From Parameters, Autumn 2001, pp. 43-62.
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Not since General Hans von Seeckt's efforts with the German Reichswehr in the early 1920s has a military organization so self-consciously set about transforming itself as the US Army today. It is part of an overall process that has been met with enthusiastic endorsements ranging from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to congressionally-mandated blue ribbon panels. Still, specifics concerning the process have been hard to come by, with one defense analyst noting the similarity of "transformation" as a military concept to the Christian idea of transubstantiation: "No one is exactly sure what it means, but most believers have an opinion about it." Generally, however, the concept is linked with the idea of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The interest in this revolution in the early 1990s led by the end of the decade to a growing acceptance of the need for military transformation if the RMA were to be achieved. Thus, the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group defined military transformation as "the set of activities by which DOD attempts to harness the revolution in military affairs to make fundamental changes in technology, operational concepts and doctrine, and organizational structure." The process, then, combines the acquisition of new military systems with appropriate divestiture and modifications dealing with doctrine and organization--all focused on maximizing the capabilities of future armed forces.
To jump-start this process, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, began in the fall of 1999 to invest in current off-the-shelf equipment to stimulate the development of doctrine and organizational design even as the Army began a search for the new technologies that would deliver the material for a future force. That force would be strategically responsive and dominant across a full spectrum of operations ranging from peacetime military engagement to smaller-scale contingencies to major theater war. The swiftness of the process, General Shinseki acknowledged, would be "unnerving to some." Nevertheless, there was an urgency to the transformation process for the Army, concerned with becoming more relevant in a rapidly changing geostrategic environment in which strategic speed and lethality could no longer successfully exist as separate variables. "All our combat power is useless if we cannot get it to the theater in time or maneuver it tactically," Major General James Dubik, the head of the experimental force at Fort Lewis, pointed out. "Right now our heavy forces have limited strategic deployability and our light forces have limited tactical utility. Transformation will take care of that disconnect."
How well Army transformation is able to deal with that disconnect, however, will depend a great deal on future US policy concerning the use of military force. At one extreme is the so-called Powell Doctrine, a relatively restrictive approach to the subject. At the other extreme is what has popularly come to be called the Clinton Doctrine, a more liberal prescription for the use of force. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how those two doctrines will influence the transformation of the US Army as it struggles to move forward toward a genuine revolution in military affairs, and how that transformation process can in turn mitigate the worst excesses of both doctrines. In the end, it is the ability of the US Army to use the new technology for the application of military force that will determine the success of the RMA. In this regard, it is appropriate to remember why Thomas Huxley remained unimpressed at the end of the 19th century by all the knowledge, machinery, and power that had extended human competence over the physical environment. "The great issue," he pointed out, "about which hangs a true sublimity and the terror of overhanging fate is, what are you going to do with all these things?"
To assert that the seeds of Army transformation were planted in the unused AH-64 Apache helicopters on the Albanian-Kosovo border in 1999 is to do a disservice to the decades-long efforts by the US Army to solve the problem of how to field a force light enough to be projected quickly on a global basis and lethal enough to dominate upon arrival. In the 1980s, the Army attempted to address this problem by transforming itself with the concept of the High-Technology Light Division (HTLD). That effort succumbed to bureaucratic infighting by 1988, leaving a window of vulnerability clearly demonstrated two years later when the US line in the Saudi Arabian sand was held for several weeks only by the lightly armed and relatively immobile forces of the 82d Airborne Division and a Marine Expeditionary Force. From the Gulf War to 1997, the pace of US military operations increased by at least 300 percent even as the armed forces were buffeted by cuts in structure, weapon programs, and personnel strength. During that period, the Army conducted a series of futures efforts beginning with the 1992 series of simulations and exercises known as the Louisiana Maneuvers. That program gave way to the Force XXI process, a series of experiments in warfighting designed to generate and test new ideas. Next came the Army After Next project, the use of studies, conferences, and war games to postulate those elements of the RMA on which the Army should focus in future geostrategic environments. These programs involved separate but complementary processes coordinated through distinct light and heavy modernization plans along similar, not common, system and organizational designs. The result was a continued bifurcation of the force between heavy and light units.
From this extended perspective, the Army's problems with Task Force Hawk simply highlighted the need to accelerate experimental efforts to solve a long-simmering problem. Landpower enthusiasts might point out that much analysis of the Serbian campaign failed to take into account the actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army that complemented the NATO attack. But there was no disguising the fact that the 11-week campaign had been decided by the 730 Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft, ranging from Cold War F-16s to the newest B-2s, that flew more than 36,000 sorties. In the wake of that campaign, there was considerable conjecture about the Army's strategic relevancy in newspaper and magazine articles. The Deputy Secretary of Defense was even more direct. "If the Army holds onto nostalgic versions of its grand past," he warned in August 1999, "it is going to atrophy and die." It was a message concerning deployability, lethality, and sustainability that was well understood in the Army. "We are committed to remain relevant," General Dubik pointed out, "able to respond quickly, and provide the appropriate forces for . . . contingencies."
The key to Army relevancy is an Army transformation process that rests on four foundations: the conduct of future war, the future operating environment, the increasing significance of full-spectrum operations, and the diminished utility of the current force. Together, these elements compel the current Army process toward a combination of evolutionary and revolutionary change. It is, in short, a self-styled "balanced" approach designed to fully capitalize on leap-ahead technology while retaining current warfighting capabilities. But the Army process also recognizes that emerging technologies cannot alone produce an RMA, that they serve as enablers for much more far-reaching changes in doctrine, concepts, and organization, which together cause fundamentally new ways of conducting military operations. At some critical point, the cumulative effects of technical advances and military innovation in all these areas invalidate former conceptual structures and cause a basic alteration in accepted definitions and measurements of military effectiveness. Such experimentation, however, is not easy; and in fact the Defense Science Board Task Force has called it "an unnatural act" for any large, established organization. Moreover, as General Dubik has cautioned, "There is no guarantee to any of this. There is no playbook. There is no answer book."
We must . . . make sure we get it close to right. We know we will not get it precisely right. But our job is not to get it so wrong that we hamstring the next generation of leaders. We have to get it right enough, so that in 2015, when the nation asks the Army to do something, it is flexible enough to accomplish any potential mission.
The Interim Force is the centerpiece in the balanced process of "getting it right." The force consists of medium-weight Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) designed "to meet a near-term strategic requirement that now is absent, as well as to prepare the Army for the long-term." To achieve these goals, the IBCTs will operate within the current division structures and provide a complementary capability to the current light and heavy units that comprise the existing Legacy Force. At the same time, the IBCTs will act as a bridging force until science and technology allow the realization of the Objective Force, the ultimate Army product of the RMA. The key to the bridging process is the development of the Future Combat System (FCS), which is to combine the capabilities of the current howitzers, main battle tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles while weighing in at not more than 20 tons--a figure in dramatic contrast, for example, to the 70 tons of the M1A1 Abrams tank. Once the FCS emerges, it will be adopted by the Legacy and Interim Forces, which will then merge into the Objective Force.
The Interim Force concept is a revolutionary bridge to the future Objective Force. To begin with, the IBCT is not a theoretical construct, but a test-bed force with goals of deploying a brigade to a forward base within four days, a division within five days, and five divisions within 30 days. And yet the units are being created without waiting for the development of new technology. Instead, the Army is focused on evaluating and refining the operations and organizational concept for these forces derived from the envisioned future environment in which the units would operate, from the kind of characteristics desired in the force, and from the capabilities that would then be required. This type of parallel effort is designed to produce a complete RMA when the emerging technology comes on line, unlike those incomplete revolutions in the past when doctrine and organization lagged the new technology as they did with the so-called "dead hand" of Napoleon in the American Civil War and with the French pursuit of offensive à outrance at the beginning of World War I. "As we develop the IBCTs at Fort Lewis, train them, and get the doctrine right," General Dubik notes in this regard, "we will be producing the doctrine and training that we need for the Objective Force." As technology produces the revolutionary breakthroughs necessary to complement this doctrine, distinctions between the bifurcated force will blur, with the Objective Force taking on the lethality associated with heavy units and the agility that is the mark of light units.
At the other end of the Army's balanced linkage, the relationship of the Interim and Legacy Forces is more conservative--founded on a determination by the Army "not to permit" transformation to compromise near-term warfighting capabilities. From this perspective, the IBCT is designed to bolster the current Legacy Force by enhancing the ability of the regional CINCs and Joint Task Force commanders to respond. For the Legacy light division, the Interim unit will become the most mobile, lethal, and survivable element, extending the division's tactical mobility while increasing the organic firepower in support of dismounted operations, and thus will likely be employed in the main divisional effort. On the other hand, the IBCT will probably be the first brigade to deploy as part of a heavy division in order to consolidate and extend the security of air and sea ports of debarkation, thus facilitating the reception, staging, and onward integration of the remainder of the division. The new formations will also provide a dramatic improvement in national and theater conventional deterrence by presenting the National Command Authorities with the capability to position a credible and flexible combat force on the ground anywhere in the world within 96 hours. At the same time, the accelerated development of the initial Interim brigades will provide impetus to the transformation process by allowing the training and development of soldiers and leaders in the doctrine and organization of these new formations without compromising the Army's basic raison d'être of winning wars.
In all this, a major issue for the Legacy Force is divestiture of old technology, organization, and doctrine--a key element if the Army's revolution in military affairs is ultimately to be complete. The Army has already restructured five major programs and cancelled seven others in order to free $16 billion for the transformation effort. Whether the right systems and doctrine are available for that process depends on the Army's ability to maintain a viable Legacy Force. But 75 percent of that force already exceeds its service half-life. Moreover, as the Legacy Force comes to the end of that cycle, there will be increasing costs for operations and maintenance--producing further pressure for recapitalization, the replacement (as opposed to modernization) of aging systems. One solution is to identify and prioritize modernization or recapitalization for those Legacy systems that have applicability for the Objective Force. Some systems, however, need to be continued even if they don't fall in this category, since their elimination would pose too great a risk to the Legacy guarantee of near-term warfighting capabilities. The Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) system, for example, is required to replace an aging fleet of trucks that will carry the tanks, Bradleys, and howitzers until transformation is effected.
Ultimately, there is no pat solution to the tension between divestiture concerned with a Legacy Force and the need to hedge against an uncertain future. It is a tension that is particularly sharp for the military profession, which has little room for any illusions about the stakes in national security affairs. "If you have lost a battle," G. K. Chesterton once noted, "you cannot believe that you have won it." There is no guarantee, for example, that the technology for the Objective Force will materialize, potentially leaving a "worst-of-both-worlds" force that could still consume substantial amounts of strategic lift, while lacking combat punch and sustainability. Nor is it ever a certainty that some new technological variant will be correctly understood. Thus, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig--a year into World War I--could inform the War Office that "the machine-gun is a much overrated weapon; two per battalion is more than sufficient." There is also no assurance that emerging doctrine and concepts will survive a future test, as was demonstrated by the Maginot Line, an efficient and effective use of military resources in terms of the static trench warfare of World War I, but useless against the mobile German army doctrine of 1940. Most important, there is the overriding need to retain a near-term strategic hedge of readiness for major theater war. Thus, it is not surprising that the Army has adopted a conservative resourcing strategy during transformation designed to keep:
a balance of old and new systems to maintain readiness for today while preparing for the future. This strategy will selectively retain or extend the life of legacy systems, synchronize divestiture with acquisition, and bring new systems as rapidly as possible in accordance with new operational concepts.
The tension between the Legacy and Objective Forces was reflected in a draft General Accounting Office (GAO) report provided to the Army in January 2001 that identified risk in the transformation efforts. The development of the Objective Force, the report asserted, represented the Army's "foremost challenge" because of uncertainty as to whether the required technology would mature enough to enable the development of the Future Combat System as envisioned or in time to meet the transformation schedule. The Army, the report added, should consider achieving Objective Force capabilities in stages--a strategy that could provide worthwhile increases in capability but might also require a continuation of Legacy and Interim Forces "longer than anticipated." The Army's response was that the report overly focused on equipment, ignoring the Army's "holistic" approach, which also involved the considerable progress being made in organizational, doctrinal, and institutional change. Focusing on acquisition alone, one source concluded, was like "looking through a Coke bottle . . . at the stars."
In any event, the Army leadership was bent on further expediting the transformation effort. On 1 March 2001, the Chief of Staff announced that the Army would lose relevancy if an Objective Force capability was not fielded by 2010. There would be no waiting for the development of better systems if it meant slowing down the transformation process. "This is about speed," General Shinseki added. As a consequence, the Army would increase funding in the integrated Future Combat System for fiscal years 2003 to 2008. In April 2003 there would be a readiness review of the FCS in order to select the best technologies and concepts for the next phase of the process. "We will make the tough calls; we will shift resources to the most promising technical solutions." The second milestone would be the development and demonstration of a prototype FCS model beginning in FY 06. "Our intent," the Chief concluded, "is to accelerate the transition to research and development by collapsing traditional lines."
This was hardly good news for those within the Army who already perceived transformation as challenging the most cherished service assumptions. Not surprisingly, some heavy armor and artillery advocates had indicated resistance, as had some in the aviation community concerned about the lack of reference to Army aviation attack units. And the fact that the Interim Force would rely on fire support from Air Force, Navy, and coalition assets was perceived by some as an abandonment of the Army's organic role in deep attack. Outside the Army, one official of the Air Force Association summarized that service's position in the post-Kosovo conflict era by asserting that "transformation cannot take place without a shift in service roles from the current emphasis on surface warfare to aero-space warfare." And the Commandant of the Marine Corps warned against attempts by each service to claim that it was the "expeditionary force" of choice for the nation. "There is no way," he pointed out, "that the entire armed forces of the United States can fit into the tip of the spear."
The Powell and Clinton Doctrines
"What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?" Madeleine Albright pointedly asked of Colin Powell during his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This exasperated question reflected a difference in outlook that was set in train in November 1984 when Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger formulated six criteria for the use of US military force overseas: Involvement of vital national interests; clear intention of winning; clearly defined political and military objectives; a constant reassessment of objectives and forces; a reasonable assurance of public and congressional support prior to commitment; and the use of US forces as a last resort. By the early 1990s, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Powell was dealing with a new, more complicated geostrategic landscape of failed states, civil wars, and ethnic conflicts. As a result he began to move away somewhat from a doctrine that was virtually immune to ambiguity. Instead of "last resort," there would be the limited use of the military for political reasons: "When force is used deftly--in smooth coordination with diplomatic and economic policy--bullets may never have to fly." This, in turn, meant a wider range of military missions across a spectrum of operations that could be far removed from a rigid focus on vital interests: "I believe peacekeeping and humanitarian operations are a given." And in his final public address before retiring as Chairman, Powell acknowledged that clear objectives were not always possible in the use of military force, that situations often were ambiguous and "murky." By that time Powell could warn that there was "no fixed set of rules for the use of military force" and that to establish such criteria was dangerous.
All this notwithstanding, Powell still found that Weinberger's criteria were a "practical guide" when it came to the relevant questions concerned with matching force and objectives. Most important, the guideline of national interest intensity was still critical for him in terms of prioritization and sustainment in the use of any military force--a Clausewitzian linkage that he always appreciated. "Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object," the Prussian philosopher had long ago warned, "the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration." Thus, as the former Yugoslavia began to come apart in 1991, Powell urged a caution based on a variant of the Weinberger Doctrine that, while adjusting the last resort criterion and acknowledging the role of early force intervention, still called for a policy of selective global engagement primarily based on US national interests. The Chairman's rationale also included such Weinberger derivatives as the use of overwhelming force for clear political and military objectives and a need for constant reassessment of the relationship of force utilization to these objectives as well as to the American people and their representatives. Soon, what quickly came to be known as the Powell Doctrine was being interpreted by its critics as a reluctance to intervene anywhere with military force, unless the intervention was so massively disproportionate as to become virtually free of risk. But Powell was having none of it. "Decisive means and results are always to be preferred," he wrote at the time, "even if they are not always possible."
We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the "surgery" is over and the desired result is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation. . . . History has not been kind to this approach.
At the beginning of President Clinton's first term in office, Powell had considerable influence on the President with this type of thinking concerning the use of force. In the last two years of that first Administration, however, with General Powell out of office, the President increasingly resorted to the use of military force across a full spectrum of operations--to the extent that in the 1996 presidential campaign, Senator Dole noted that the Clinton Administration had initiated more military deployments than any of its predecessors. In the second Administration, Kosovo resulted in further fin de siecle twists to the emerging Clinton Doctrine. For the President, morals and values as much as geopolitics played a key role, with every cruise missile and bomb in that conflict aimed not only at destroying the Serbian national will, but also at demolishing the idea that leaders could commit criminal acts so long as they acted within their own country. For the first time, one Administration official explained, Clinton was stating that "genocide is in and of itself a national interest where we should attack." The President elaborated on this theme in an exuberant speech to NATO troops in Macedonia following the successful conclusion of the Kosovo campaign. In this brave new world, he emphasized, national sovereignty would be subordinated to human rights. In terms of "ethnic or religious conflict" in the world, universality would be "an important principle" that he hoped would be applied in the future "whether within or beyond" the borders of a country.
In the wake of Kosovo, the President continued to give pride of place to values in the basic components of his emerging doctrine for the use of force. First, there was the increasingly pessimistic appraisal of the international security environment--"a viper's nest of perils," in Secretary Albright's description, ranging from terrorism and international crime to computer hackers and genocidal violence. The second ingredient of the Clinton Doctrine was the assumption, as the dominant world power with global economic interests in an increasingly interdependent environment, that the United States had a vested interest in the maintenance of international stability, of world order. The third component was the conviction that in order to achieve international stability, the United States must maintain sufficient forces to conduct simultaneous military action against multiple adversaries--a primary constabulary mission for American military power to ensure the system didn't break down, causing globalization to fail. Implicit in this linkage to world order was the idea that the best way to maintain stability in areas that truly mattered to the United States was to diminish instability in other areas, however unimportant that instability might appear, before it could build in intensity and spread to areas of significant interest. It was, as Secretary Albright demonstrated, the harnessing of the "domino theory" to the concept of shaping. "Common sense tells us," she commented, "that it is sometimes better to deal with instability when it is still at arm's length than to wait until it is at our doorstep." President Clinton was even more explicit in terms of the shaping function in a February 1999 speech that foreshadowed the bombing decision in Serbia:
It's easy . . . to say that we really have no interests in who lives in this or that valley in Bosnia, or who owns a strip of brush land in the Horn of Africa, or some piece of parched earth by the Jordan River. But the true measure of our interests lies in not how small or distant these places are, or in whether we have trouble pronouncing their names. The question we must ask is, what are the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester and spread.
In the end, the criteria that are popularly ascribed to both doctrines are only factors to be considered, not absolute requirements like those of Just War doctrine. Moreover, because the Powell Doctrine has moved somewhat from the strict constructionist Weinberger position, and because the Clinton Doctrine began its early evolution when Powell was Chairman of the JCS, there are many similarities. Both believe in using force in conjunction with the other elements of national power; both recognize that force may be used in a wide spectrum of situations, including those involving peace and humanitarian operations; and both believe in the use of quick, overwhelming, and decisive force for clear military and political objectives. In terms of applying that decisive force, the Clinton approach is generally to rely on stand-off, high-tech weapons, while the Powell Doctrine includes a basic distrust of technology as a panacea in the use of force, combined with a recognition that conflict resolution always requires, and conflict termination nearly always requires, the use of landpower.
The Powell Doctrine is often described as a strategy of reluctance focused on a narrowly defined concept of national security which, if taken too literally, can amount "to virtual isolationism again, via the great circle route." But with its emphasis on national interests and a finite amount of resources, the Powell Doctrine ensures a selectivity in near- and mid-term shaping and responding activities in order to prepare for future regional and near-peer threats. On the other hand, the Clinton Doctrine has been accused of a willingness to use military force only when the political cost of standing aloof exceeded the cost of a carefully staged and limited intervention. Moreover, there is the general charge of doctrinal inconsistency in an administration that never made clear why the United States pulled out of Somalia, elected to stay out of Rwanda, or stayed out of Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor for as long as it did, then elected to intervene in the way that it did. But by emphasizing shaping and responding activities across a full spectrum of operations in the near- and mid-term, the Clinton Doctrine offers the potential of preparing for the future by using military force to resolve crises, prevent conflicts and instability, and deter aggression--all of which could lead to the outbreak of major wars. Ultimately, there will be some mix of the two doctrines in the Bush Administration, which will, in turn, determine the mix of the shape-respond-prepare strategic variables. That combination will directly affect the Army transformation process and determine if the United States in the future can avoid both Munich-like appeasements and Vietnam-like quagmires.
Revolution or Evolution?
At first blush, the Clinton Doctrine appears made to order for Army transformation. To begin with, there is the balanced shape-respond-prepare approach to the full spectrum of operations, a rich source of experimentation for the Interim Force as it moves toward the versatile Objective Force. That very versatility can ensure that the Army remains the most relevant and effective force for shaping the international environment. Added to this are the transformation products of increased deployability, lethality, and sustainability, which can provide the Army a rapid-response capability across the full spectrum of operations as a warfighting force and a strategic deterrent. Prior to conflict, this force capability can also buy US authorities critical time for analysis and assessment as well as impart a synergism to other diplomatic, economic, and political crisis resolution tools. The problem is that this balanced shape-respond-prepare approach is a good defense strategy only if it is adequately resourced. If not, it can be disastrous, particularly in the absence of clearly articulated priorities on where to place emphasis and where to accept or manage risk. In that kind of environment, trying to square the means/end circle of full-spectrum dominance has left the services in a position in their transformation efforts, as Andrew Krepinevich has described it, "of trying to create bricks without straw." This has been particularly hard on the Army, which in its pursuit of post-Cold War relevancy under a doctrine bent on maintaining world order and stability by "policing democracy's empire," has been hoist with its own petard of accepting the concept of full-spectrum dominance--a dilemma nicely summarized by General Dubik:
Crises arise and we cannot say "no" to the National Command Authorities. If the President says, "Go to Kosovo," we do not say, "Gee, we are kind of busy." And when he says, "Remember, besides Bosnia you have to train for major theater war," we do not say "Hey, we could sure use a break." If things heat up in East or Southwest Asia, the call is not, "Are you ready?" It is simply "Go."
The result of all this is an environment in which it is difficult to effect fundamental transformation. Certainly the current operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the force is a far cry from that of the 1920s, a period often cited as a model for military innovation. "It is not about money," one DOD official commented in this regard: "They were as poor as church mice, but their best minds had time on their hands, figuring out where to go. A lot of talent was geared toward developing new doctrine. Today our personnel don't think about these kinds of issues." For the Army, this lack of organizational slack is particularly significant. In a recent war game played in preparation for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), for example, an Interim division was used in the later years of the game period. The conclusion was that the Army is and will be the most highly used of the services across the entire spectrum of operations.
Not surprisingly, so far the Powell Doctrine pervades the philosophy for the use of force in the Bush Administration. For National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, US national interests must be the primary basis for such use. "It takes courage to set priorities," she has commented: "Using the American armed forces as the world's `911' will degrade capabilities, bog soldiers down in peacekeeping roles, and fuel concern among the great powers that the United States has decided to enforce notions of `limited sovereignty' worldwide in the name of humanitarianism." President Bush was equally adamant, pointing out that he would avoid "missions without end" and not send troops "to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide" outside US national interests. "Nor do I think we ought to try to be the peacekeepers all around the world," he concluded. "When America uses force in the world, the cause must be just, the goal must be clear, and the victory must be overwhelming."
The adoption of this more selective approach to global engagement was accompanied by a well-publicized campaign for DOD transformation with the goal of obtaining dramatic improvements of military effectiveness at reduced cost. To this end, the President announced that he had given Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld "a broad mandate to challenge the status quo as we design a new architecture for the defense of America. . . . Our goal is to move beyond marginal improvements to harness new technologies that will support a new strategy." Implicit in this type of accelerated approach to transformation is the existence of greater short-term risk for a long-term payoff, which only intensifies the paradox of the investment/divestment tensions between the Legacy Force and the Objective Force. On the one hand, there is the question of whether the new technology will mature quickly enough to meet the Army's ambitious transformation schedule. On the other, there is the approaching obsolescence of many of the Army's systems--one of the reasons for the acceleration to 2010 of the FCS fielding objective, which in turn brings the question full circle back to the speed of technology maturation.
In all this, the Army's position remains that there is a need to maintain a substantive Legacy Force in order to hedge against such uncertainties. It is a position that is not helped by the well-publicized recapitalization effort for that force with the 155mm Crusader howitzer, a weapon system so heavy--in a time of increased deployability emphasis--that an Air Force C-5 will not be able to carry both the gun and its supply vehicle. For some, this smacks of a "Colonel Blimp"-like reaction to change, typical of military inertia and epitomized by the British officer in the interwar years who insisted on maintaining the horse in the artillery and cavalry "because thereby you will keep up the high standard of intelligence in the man from his association with the horse." From this perspective, as Eliot Cohen points out, only a "ruthless retirement" of obsolete hardware will demonstrate "that Washington is finally serious about the `Revolution in Military Affairs.'" But the services are also aware of the dangers in switching modernization funds. In 1994, for example, the Navy offered to drop below the authorized size of the fleet to free funds for developing future capabilities. Instead, the projected savings were used to reduce budget shortfalls--a lesson that was not lost on service chiefs when QDR discussions began.
Such pressures are to be expected in the absence of major threats, after years of deferred modernization and readiness problems, and given such Administration priorities as national missile defense. In that environment, there is a natural temptation to focus on "revolutionary" concepts and technology at the expense of the Legacy Force. Certainly, there is always the danger that a legacy force can diminish the transforming potential of new technology. The Interim Force can do much to mitigate such a development by demonstrating that RMAs can come about not just by transforming all elements of the force, but by identifying and exploiting synergies between the old and the new. The German army between the world wars offers a striking example of this--using experimentation to determine what new systems and capabilities would be needed, what legacy systems and capabilities should be sustained, and what kind of mix of the two should be created. For example, legacy systems such as artillery were motorized to support the tanks. And great care was taken to include the right mix of new capabilities--such as airborne, close air support, and radio communication--with such legacy capabilities as engineer and logistics functions in order to produce optimum capabilities for mechanized air-land operations.
The Doctrinal Combination
The ascendancy of the more selective engagement of the Powell Doctrine in the Bush Administration should not be overemphasized in terms of Army transformation. Americans associate themselves with Jefferson and Wilson, not Machiavelli and Metternich. With the click of a TV remote control or a computer mouse, the American public can be face-to-face with the realities of the post-Cold War world. The current President may choose his use of force at the lower end of the operations spectrum more consistently and effectively than his predecessor. What he cannot do is choose not to choose. The new environment is much more than just a balance-of-power world. In one way or another, as Secretary Powell acknowledges, the United States cannot avoid the full spectrum of the Clinton Doctrine.
For the Army, the most critical area on that spectrum that is not addressed by transformation is peace operations. As the recent experiences in both Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate, conflict termination in smaller-scale contingencies in the new environment normally requires long-term peace enforcement for conflict resolution, usually provided by ground troops. Given the charter of Army transformation, there is little to be gained in terms of technology, doctrine, and organization experimentation by using the Interim Force in peace operations. Army transformation documents make much of physical and mental agility and versatility that support "seamless transitions between benign and hostile environments," but they admit that how that is to be accomplished "is not self-evident." The fact remains that the transformed Army as currently envisioned will not solve the dichotomy between peace operations and warfighting in terms of readiness and training; nor will it ease the problem of OPTEMPO even under the most selective implementation of the Powell Doctrine. Only by expanding the transformation effort to consider such experimental concepts as a two-force army will the process face the full force implications of the crossover between the Powell and Clinton Doctrines.
Peace operations are symptomatic of the problems of trying to incorporate the two doctrines into a coherent strategy. There is general agreement that some form of transformation must occur if the United States is to maintain its military superiority into the future. Joint Vision 2020 provides a broad picture of that future, but little guidance concerning the objectives, pace, and requirements. In particular, the Bush Administration will have to address the specific objectives that should guide transformation and the degree of urgency for pursuing the process in order to articulate a defense strategy. Decisions on what will be required in terms of investment and divestment will be necessary for programming guidance. Finally, there must be risk accountability associated with the objectives, pace, and requirements established in pursuit of transformation. A policy of accelerated transformation will have to account for any additional risks concerning the ability of the US military to meet near- and mid-term requirements such as warfighting. On the other hand, in the event of a more modest transformation effort, there will be a need to account for any risks in the ability of the US armed forces to deal with future challenges. In any event, "ad hocism" will not do; there must be an overarching framework to reconcile the two doctrines. "Case-by-caseism, even if done competently, is simply inadequate," Richard Haass points out in this regard. "You pay a real price for not having a grand strategy."
Another aspect of Joint Vision 2020 that has an impact on Army transformation is that the document discourages jointness by preserving each service's distinct interests with its discrete separations of the concepts of dominant maneuver and precision engagement. The result is a bifurcated intellectual revolution with competitive, not complementary, traditions in the form of maneuver theory developed from Blitzkrieg doctrine and precision-strike theory derived from interwar strategic bombing theory. All this only encourages each service to pursue its separate path across the spectrum of operations, even to the point of perfecting concepts beyond the limit of meaningful joint contributions and at the expense of other services. In the end, there is a critical requirement to bring together the separate paths of the intellectual revolution. Joint experimentation needs to go beyond interoperability and the current service "seams" to exploit integration, synergies, and interdependence in order to create and explore joint capabilities that do not currently exist. In a time of limited resources, without new joint operational concepts and architecture, the way the United States fights will not be fully transformed.
For the Army, a defense-wide approach to transformation is axiomatic. More than any other branch of the armed forces, the Army is dependent in fundamental ways on change within the other services. A transformed Army, for example, will have far greater reliance in the future on remote fires and strategic mobility provided outside its organization. As a result, the Army continues to emphasize that in the transformation process, "the services must become more interdependent" and that this interdependence "is achieved through the deliberate, mutual reliance on the capabilities of other services to maximize the synergy of the joint force while minimizing its vulnerabilities." At the same time, there is a recognition that Joint Forces Command has not yet become the authoritative voice on transformation in the context of both force development and joint experimentation. Moreover, the CINCs of the unified commands deal primarily with current threats and thus have a relatively short-term focus compared to the services, which have the responsibility for the long-term equipping and training of the force. In this context, continued Army experimentation can provide key input to what will have to become a joint venture in order, as the Army recognizes, for a complete transformation process to occur.
There has been a sense of urgency to that experimentation since the outset of the Army transformation effort--the idea, in General Shinseki's words, that there is only "a narrow window," that "these conditions will not last for very long." Part of that urgency, of course, has to do with the growing obsolescence of the Legacy Force. But much of it also has to do with the sense of ubiquitous and rapid technological change leavened by the understanding that technology can provide only the promise of innovation, that it does not determine the process of change. That type of determination can come only from the top, a process hindered by the maximum four-year tenure of an Army Chief of Staff. In those circumstances, it is difficult to find time to create a transformation vision and attract a hard core of innovators in the spirit of General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, who wrote to the British War Office in the 1920s that his experimental armored forces should be connected with "many enthusiastic experts and visionaries . . . ; it doesn't matter how wild their views are if only they have a touch of divine fire. I will supply the common sense of advanced middle age."
All this the Chief of Staff has set in train. The more difficult task is to institutionalize a process that can achieve his vision. "Much of what we are up against," General Dubik points out, "is not technology but mindsets, institutional obstacles. . . . Part of what we are doing involves breaking the bureaucracy and rebuilding it for the new force."
"'Continuity' must reign over those principles, practices, and organizations that remain useful," General Dubik has pointed out; "'change' over those variables that have lost their utility." The combination of the Powell and Clinton Doctrines will facilitate this interaction as the Army moves forward in the transformation process. Taken singly, each doctrine could have adverse effects on that process. With just the Clinton approach, there would be little chance for the Interim Force to influence the Objective Force, because it would be consumed in helping a Legacy constabulary force to spread indiscriminately across the operations spectrum in the endless service of world order. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to make any substantial divestiture or to find time or incentive to change organization, concepts, and doctrine. On the other hand, the Powell Doctrine when taken alone could cause the RMA to become too narrowly focused on the Holy Grail of future peer threats, ignoring more immediate asymmetrical challenges throughout the entire spectrum of operations. In that type of situation, there would be fewer opportunities to try out full Interim Force improvements in organization and doctrine and more chance for premature divestment of the Legacy Force.
In combination, the two doctrines have had a positive effect on Army transformation. There is the reminder from the Clinton Doctrine of the worth of shaping and responding in terms of deterrence and compellance, all of which can be achieved in a safer and more capable manner with the initial combination of Interim and Legacy Forces and, eventually, with the Objective Force. Added to this is the fact that the full operational spectrum is a permanent fixture of the new environment, and that by orienting against threats across this spectrum, the Army will develop a more versatile and agile Objective Force that can provide the National Command Authorities more options and will thereby improve the chances of "getting it right" in the transformation process. From the Powell Doctrine, there is the reminder that absent prioritization, the characteristics of the Objective Force may only ensure the equivalent of a more speedy dispatch of Custer and his troops to the Little Big Horn. Moreover, there is also the emphasis on restraint with the fascination concerning the technological revolution--that in fact technology is not a panacea for the use of military force and needs to be disciplined by the concomitant development of doctrine and organization and the realities of committing landpower in force intervention. In the end, the net result has been to reinforce the three-force Army initiative for achieving acceptable transformation risk in the near-, mid-, and long-term.
This is an essentially conservative approach to a revolutionary process. But it has the merit of using the synergism of change and continuity to maximum effect. Moreover, in a time of resource constraints, by initially transforming a small part of the force and linking it to the past and present, the process has avoided creating two armies, an important aspect of congressional relations as transformation proceeds. Additionally, Army transformation has stirred important debates--in sharp contrast to the French experience in the interwar years when the High Command would not allow dissenting opinion on doctrine. "Everybody got the message," André Beaufre noted in his memoirs, "and a profound silence reigned until the awakening of 1940." Equally important, there has been little of the strident advocacy in either camp like that of J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart in interwar Britain, which exacerbated the split between the innovators and the large mass of professional soldiers, thus assuring that the ideas of the innovators played a decreasing role in the preparation of British ground forces for the next conflict.
In any event, the current debates on Army transformation reflect a positive interest in the process of change, which is always a good thing. In the interwar United States, where there was no interest for the most part in the military, there was no pressure to change. In the case of the American horse cavalry, this resulted in tacit permission for the cavalry professional to romanticize an increasingly untenable situation in the most mechanized nation in the world.
1. Douglas A. Macgregor, "Transformation and the Illusion of Change," National Security Studies Quarterly, 6 (Autumn 2000), 111.
2. Michele Flournoy, Project Director, Report of the National Defense University Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group (Washington: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, November 2000), p. 14. The Defense Science Board defines transformation as a change that is focused on military operations, managed by the organization itself, and aimed toward the "very big change" implicit in an RMA, the pursuit of which involves "fundamental changes in military capabilities including new doctrines, operational concepts, and organizational structure." Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Warfighting Transformation (Washington: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, August 1999), pp. 5-6.
3. General Eric K. Shinseki, address to the Eisenhower Luncheon, 45th Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army, 12 October 1999. See also Final Draft, 17 January 2001, unclassified TRADOC study, The Foundation of Army Transformation and the Objective Force Concept, p. 1.
4. James Dubik, "IBCT at Fort Lewis," Military Review, 80 (September-October 2000), 18.
5. Elting Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), p. 208.
6. Richard J. Dunn, III, "Transformation: Let's Get it Right this Time," Parameters, 31 (Spring 2001), 22-23.
7. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force, p. 13. See also Foundation of Army Transformation, p. 12, and for other service transformation activities, pp. 14-16; Steven Metz, American Strategy: Issues and Alternatives for the Quadrennial Defense Review (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2000), pp. 19-20; and Stephen P. Aubin, "Stumbling Toward Transformation: How the Services Stack Up," Strategic Review, 28 (Spring 2000), 39.
8. See, for example, Daniel Verton, "Army Battles Irrelevancy," Federal Computer Week, 15 November 1999; and John Barry and Evan Thomas, "Not Your Father's Army," Newsweek, 22 November 1999, pp. 49-52.
9. Colin Clark and George Seffers, "Hamre to U.S. Army: Rethink Future War Strategy," Defense News, 6 September 1999, p. 6. Retired Lieutenant General Thomas Rhame, the commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Desert Storm, was not receptive to the message: "The current trend seems to be to say the Army is not relevant, but I'm not willing to respond too warmly to all this relevancy crap until someone is prepared to guarantee me what the threat will be in the future." Ibid.
10. Dubik, p. 23.
11. Foundation of Army Transformation, pp. 15, 45.
12. Defense Science Board Task Force, p. 27. See also p. 20, and Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," The National Interest, No. 37 (Fall 1994), p. 31.
13. Dubik, p. 18.
14. Ibid., p. 17.
15. Michael Mehaffey, "Vanguard of the Objective Force," Military Review, 80 (September-October 2000), 6-7; and Sean D. Naylor, "Stealthy, Fast, Lethal: Objective Force Will Require Changes in Training and Doctrine," Army Times, 19 March 2001, p. 10.
16. Dubik, p. 19.
17. Foundation of Army Transformation, p. 43. Even the often-critical A Strategy for a Long Peace acknowledges that "any strategy must also preserve the US military's ability to defend America's global interests throughout the entire transformation period, which could run a decade or longer." Steven Kosiak, Andrew Krepinevich, and Michael Vickers, A Strategy for a Long Peace (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2001), p. 9.
18. Mehaffey, pp. 7-8, 16.
19. Flournoy, p. 14; and Louis Caldera and Antulio J. Echevarria, "The Strategy-Resource Mismatch," Armed Forces International, March 2001, p. 32. The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office estimates that just to keep the armed services at their current status will require a $51 billion annual increase in DOD funding--a figure that did not include an estimate of approximately $60 to $100 billion for national missile defense. Gordon R. Sullivan, "No Easy Fixes," Ibid., p. 36.
20. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 255-56. But see Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century," in The Use of Force, Military Power and International Politics, ed. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (4th ed.; Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1993), p. 180. Katzenbach believes that it is precisely because the military profession deals with life and death matters that it should be utterly ruthless in discarding the old for the new.
21. A. J. Bacevich, "Preserving the Well-Bred Horse," The National Interest, No. 37 (Fall 1994), p. 44. See also A Strategy for a Long Peace, p. 30.
22. Foundation of Army Transformation, p. 14. See also Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Why No Transformation?" Joint Force Quarterly, No. 23 (Autumn/Winter 1999-2000), p. 100; and Dubik, p. 18, who also notes the need to retain some of the current Legacy Force as a "hedge against potential trouble" even as the Army transforms:
North Korea has not gone away; Southwest Asia has not gone away; the requirements for those forces around the world have not gone away. And so we cannot erode this capability; we need to keep that warfighting capability, the forced entry capability. We have to keep upgrading, recapitalizing, investing in these forces to maintain our superiority over any potential enemy while we are developing the organizations, doctrine, and equipment that will replace them.
23. The Army asked that the report be put on hold until there could be discussions with the GAO. Kim Burger, "Army Officials Object to Aspect of GAO's Transformation Report," Inside the Army, 5 March 2001, p. 1.
24. Robert Nolin, "New Army to Be Faster, More Mobile, Chief of Staff Tells Broward Convention," Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, 2 March 2001, p. 1.
25. Chris Strohm, "Shinseki Says More Money Will Be Added for Transformation," Inside the Army, 5 March 2001, p. 13.
26. Matthew Cox, "Off Track? Plan for Medium-Weight Force Has Skeptics Among Tankers," Army Times, 8 November 1999; "Helo Supporters Concerned About Aviation's Role in the `New Army,'" Inside the Army, 25 October 1999; and Barry and Thomas, p. 52.
27. One retired general, referring to the traditional Army belief in the need for organic deep strike capabilities, termed the ongoing evolution of the Interim and Objective Forces as "violating the paradigm." Daniel Dupont, "Observers Surprised by Army's Decision to Kill ATACMS Block IIA," Inside the Army, 6 January 2000, p. 7.
28. Aubin, p. 47. Aubin, the Director of Policy and Communications for the Air Force Association, goes on to accuse the Army of being intellectually mired in the past, "focused on the idea of closing with the enemy--be it with heavy or lighter forces--even if the enemy might be destroyed from the air or sea before the Army arrives" (p. 40).
29. Hunter Keeter, "Commandant Seeks Inter-Service Discussion Over Expeditionary Roles, Missions," Defense Daily, 31 October 2000, p. 1.
30. Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), p. 561.
31. Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," Defense '85, January 1985, p. 10. For Powell's involvement as Weinberger's military assistant in the draft doctrine, see Powell, p. 92.
32. All quotes from Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, 71 (Winter 1992/93), 36, 39. For more on this evolving aspect of Powell's thoughts, see DOD, Joint Pub. 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington: JCS, 1993), pp. I-3 and I-4, published three weeks before his retirement as Chairman.
33. Powell's remarks at the National Press Club, 28 September 1993; Charles A. Stevenson, "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine on the Use of Force," Armed Forces and Society, 22 (Summer 1996), 513.
34. Powell, "U.S. Forces," pp. 37-38.
35. Original emphasis. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), p. 92. For Powell's admiration of Clausewitz based on studies at the National War College, see Powell, My American Journey, p. 200.
36. Powell, "U.S. Forces," p. 40.
37. Hunter Kiefer, "Hans Mark: Complementary Technologies Critical to Military Transformation," Defense Daily, 5 July 2000, p. 2. It was a conflict, as Senator Joseph Biden pointed out, designed to demonstrate that dictators "cannot hide behind a border." Douglas Waller, "The Three Ifs of a Clinton Doctrine," Time, 28 June 1999, p. 35.
38. Bob Davis, "Pledging a `Clinton Doctrine' for Foreign Policy Creates Consensus for Adversaries and Allies Alike," The Wall Street Journal, 6 August 1999, p. A12; Doyle McManus, "U.S. Casts About for Anchor in Waters of Post-Cold War World," The Los Angeles Times, 27 March 2000, p. A6; and Robert Manning, "The Clinton Doctrine: More Spin than Reality," The Los Angeles Times, 5 September 1999, p. 2.
39. Andrew J. Bacevich, "Policing Utopia," The National Interest, No. 56 (Summer 1999), p. 10.
40. "Prosperity is a parent to peace," Secretary Albright announced at her confirmation on 8 January 1997. Moreover, she added, "we know that democracy is a parent to peace." Bacevich, "Policing Utopia," p. 11.
41. Michael T. Klare, "The Clinton Doctrine," The Nation, 19 April 1999, p. 5.
43. Michael Kinsley, "Is There a Doctrine in the House?" The Washington Post, 9 August 2000, p. A25.
44. Richard N. Haass, "The Squandered Presidency: Demanding More from the Commander-in-Chief," Foreign Affairs, 79 (May/June 2000), 139; and Charles Krauthammer, "The Clinton Doctrine," Time, 5 April 1999, p. 88.
45. Andrew Krepinevich, address to the US Army War College, 31 January 2001.
46. Dubik, p. 23.
47. Gail Kaufman, "Futurists Say Pentagon Still Lagging on Its Future Weapons Development," Stars and Stripes Omnimedia, 22 January 2001, p. 2; and A Strategy for a Long Peace, p. 10. See also Defense Science Board Task Force, p. 17.
48. "Dynamic Commitment III" was the third in a series of four games designed to help craft the QDR. "War Games Show Army Used Extensively in Meeting Security Strategy," Inside the Army, 5 February 2001, p. 1. See also A Strategy for a Long Peace, p. 21.
49. Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, 79 (January/February 2000), 54.
50. McManus, p. A6; Jonathan Rauch, "Two Cheers for the Clinton Doctrine," National Journal, 27 May 2000, p. 1,666; and William Safire, "Exegesis of Acceptance," The New York Times, 7 August 2000, p. A19.
51. David Bond, "Bush Team Rethinking Military Strategy," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 12 March 2001.
52. Neil Baumgardner, "Army Official Warns of Approaching Block Obsolescence," Defense Daily, 7 March 2001, p. 4; and Richard Hart Sinnreich, "Hedging Army Transformation Need Not Impede It," The Lawton Constitution, 11 March 2001, p. 4.
53. Thomas Donnelly, "No End of a Lesson," The National Interest, No. 37 (Fall 1994), p. 110. See also Barry and Thomas, p. 49; and Katzenbach, p. 173.
54. Eliot A. Cohen, "Defending America in the Twenty-First Century," Foreign Affairs, 79 (November/December 2000), 48.
55. Krepinevich, "Why No Transformation?," p. 100.
56. Williamson Murray, "Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German Experiences," pp. 17, 40, 42; and Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, "Introduction," p. 4; both in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996).
57. Foundation of Army Transformation, pp. 38, 41. See also Flournoy, pp. 13-14.
58. For examples of such force proposals see Steven Metz, The American Army in the Balkans (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001), pp. 36-37; John C. Hamilton, "U.S. Army Peace Operations in Kosovo: Time for a Change," Student Research Project, US Army War College, 10 April 2001, pp. 15-16; and James M. Dubik, "Building a Strategy-based Force Structure," Landpower Essay Series, No. 99-10 (Arlington, Va.: Association of the United States Army, December 1999), p. 6, who proposes a "prevention and deterrent force" focused on conventional warfighting in smaller-scale contingencies and major theater wars and an "engagement force" organized by regional theaters. The reality of an engagement policy, he points out, is that it is "long-term. . . . The operational `model' of a quick, decisive defeat of an enemy followed by a withdrawal of military forces does not fit the circumstances associated with engagement" (p. 7).
59. McManus, p. A6. See also Flournoy, p. 14.
60. Antulio Echevarria, "National Strategy and Military Transformation," Strategic Studies Institute Newsletter, March 2001, pp. 3-4; Defense Science Board Task Force, p. 27; and Macgregor, p. 114.
61. Original emphasis. Foundation of Army Transformation, p. 17. See also p. 25, and A Strategy for a Long Peace, p. 15.
62. "`Jointness' notwithstanding," Eliot Cohen concludes concerning transformation, "the individual services will remain the foundations of military organization as far as the eye can see." Cohen, pp. 51-52. But see Macgregor, pp. 115-16, who perceives the services as the biggest obstacle to transformation--an impediment that can be overcome only by legislation on the scale of the 1947 National Security Act: "So-called transformation programs that occur without significant joint influence and careful congressional oversight will not change the single-service warfighting establishments inside the US armed forces." The Defense Science Board advised Joint Forces Command to hurry up the process and not wait for perfect solutions. As for everybody else, the board advised in terms of the new command: "Give it time! Don't expect definitive answers early--this is a process, not an event." Defense Science Board Task Force, p. 27.
63. Address by General Eric K. Shinseki, 10 February 2000. See also Dubik, "IBCT at Fort Lewis," p. 19: "The final product is going to be in the future, once we get the answer from the science and technology community. But when the science and technology community comes forward and says, `yes, we can produce it,' we want the change as quickly as we can." The Defense Science Board, on the other hand, found no sense of urgency in DOD transformation efforts. Defense Science Board Task Force, pp. 10-11. And Andrew Krepinevich has accused DOD of adopting the "Wells Fargo" approach to transformation: moving in slow stages. Krepinevich, "Why No Transformation?" p. 97. Others argue that there is no hurry because of a "strategic breathing space" with no major threats in the near future. Ivans Eland, "Tilting At Windmills: Post-Cold War Military Threats to U.S. Security," Cato Institute Policy Analysis, 8 February 1999; and Metz, p. 42.
64. Harold Winton, To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine (Lawrence, Kans.: Univ. of Kansas, 1988), p. 76.
65. Dubik, "IBCT at Fort Lewis," pp. 19-20. See also Dunn, p. 28, who believes the HTLD failure--the last Army transformation effort--was due to the failure to transform simultaneously the entire Army, the institution that had to effect the transformation of the force.
66. Dubik, "Building a Strategy-based Force Structure," p. 1.
67. The "revolutionists" do not see this as a positive attribute. "Unless you're willing to risk failure," Andrew Krepinevich asserts, "then you're not likely to get anything but small incremental changes" (Kaufman, p. 1). His former boss, Andrew Marshall, the long-time head of DOD Net Assessment, believes that a useful way to deal with the future is to transform a small part of the armed forces to see if the results work well instead of a full-blown transformation effort. "I think what that would mean, probably," he concluded in a virtual description of the Army process, "is taking some part of the force and beginning to experiment with new concepts of operation, new kinds of weapons systems" (ibid.). See also Robert Holzer, "Top U.S. Military Strategist Faults Navy Innovation," Defense News, 12 February 2001, p. 1, in which Marshall praised Army efforts: "I like what Shinseki is doing. He is trying to push the creation of new units. I like the idea of taking a part of the force and co-evolving it. I wish the other services were doing something similar."
68. André Beaufre, 1940: The Fall of France (New York: Knopf, 1968), p. 43. "These are important debates about not just the Army, but also the security of the nation" (Dubik, "IBCT at Fort Lewis," p. 18).
69. The split was so severe that the innovators continued to lack influence even after the 1939-40 German victories demonstrated the need for immediate reconsideration of ground tactics. See Murray, "Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German Experiences," p. 24. See also Brian Bond and Martin Alexander, "Liddell Hart and DeGaulle: The Doctrines of Limited Liability and Mobile Defense," in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 598-623.
Dr. David Jablonsky (Colonel, USA Ret.) is the professor of national security affairs in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. He is a graduate of Dartmouth College and the US Army War College, has an M.A. from Boston University in international relations, and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in European history from Kansas University. Dr. Jablonsky has held the Elihu Root Chair of Strategy and the George C. Marshall Chair of Military Studies at the War College. His most recent books are Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New World Order and Roots of Strategy, Volume 4.
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