

**TOTAL FORCE:
FEDERAL RESERVES AND STATE NATIONAL GUARDS**

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FOREWORD

Never before in peacetime has the United States placed so much emphasis and reliance on the Armed Forces' Reserve Components. Since the Total Force Policy was introduced by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970, this dependency has grown even more. The 1990 mobilization for OPERATION DESERT SHIELD and the follow-on offensive OPERATION DESERT STORM in 1991 validated the use of the Reserve Components for contingency operations and guaranteed the policy's extension for the foreseeable future.

Yet, even with the renewed emphasis on the Reserve Components' roles, their legal basis, mission, mobilization, training, force structure, and relationship to their respective Active Component remain relatively little understood. There are relatively few, if any, single source references pertaining to these Reserve Component areas.

This Strategic Studies Institute report responds to the growing strategic importance of the Armed Forces Reserve Components. Declining defense budgets leading to small Active Component forces, coupled with inherent dangers facing the world community in a multipolar world, makes the use of Reserve forces on a recurring basis a necessity. This is especially true for Reserve Combat Support and Combat Service Support Forces not readily available in the Active Components. In essence, because of the relatively short time in which contingency operations unfold, the Reserve Components have become the Nation's strategic reserve insurance policy.

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SUMMARY

This study is unique among recent works published by the Strategic Studies Institute because it is primarily a survey of current basic information concerning the Armed Forces Reserve Components. In addition, it provides an analysis and forecasts their status and roles in the future.

The study explains the Total Force Policy, its origins and application from 1970 to its first test in 1990 and 1991 during OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The post-cold war defense reductions have caused an even greater reliance upon the Reserve Components than anticipated by the Defense establishment.

The legal basis for the establishment of the Reserve Components for the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard (a part of the Navy upon mobilization) and the reason there are two separate reserves for the Army and Air Force are reviewed. In the final analysis, the legal foundation for the reserves rests with the U.S. Constitution and the traditions of the nation. In the 20th century, legislation has been passed placing greater reliance on the Reserve Components while enhancing their readiness.

Over the years Reserve Component categories of individual service and types of active duty performed have been refined and defined. The complexities of the modern world necessitated increased flexibility when utilizing citizen soldiers. Access to reservists depends upon the individual's category of service ranging from the immediately available Selected Reserve to the prior service Individual Ready Reserve. There are also different categories of active duty which an individual reservist performs either involuntarily or voluntarily. The types of training range from Annual Training to the newest category, Active Duty Special Works.

Each Armed Service and the Reserve Components within each service have varying management structures, all of which are legislated by the Congress. A detailed description of each is given within the text of this report. In the case of the Army and Air Force there are two Reserve Components each, the National Guards of the individual states and the Federal Reserve. For the Navy, Marine Corps and the Coast Guard there is only a Federal Reserve.

While there are similarities in pay, benefits and entitlements differ between the Active Components and their reserves. Reservists on active duty do receive the same pay, and much of the same allowances as their active counterparts. However, entitlements differ depending on the length of the tour of active duty.

The need for well-equipped, organized, and trained Reserve Components increased after the 1898 Spanish- American War. As a

consequence the need for full-time support for the Reserve Components progressively increased as modern warfare became more and more complex and deadly. Today this support ranges from Active Component soldiers serving with the Reserve Components to government civilians and also reservists on active duty.

Gaining access to the Reserve Components is well-defined and the decision to mobilize reservists for overseas deployment or domestic missions is a political act prompted by the severity of the national emergency. Five mobilization categories will bring reservists to active duty. Each category requires varying degrees of approval from the chief executive to the Congress. The categories range from Selected Mobilization to Total Mobilization.

After reviewing those elements of commonality among the Armed Forces' Reserve Components, the study considers in detail the state National Guards and the Federal Reserves of each Armed Service in the Defense establishment. The sections on each Reserve include a brief history of its evolution in the Defense establishment. The report gives an overview of each component as it exists today regarding command, manning, structure, management, stationing, equipment, training, and education.

Next the author projects what the future holds for each Service's Reserve. This section is speculative; however, it considers past peacetime periods in which the Armed Forces and their reserves have languished without funding or interest on the part of the government and its citizens. This perspective, however, is tempered by the realization that the United States has never found itself to be the only superpower in a multipolar world. This is coupled with the recent experience of what the new order will bring in the 21st century in terms of using armed forces. Examples of the new missions are numerous and include the Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Hurricane Andrew, the 1994 California earthquake, the 1994 California urban riots, and midwestern floods. All of these incidents required the use of Reserve Component individuals and units and give a clear indication of what the Armed Forces and their Reserve Components should expect well into the next century.

**TOTAL FORCE:
FEDERAL RESERVES AND STATE NATIONAL GUARDS**

Introduction.

The United States has evolved a unique reserve system for its military establishment. It is a system that was originally constructed partly as a result of an 18th century fear of standing armies and strong centralized governments, and is imbedded with myth and tradition. It is a system that is laced with domestic politics, spiced with states rights, and contains strong citizen-soldier lobby groups. The reserves today are divided between the state militias or National Guards and Federal Reserves for the Army and Air Force, while the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard have only the latter. Although U.S. wars are fought and won by citizen armies, the reserve system has rarely met the readiness claims of its citizen-soldiers or the Regular, now called Active Component (AC), establishment. Each military service's components, Active and Reserve, warily regards the other with skepticism and, at times, hostility. American society has accepted the contentious nature of the relationship between Regular and citizen-soldiers be they reserves, wartime volunteers or conscripts. However, in the major wars citizen-soldiers have been the nation's saviors. The fact that the Regular establishment has traditionally borne the first onslaught of a conflict or that its professionalism has molded the citizen forces mobilized to fight the nation's wars is usually lost in the euphoria of citizen-dominated Armed Forces' victory over an enemy.

Today, the Armed Forces' Reserve Components (RC), to include the U.S. Coast Guard which, although under the Department of Transportation in peacetime, is part of the Navy during a national emergency or war, play a greater role than ever in national security. The Cold War was partly responsible for this increased reliance because the Soviet threat appeared so overwhelming and the cost of maintaining large Active forces was prohibitive. Then, too, it is due partly to the failure to mobilize, except for a small number, the RC for the Vietnam War. After this Asian war many defense analysts and military leaders claimed that the eventual lack of public support could be attributed, in part, to President Lyndon Johnson's failure to fully mobilize the reserves, and that this politically motivated decision, in turn, did not fully commit the American public.

As a consequence, as the Vietnam War ended, a new policy was evolved that had significant impact on the nation's reserve forces. On August 21, 1970, the "Total Force Policy" for the Armed Forces was introduced by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. It was a vehicle to promote a reduced response time for the reserves to back a small Active establishment in a national emergency. Also it was seen as an economy measure in anticipation of the defense budget's growth to eventually accommodate the

increased cost of all-volunteer forces planned for commencement in 1972. In 1979, the policy was spurred on by the beginning of a massive rearmament program initiated by President Jimmy Carter's administration after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. According to the Department of Defense Reserve Forces Policy Board, the Total Force Policy "implies an increased interdependence of active and reserve forces. It absolutely requires that the availability and readiness of reserve forces must be as certain as the availability of active forces."¹ Thus, once again, the RC, as they were prior to Vietnam, would be the immediate and primary source of additional forces in a national emergency.

The Armed Forces' responses were varied. Those that are "platform" oriented, that is depend on large weapons systems such as aircraft and vessels, the Navy, Coast Guard and Air Force, approached the policy differently than the two services which are manpower intensive, the Army and Marines. Obviously, the loss of a number of ships and aircraft in a major war, given the length of time required by defense industry to replace such high technology weaponry, would result in excess manpower. In the Air Force, for example, some reserve pilots have greater experience because of prior active duty with the AC and civilian jobs with airlines which equates to more flying hours than their active counterparts. As for the Navy's experience, it is almost impossible to man a vessel with reservists in any considerable number because of the complexity of modern technology. Such is not the case with the Marine Corps and the Army. A conflict of any proportion would result in initial manpower and unit requirements. Also, combat losses would need to be replaced immediately, initially from the reserves. Then too, it is expensive to keep on active duty certain type units such as Graves Registration and Civil Affairs for which there is no immediate requirement upon mobilization.

The 1990 Persian Gulf War saw a return to the use of the RC in a national emergency and was seen by many as the Total Force Policy's vindication. The reserves of all the services mobilized and deployed, sometimes in advance of active forces. Reserve combat and support units representing the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force, and Army support units deployed.

The Gulf War can now be seen as a unique event. As a consequence of Cold War preparations, both the AC and the RC were better prepared than in the nation's past major wars. However, the public's inclination after a conflict is to return to normalcy as rapidly as possible. This attitude carries over in terms of defense appropriations and strength authorization so that active and reserve peacetime establishments are usually minimum forces. The surprising part of this traditional approach to war is that the ACs of all services have had, in varying degrees, problems successfully integrating their reserves within their establishments in peacetime for reasons that range from the traditional hostility between citizen-soldiers and Regulars to competition for scarce dollars. The successes and problems with

attempts at integration will become readily apparent as the reserves are examined below.

The Legal Basis for the Reserve Forces of the United States.

The Constitutional basis for state reserve forces resides in Article 1, Section 8, giving Congress the power to call out the militia of the states and to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining" citizen-soldiers. However, it became apparent, beginning in President George Washington's first administration, that other citizen forces would be required to support the nation's Regular forces during wartime. Thus, an unsuccessful attempt was made to create a "Federal Militia." However, the wars which followed the birth of the Republic used Federal volunteers and then, for the first time during the Civil War, citizen conscription. All these actions were authorized under the Constitution's Article 1, Section 8, which gave Congress the power to "raise and support Armies . . ."

Today, the legislative basis for all United States reserve forces is *Title 10 United States Code, Armed Forces (10 USC)*. This legislation states the reserves' purpose:

. . . to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, during, and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.²

Title 10 United States Code lists the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces within the Department of Defense (DOD) as the Army National Guard of the United States (ARNG); Army Reserve (USAR); Naval Reserve (USNR); Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR); Air National Guard of the United States (ANG); Air Force Reserve (AFRES); and Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR). As indicated earlier, the latter reports to the Department of Transportation (DOT) in peacetime and the Coast Guard may become a part of the Navy in war or national emergency. Within these reserve forces there are three categories in which individual reservists are placed regardless of the service—the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve.

Reserve Categories of Service and Active Duty.

The Ready Reserve consists of units and individual "reserves" liable for call-up by the President under the authority of section 673b of *10 USC*. There are over 1,800,000 individuals in this category. Within the Ready Reserve are several separate categories. There is a Selected Reserve composed

of units and totaling about 1,000,000 individuals.³ The units are manned and equipped to serve as required. Their members are "drilling" reservists who perform regularly scheduled training of 48 paid drill or training assemblies which are 4-hour periods (IDT-Inactive Duty for Training) and perform Annual Training (AT) of not less than 14 days per year. At home station in their local communities, reserve units usually conduct Multiple Unit Training Assemblies (MUTA) which are four 24-hour periods, one weekend per month. These are called MUTA-4.

The Selected Reserve contains full-time support personnel in the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program. The term AGR is used by the Army and the Air Force; however, the Navy refers to the program as TAR (Training and Administration of Reserves) and the Marine Corps as FTS (Full-time Support). Within these programs are reserve personnel who have volunteered for active duty status to perform a variety of duties to include organizing, administering, recruiting, and instructing the reserves. Those individuals in units are assigned authorized mobilization positions.

This Reserve category also includes Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). This program is available in the Federal reserves only. Individual reservists augment the staffs of AC units, major commands and Executive Branch departments such as DOD and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These reservists are required to perform at least 14 days of AT. There is also a small subcategory of IMA called Drilling IMA (DIMA). Individuals in this program perform the same number of Inactive Duty for Training (IDT) and Annual Training days as units do.

The Selected Reserve is unique because the President is authorized to order it to active duty other than during a declared war or national emergency (*10 USC 673b*). Section 673b states that not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve may be on active duty at any one time. These reservists are authorized to serve for 270 days. The Congress can extend the time further as it did for ARNG combat maneuver units in the 1991 Gulf War. This authority is popularly known as the "200K call-up."

The Ready Reserve also contains the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR is a pretrained manpower pool of individuals who have served in an AC or one of their Selected Reserves and have not completed their mandatory service obligation, which is currently 8 years. It has about 776,000 members.⁴ It is only applicable for Federal reservists. The IRR can be ordered to active duty involuntarily for training, but this is rarely done. Its members have a low priority in terms of training and unless they volunteer and funds are available, they will not be trained. These individuals are not affected by a Presidential 200,000 call-up. However, the President can call the IRR to active duty involuntarily along with the Selected Reserve if he declares a national emergency (*10 USC 673*). In 1984, Congress mandated that

each service screen their IRR annually.

Distinct and apart from the IRR is a category of National Guard soldier or airman in the Inactive National Guard (ING). These approximately 7,000 Guardsmen are inactive individuals attached to an Army or Air Guard unit, but are not part of the Selected Reserve.⁵ They are required to muster once a year, but do not train nor do they receive compensation.

The Standby Reserve is composed of individuals, approximately 26,000, who retain their military affiliation, but are not part of the Ready Reserve.⁶ They have been designated key civilian employees, or have a temporary disability or hardship. They do not train and are not in units. This also is an exclusive Federal Reserve category. Over the years since Vietnam, DOD has made strenuous efforts to reduce this manpower pool. Individuals in this category may be involuntarily called to active duty during a war or national emergency with the approval of the appropriate Service Secretary and Secretary of Defense.

The Retired Reserve is composed of individuals who have been honorably retired and are receiving retired pay on the basis of having over 20 years of active duty. All reserve soldiers are eligible for retired pay at age 60 if not serving in the Ready or Standby Reserves. A Service Secretary has the authority to order to active duty involuntarily retirees if such a call-up is in the interest of national security. Retirees, by DOD directive, are placed in one of three categories by age. Category I contains those who have been retired not more than 5 years and are under age 60. Category II are those individuals retired more than 5 years, under age 60 and physically fit. Category III includes all other retirees.

In addition to training under the categories of AT and IDT performed primarily by Selected Reserve soldiers, there are several other categories of active duty in which a reservist can serve. There is Active Duty for Training (ADT). In this category a reservist can obtain additional training to enhance his or her skills or to gain new skills such as Airborne qualification or learn a new Military Occupation Specialty (MOS). ADT may also include attendance at any level of training or schooling from Initial Entry Training to Senior Service College. It is also used for training on active duty beyond AT. IRR soldiers can volunteer to perform ADT as "fillers" for Active and Reserve units engaged in major exercises such as *Reforger* in Europe. Another category in which a reservist may serve is Active Duty Special Work (ADSW). This does not involve training per se, but rather uses the expertise of the individual to perform work to enhance the RC's readiness. Lastly, there is Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD). A reservist who volunteers in this category is selected by virtue of his or her skills not readily available in the AC. All types of active duty but the latter are paid from funds specifically authorized by Congress for the reserves. While serving in each category except TTAD, reservists serving less

than 179 days are not counted against the AC strength which, like the Reserve, is established by law.

Management of Reserve Forces: Congress and the Department of Defense.

Congress, under the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, is the final authority to manage the reserves of the various Armed Services. Reserve issues are overseen by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the Defense Subcommittee of the respective Houses of Congress Appropriations Committee. Congress enacts laws establishing policies and guidelines from pay and allowances to officer promotions and force structure. Of special interest to Reserve forces is annual congressional action establishing strength authorizations which, in turn, are used to support pay and allowances. Congress can and does insure, from time to time, that moneys appropriated go directly to the respective Reserve Component for installations and equipment purchase. These funds are, therefore, "fenced" for specific purposes within the reserves.

The Secretary of Defense delegates overall responsibility for reserve forces to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD/[RA]). This office works directly with the Service Secretaries of the various Departments and with the Armed Forces leadership. Acting through the ASD/RA is the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB). By statute, this board is chaired by a civilian and is composed of general officer representatives from all the Armed Forces and their Reserve Components. Membership also includes the civilian Assistant Secretaries (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) of each Service. The board, the principal advisory group to the Secretary of Defense on reserve matters, is required to submit an annual report on the Reserve Components' status to Congress and the President. The report focuses on reserve readiness and makes recommendations as to how the reserves can be improved.

Unique within the management structures of the Army and Air Force is the National Guard Bureau (NGB). The Bureau fulfills the need for the Defense establishment to have a centralized agency to work with the 54 separate state and territory National Guards. By law, *10 USC Section 3040*, the NGB is both a staff and operating agency whose chief reports to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force through their respective Service chiefs. The NGB is the avenue by which the Federal Government communicates with the states; i.e., the governors and the Adjutant Generals, the latter usually appointed. The NGB then becomes the clearing house for dealing with individual states. The Bureau controls funding, total strength, force structure, and equipment. It also develops state regulations for the National Guards.

Pay, Benefits and Entitlements for the Reserves.

Pay, benefits, and entitlements eligibility are directly related to the reservist's type of service. As with the AC, basic pay and allowances depend on length of service and rank. Reservists may receive special pay as aviators or medical personnel or hazardous duty pay for personnel in authorized positions such as airborne, or deep sea diving.

Benefits are available depending upon the service member's reserve status. When performing IDT duty for pay and for exchanging one 4-hour drill period for one day of privileges, Ready Reserve members and their families may use a post/base exchange, a department-type store. Ready Reservists and their families also have access to commissaries (food stores) based on the number of training days performed during the previous calendar year, up to 12 days. Ready Reservists may use military clothing stores, recreation facilities, clubs and other services while on IDT, ADSW, TTAD, AT, and ADT. They are eligible for full-time Serviceman's Group Life Insurance and may participate in the Montgomery GI Bill Educational Assistance Program. While on active duty they may also receive limited medical care. Since 1986, reservists have been subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice in an IDT status as they are when on active duty. Reservists can be recalled to answer for crimes committed in any active duty category.

Full-Time Support of the Reserves.

In 1906, a system of providing full-time support (FTS) to reserve units was begun. As technology increased and warfare became more complex, full-time support programs emerged for all the RC. FTS personnel insure continuity and stability which improves unit readiness. They provide administrative, logistical, operational and training support to reservists. Today, there are three FTS categories. The first is Active Guard/Reserve (AGR). This category was described previously in the section "Reserve Categories of Service and Active Duty." Next is FTS Military Technicians and Air Reserve Technicians, a category that applies only to the Army and Air Force RC. These are Selected Reservists who are Federal civilian employees providing FTS in reserve organizations and units. Closely related to this category are Civil Service, both Federal and state, who also support units and organizations, but are not required to be drilling reservists. Lastly, a small number of AC personnel are assigned or attached to RC organizations and units. These soldiers provide advice, liaison, management, administration, and maintenance support.

Gaining Access to the Reserves.

Today, five mobilization levels can be utilized to gain access to U.S. reserve forces. Also, reservists may and are asked to volunteer their services to enter active duty in peace and war. Legally, under *Title 10, United States Code*, the threat's seriousness to national security governs the mobilization level.

The reserves are affected by each level.⁷

- *Selective Mobilization (10 USC 3500, 8500; 10 USC 331, 332; 10 USC 673)*. Congress or the President may order the expansion of the AC Armed Forces by mobilizing reserve units and/or individuals. This level of mobilization would not be used for a contingency operation required to meet an external threat to national security, but rather a domestic threat to the safety and well-being of citizens. The 1992 Los Angeles riot is an example of this mobilization level.

- *Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (10 USC 673b)*. The President, by Executive Order, may augment the AC to meet operational requirements by calling to active duty up to 200,000 reserve personnel for up to 270 days. As indicated previously, this authority is known as the "200K call-up." The President is required to notify Congress and explain the reasons for his actions. President George Bush exercised this option after the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

- *Partial Mobilization (10 USC 673, 673b; 10 USC 6485)*. Congress or the President may declare a national emergency and issue an executive order for the augmentation of AC Armed Forces with up to one million soldiers (President only) as individuals or in units from the Ready Reserve for up to 24 months. Congress can pass legislation establishing any limit for a partial mobilization. Preparations for offensive OPERATION DESERT STORM required a partial mobilization after a Presidential declaration of a national emergency in January 1991 which was issued in order to freeze Iraqi assets in the United States.

- *Full Mobilization (10 USC 671a, 672[a])*. Congress is required to pass legislation, public law or joint resolution, declaring war or a national emergency. All reserve units and individuals within the force structure would be mobilized and authority is available for national conscription. An example of this level is the 1940 U.S. mobilization after the German conquest of France in the spring of that year.

- *Total Mobilization (10 USC 671a, 672[a])*. Congressional declaration of war or national emergency, public law or joint resolution, is required for this mobilization level. Not only are all reserve units and individuals called-up, but additional units are created beyond the force structure in existence, by national conscription if necessary. All the nation's resources are mobilized to sustain the expanded Armed Forces. World Wars I and II are examples of total mobilization.

The Army's Reserve Components.

Background. Because the Army's reserve system is the first, largest, and most complex, its historical development is important in understanding the other Armed Forces reserve

systems. There are two reserve categories for the Army: the state militias and the Federal Army Reserve. The former are the nation's first citizen reserve, today's Army National Guard (ARNG). The National Guard traces its origins to the colonial militias formed in each community as a defensive force. Service in these militias was mandatory and regular drills or musters were conducted. During the American Revolution both long- and short-term militia units were raised to augment the Continental Army.

The militias were and continue to be dual mission forces with dual loyalties. Each remains under the governor's control in peacetime, but is available to the Federal Government in time of war or national emergency. Although Guard units that meet AC standards receive Federal recognition in peacetime, the parent Armed Forces, by law (*Titles 10 and 32 USC*), can only advise and coordinate training in peacetime. The Constitution makes it clear that the Federal government does not have direct access except upon mobilization or what is known as "federalizing" the Guard for war or a national emergency.

The militias' performance in the Revolution and in the wars which followed was questionable. As a consequence, the Federal Government, beginning with George Washington's administration, attempted from time to time to create a Federal militia in peacetime and call for volunteers in war. Both actions have met with opposition from militia supporters. In the Mexican War, the Federal Government began calling for volunteers who, although formed into units by the states, were immediately reorganized and placed in Federal service. At the onset of the Civil War, President Lincoln called for militia. However, of the over 1,780 regiments raised, only 15 were in existence prior to the war.⁸ State designated regiments were, in reality, Federal volunteers. The militias, resurrected after the Civil War for domestic disturbances, were renamed National Guard in honor of the unit the Marquis de Lafayette formed during the French Revolution. They continued, however, to suffer from deficiencies which became apparent on mobilization for the Spanish-American War. Further, legal opinion was that the Constitution forbade militia deployment overseas. In the Spanish-American War Guardsmen volunteered as individuals. As a consequence, the 1903 Dick Act became the first legislation in 111 years aimed at reforming the militia. Basically, the act called for enforced Federal standards, Regular Army instructors, and inspectors, as well as increased Federal expenditures for equipment. Increasingly concerned over the legal restrictions barring the Guard from overseas deployment and lack of enforcement of Federal standards in peacetime, the Guards' dual missions and loyalties, and the forces' unpreparedness, the Army sought alternative reserve forces. The Army moved modestly and cautiously in 1908 to create a Medical Officer Reserve Corps. The new corps was legislated into existence under the Constitution's Army clause. The National Guards' condition after they were called up in 1916 for border duty during the Mexican Punitive Expedition prompted the Army and

Congress to expand the Medical Reserve in the National Defense Action of 1916 to include both officers and enlisted personnel in all branches of the Army. The two new reserve organizations were called respectively the Officer Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps. After both proved of value during World War I, the two were merged in the National Defense Act of 1920 as the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC). This Federal Reserve is today's Army Reserve. Under subsequent amendments to the 1916 Act, the National Guards would become part of the Army of the United States when ordered into Federal service. Federal financial assistance was increased and Guard units could receive Federal recognition in peacetime if they met Army standards.

Based on wartime experience, the Army planned a post-World War I force comprised of 27 ORC and 18 National Guard Divisions. In 1933, legislation was enacted to allow for overseas deployment of Guard units.⁹ Unfortunately, the small defense appropriations of the inter-war period insured that World War II mobilization mirrored past deficiencies of AC, Reserve, and Guard forces.

At the war's conclusion, the Armed Forces struggled to rebuild in a constrained budgetary environment. The National Defense Act of 1947 created separate Service secretaries. Shortly after the new organization was established, the first Secretary of Defense ordered a committee to examine the state of the nation's reserves. The committee issued its report, *Reserve Forces for National Security* or the "Gray Report," named for its chairman, Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray. Critical of state forces, it recommended that all Reserve Components be Federal. The emphasis on combat arms in modern times has always been difficult to comprehend in light of the Guard's dual missions. The "Gray Report" noted that "The use of the National Guard with its present powerful armament is not generally suitable for the execution of state missions and not consistent with sound public policy" and that "the same forces can no longer be expected to perform both local and national functions and that a modern Federal striking force cannot be prepared adequately under state control."¹⁰ At the urging of the National Guard, Congress ignored the study.

The Cold War, commencing with Korea, brought further increased reliance on the reserves to fight a global war against the Soviet Union. For the Korean War, individual reservists and reserve units were mobilized. After analyzing the Reserve and National Guard's lack of readiness, the Congress passed legislation attempting to improve their readiness and bring the ORC into parity with the state forces in regard to regulations and funding. This legislation changed the name of the ORC to U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).

Problems continued to plague reserve readiness and were apparent during the 1962 Berlin call-up. Intent on streamlining the Army's cumbersome and expensive dual reserve system, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara attempted to merge the ARNG


with the USAR. Failing to accomplish this, he then sought to move all combat arms (infantry, armor and artillery) into the ARNG, maintaining the USAR as a support force. In this latter attempt he was only partially successful for the Army, with congressional acquiescence, asked for and received back a number of USAR combat maneuver units. However, this laid the basis for further migration of combat units to the ARNG, leaving the USAR's composition primarily, but not completely, support units.

Breaking with the past, President Lyndon B. Johnson made a political decision not to fully mobilize the reserves for the Vietnam War. As indicated previously, only a small number of reservists and reserve units were called to active duty during this unpopular conflict. The reserves became a haven for young men attempting to avoid conscription. Manpower was obtained by increasing draft calls and expanding the Reserve Officer Training Corps and Officer Candidate School quotas.

The 1990-91 Gulf War partially broke the tradition of reserve unpreparedness. The USAR and ARNG deployed support forces. In this sense this conflict vindicated the Total Force Policy. It also proved that reserve forces, when used in a complementary role, could be successful.

The Army's Reserve Components Today. At the Cold War's end the Total Army is going through massive changes in the number of personnel, structure, equipment, training, and missions. As the AC is drawn down, the RC's importance to the Total Force has continued to grow. In fact, within the Total Army, 53 percent of the personnel will be in either the ARNG or USAR while only 47 percent are AC. Figure 1 shows the nature of this dependency based on projected Fiscal Year 1996 statistics. In terms of Combat Structure (Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Air Defense, Special Forces, Combat Engineers, Combat Aviation), in percentages the Active Army has 48, the ARNG has 48, and the USAR has 4 percent. Combat Support (Signal, Chemical, Military Police, Civil Affairs, Engineers, Aviation, Military Intelligence,

TOTAL ARMY COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT STRUCTURE



Source: Office Chief Army Reserve Special Report, 1999, p. 9.

Figure 1.

psychological operations) and Combat Service Support (Medical, Finance, Supply and Service, Quartermaster, Transportation, Ammunition, Judge Advocate General, Railway, and Maintenance) break down into the following percentages: Active, 35; ARNG, 29; and USAR, 36.¹¹

In overseas deployment planning for contingency operations, Figure 2 shows the number of Reserve Component personnel dedicated to what the Army calls "warfighting," which includes "Forward Presence" units already deployed overseas; "Crisis Response," those forces immediately deployed; and "Early

ARMY BASE FORCE*				
FORWARD PRESENCE	CRISIS RESPONSE	EARLY REINFORCE	STRATEGIC RESERVE	TRANSITION
AC Unit Personnel 66K	120K	58K	17K	
ARNG Unit Personnel 15K	15K	51K	134K	43K
		USAR UNIT 7K Personnel		
USAR: Individuals 16K				
AC: CS/CSS 143 K Unit Personnel				62K
USAR: CS/CSS 144K Unit Personnel				
ARNG: CS/CSS 124K Unit Personnel				
SUSTAINING BASE				
AC: 120K		USAR: 60K		NG: 31K
<p>*Numbers are approximate due to constant changes in appropriations during FY 1993-1994. Source: Office Chief Army Reserve, Policy and Liaison Division, May 1994.</p>				

Figure 2.

Reinforcement" units that would be the follow-on forces to support those already deployed. The ARNG combat units are part of a "Strategic Reserve" and what is called "Transition" or expansion. The other than wartime mission forces also are indicated for all three components under the heading of "Sustaining Base."¹²

As one can readily observe, the reserve forces' contribution to the Total Army is significant. No contingency operation can take place today without mobilizing the Army's two reserves. In order to better understand the two citizen-soldier components, the following is a brief description of today's ARNG and USAR.

Army National Guard (ARNG). The ARNG is composed of 54 state and territorial forces of varying strength and unit composition. Currently, the ARNG is authorized 410,000 soldiers. Each state Guard has a dual mission and "performs federal tasks, for national defense and for domestic emergencies, and state tasks, for local emergencies."¹³ Within the NGB is the Director, ARNG. The director and his staff allocate available resources to provide units for the ARNG's Federal combat mission. His office conducts long-range planning, submits programs and budgets to the Army Staff and administers resources for personnel, force structure, training, and equipment.

The ARNG maintains the Army National Guard Personnel Center, which operates as an NGB field agency. In peacetime, the Center manages the Official Military Personnel Files of all ARNG officers and is directly involved with those Guardsmen, officer and enlisted, who are in the AGR program. Enlisted records are maintained by the states and territories. Officer and enlisted personnel data are on one personnel management information system, the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System. The center is also responsible for the dissemination and monitoring of ARNG peacetime personnel policies.

The ARNG management structure (Figure 3) flows from the Chief, NGB to the Director, ARNG. Because the ARNG is composed of independent state forces, there is no "chain of command" from the Department of Defense. Rather there is a "channel of communication" to each state and territorial governor and the usually politically appointed state official (South Carolina elects), The Adjutant General (TAG), a Major General who may or may not have Federal recognition of his rank outside the state. The governor is the commander-in-chief and the TAG his Chief of Staff who commands all state military forces. The District of Columbia is unique in that the President of the United States is both the commander-in-chief of it and the Armed Forces. A State Area Command (STARC) exercises command and control of a state's force in peacetime and assists during premobilization activities.

Historically, from the minutemen at Lexington and Concord, the ARNG has been primarily a combat arms force. Currently, the ARNG has 8 divisions and 45 combat maneuver brigades.





Figure 3.

Approximately, 40 percent of the ARNG's strength is in the combat category. Twenty-eight percent is combat support, while 24 percent is in combat service support. Because each state controls its own forces, it has about 8 percent of its strength in administrative support, and this includes those individuals at Departments of the Army and Defense levels (Figure 4).¹⁴ As part of the Army's plans for downsizing, the current structure will be modified to allow for 15 "enhanced brigades" in a high state of readiness and 22 others at a lesser level that are considered a "strategic insurance" force.

Units in the Army National Guard vary in size from Military History Detachments to combat divisions. Some ARNG major units, such as the 35th Division Mechanized, are spread over as many as seven states. Major units by state, for example, range from a sole Infantry Brigade in Connecticut, to California where the ARNG has a Troop Command, a mechanized infantry division, an area support group, a medical brigade and a military police brigade. As with the Active Army, within large combat formations are smaller combat and combat service support units. Since a large percentage of the ARNG is combat arms, the Army's drawdown has allowed the migration of modern weapons systems, such as M-1A1 Main Battle Tanks and Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles to the state forces.

ARNG COMPOSITION



Source: National Guard Bureau, May 1994.


Figure 4.

U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). The U.S. Army Reserve is a Federal Reserve comprised of regional units and individuals located throughout the United States that is centrally commanded and administered. Currently it is authorized 230,000 Selected Reserve soldiers. Additionally, about 440,000 soldiers are in the IRR. The USAR's primary mission is to support and augment the AC. It is, in peace and war, "under direct and immediate federal control. . . . As a consequence, the roles and missions of the Army Reserve are assigned directly by the Army and the Congress."¹⁵ While it can be utilized like the ARNG for domestic

missions, it can only do so upon a declaration of a national emergency or partial mobilization. However, unlike state forces, its units are not restricted by state boundaries because it is a Federal force with a direct chain of command from the smallest detachment to the Chief, Army Reserve.

The Chief, Army Reserve has three primary responsibilities: Chief, Army Reserve; Commander of the U.S. Army Reserve Command; and Deputy Commanding General of Forces Command. As Chief, Army Reserve he also serves as the advisor to the Army Chief of Staff on USAR issues.

The Office, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) is the staff agency that advises and is responsible for the Army Reserve. This office manages planning, training, mobilization, readiness and maintenance of the USAR. The office is responsible for three appropriations: pay and allowances, operations and maintenance, and construction. OCAR, as an Army Staff component, engages in the formulation of Department of the Army policies regarding the USAR. The Office also develops long-range plans for the USAR. Figure 5 shows the USAR command and control relationships.



*The Chief Army Reserve also serves as DCG, FORSCOM; CDR, USARC
 Source: Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report FY93, p. 107.

Figure 5.

The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) is responsible for command and control of all USAR units located in the Continental United States (CONUS), excluding those units under control of Special Operations Command and overseas commands. Currently, there are 47 subordinate headquarters providing command and control for USARC-controlled USAR units. As part of a reduction in end strength, the USAR has a plan pending approval to reduce

this number to 31.

At present, these subordinate headquarters are a mixture of Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) (21 of them organized on a geographical basis), functional or "go-to-war" commands, Divisions (Exercise) and Divisions (Institutional Training). These headquarters control all of the units that make up the Army Reserve (except Special Operations Forces). The reduction plan creates 10 Regional Support Commands (RSCs), aligned along the boundaries of the 10 Standard Federal Regions (SFRs) used by most Federal agencies less the Department of Defense and eliminates 10 ARCOMs. The only remaining ARCOM within the USARC that will exist OCONUS is in Puerto Rico.¹⁶


The total USAR Troop Program Unit (TPU) composition, shown in Figure 6, is divided into four functional areas: 56 percent Combat Service Support, 18 percent Combat Support, 6 percent Combat, and the balance, 20 percent, "Mobility Base Expansion" (training divisions/brigades, garrisons, U.S. Army Reserve Forces schools, hospitals, depot support and port operations).¹⁷ Units range from detachments to large units such as Theater Army Area Commands. As support type units they are to a greater extent independent because they provide unique functions.

A Field Operating Agency of OCAR, the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) commands and controls USAR soldiers not in TPUs. Its mission is similar to the AC's Personnel Support Command. It provides life cycle management for those soldiers not assigned to USAR units and is assuming similar responsibilities for TPU members. The Center is also responsible for the administration and records of the IRR, IMA program, Standby Reserve and retirees of all components to include the Retiree Recall Program. USAR AGRs are managed by the Full-Time Support Manning Center co-located with ARPERCEN but reporting directly to OCAR. Although ARPERCEN's motto is "Management for Mobilization," it has inherited mission responsibilities that have little to do with the Reserve, such as management of records for World War II Philippine Scout veterans. These missions are holdovers from the old Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center operated by the Army's Adjutant General.

Equipping USAR units has not been as easy as with the ARNG. Since the USAR does not mirror the AC as does the ARNG, equipment has not migrated in similar quantities. Additionally, the type of major end items of equipment for bakeries and laundries does not appear as glamorous as M-1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles and therefore does not appear as necessary for war. Therefore, the Reserve must rely heavily on programs such as Dedicated Procurement. As a consequence, "the USAR still lags significantly behind all other DOD [Department of Defense] Reserve Components in the amount of equipment actually on hand when compared to wartime requirements."¹⁸

USAR TROOP UNIT COMPOSITION

End of FY 93



*Training Divisions, Training Brigades, Garrisons, Schools, Hospitals, Depot Support, Port Operations

Source: Office Chief Army Reserve, Special Report FY 1993, p. 8.

Figure 6.

Training the Army's Reserve Components. The Total Army Training Study conducted in 1984 developed the Reserve Components Training Development Plan. Revised annually, this document integrates all reserve training initiatives into a comprehensive plan which provides the blueprint for pre- and post-mobilization training for individuals and units. The study identified requirements and recommended methods, new and existing, to train the ARNG and USAR to Army standards as individuals, crews, and units.

Individual enlisted soldiers and officers may attend any AC school or course provided there is a need for the training or education, a space is available, and the soldier meets certain

admission criteria. Some admissions, especially in the Federal USAR, require board approval for such schooling as the Sergeants Major Academy and Command and General Staff College. There are a number of major training programs to enhance the ARNG and USAR's unit readiness. One of the most significant is CAPSTONE, a management tool that aligned the reserves and the AC within a wartime organizational structure. The organizational structure was then used as a basis for planning and training USAR and ARNG units, allowing them to make the fullest use of limited training time to focus on wartime missions and build a relationship with the AC units they would operate with in wartime. Other programs such as Affiliation, Partnership and Counterpart, as the names imply, build closer relationships between the AC and the USAR and ARNG. The Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) Program further expands CAPSTONE by allowing reserve units to deploy and train in overseas areas they might be sent to after mobilization in a national emergency.¹⁹

New programs continue to be introduced. As a result of the inability to deploy the ARNG roundout brigades for the Gulf War, Congress passed The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992. Also in 1992, BOLD SHIFT, a program in which AC teams assist in individual, unit and leader training in the USAR and ARNG, was introduced. The ARNG's Project Standard Bearer and the USAR's Project PRIME focus on training units identified as part of the Contingency Force Pool (CFP), those which would be mobilized and deployed early in a crisis.²⁰

The Air Force's Reserve Components.

Background. As with the Army, the U.S. Air Force has a dual reserve. A National Guard air arm began in 1908 when the New York National Guard volunteered to form the Signal Corps' 1st Aero Company. After the creation of a Regular Air Service in 1907, the first National Guard fixed wing unit appeared. In 1911 an Aero detachment was formed in California and in 1915 the First Aero Company, New York National Guard, was federally recognized.²¹ The 1916 National Defense Act established an Aviation Section in the Signal Corps and created a Federal Reserve of 296 officers and 2,000 enlisted personnel. As a consequence, the first Air Force Reserve Aero Squadron organized in 1917 and deployed to France that same year. The Army Air Corps gained equal status with other Army branches in 1926 when it became the U.S Army Air Corps.²² In the inter-war period, from 1919 to 1940, the AC ORC and the ARNG's air assets suffered from limited funding. In fact, the Air Corps was so chronically undermanned that it used reservists who were not counted against manpower ceilings on a regular basis. Both were relatively insignificant in terms of providing units during the mobilization for World War II. The ORC provided 1,500 trained pilots for the Army Air Corps during the critical period just after Pearl Harbor.²³

At the conclusion of World War II the Air Force was

reorganized. An Air Defense Command was established for continental U.S. air defense. This command was given the mission to provide for the organization, administration, training, and maintenance of the National Guard and Reserve Air Force elements. The former expressed a desire to "reconstitute the air capability" of the state National Guards. The Army Air Force was less than enthusiastic. However, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall overrode objections in an effort to obtain support for post-war Universal Military Training and supported the establishment of the Air National Guard (ANG) in late 1945. However, the Air Force continued to object to the lack of direct control and reporting chain to state air assets.²⁴

The National Security Act of 1947 created a new "National Military Establishment" which authorized the Air Force as a separate service. Three military departments, headed by civilian secretaries, Army, Navy, and Air would report to a Secretary of Defense. The National Guard Bureau would have two separate divisions, one Army and the other Air Force. The Bureau itself would remain under the Department of the Army. The Air Force was still concerned about this Army oversight and the lack of direct control of state forces and questioned why a governor required state air elements. The controversy came to a head following the Gray Report. The Secretary of the Air Force convinced the Defense Secretary to request legislation merging the ANG with the AFRES. The National Guard lobby killed the proposed merger. However, the legislation made it clear that the National Guard Bureau would be denied the power to interfere with Air Force and Army operations through the Bureau's divisions.²⁵ Once the issue was resolved, the Cold War insured emphasis on both the AFRES and ANG. During President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administrations increased attention was paid to the AFRES and ANG, primarily as a result of the successful use of air power during the Korean War and a deliberate attempt by the Chief of Air Force to influence congressional delegations in favor of his service. In addition to continental U.S. air defense, the ANG absorbed additional missions such as those in the Tactical Air Command which included fighters, reconnaissance, troop transporters, heavy equipment lift, and medical evacuation. The AFRES was similarly tasked and duplicated these missions. Unlike the Army, the Air Force, over the following years, used both the ANG and AFRES in real world missions without the need to mobilize by using individual volunteers. Examples of such mission deployments range from Berlin and the Pueblo Crisis, in 1961 and 1968 respectively, to airlift into Grenada in 1983 and JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989. Indeed, the Total Force policy was very much a part of the Air Force philosophy after the Korean War and prior to its introduction in the early 1970s. It was and is much easier for the Air Force AC to validate standards because it was dealing with a more manageable force that applies its skills frequently. Some reservists have related civilian experience in aviation. These factors account for the relative short time to mobilize and deploy air assets. As a platform oriented service composed of small crew formations and individuals, it has been far easier for

the active force to integrate the ANG and the AFRES into a Total Force.

During the 1990 Gulf War the ANG provided early augmentation of the deployment with two Military Airlift Groups on a voluntary basis prior to mobilization. These were quickly followed by reconnaissance and air refueling tanker units. After mobilization other ANG support units followed including a Mobil Aerial Port Squadron and two F-16 squadrons.²⁶ The AFRES deployed 12 out of 14 C-141 and C-130 squadrons, all of its C-5 assets, one A-10 fighter unit, all of its medical elements, and other smaller support assets such as Aerial Port, Security Police, and Fire Protection units.²⁷

The Air Force's Reserve Components Today. The Air Force has faced the realities of the Cold War's end. Its performance in the Gulf War, heightened by media attention, has not exempted it from downsizing. Even prior to the current reductions, beginning in 1973, missions have been slowly migrating to the Reserves and Guard. The active force's manning level has decreased by one third since 1986. During that time the RCs have grown slightly to match increasing missions. However, the Air Force continues to be a power projection force that can be immediately deployed to the scene of a conflict anywhere in the world. Indeed, the Air Force was able to respond first with major deployments of assets to Saudi Arabia in August 1990 and the Air Force also transported the 82nd Airborne Division and other Army units to the Gulf from the United States and Europe. In accomplishing this, heavy reliance was placed on ANG and AFRES units and individuals.

Today, the ANG comprises 117,676 (19 percent) and the AFRES 81,539 (13 percent) of the Air Force Total Force of 623,180 (Figure 7).²⁸ Also about 112,000 airmen are in the IRR. The RCs dominate many Air Force missions. For example, the AFRES contributes 100 percent of the aerial spraying capability, 71 percent of the aeromedical evacuation assets, and 50 percent of the strategic airlift crews. The ANG provides 92 percent of the continental U.S. interceptors, 86 percent of the tactical/weather reconnaissance assets and 70 percent of the communication units. For a complete breakdown of ANG and AFRES contributions to the Total Force, see Figure 8.²⁹

All reserve units in peace and war are assigned to an AC command. These major commands are Air Mobility, Air Combat, Air Force Special Operations, Pacific Air Forces, Air Force Materiel, Air Force Intelligence, Air Training, and U.S. Forces Europe. These commands set training standards, provide advisors, and evaluate the Reserve Components. Through these commands both the ANG and the AFRES perform worldwide missions.³⁰ These missions include airlift support to the U.N. force in Somalia, domestic counter narcotics efforts, fighting forest fires, and many other real world tasks both at home and abroad.

Both the ANG and the AFRES, as their Army counterparts, are

separate and distinct components. What follows gives a general





Figure 7.

AIR RESERVE COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS



Source: Department of Defense, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*, June 1992, pp. 25-26.

Figure 8.

overview of these reserve forces.

Air National Guard (ANG). At the NGB level there is a Director of the ANG who has equal status with the ARNG Director. The Constitutional constraints also apply to the ANG and, therefore, as with the ARNG, there is a "channel of communication" from the Department of Defense (See Figure 3). The ANGs are state and territorial forces available to the Federal Government when required. While not all the aircraft and units within the ANG are compatible with state missions, some, such as

medical and engineering and security units, are used by governors as are individual airmen. The 54 state and territorial governors are the Commanders-in-Chief of their respective Guards which are immediately available for state missions. The Adjutant General is the Chief of Staff for both the Air and Army National Guards, making state forces joint in nature. The ANG shares responsibilities in the State Area Command (STARC); however, each state and two of the four territories maintain an ANG headquarters. Every state and territory has at least one of the 80 ANG installations in its geographic boundaries.


Also similar to the ARNG, the ANG has a larger percentage of its approximately 400 units in the combat category of continental interceptor and tactical fighter wings than in support areas. As with the ARNG, the 117,000 Air Guardsmen either are unit members or in an inactive status. Other than combat formations, ANG units include tactical control and combat communications, engineering installation, communications and mission support, weather, aircraft control and warning, civil engineering, medical, security police and range control. Examples of the type of units within a state range from the New York ANG with two airlift groups, a rescue group, a fighter group and wing, and a tactical control group, to Delaware with a single airlift group.³¹

Many ANG units fly the same type and model aircraft flown by the AC. At times there is a migration of older aircraft; however, as the Air Force becomes smaller much of the equipment passed to the ANG is in the state-of-the-art category. Air combat units utilize F-16, F-15, A-10, F-4G, and RF 4C aircraft. ANG units, which provide personnel and cargo transportation capabilities, are equipped with KC-135 C-5A, C-141, and C-130 aircraft. Some B-1s are in the Kansas Air National Guard.

Air Force Reserve (AFRES). The AFRES is a Federal Reserve. Its chain of command (see Figure 9) flows directly from the Air Force Chief of Staff to the Chief of Air Force Reserve, who is dual-hatted. The latter heads the Office of Air Force Reserve and is the principal advisor to the Chief of Staff. In this capacity the Chief establishes policy and develops plans and programs. In addition to staff functions, the Chief of Air Force Reserve also commands the Air Force Reserve.

Headquarters, AFRES is located at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. From there the Chief Air Force Reserve exercises control over three Air Force Commands. The 4th Air Force at McClellan Air Force Base, California is responsible for providing airlift, C-9 aeromed evacuation, rescue and special operations units; the 10th Air Force at Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas oversees five fighter wings, an air refueling wing, and one composite wing; and the 14th Air Force at Dobbins Air Force Reserve Base, Georgia supports airlift and weather reconnaissance units. These major commands provide for the administration and supervision of the unit programs, provide logistic support, review and manage unit

AIR FORCE RESERVE COMMAND AND CONTROL



Source: Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report FY93, p. 187.

Figure 9.

training, and validate combat readiness of units in their respective geographic regions. Most of the AFRES units, upon mobilization, are gained by either the Air Combat Command or Air Mobility Command. A field operating agency, the Air Force Reserve Personnel Center, located in Denver, Colorado, provides personnel services to all AFRES and ANG members.

AFRES units are equipped with cargo C-141, C-130, C-5 and KC-135. Combat aircraft in the AFRES include F-16, A-10 and HH/MH-60 (helicopter). As a Federal Reserve the AFRES has an Associate Aircraft Program which provides trained crews and maintenance personnel for approximately 300 AC aircraft. This program pairs a Reserve unit with an AC unit who then share a single aircraft. Aircraft types in the program include C-5, C-17, C-141, C-9, KC-10 and B-52.

Training the Air Force's Reserve Components. Reservists are trained at AC Air Force training and educational facilities. They range from crew and pilot training to Senior Service College. Unit training is conducted by full-time technicians who are civil service employees during the week and reservists on drill weekends. Much of what is considered training is performed as real-world missions such as humanitarian airlifts and support of all AC missions.


The Naval Reserve (USNR).

Background. President Thomas Jefferson believed that the nation was best served, not by standing military forces but by citizen militias. As a consequence he suggested creation of a national naval militia in 1805. In the same period several seacoast states established naval militias. A number of these

units survived to augment the Union Navy during the Civil War. In May 1888, Massachusetts brought back the concept by establishing a naval battalion as part of the state militia. A decade later 16 states followed suit. In 1898 these militias served in the Spanish-American War. The Navy Department eventually established, in 1914, a Division of Militia Affairs. A year later, in March 1915, Congress legislated into existence a "Federal Naval Reserve," the forerunner of the modern Naval Reserve.³² This Federal organization eventually supplanted the state militias.

The Federal United States Naval Reserve (USNR) has provided personnel in every war since its establishment. Over 300,000 Navy reservists served in World War I and all Navy draftees (2,000,000) were classified as reservists in World War II. The USNR spearheaded the space shuttle "Challenger" salvage and in 1987 two USNR minesweepers deployed at the height of the war between Iraq and Iran. In the Gulf War, USNR personnel deployed to the Gulf. Over half of these reservists were medical specialists. USNR sealift specialists, air-naval gunfire liaison officers, harbor masters, cargo handlers, Seabee (construction) battalions, search and rescue detachments, and port security personnel also deployed to the Gulf. During the War other reservists augmented Naval commands worldwide.³³

The Naval Reserve Today. A Reserve or AC rear admiral heads the USNR command and control structure (Figure 10) and is based in Washington, DC. As the Chief of Naval Reserve, this officer is also the Director of Naval Reserve and Commander, Naval Reserve Force. The Chief of Naval Reserve is the principal advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations for planning, policies, programming and budgeting.



* The Commander, Naval Reserve Forces also serves as Director, Naval Reserve and as Chief of Naval Reserve.

Source: Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report FY93, p. 188.


Figure 10.

The Naval Reserve Force Command is a field command operating in New Orleans. It has primary responsibility for operations, training, administration, and readiness of all Naval reservists. Its responsibilities include the TAR, the IRR, and IMA programs. Colocated are two subordinate commands, Naval Surface Reserve Force and Naval Air Reserve Force. Both are commanded by Reserve flag (general) officers. The senior of the two is the Deputy Commander, Naval Reserve Forces. There is also a third reserve command located in New Orleans, the Naval Reserve Recruiting Command, responsible for the recruitment of manpower to fill Naval Reserve units and individual Selected Reserve positions. The Selected Reserve is authorized a strength of 118,000 which is 12 percent of the Navy. Another approximately 160,000 are in the IRR.³⁴

Selected Reservists serve either in "commissioned" or "augmentation" units in over 250 training sites across the nation. Commissioned units, comprising 20 percent of the Selected Reserve, are self-contained organizations possessing their own major end items of equipment. These units are structured to mobilize and be functionally independent or deploy along side AC units. The types of units in this category include ships, aircraft squadrons, construction battalions, cargo handling battalions, mobile inshore undersea warfare units, and special boat units. Eighty percent, approximately 2,500 units, are in the augmentation category. These units are composed of reservists with professional skills in, for example, medicine, intelligence, and law. These units augment just about every AC organization. Upon mobilization these skilled personnel are immediately available to serve as an individual asset or as unit members.³⁵

The USNR's contribution to the Navy's Total Force is significant. The force contributes 100 percent of the Navy's total assets in five areas: heavy airlift, composite aircraft, strike rescue, embarkation assistance and harbor protection. Over 50 percent of the Reserve units are the areas of shipping control, cargo handling, military sealift, Seabee battalions, and intelligence/security (Figure 11).³⁶

Training the Naval Reserve. USNR personnel attend Navy educational and training institutions as required. Contributory support, reservists using their skills to support on-going fleet operations, not only enhance readiness training, but also add needed manpower to support the AC in peacetime. Other training programs are available. One of the newest is the Naval Surface Reserve's Innovative Naval Reserve Concept. It has been applied to the Fast Frigate Program. Eight FF-1052, Knox Class, frigates have been designated training "platforms" and are under the USNR's operational control. Each frigate in the program trains a Selected Reserve crew and four cadre crews. The cadre will then be available as nucleus activation crews for decommissioned ships.



Source: *The Officer, 'The Reserve and the Total Force: America's Future National Security.'* February 1993, p. 178

Figure 11.


The U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR).

Background. The authority for the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR) resides in an appropriation act passed by Congress on August 29, 1916. Two days later the Navy Department issued General Order 231 establishing "A U.S. Marine Corps Reserve to be a constituent part of the Marine Corps" ³⁷ When war was declared in April 1917, USMCR strength consisted of three officers and 32 enlisted men. By the end of World War I, the authorized strength had climbed almost 80,000. In the inter-war period the Congress passed an act to establish a formal organizational structure for the USMCR. The basic unit became Fleet Marine Corps Reserve company. When World War II broke out there were 23 Marine Reserve battalions and 13 Reserve air squadrons. Ultimately, 68 percent of the Corps during the war was composed of reservists. During the Korean War the entire USMCR, 88,500 men, was mobilized. At Inchon, half the 1st Marine Division was comprised of USMCR personnel. The USMCR was reorganized in 1962 into the structure that exists today. It includes the 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and 4th Force Service Support Group.

Not mobilized for Vietnam, the USMCR activated over 31,000 reservists for the 1990 Gulf War. Of this number 13,000 deployed to Southwest Asia. Forty percent of the 2nd Marine Division was comprised of USMCR members. Numerous smaller USMCR combat and support units were composed entirely of reservists. Several reserve combat units successfully engaged the enemy. ³⁸

The Marine Corps Reserve Today. Because the Marine Corps is

a smaller service within the Navy, its reserve is integrated within its own command and control structure. The Commandant of the Marine Corps is responsible for the USMCR. His Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, an AC general officer, is the principal staff officer for USMCR matters. The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Reserve Affairs Division. The USMCR command and control structure is shown in Figure 12.




Source: Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report FY93, p. 189.

Figure 12.

An AC general officer commands the Marine Reserve Force (MARESFOR) which is headquartered in New Orleans. In this command are five Fleet Marine Force major subordinate commands and a support command. The headquarters provides a centralized command structure for all USMCR elements, and its staff is comprised of both AC and Reserve personnel.

Subordinate to the MARESFOR are a number USMCR elements. The AC Fleet Marine Forces' USMCR units are organized in a Marine Division (MARDIV), a Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), a Force Service Support Group (FSSG), and two Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) commands. These organizations are each commanded by Reserve general officers and are collocated with MARESFOR. The MARDIV consists of nine infantry, two tank, one armored infantry assault, and one light armored battalion and combat and combat support units. The MAW has 19 squadrons of fixed and rotary wing

aircraft and an antiaircraft battalion plus support units. The FSSG is composed of seven support battalions. The MEB command elements are organized as command and control nuclei for a Marine Air Ground Task Force upon mobilization. All in all, the USMCR comprises 25 percent of the total Marine force structure and 33 percent of the manpower, 42,000 Selected Reserve authorized strength with approximately 70,000 IRR.³⁹ The USMCR contains 100 percent of the Marine Civil Affairs Groups and 50 percent of the force recon and air naval gunfire units, as well as significant percentages of other type units (Figure 13).⁴⁰



Source: *The Officer, "The Reserve and the Total Force: America's Future National Security,"* February 1993, p. 179.

Figure 13.

Under MARESFOR is the Marine Corps Reserve Support Command headquartered in Overland Park, Kansas. Commanded by a Reserve general officer, the center administers the IRR, provides training opportunities to USMCR members during AC exercises, and may activate IRR members on a voluntary basis to support special projects, mobilization screening, and professional education courses.⁴¹

Training the Marine Corps Reserve. The small Marine Corps strength minimizes segregated training for USMCR personnel. Reservists are educated and trained by the AC across the board. Special two-week courses for the USMCR are available at regular intervals. They are primarily Military Occupation Specialty refresher training or review specific aspects of Marine Corps doctrine. Reservists, like their AC counterparts, may attend a full range of training and education programs provided by the other Armed Services. Unit members and IMA train on an annual basis. The USMCR is called upon annually to augment AC exercises. Lastly, there is the Reserve Counterpart Training program. This type of training allows individual reservists to serve alongside their AC counterparts for 2-4 weeks working in the specialty.⁴²

U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR).

Background. The Coast Guard was first established in January 1915 when the Revenue Cutter Service merged with the Life-Saving Service. Although the Coast Guard, since 1967, operates as part of the Department of Transportation, it is, by law, one of the U.S. Armed Forces. It operates as part of the Navy in war or national emergency; its personnel and ships transferred to operational control of Navy commanders.


In 1939 the first Coast Guard Reserve was established. On February 19, 1941, this civilian component became the Coast Guard Auxiliary. The Coast Guard Reserve provided 144,000 personnel for World War II. After the conflict, the civilian auxiliary languished until the end of the decade when reserve personnel began to meet informally to train without compensation. Several years later, legislation passed in 1950 drastically increased the Coast Guard's port security mission. With the growing tensions brought about by the Cold War, Congress, as part of an across-the-board strengthening of the Armed Forces, created a paid drill Coast Guard Reserve. The first unit of this peacetime force was organized in October 1950 in Boston. For the wars which followed there were no reserve activations. However, as in the Armed Forces reserves, individual members volunteered for the Korean War and Vietnam. During the Gulf War over 1,600 Coast Guard Reservists were called to active duty to perform in-theater port security and port out-loading in the United States.

The U.S. Coast Guard Reserve Today. The USCGR is "directed" by an AC Rear Admiral who serves as Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve, reporting directly to the Coast Guard's Commandant. The Director does not command the USCGR. The reserve chain of command does not differ from that of the AC. The USCGR is organized into 10 Reserve Districts and 46 "Groups" encompassing units in 39 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam. Units are the responsibility of local AC commanders (Figure 14).⁴³

Currently, under *Title 14, U.S. Code* and, unlike the other four Federal Reserves of the Armed Services, only the USCGR can be involuntarily called to active duty for not more than 30 days in a 4-month period and not more than 60 days in a 2-year span to meet the surge demands caused by a manmade or natural disaster without a Presidential declaration of a national emergency. Also this reserve force is not restricted from acting in a law enforcement capacity as are the other Federal Reserves.⁴⁴

The USCGR has an authorized Selected Reserve strength of 10,000 serving in units and about 8,000 in the IRR.⁴⁵ Most of the units directly augment local AC commands. One hundred percent of the Coast Guard's deployable port security units are in the USCGR. Other type units include small stations, marine safety offices, operational shore facilities and command and control elements, repair and supply, and air stations. Only 3.5 percent


COAST GUARD RESERVE COMMAND AND CONTROL



Source: Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report FY93, p. 191

Figure 14.

of the Total Force USCGR personnel serve aboard vessels (Figure 15).



Source: *The Officer: "The Reserve and the Total Force: America's Future National Security,"* February 1993, p. 180.

Figure 15.

Since USCGR personnel are primarily augmentation forces, they are integrated in a number of Coast Guard missions and have specific responsibilities, for example, port management

operations. They perform port security, safety, and environmental inspections at all levels: district, group, and marine safety offices. Additionally, reservists are integrated into the operations of small boat units where they stand watch, perform as crew members, coxswains, and boat engineers. This type of augmentation is especially useful for "surge operations" such as narcotic interdictions, intercepting illegal immigrants, and combatting natural disasters. Some 200 reservists were called to active duty for Hurricane Andrew and 500 more served in midwest flood relief operations in 1993.

Training the Coast Guard Reserve. USCGR members attend similar formal training and education programs as do their Active Component counterparts. The Reserve performs over 53 percent of its training duties in direct support of operational missions.

Reserve Forces of the United States and the Future.

Post-war and peacetime environments have never been easy for U.S. Armed Forces. In the peacetime periods between war there has been, especially in the 20th century, a struggle between Active and Reserve Components for personnel strength and portions of a decreasing defense budget. Coupled with this fratricidal warfare for scarce dollars are other contentious issues: end strength, force mix, missions, and recruiting, equipping and training reservists.

In many ways today's post-Cold War demobilization is vastly different than those in the past. There is a difference because of the introduction and institutionalization of two concepts. First is the Total Force Policy and second, the elimination of conscription and the introduction of the smaller, but costly all-volunteer forces. Both have placed the Armed Forces reserves into a position to assume greater roles in defense than ever before in the nation's history.

Prior to his resignation, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin conducted what he called *The Bottom-Up Review: Forces For A New Era*. The results were announced on September 1, 1993. The Armed Forces, the Review stated, must be prepared to "field forces sufficient to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts."⁴⁶ However, only by using the reserves extensively would the Armed Forces be able to accomplish this requirement. As indicated in the individual reserves training programs, emphasis is being placed on reserve forces' readiness. *The Bottom-Up Review* has remained the Clinton administration's defense blueprint, thus insuring a prominent role for the reserves into the future. However, problems exist for the Armed Forces because of the built-in dependency on their pre-trained citizen-soldier forces.

One problem that affects all the services is accessibility to their reserves in conflicts less than major regional

contingencies, the type of conflicts that are more likely in the future. In a Department of Defense contracted study by the Institute for Defense Analyses released during the spring of 1994, there was general agreement that there will be a "need for RC units and individuals in lesser contingencies and operations other than war (OOTW)." ⁴⁷ One significant example is the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia. A postal unit available from the USAR was required. Unable to gain access to a Selected Reserve unit without the President invoking a 200K call-up under *10 USC 673b* or declaring a national emergency, volunteers were called for and a provisional unit created which did not function well. Another problem in Somalia was that after combat forces landed, the mission should have, in the author's opinion, been turned over to Civil Affairs units, which units have members who in their civilian lives manage cities and towns from sanitation to government and police forces, exactly what was needed for a country in chaos. This was not done because these units are in the RC. Had these units been deployed, the results, for the military, the Administration, and for Somalia might have been better.

The Defense Department's response to the growing need for reservists and reserve units was to ask for legislation which would allow the Secretary of Defense to call-up 25,000 Selected Reserve members for contingencies and operations other than war. In the fall of 1994 Congress refused to act upon the request, but, as of this writing, later agreed to reexamine the issue. Not certain that such authority would be forthcoming, DOD is continuing to examine the long-standing policy of seeking reserve volunteers for operations and institutionalizing procedures. A recent study on volunteerism acknowledges that the Air Force "uses volunteers routinely for peacetime operations." ⁴⁸ The reason is simple: air crews are small and the skill levels of reservists are equal to or better than the AC. The other Services, especially the Army, require greater numbers of individuals in units (vessels) that require lengthy post-mobilization training and cohesion prior to deployment. In the final analysis, volunteerism is less than a satisfactory option for all but the Air Force. However, the DOD will continue to institutionalize this option as long as it lacks the Secretarial 25,000 call-up authority.

The senior leadership of the Active Components has traditionally been uncomfortable with large reserve formations and the command of these by senior reserve officers. Volunteerism precludes the need and perceived "problem" created by bringing large reserve forces and reserve senior officers onto active duty.

Another problem that will plague the reserves in the future is the inevitable reduction in training operations tempo (optempo). *The Bottom Up Review* requires the maximum effort be made to ready reserve forces for combat. However, in FY 1995, for example, the budget allows the USAR to train only those units in

the Contingency Force Pool (pre-identified units that would be required early in an emergency).⁴⁹ Other than enhanced ARNG combat maneuver brigades, which would be necessary if there were two major regional contingencies, the FY 1995 budget does not contain funds for any other Guard brigades.

The absence or reduction of meaningful RC training in the past has led to a decline in reenlistment which has created a significant annual turnover of personnel and ultimately resulted in lower readiness levels. With the uncertainty about the ultimate size of the reserves, there is also a reluctance to enlist and once the reserve drawdown is completed in 1999, recruiting for the reserves will become even harder.

The other difficulty facing the reserves is the increasing technological revolution and pace of modern maneuver warfare. It, therefore, will become increasingly difficult for combat maneuver forces in the Reserve Components to deploy in a contingency without extensive and lengthy post-mobilization training. With a downsized AC, the numbers of personnel used to conduct RC post-mobilization training will be harder to come by.

The future of the USAR, as a consequence of an "Off-Site" agreement announced in December 1993 by former Secretary Les Aspin, appears bright. One result of the agreement was the eventual migration of most of the remaining combat arms structure from the USAR to the ARNG, leaving the former Reserve Component primarily combat service support. It is likely that there will be further moves to define the support role for the USAR and the combat role for the ARNG.⁵⁰ As a consequence, the USAR will form the bulk for early mobilized and deployed reserve units. Almost all of the USAR's Troop Program Units will be part of the Contingency Force Pool and its other units, which support mobilization, will be utilized even before the deployment of AC units in the event of a regional conflict.

The same holds true for the USNR. The complexities of modern naval warfare limit the use of ships that are exclusively manned and commanded by reservists. Those ships "manned" by reservists actually have 80 percent Active Component personnel crews. The Navy also has limited need for large numbers of reserve personnel in the future because if ships are lost in combat there will be more than enough crews available since the industrial base lead time will preclude launching replacements for a conflict. However, there probably will be an increased dependency on shore-based USNR support units and individual reservists in specialty areas.

The USMCR will change little. Although there will be budget cuts and small force reductions, the Marine Corps' utilization of its reserve will remain basically the same: small combat units easily integrated with the bulk of the reserve in support units, and command positions filled by both AC and Reserve officers.

In regard to the Coast Guard, faced with budget cuts, its leadership has decided to make the USCGR the bill payer to maintain the AC's strength. This decision will impact more on the Coast Guard's domestic missions than on its small, but not insignificant, national security role. The most significant consequence will be on AC personnel for they will be required to perform more weekend and holiday duty.

The AFRES, and to a lesser extent the ANG, are the most integrated of all the RCs with their ACs. The Air Force war plans show its intent to make full use of its reserve assets early in any contingency operation. This is partially because the Air Force is platform oriented; that is, the mission revolves around aircraft. As the AC downsizes, more and more modern equipment will flow to the reserves. However, in the distant future, should the defense budgets continue to decline, there will emerge a problem of aging aircraft. It is becoming increasingly clear that there is also less need for ANG fighter units. The future will probably see a substantial reduction in these units. It remains to be seen, however, if the existing Guard assets are moved into the support arena.

For those Armed Forces that depend heavily on having available large numbers of pretrained individuals, the Army and the Marine Corps, the Individual Ready Reserve will be increasingly important as fillers and casualty replacements. The downsizing of the AC forces will swell this reserve program, as did the large Cold War forces, and then by the next century its numbers will decline. The Clinton administration firmly opposed abolishing the Selective Service System which, in the distant future, once the IRR declines in numbers, will become increasingly important as a manpower source.⁵¹

The other individual manpower pool, the IMA, may eventually be removed from the Selected Reserve and returned to the Mobilization Designee Program, which was volunteers within the IRR. The Armed Forces will, by necessity, increasingly rely on Selected Reserve units. Further cuts in the Selected Reserve will be unacceptable and thus the IMA program may transition to the IRR so that it does not count as part of the Selected Reserve strength.

In the future, the RCs will become the "compensating leverage," according to Secretary of Defense William Perry, to reduce the potential risks accrued by accepting smaller AC forces.⁵² In addition to providing support in the worst case scenario, two major regional contingencies, the reserves will also be involved in peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and humanitarian missions both at home and abroad.

To be able to provide that leverage regardless of the roles or missions they assume, the Armed Forces Reserves must meet four "imperatives" noted by the Reserve Forces Policy Board. First, they must be well-organized, provided the most modern equipment,

fully trained within the time limits imposed, and fully sustained annually. Second, they must continue to be affordable, that is not only less costly, but effective and efficient in what they do. Third, they must be relevant. To be so requires further integration into their AC and thus properly molded to meet national security and domestic requirements in the future. Last, there must be immediate access to reserve individuals and units by the Secretary of Defense.⁵³ If the nation continues to rely on citizen soldiers, then the mechanism must be in place that allows for accessibility to reserve forces in peace and war. If all these imperatives are met, the nation will continue to be well-served by its citizen-soldiers.

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GLOSSARY

AC - Active Component

ADSW - Active Duty Special Work

ADT - Active Duty for Training

AFRES - Air Force Reserve

AGR - Active Guard/Reserve

ANG - Air National Guard

ARCOM - Army Reserve Command

ARNG - Army National Guard

ARPERCEN - Army Reserve Personnel Center

ASD/RA - Assistant Secretary of Defense/Reserve Affairs

AT - Annual Training

CFP - Contingency Force Pool

CONUS - Continental United States

DIMA - Drilling Individual Mobilization Augmentees

DOD - Department of Defense

DOT - Department of Transportation

FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency

FSSG - Force Service Support Group

FTS - Full Time Support

GOCOM - General Officer Command

IDT - Inactive Duty for Training

IMA - Individual Mobilization Augmentee

ING - Inactive National Guard

IRR - Individual Ready Reserve

MARDIV - Marine Division

MARESFOR - Marine Reserve Force

MAW - Marine Aircraft Wing
MEB - Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MOS - Military Occupation Specialty
MUTA - Multiple Unit Training Assemblies
NGB - National Guard Bureau
OCAR - Office, Chief Army Reserve
ODT - Overseas Deployment Training
OOTW - Operations Other Than War
ORC - Organized Reserve Corps
RC - Reserve Components
RFPB - Reserve Forces Policy Board
RSC - Regional Support Commands
SFR - Standard Federal Regions
STARC - State Area Command
TAG - The Adjutant General
TAR - Training and Administration of Reserves
TPU - Troop Program Unit
TTAD - Temporary Tour of Active Duty
USAR - United States Army Reserve
USARC - United States Army Reserve Command
USCGR - United States Coast Guard Reserve
USMCR - United States Marine Corps Reserve
USNR - United States Naval Reserve

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COLONEL CHARLES E. HELLER is currently Assistant Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Reserve, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. He holds a Ph.D. in U.S. history from the University of Massachusetts/Amherst and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. He is a military historian and has written studies on Army force mix, force structure, the Reserve Components, Army domestic missions, and the Israel Defense Forces. His most recent publication is "The Total Force Policy," in *U.S. Domestic and National Security Agendas: Into the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Sam Sarkesian and John Flanagan. He recently completed a chapter in the book, *America's Armed Forces: A Handbook of Current and Future Capabilities*, to be published by Greenwood Press. Colonel Heller has had a variety of Active and Reserve assignments in Germany and the United States. His previous assignment was Army Reserve Advisor to the Strategic Studies Institute. Prior to returning to active duty in the Active/Guard Reserve Program, he was Director of the Evening College and University Summer Session at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst, Massachusetts.

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