instead of Unit of Action or Unit of Employment, since it is well defined and commonly understood. The point that a unit of any size is envisioned to be much more capable and cover more ground is indisputable.

31. TRADOC PAM 525-3-90, The United States Army Objective Force, Operational and Organizational Plan for Maneuver Unit of Action, 22 July 2002, p. 135.

32. Several elements of doctrine have been developed that begin to address the needs of the Objective Force. Field Manual 3-0, 14 June 2001, begins to make this transition, but is further supported by several TRADOC doctrinal publications. The case for a more flexible doctrinal system is perhaps best spelled out in TRADOC PAM 525-3-90.

33. Milestone B is a formal decision point in the defense acquisition process, formally articulated it the DODD 5000 series. This directive has been suspended, but the formal decision point is still of importance.

34. See UA Maneuver BattleLab, Operational Requirements Document for the Future Combat System, 30 August 2002, sec. 1.5.2, pp. 10-25.

35. TRADOC PAM 525-3-90 outlines some of the improved training capabilities and procedures that will be required for the Objective Force Unit of Action. See section 5.3, pp. 124-32, for a more complete exposition.

36. Ibid., p. 135.

37. US Army White Paper, “Concepts of the Objective Force,” p. 17.


Dr. Terrence K. Kelly (LTC, USA Ret.) is a Senior Researcher with RAND, where he does homeland and national security research. Before joining RAND, he served as the Senior National Security Officer in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. He also served in the State and Commerce Departments, with the Army Staff and Secretariat, and in the 82d Airborne and 8th Infantry Divisions. He is a 1982 graduate of the US Military Academy, was a White House Fellow, and holds a Ph.D. in mathematics and an M.S. in computer and systems engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the Army War College.


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Reviewed 15 May 2003. Please send comments or corrections to usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil