

UNIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES:
IMPLEMENTING THE
1986 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT

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FOREWORD

The prestige the U.S. military establishment enjoys today stands in sharp contrast with its reputation of a decade ago. Starting with America's military involvement in Viet Nam and culminating with the Iran hostage rescue attempt, the Beirut bombing, and the Grenada intervention, the U.S. armed forces endured a prolonged period of criticism. The experiences of that period, *inter alia*, convinced the U.S. Congress that the Department of Defense required a major overhaul.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was the most significant legislation for the U.S. Armed Forces since the National Security Act of 1947. The increased unification the Goldwater-Nichols Act was intended to bring to the Department of Defense was considered too extreme by some, but insufficient by others. In this monograph, Professor Douglas Lovelace assesses many of the act's major provisions. He describes the congressional motivation for passing the act, assesses the extent to which the act has been implemented, discusses its impact on the Department of Defense, and offers recommendations for furthering the purposes underlying the act.

The author's critical analysis leads him to conclude that the Department of Defense and the nation have benefitted from the substantial implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. As we approach its 10-year anniversary, however, Professor Lovelace finds significant room both for the Department of Defense to complete implementation and for the Congress to enact modifications to more coherently focus the act on its central purposes. His thought-provoking analyses, conclusions, and recommendations should fuel discussions of the extent to which the act has, or can, achieve its intended results.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this report as a contribution to the assessment of the first decade of the post-Goldwater-Nichols era.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR., joined the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in September 1994 on his retirement from active duty with the U.S. Army. His military career included a combat tour in Vietnam and a number of command and staff assignments. While serving in the Plans, Concepts and Assessments Division and the War Plans Division of the Joint Staff, he collaborated in the development of documents such as the *National Military Strategy*, the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, the *Joint Military Net Assessment*, *National Security Directive 74* on multilateral peacekeeping, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, and others. He was also Director of Military Requirements and Capabilities Management at the U.S. Army War College. He holds a B.S. in aerospace management and an M.A. in business from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College. His most recent SSI study is *Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine and Antipodean Insights*.

PRECIS

Since the end of World War II, Congress has taken significant measures to unify the Armed Forces of the United States. The National Security Act of 1947 marked the beginning of the unification trend. Congress continued the evolutionary process by passing the 1949 and 1958 amendments. In 1986, Congress passed seminal legislation that significantly reorganized the Department of Defense (DOD), moving it further toward a unified structure. In the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), Congress sought to strengthen civilian control of DOD, improve military advice to civilian leadership, clarify the authority and responsibilities of the combatant commanders, improve strategy formulation and contingency planning, and provide for more efficient use of defense resources. As the 10th anniversary of the passage of the GNA approaches, it is appropriate to examine the act's impact.

This study assesses the extent to which the GNA has been implemented, examines whether Congress' intent has been realized, evaluates the impact the act has had on DOD, and discusses what measures should be taken to consummate or curtail implementation. The analysis and assessment herein show that DOD has substantially implemented the act, but also that implementation is incomplete.

- Generally, the provisions of the act intended to strengthen civilian control over DOD have been effectively implemented.

- By promulgating the *Defense Planning Guidance* document, the Secretary of Defense has increased his authority over the development of programs and budgets. However, the practice of publishing a new document annually denies DOD components needed planning stability.

- The secretary has asserted control of the contingency planning process by providing the *Contingency Planning Guidance* document to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) of the combatant commands.

- The act improved the military advice provided to the National Command Authorities (NCA) by increasing the authority and responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, it also allowed the chairman to formulate military advice without consulting the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) by permitting him to consult them as he considers appropriate.

- The act clarified the authority and responsibilities of the CINCs of the combatant commands, but not to the extent

Congress intended. Also, ambiguity still exists with respect to the chain(s) of command.

- The act has not been fully implemented with respect to strategy formulation. The national security strategy reports submitted to date have not been as comprehensive as Congress specified.

- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not prepare the type of strategic plans called for in the act.

- Although emphasis on the military requirements of the combatant commands has increased, the services continue to dominate the requirements determination process.

- An effective system for evaluating the preparedness of the combatant commands to carry out their assigned missions, for identifying force capability strengths and deficiencies, and for assessing the impact of such strengths and deficiencies on strategic plans and policy has yet to be implemented.

- The congressional intent regarding joint doctrine has been accomplished. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has developed a robust body of joint doctrine that, *inter alia*, harmonizes and rationalizes the operational roles of forces provided by the services. In doing so, joint doctrine facilitates effective and efficient application of defense resources.

- Congressional intent concerning the review and reallocation of roles and functions among the services has not been completely realized.

- The congressional intent for the periodic review and adjustment of the missions, responsibilities, and force structures of the combatant commands has been largely effected.

- The Department of Defense has improved the quality of joint staffs by implementing the joint officer management provisions of the act, but that effort may have been constrained by negative effects on officers who serve in joint assignments.

These conclusions and their underlying analyses suggest several recommendations:

- Congress should insist that presidents produce national security strategy reports that are as comprehensive and specific as the act requires.

- The Secretary of Defense should promote stability in defense program planning by reverting to a biennial *Defense Planning Guidance* publication cycle. Congress should amend the

Goldwater-Nichols Act to permit biennial publication.

- The secretary should establish policy to ensure that the chairman adequately consults with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress should amend the act to instruct the chairman to consult the other members on all issues with potential impact on the services, while allowing him to remain unbound by such consultations.

- The secretary should conduct a review of the relationship of the CINCs to their Service component commanders and the latter's relationship to their Service Chiefs. The review should affirm the chain of command from the NCA to the CINCs and develop a concept for the chain of command that runs from the NCA through the Military Departments. Congress should amend the GNA to recognize, define, and describe both chains of command.

- The secretary should establish policy that a certain percentage of Service "OPTEMPO" funding be dedicated to joint training and exercises. Congress should revise the GNA, expressly authorizing the secretary to do so.

- The chairman should develop national military strategic plans keyed to the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) periods.

- The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the GNA, should transfer responsibility for administering the Integrated Priority List (IPL) process to the chairman from the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The chairman should restructure the process so that it focuses on specific capabilities needed rather than particular programs, and should use the IPLs as the primary basis for determining military requirements.

- The chairman should develop and implement a system for evaluating the preparedness of the combatant commands that does not rely on self-evaluations by the commands. The system also should identify force strengths and deficiencies as well as assess their impact on accomplishing national security objectives and on strategic plans.

- As the Joint Warfighting Center matures, the chairman should continue to increase its oversight of the joint doctrine development process.

- If it is the sense of Congress that significant changes in the roles and functions of the U.S. armed forces are required, it should establish its own commission to identify needed changes and propose appropriate legislation.

- The secretary should continue to emphasize full

implementation of the joint officer management provisions of the GNA with the objective of bringing all services into compliance.

- Congress should add language to the act which would ensure officers are not rendered less competitive for promotion for having received joint education and having served in joint assignments.

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INTRODUCTION

Reorganizing the military establishment of the United States has been a subject of considerable congressional interest throughout much of this century. As early as 1921, Congress began considering proposals to combine or unify the military departments under a single executive agency. Between 1921 and 1945, for example, Congress considered some 50 proposals to reorganize the United States armed forces. Due largely to opposition from the Departments of War and Navy, however, none of these initiatives resulted in legislation.¹

The experiences of World War II made it clear that, for the U.S. armed forces, future warfare would be increasingly characterized by unified operations,² and that a centrally coordinated process for providing U.S. military capabilities was needed. In a message to Congress (December 1945), President Truman stated that "there is enough evidence now at hand to demonstrate beyond question the need for a unified department." He urged Congress to ". . . adopt legislation combining the War and Navy departments into one single Department of National Defense."³ President Truman's message led to the National Security Act of 1947 which created the "National Military Establishment" and initiated a trend toward unification of the U.S. armed forces that would continue throughout the remainder of the century.⁴

The type of unification advanced by legislation and considered in this study would not ultimately eliminate the separate services or merge the military departments into one.⁵ As used herein, unification refers to the centralized direction of the U.S. armed forces and the concomitant subordination of the military departments and services to a centralized control structure. This contrasts with a separatist approach by which each military department would be a relatively autonomous organization coordinating, and perhaps synchronizing, its activities with the other departments, but retaining essential decision making autonomy in most areas.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, informally called the Goldwater-Nichols Act or GNA, was the most comprehensive defense reorganization package enacted since the 1947 National Security Act. Designed to accelerate the unification of the U.S. armed forces by fundamentally altering the manner in which they were raised, trained, commanded, and employed, the GNA impacted virtually all major elements of DOD. Many consider the GNA as instrumental in the success of U.S.

forces during Operation DESERT STORM. Nonetheless, a decade after its passage, there is evidence which suggests that this seminal legislation has yet to be fully implemented. There also are indications that implementation may have already gone too far in consolidating authority within the offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), at the expense of the military departments and services. The first purpose of this study, therefore, is to assess the extent to which the provisions of the GNA have been implemented within the framework of the act's eight stated objectives.⁶ The study also assesses the general effects the GNA has had on the U.S. armed forces and offers conclusions and recommendations for achieving the improvements Congress intended when it passed the GNA. The assessment begins by taking into account the act's historical context, particularly the events that directly contributed to its passage.

EARLY UNIFICATION EFFORTS AND CONCERNS

How best to balance the unified and separatist approaches to DOD organization has been a challenge that has confronted Congress over the years. Since 1947, Congress has gravitated toward the unification pole of these contrasting views of armed forces organization, but the attraction of the separatist philosophy remains significant. Since the end of World War II, almost every Secretary of Defense has supported increased centralization of authority. The military departments, on the other hand, have generally attempted to retain their autonomy.

In attempts to craft the most effective balance between these opposing forces, Congress has also had to consider a third factor. Increased unification of the U.S. armed forces erodes congressional control over the military, and Congress has sought to limit that effect by not over-centralizing authority within the executive branch.⁷ The interaction of these dynamics has resulted in an evolutionary unification process that the GNA has perpetuated, and which continues as the provisions of the act are implemented.

A review of the defense reorganization legislation that preceded the GNA assists in constructing a contextual background for assessing the act and illustrates its relative significance. The National Security Act of 1947 was the first, albeit relatively ineffective, piece of unification legislation. Although the act created the position of Secretary of Defense, it gave the secretary no real authority over the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. Congress perceived both the benefits and the dangers associated with unification, and decided not to enact more radical legislation for fear of yielding much of its control over the military to the Executive Branch.⁸ By 1949, however, the Executive Branch was pressing for legislation to

achieve greater unification. Commenting on the National Security Act, President Truman, in a March 1949 message to Congress, stated:

This act has provided a practical and workable basis for beginning the unification of the military services and for coordinating military policy with foreign and economic policy . . . The past eighteen months have dispelled any doubt that unification of the armed forces can yield great advantages to the nation . . . [but] the act fails to provide for a fully responsible official with authority adequate to meet his responsibility, whom the president and the congress can hold accountable.⁹

The 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act represented an important, but limited, step in further unifying the U.S. military establishment. Congress established the Department of Defense as an executive department and made the Secretary of Defense responsible for its general direction. It also redesignated the executive departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as military departments, reducing them in stature, but instructed that they continue to be "separately administered."¹⁰

The congressional intent stated in Section 2 of the Amendment was:

. . . to provide three Military Departments, **separately administered**, . . . to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control of the **Secretary of Defense** but not to merge them . . . and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces **but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff (but this is not to be interpreted as applying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Joint Staff)** [emphasis in original].¹¹

An important feature of the 1949 Amendment was that, while clearly avoiding the actual merging of the military departments and the creation of a "single Chief of Staff," the amendment provided for a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which were established in 1947 to serve as the principal military advisers to the president, National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense.¹² The JCS Chairman was assigned significantly circumscribed authority. He was not to exercise command over the military services nor the Joint Chiefs, and, in fact, he was not even a voting member of the JCS.¹³

With the 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act,

Congress took a further step toward unifying the armed forces but stopped short of merging the military departments. Nonetheless, unification pressures continued. By 1958, the benefits of unified strategic direction of the armed forces were more apparent, but Congress still feared the creation of too much centralized authority over the military. The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, amending the National Security Act of 1947, nonetheless gave the Secretary of Defense real authority over the U.S. military establishment, to include the power to reorganize the Department of Defense. The amendment modified the requirement that the military departments be "separately administered" to say that they must be "separately organized."¹⁴ The 1958 Act,

further subordinated the Military Departments to the central authority of the Secretary of Defense, established the chain of command from the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the unified and specified commands, and provided for the central direction and control of research and development.¹⁵

During the three decades that followed, there was little congressional action to unify the U.S. armed forces; however, the Secretary of Defense used his increased authority to take limited steps toward further unification.¹⁶ In the early 1980s, however, several events helped shape a congressional consensus that DOD required significant reform.

THE ROAD TO REFORM

The Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt.

On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, seizing 53 American hostages. The attack on the embassy should not have come as a complete surprise. Almost 9 months earlier, a similar incident occurred but was resolved diplomatically.¹⁷ Although a contingency plan for the evacuation of U.S. personnel existed,¹⁸ it is unclear if the JCS, in response to the first attack on the embassy, advised the Secretary of Defense or the president that the contingency plan should be made ready for potential execution. In any event, over 5 months elapsed after the second seizure and the taking of American hostages before the United States mounted a military response.

The U.S. national leadership was confronted with a situation for which it seemed unprepared. Direct White House supervision, excessive devotion to secrecy and compartmentation, and a general circumvention of the established crisis action planning process

characterized operational planning for the rescue mission.¹⁹ The plan that resulted was "joint"²⁰ in that it included forces from all services but, at the same time, it was not a unified operation in that it did not provide for unified command, unified action, or joint training of the forces.²¹ Acting on the advice of the JCS that the high-risk mission had a better-than-average chance of succeeding, President Carter directed that the operation be executed.²²

Operation EAGLE CLAW, designed to rescue the hostages quickly and dramatically, ended in catastrophe. American planning, equipment, tactics, and leadership proved inadequate.²³ Eight servicemen on the mission were killed, expensive U.S. equipment and classified information were abandoned, and not a single hostage was rescued.²⁴ The entire world wondered if the United States had indeed become a military "paper tiger."

In the months following the failed rescue attempt, a stunned American public endured the daily media reminders of the continued plight of the hostages and America's inability to do anything about it.²⁵ It is not surprising that the Iran hostage rescue experience aroused congressional suspicions that serious problems existed concerning how the U.S. armed forces were commanded, organized, trained, and employed, and that remedial action was required.²⁶ Those suspicions were confirmed by subsequent events.

Beirut.

During fall 1983, congressional concern over the command, organization, and employment of U.S. armed forces again peaked following a military disaster. The previous year, some 1,200 U.S. Marines joined French and Italian contingents in a multinational force. Their mission was to preserve peace in and around Beirut, Lebanon, facilitate the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of Lebanon's government, and help bring peace to the war-torn country. The Marines occupied positions in the vicinity of Beirut International Airport.

In April 1983, a massive explosion destroyed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 17 U.S. citizens and over 40 others. Fighting between indigenous factions intensified throughout the spring and summer. From March through October 1983, the Marines suffered a number of casualties (4 dead and 15 wounded) from the various factions involved in Lebanon's civil war.²⁷ Events culminated on October 23, 1983, when a suicide bomber attacked the Marines' headquarters building, killing 241 U.S. military personnel and wounding over 100 others.²⁸ Shortly thereafter, President Reagan withdrew the remaining U.S. forces.²⁹

Congressional reaction was swift. A delegation from the Investigations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services arrived in Beirut by December 12, 1983. Their report to the Committee Chairman (December 19, 1983) criticized several military aspects of the incident. Transcending the tactical level, the more notable criticisms included an ambiguous chain of command, lack of proper oversight by higher levels of command, lack of adequate intelligence support, reporting by military sources of incomplete or inaccurate information,³⁰ the failure of civilian leadership to heed the advice of senior military leaders concerning the overall risks of the operation, and the inability of the military to anticipate and protect against such an attack.³¹

With the memories of the Iran hostage rescue attempt still vivid, the Beirut tragedy suggested that the deficiencies of the U.S. armed forces that contributed to the debacle in Iran had not been corrected, but somehow had worsened. Those sentiments began to prevail, and even a successful military operation would not arrest the congressional movement toward sweeping reform of DOD.

Grenada .

President Reagan came into office with the task of restoring U.S. prestige, in part by improving the credibility of its military capabilities. The U.S. experience in Lebanon did not further that objective. It appeared, however, that the successful use of military force for a just cause could restore the confidence of the American people in their military and government.³² Cuban activities on the island of Grenada necessitated a military operation that was large enough to be credible, but not so large as to present significant risk of a large number of U.S. casualties.³³

On October 25, 1983, 2 days after the Beirut bombing, the invasion of Grenada, Operation URGENT FURY, began.³⁴ The mission was to secure and evacuate about 1,000 U.S. citizens, defeat the Grenadian and Cuban forces present, and stabilize the situation so democratic government could be restored.³⁵

Taken in the whole, Operation URGENT FURY was a success; the students were freed unharmed, the Bishop government was ousted, Cuban troops were removed, and democracy was restored. Still, critics reported many problems with the operation,³⁶ to include a lack of accurate, up-to-date maps, imperfect intelligence support, and U.S. casualties resulting from accidents and fratricide.³⁷ There were interoperability problems among the services, particularly in the area of communications.³⁸ And, although some forces acted bravely, they achieved only limited success. Reportedly, U.S. Army units performed sluggishly, used

inappropriate tactics, and suffered from breakdowns in discipline.³⁹ While the validity of such accounts has been debated, the fact remains that the overall success of the operation failed to preclude congressional criticism, and the Reagan administration again found itself on the defensive.⁴⁰

Congressional Reaction.

These brief operational sketches and the congressional reactions they elicited complete the historical context that shaped the widespread congressional perception that the U.S. military was in need of reform. As early as June 1983, members of Congress already were considering changes within the Department of Defense. Senators John Tower and Henry (Scoop) Jackson, then Chairman and Ranking Minority member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, for example, directed the committee staff to conduct a study of the organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense. For the next 18 months, the study took the form of hearings, interviews, and research. In January 1985, Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn directed that a more formal and vigorous study be undertaken.⁴¹

The Locher Report. The resulting staff study yielded a report entitled *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, informally known as the Locher Report (October 1985, Study Director: James R. Locher). The report indicated that consensus was building in Congress that DOD required reorganization. The essence of the report was reflected in the testimony of former Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger:

. . . in the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements. Without such reform, I fear that the United States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the nation.⁴²

The report addressed a wide range of issues affecting the performance of the DOD, including its four major organizational elements: the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the unified and specified combatant commands, and the military departments. The report also addressed two key decision-making processes: the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the acquisition process.⁴³ Additionally, congressional review and

oversight of defense policies and programs and civilian control of the military received scrutiny.

The report went beyond the mere cataloging of deficiencies and issues. It offered numerous recommendations for overhauling DOD, its decision-making processes, and its organization. The more significant recommendations included:

- to establish three new Under Secretary of Defense positions for nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, and regional defense and force projection;
- to create the position of an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic Planning);
- to disestablish the JCS and replace it with a Joint Military Advisory Council consisting of a chairman and a 4-star officer from each Service who is on his last tour of duty;
- to authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to provide military advice in his own right and designate him the principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense;
- to authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council to develop and administer a personnel management system for officers assigned to joint duty;
- to remove the Service component commanders within the unified combatant commands from the operational chain of command; and
- to integrating fully the Secretariats' and the Service headquarters' staffs.

Although Congress did not directly act on any of the report's fairly radical recommendations, the report effectively illuminated numerous deficiencies within DOD.⁴⁴ Moreover, the report affirmed the congressional perception of the need for change within DOD and helped shape the debates that would occur over the next year. Congressional debate was accompanied by Executive Branch interest in defense reform.

Presidential Reaction.

In June 1985, out of concern that Congress, if left to its own devices, might impose ill-advised, or at least unwanted changes upon the Department of Defense, President Reagan established the *Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management*, informally known as the Packard Commission (after its chairman, David Packard). Establishing the commission also served to stanch

any public perception that the executive branch was not willing or able to reform one of its departments. The president charged the commission to:

. . . conduct a defense management study of important dimension, including: the budget process, the procurement system, legislative oversight, and the organizational and operational arrangements, both formal and informal, among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Command systems, the Military Departments, and Congress.⁴⁵

In February 1986, the commission provided the president an interim report containing several recommendations. The president officially endorsed the preliminary recommendations in April 1986, and designated many for "quick and decisive implementation."⁴⁶ The commission published its findings in June 1986. They were generally consistent with the conclusions of the Locher Report released some 8 months earlier.⁴⁷ However, the commission's key recommendations were considerably less radical:

- defense planning should begin with a comprehensive statement of national security objectives and priorities;
- the president should issue provisional 5-year budget levels to the Secretary of Defense;
- the CJCS should prepare a military strategy and options for operational concepts;
- the CJCS, with the advice of the JCS and the combatant commanders, should prepare broad military options, framing explicit trade-offs among the armed forces, and submit recommendations to the Secretary of Defense;
- the CJCS, with the assistance of the JCS and the Director of Central Intelligence, should provide net assessments of U.S. and allied armed forces relative to those of potential adversaries. The assessments should be used to evaluate risks inherent in the options developed;
- the president should select a particular option and specify an associated budget level upon which the Department of Defense would base its 5-year defense plan and 2-year budget;
- the CJCS should be designated as the principal uniformed military advisor to the president, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense, representing his own views as well as those of the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff;

- the Joint Staff and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be placed under the exclusive direction of the chairman;

- the Secretary of Defense should direct that commands to and reports from the unified and specified commands be channeled through the chairman;

- the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) should be created;

- broader authority should be assigned to the unified commanders to structure subordinate commands, joint task forces, and support activities;

- the Unified Command Plan should be revised;

- the Secretary of Defense should be provided with the flexibility to establish the shortest possible chains of command to deployed contingency forces; and

- the Secretary of Defense should establish a single unified command to integrate global air, land, and sea transportation.⁴⁸

During early spring 1986, while both houses of Congress considered defense reform bills, influential congressmen such as Senator Goldwater conferred with members of the Packard Commission. As a result of these discussions, Congress began to embrace the Packard Commission's recommendations over the more revolutionary changes recommended in the Locher Report.⁴⁹ The interaction between the legislative and executive branches in producing the package of reform that ultimately resulted is noteworthy. Congress, in initiating the Locher study effort, precipitated presidential action to form a Blue Ribbon Commission. By forming the Packard Commission, endorsing the commission's recommendations as early as possible, and committing to their implementation, the president essentially was able to coopt Congress and influence the reform package it ultimately adopted.⁵⁰

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Throughout the first half of 1986, discussions continued over the need to reorganize the Department of Defense. On one side of the debate was the U.S. Congress, convinced that reform was necessary. On the other side were the Secretary of Defense and the services.⁵¹ Interestingly, the president sided with Congress.⁵² With the Executive Branch seemingly divided over the issue of defense reorganization and against the background of the Iran hostage rescue attempt, the Beirut bombing, and the incursion into Grenada, Senators Goldwater and Nunn and

Representative Nichols were able to build exceptionally strong bipartisan support for reform.

During the spring and summer, each house passed its version of the reform bill by an overwhelming majority.⁵³ With the Congress largely of a like mind concerning defense reorganization, the joint conference to resolve inter-committee issues went quickly and smoothly.⁵⁴ The conference report was published on September 12, 1986, and this substantial piece of legislation sailed through the Senate and the House of Representatives on September 16 and 17, respectively. By October 1, 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was law.

Congressional Intent.

Traditional congressional concern over the migration of control of the military from the legislative to the executive branch has, in some respects, retarded the evolution toward unification. Congress recognized the value of separately organized military departments that competed to best meet the requirements of the CINCs by offering alternative program recommendations. Congress also perceived the need for more unified direction of the U.S. armed forces, but feared that too much centralization of authority might inhibit the discretionary authority of Congress over defense matters. The provisions of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act reflect these countervailing concerns.

The scope of the legislation clearly evidenced congressional dissatisfaction with the lack of unified direction and action of the U.S. armed forces. Congress believed the problems derived from dysfunctional relationships among the Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, CJCS, JCS, CINCs and Service components, and the Service Chiefs. In passing the GNA, Congress intended:

(1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority within the Department;

(2) to improve the military advice provided to the president, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense;

(3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;

(4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;

(5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;

(6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;

(7) to improve joint officer management policies; and

(8) to enhance otherwise the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.⁵⁵

Each provision of the act addressed one or more of these elements of congressional intent. An in-depth analysis of every provision of the act is beyond the scope of this study. However, an assessment of the more significant provisions provides a sufficient basis for determining the extent to which the act has served its purpose. The assessment that follows is organized around the elements of the act's stated intent and supported by analyses of key provisions designed to address each element.

ASSESSMENT

Strengthening Civilian Authority.

This section analyzes the provisions that directly impacted the authority and control of the Secretary of Defense. Since civilian control exercised by the Secretaries of the Military Departments was not a major focus of the act, an analysis of corresponding provisions is not provided in this study.

Congress formulated several provisions of the act to strengthen directly the authority of the Secretary of Defense. The two most significant provisions increased the secretary's influence over program planning conducted by DOD components and the contingency planning conducted by the CINCs. Other provisions indirectly enhanced the secretary's control. The more significant of those relate to improving the advice the secretary receives from the uniformed military, thus enhancing his ability to command.

Defense Planning Guidance. First, to increase the secretary's authority and control over programs developed by DOD components, the act provided that

[t]he Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall provide annually to the heads of Department of Defense components written policy guidance for the preparation and review of the program recommendations and budget proposals of their

respective components. Such guidance shall include guidance on--

- (a) national security objectives and policies;
- (b) the priorities of military missions; and
- (c) the resource levels projected to be available for the period of time for which such recommendations and proposals are to be effective.⁵⁶

The authority provided by this section clearly empowered the secretary to establish the criteria upon which the military departments and other DOD components must base their programs.⁵⁷ The secretary uses the *Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)*, a classified document, as his tool for providing the program planning guidance required by the act.

The *DPG* initiates the first phase of the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).⁵⁸ The PPBS is the biennial process by which DOD plans for the force capabilities that will be needed from 2 to 8 years in the future. It facilitates the development of programs to attain those capabilities and translates those programs into budget submissions. Those programs and budget submissions, rationalized and synthesized through the PPBS, combine to form the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and yield DOD's portion of the president's budget. Thus, the *DPG* provides the initial policy guidance for the program planning that produces the DOD budget. By asserting himself in the program planning process early, the secretary has enhanced his influence over the programs ultimately submitted for approval.

A review of the *DPG* to date reveals that it directly addresses and, on balance, satisfies the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It summarizes the national security and military strategies, outlines strategic challenges and opportunities, provides some priority of military missions, and is consistent with the resources expected to be available during the targeted 6-year planning period.⁵⁹ Additionally, the CJCS reviews drafts of the *DPG* and is afforded the opportunity to provide comments prior to its publication. Through the *DPG*, the secretary influences DOD programs early in the planning phase, and, by putting his full weight behind the *DPG*, he sets the standard by which the programs of DOD components will be evaluated. By doing so, he has ensured that DOD components take appropriate notice of his guidance and priorities regarding DOD programs.

This positive assessment of the secretary's promulgation of policy guidance for the preparation and review of DOD programs must be qualified. First, the specific priorities set forth in

the *DPG* are few, and the guidance provided is, in many instances, fairly general. This allows the military departments considerable latitude in structuring their respective programs. That is somewhat appropriate, since the departments require a degree of flexibility if they are to craft programs that most effectively and efficiently satisfy the CINCs' requirements. In developing the *DPG*, the Secretary of Defense must balance the military departments' need for planning and programming flexibility against the risk of unnecessary duplication and redundancy that may result in the absence of specific guidance and priorities.

Another criticism of the *DPG* involves the timing of its publication. The GNA called for the Secretary of Defense to provide his planning and programming guidance annually. However, the need for stability in planning and for programming supported by adequate analyses necessitates a two-year PPBS cycle. Since the *DPG*, by design, initiates a new PPBS cycle, it logically became a biennial document.

Congress, however, requires annual budget submissions. The PPBS accommodates annual budget submissions by providing for annual budget reviews and adjustments during the years between those in which new presidents' budgets are developed. Consequently, every other year, the secretary should be simultaneously developing planning guidance for a new PPBS cycle while making adjustments to a mid-cycle budget. One would expect the mid-cycle adjustments to be relatively minor, given that they continue to serve the two-year budget submitted the prior year.

What was perceived to be an exception occurred in 1993 when the Clinton administration determined that a significant mid-course correction in the defense program was required. The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) was conducted to chart the new course, and it yielded an off-cycle *DPG*. With the FY 94-99 *DPG* published the year prior and the FY 96-01 *DPG* still a year away, the FY 95-99 *DPG* was seen as an anomaly brought on by the new administration's exercise of its prerogative to set a new course for DOD. The BUR, its name notwithstanding, was driven by the OSD and the Joint Staff and was conducted outside the established planning system.⁶⁰ Since each Service had developed planning and programming processes to support the 2-year PPBS, their participation in the BUR and the development of the resulting *DPG* was constrained.

The FY 96-01 *DPG* was published less than 8 months later. A year after that, the FY 97-01 *DPG* was published, again off-cycle. Work is ongoing to produce the FY 98-03 *DPG*. Upon its publication, annual *DPGs* will have been published for 5 consecutive years. Prudence dictates that DOD should have a process for making budget adjustments during those years in which new president's budgets are not developed. It is not clear,

however, that annual reinitiation of the PPBS is helpful or warranted. The DOD components, particularly the military departments, require stability in the PPBS if they are to use their forecasting, planning, and analytical processes effectively.

There is no doubt that the provision of the GNA that gave rise to the *DPG* provided the Secretary of Defense with an effective means of asserting increased control over the development of DOD programs. However, recognizing the *DPG* for the powerful tool it is, a secretary could use it to the effect of over-controlling and, thus, destabilizing the planning and programming process. Ironically, while the secretary may be complying with the letter of the GNA by publishing annual *DPGs*, he may not be implementing the congressional intent of improving DOD program planning.

Contingency Planning Guidance. The GoldwaterNichols Act also increased the Secretary of Defense's authority and responsibility in the area of contingency planning.⁶¹ The act provides that

[t]he Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President and after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall provide annually to the Chairman written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans.⁶²

The tool used by the secretary to implement this provision of the act is the *Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)*.

The *CPG* is a concise, classified document that the secretary uses to inform the chairman of general and specific strategic areas of concern to the civilian leadership for which contingency planning should be conducted. The chairman then uses this guidance to fulfill his responsibility to "[provide] for the preparation and review of contingency plans . . .," also as required by the GNA.⁶³ The *CPG* also informs the chairman of the general requirements of the secretary, or his representatives, to review contingency plans during their development as well as upon completion.

This element of the GNA has been implemented quite effectively.⁶⁴ The Joint Staff collaborates with OSD in the initial drafting of the *CPG*. The final draft is coordinated with the chairman before it is forwarded to the secretary for his approval and subsequent submission to the NSC for presidential approval. After the *CPG* is published, the Joint Staff translates the policy guidance it contains into specific planning guidance and tasks and inserts them into the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*, the document by which the chairman tasks the CINCs to develop operation plans.⁶⁵ Using this guidance, the CINCs

develop plans peculiar to their geographic or functional areas of responsibility. Even before the plans are completed, the CINCs' strategic concepts are forwarded to the CJCS for review and approval. The Secretary of Defense, or his representative, selectively reviews strategic concepts of particular interest. OSD-level review occurs again when the completed plans are submitted for approval.⁶⁶

Through the *CPG*, the Secretary of Defense has inserted himself and his selected representatives squarely into the contingency planning process. He has done so in a manner that gives primacy to the policies of civilian leadership, appropriately defers the actual development of contingency plans to the uniformed military leadership, and, by involving himself early, maintains effective civilian control throughout the planning process. This is precisely what Congress intended in the GNA.⁶⁷

Improving Military Advice.

Several significant provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to improve the military advice given to the president, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC. The sponsors of the act believed the JCS was incapable of providing concise, timely, and useful advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA).⁶⁸ Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger bore out this conclusion:

The existing structure [of the JCS], if it does not preclude the best military advice, provides a substantial, though not insurmountable, barrier to such advice . . . [T]he recommendations . . . must pass through a screen designed to protect the institutional interest of each . . . service . . . [N]o service ox may be gored . . .

The unavoidable outcome is . . . log-rolling, back-scratching, marriage agreements, and the like . . . The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded.⁶⁹

Not only did the JCS system inhibit innovative thought, it also was not an efficient decision-making system. For example, General David Jones, a former CJCS, described to Congress how the JCS had spent an entire afternoon arguing over which Service should provide the attache to the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.⁷⁰

Notwithstanding the widespread deprecation of the JCS, Senator Goldwater reminded the Senate that the members of the JCS

were given an "almost impossible task: to represent their own services' viewpoint but, simultaneously, to sacrifice that view to the greater common good of joint considerations." He also pointed out that "interservice rivalry can be a good thing [and] we wish to encourage competing views reaching senior-level decisionmakers. But the JCS process does not encourage independent thought."⁷¹

The congressional concern was echoed by the Packard Commission. In its report, the Commission stated that "[t]he president and Secretary of Defense require military advice that better integrates the individual views of the nation's combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the services." The report further concluded that "there is no one uniformed officer clearly responsible for providing such an integrated view, who can draw upon the best thinking of, and act as an effective spokesman for, our senior military leadership."⁷²

To eliminate this shortcoming, Congress assigned increased responsibility to the CJCS. In the GNA, it transferred the duties and functions previously the responsibility of the corporate JCS to the chairman, designated the chairman as the "head" of the JCS and the principal military advisor to the NCA and NSC, and directly subordinated the Joint Staff to the chairman.⁷³ The act further provided that the chairman, subject to the direction of the president, may participate in NSC meetings.⁷⁴ Additionally, the act permitted the Secretary of Defense to assign overall supervision of certain defense agencies and field activities to the chairman.⁷⁵ The act also created the position of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist the chairman in discharging his new duties.⁷⁶

However, Congress tempered the measures taken to increase the chairman's authority with others that circumscribed it. Notably, the act vested the chairman with no command authority. The chain of command prescribed by the act runs from the president, to the Secretary of Defense, to the CINCs.⁷⁷ Also, the other members of the JCS retained their responsibilities as military advisors to the NCA and NSC. The act provided further that should a member of the JCS disagree with the advice the chairman intended to give to the NCA or the NSC, the member may submit his dissenting view, which the chairman must offer at the same time he presents his own.⁷⁸ The act also provided that each member of the JCS, after informing the Secretary of Defense, may make independent recommendations to Congress.⁷⁹ Finally, the act provided that the chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, consult the other members of the JCS and convene regular meetings.⁸⁰ While the act enlarged the chairman's responsibilities and authority, it clearly did not intend for him to become too powerful, nor for the JCS to become an inert organization.

The strengthened position of the chairman has been the most intensely debated aspect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. By the end of General Colin Powell's tenure as chairman, a group of critics asserted that the increased authority of the chairman had resulted in less effective advice to the NCA because recommendations were based narrowly on the chairman's views, rather than on the range of opinions that might emanate from the JCS. The commentators argued that several provisions of the act combined synergistically to make the chairman much more powerful than Congress intended. They claimed that his authority to preside over the JCS and set the agenda for JCS meetings, his command of the vitalized Joint Staff, his control of communications to and from the combatant commanders and the NCA,⁸¹ and his designation as the principal military adviser to the NCA enable him to prevail on most, if not all, issues within the uniformed military. Additionally, given the responsibilities assigned to him in the act to evaluate Service programs and offer alternative program recommendations,⁸² some critics allege that the Service Chiefs are further discouraged from challenging him. Thus, some commentators claim, the chairman can attenuate debate and squelch dissent. They also argue that his increased authority allows him to impose his views upon his civilian leaders.⁸³

Referring to the increased power of the chairman as "the biggest Washington scandal," Edward Luttwak charged that it amounts to the "collapse of civilian control over the military policies and military strategy of the United States." He went on to assert that,

. . . the power of decision that our civilian President is supposed to exercise through his appointed civilian officials has been seized by an all-military outfit that most Americans have never even heard of: the . . . 'Joint Staff' that serves the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁸⁴

John Lehman added to the debate by claiming the chairman generally is not providing the NCA a range of options, but only a single, take it or leave it, military option that ostensibly represents the position of the armed forces on the issue at hand. Referring to the framers of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Lehman opined that,

[i]n their understandable quest for efficiency, the military reformers have consolidated the power previously separated between the Military Departments, disenfranchised the civilian officials of each service, and created autocracy in the Joint Staff and arbitrary power in the person of the Chairman.⁸⁵

Providing what probably has been the most severe criticism of the chairman's increased authority, Richard Kohn described a military that is "out of control." Quoting "a senior officer involved," he asserted that General Powell instituted a system of command and control in the Pentagon designed "to give the NCA no options . . . to control the discussion by presenting just one approach, which was the option of his choice."⁸⁶

Assessing the merits of the criticisms is difficult because their substantive bases are not always clear. For example, it is not completely clear whether Luttwak, Lehman, Kohn, and others believe that the office of the chairman was made too powerful by the GNA, or that General Powell became too powerful a chairman because of his personality and background. Interestingly, the manner in which the current chairman, General John Shalikashvili, performs his duties has not drawn such criticism when he, in some respects, has gone even farther than his predecessor in consolidating the authority given the chairman under the GNA.⁸⁷

As a basis for his criticism, Kohn relies extensively on accounts in Bob Woodward's *The Commanders* because "no one has disputed its facts."⁸⁸ One must remember that many of Woodward's facts were not substantiated. Luttwak and Lehman, on the other hand, provide no insights as to the bases for their assertions. Absent an articulated underlying rationale, an analysis of the argument that the GNA has brought about a decrease in civilian control of the military accompanied by ineffective military advice must be limited essentially to an assessment of the argument's internal consistency.

In response to Kohn's criticism, General Powell stated that "[o]f all the problems facing the nation, a crisis in civil-military relations is not one of them and things are not out of control. . . . both Presidents Bush and Clinton expressed satisfaction with the manner in which I provided my advice."⁸⁹ If there has been no perception on the part of either the NCA or the chairman that there is something wrong with the manner in which military advice is provided, then it is difficult to make a case for a loss of civilian control and a concomitant decrease in the effectiveness of military advice. If there has been reasonable harmony between the civilian and military leadership, then it is unlikely there was a crisis in civil-military relations.

Kohn and Luttwak's counter to this conclusion is illogical. They argue that this very harmony proves the crisis. For example, Kohn asserts that "[w]ithout any authorization from superiors, [General Powell] developed a set of concepts designed to reconfigure the entire military establishment [and] pushed his vision of a new national strategy."⁹⁰ The GNA not only authorized General Powell to develop alternative force concepts, but required him to do so.⁹¹ His authority to develop national

military strategy was likewise derived from the act.⁹² It can hardly be said he acted without authorization.

The illogic of Kohn and Luttwak's position is further exposed by the fact that General Powell's superiors, including the president, accepted his force structure and strategy recommendations, although they certainly could have asked for others from General Powell, the JCS, or from the secretaries of the military departments. One cannot logically argue that because the NCA accepted the recommendations of the chairman, a crisis in civil-military relations somehow resulted.

Kohn applied the same flawed logic to the issue of homosexuals in the military. He asserted that "at a time of presidential transition, when civilian authority was vulnerable, General Powell was 'in the face' of the two most powerful civilians in military affairs." But once again, the GNA required the chairman to provide military advice to the NCA. The civilian leadership may fully or partially embrace the advice, or reject it entirely. The former chairman was obligated to provide his best military advice, and that is what he did. The fact that his civilian leadership heeded his advice is not evidence of even the voluntary relinquishment of their authority, much less a breakdown in civilian control of the military. To hold that the president approved and the Secretary of Defense promulgated the so called "don't ask, don't tell policy" because of coercion by the CJCS, and not because of congressional and popular concern that a more liberal policy might not be in the best interests of the U.S. armed forces, strains credibility.

Contrary to the critics' charges, the lessons of the Persian Gulf War provide evidence that the GNA strengthened civilian control over the armed forces. With his role in overseeing contingency planning expanded by the act, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, in 1989, called for a change in the focus of contingency planning for Southwest Asia. He directed that additional attention be given to the defense of the Arabian Peninsula against strong regional threats. Consequently, when Iraq attacked into Kuwait the CINC was already well along in his planning to repel and reverse such aggression. The Secretary of Defense concluded that "[c]ivilian control and oversight of the Department of Defense was enhanced [by the act] as was senior civilian cognizance of the strategy and planning process."⁹³

Congress, also, seems satisfied with the act's provisions for improving military advice provided to the NCA. In passing the act, Congress allowed that problems could surface during its implementation. In presenting the reform bill to the Senate, Senator Nunn observed that the executive and legislative branches would have to monitor implementation to ensure the act produced the intended effects and should to be prepared to effect

modifications, if required.⁹⁴ Representative Nichols made a similar observation when he presented the bill to the House of Representatives. He said, "[t]hose who have worked on DOD reorganization realize that problems may arise in implementing such far-reaching legislation. We will attempt to respond to *bona fide* problems with legislative modifications when necessary."⁹⁵

The express invitations to modify the act notwithstanding, neither the president, the Secretary of Defense, nor the Congress, has proposed any legislation to modify significantly the chairman's authority and responsibilities. Therefore, a problem in civil-military relations that would degrade the military advice provided by the chairman is difficult to establish.

Nonetheless, a key issue remains concerning the manner in which the chairman formulates the advice he provides to the NCA. There is evidence that the chairman may not always adequately consult with the other members of the JCS before providing his advice to the NCA. The chairman has promulgated a formal policy that "coordination with the services . . . will be sought on actions that impact on the services' plans or policies . . . [or] for joint actions that will result in advice by the chairman to the president, NSC, or Secretary of Defense"⁹⁶ This policy conforms to the requirements and intent of the act. However, there are indications of inconsistent implementation of the policy.

The importance of formal JCS meetings in the JCS conference room appears to have decreased since passage of the GNA, indicating a decrease in formal consultation.⁹⁷ Also, just before retiring, General Carl Mundy, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, sent a letter to the chairman describing his concerns about decreasing Service influence over joint issues.⁹⁸ Additionally, the Service Chiefs were not given a reasonable opportunity to consult in the development of General Shalikashvili's first *Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR)*.⁹⁹

To the extent that the NCA are willing to accept the chairman's unilateral advice, he may be more prone to give it. However, such advice is apt to be less robust than advice enriched by prior consultation with the other members of the JCS. A return to the process of consensus building and voting within the JCS, however, is neither necessary nor warranted; the chairman is clearly the senior military adviser to the NCA. Nonetheless, the chairman obviously can benefit from consultations with the other members of the JCS, particularly when the issues under consideration have potentially significant impact on the services or when the services will be called upon to implement resulting policy decisions. While some issues may warrant formal JCS meetings, consultation on others could occur

informally or through the proxy of staff coordination.

While the NCA's willingness to accept the chairman's unilateral advice may not be a civil-military relations problem, it can affect the quality of the advice the NCA receives. Given the indicators that previously routine consultation with the other members of the JCS may be eroding, it may be in the NCA's best interest to establish policy that ensures the chairman consults with the other members of the JCS, whenever the services have vested interests in the issues under consideration.

The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, the bulk of the evidence indicates that the act has not only enhanced civilian control of the armed forces, but has also improved the military advice provided to the NCA. In the official DOD report on the Persian Gulf war, the Secretary of Defense noted that the conflict was the first test of the act in a major war. He complimented the chairman, the vice chairman, and the other members of the JCS for the "excellent military advice" they provided. He reported that the act's strengthening of the position of the chairman enabled the chairman to bring to bear his strategic insight and exceptional leadership to ensure the CINC was provided with all he needed to successfully prosecute the war.¹⁰⁰ In addition to improving civilian control of the armed forces, the GNA also provided more authority to the CINCs.

Expanding the Authority and Responsibility of the CINCs.

To reduce further the influence of Service parochialism and better focus DOD strategic planning on the needs of the unified and specified combatant commanders, Congress determined that the roles of the CINCs also had to be strengthened.¹⁰¹ Congress crafted several provisions of the act with that goal in mind. The act reemphasized and clarified the responsibilities of the CINCs for accomplishing assigned missions as well as for ensuring their commands' preparedness to do so.¹⁰² It also described, in detail, command authority, specifying that a CINC has authority to:

- direct subordinate commands in all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics;
- prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command;
- organize the command and forces within the command;
- employ forces within the command as he considers necessary to accomplish the command's missions;
- assign command functions to subordinate commanders;

- coordinate and approve administrative, support, and disciplinary activities necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;

- select and suspend subordinate commanders and staff officers; and

- convene courts martial.¹⁰³

The act also provided that the Secretary of Defense shall periodically review the authority of the CINCs and ensure their authority is commensurate with their responsibilities. The act gave the CINCs the responsibility to report promptly to the secretary any instances in which they feel their authority to be inadequate.¹⁰⁴ Additionally, Congress considered terms like "full operational command," traditionally used to describe the authority of the CINCs, to be inappropriate for describing their new authority.¹⁰⁵ The act gave rise to a new term, "combatant command," that DOD has formally adopted.¹⁰⁶

The act further reinforced the CINCs' authority by directing the secretaries of the military departments to assign all forces under their jurisdiction to the CINCs,¹⁰⁷ except for those forces needed to carry out the 12 Service functions.¹⁰⁸ Although the act specified a single, clear chain of command from the president to the Secretary of Defense to the CINCs,¹⁰⁹ it notably did not provide for an administrative chain of command from the president to the Secretary of Defense to the military departments. Thus, while the act allowed each military department to retain unspecified authority and control over a portion of their forces, the bulk of the U.S. armed forces were placed under the authority of the CINCs.

Recognizing the geographic dispersion of the CINCs and the broad spans of control inherent in the offices of the president and the Secretary of Defense, Congress included provisions in the act that allow the chairman to assist the NCA in overseeing the CINCs. Specifically, the president may direct that all communications between himself or the secretary and the CINCs go through the chairman. The president may also direct that the chairman assist him in the performance of his command functions. The Secretary of Defense may assign the chairman responsibilities for assisting in overseeing the combatant commands; however, such assignment confers no command authority.¹¹⁰

Although the chairman is vested with no command authority, his role in making the chain of command function effectively is pivotal. In addition to making him the principal military advisor to the NCA, the act designated him the spokesman for the CINCs, especially for the requirements of their commands, and made him

responsible for informing other elements of the DOD of the CINCs' requirements. This provision of the act not only increased the chairman's real authority, but also enhanced the ability of the CINCs' to influence the NCA.¹¹¹

Another provision of the act indirectly, but substantially, increased the authority of the CINCs. It made the secretaries of the military departments responsible for "fulfill[ing] (to the maximum extent practicable) the current and future operational requirements of the [CINCs]. . . ." ¹¹² In short, the CINCs were made responsible for identifying requirements for military capabilities, the chairman was made responsible for synthesizing the requirements, and the services were tasked to fulfill the requirements. Thus, the services were not to interpret, on their own, the CINCs' requirements and base Service programs on the capabilities the services determined to be most important to the CINCs. Via the GNA, Congress sought to clearly establish the primacy of the CINCs over the Service chiefs, at least with respect to the determination of required military capabilities.

Whether these statutory provisions have improved the abilities of the CINCs to accomplish assigned missions and focused the services on providing trained, equipped, and ready forces to satisfy the CINCs' requirements is debatable. Evidence suggests that the impact of these provisions may not have been as significant as Congress had intended. On occasion, responsibility for accomplishment of missions assigned to a CINC have become blurred. For example, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed the Air Staff's Deputy Director of Plans for Warfighting Concepts to develop a plan for a U.S. response. The Air Staff unilaterally developed the plan without direction from the Commander-In-Chief of the U.S Central Command (USCINCCENT), the chairman, or the NCA.¹¹³ Given that the Goldwater-Nichols Act clearly assigned the responsibility for operation planning to the CINCs, the Air Staff's planning encroached upon USCINCCENT's planning authority and responsibility.¹¹⁴ The fact that the chairman directed that the Air Staff's planning cell be expanded to become a joint planning cell under the Joint Staff's Director for Operations¹¹⁵ did not negate the Air Force's infringement on the CINC's planning authority.

Another dynamic decreases the effectiveness of the provisions of the act designed to increase the CINCs' authority. Prior to passage of the act, two chains of command existed within the U.S. armed forces. The operational chain of command ran from the president, to the Secretary of Defense, through the JCS, to the CINCs. The administrative and support chain of command ran from the NCA to the secretaries of the military departments.¹¹⁶ The two chains of command converged at the level of the Service components of the combatant commands. The Service component

commanders ostensibly served two masters, the CINCs and the Service chiefs. Congress concluded that the resulting ambiguity inhibited the CINCs' ability to exercise command over subordinate forces and to control resources allocated to their commands.¹¹⁷ Congress intended to solve the problem by clearly prescribing a single chain of command that runs from the president, to the Secretary of Defense, through the CJCS, to the CINCs.¹¹⁸

In passing the act, Congress intended that a CINC's "subordinate commanders perceive [the CINC], rather than officers in the military departments, as the superior whom they serve."¹¹⁹ Congress consciously abandoned the term "full operational command" because of its historical connotation of circumscribing the authority of the CINCs.¹²⁰ In addition to prescribing a single chain of command, Congress gave the CINCs the authority to approve the assignment of or to dismiss immediately subordinate commanders and principal staff officers. It also gave the CINCS the authority to evaluate formally the duty performance of those subordinates.¹²¹

The type and clarity of authority provided in the act should have been sufficient to ensure unambiguous organizational relationships. However, this may not be the case. First, the act did not give the CINCs true control over the assignment of senior officers to the commands. The CINCs can refuse to accept nominated officers,¹²² but can "hire" officers only if they have been nominated. By influencing the pools of nominees for senior positions within the combatant commands, the services can ensure the officers' residual loyalties after they are assigned. The CINC's authority over immediate subordinates is further attenuated by the fact that the services retain influence over promotions and subsequent assignments of their officers.¹²³ That, combined with decades of Service indoctrination, causes senior officers assigned to combatant commands to remain predisposed to respond to the desires of their services.

A related difficulty results from the act's construct of a single chain of command. The act does not allow for the "command" of those Service forces that are not assigned to the CINCs. Recognizing this reality, the chairman declared that although there is only one chain of command, it has two branches: one runs to the CINCs and the other runs to the military departments for the forces that are not assigned to the CINCs.¹²⁴ Since the branching occurs at the Secretary of Defense level, the only unidimensional link in the "single" chain of command is that which connects the president and the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, although Congress, via the GNA, sought to establish a single chain of command, dual chains persist.¹²⁵ It should be noted, however, that the act placed the Service components exclusively within the CINCS' chain of command. However, the aforementioned promotion and assignment influence retained by the

services may limit the practical significance of that provision. Thus, the efforts of Congress to buttress the CINCs' authority by clarifying the chain of command have not been completely successful.

The CINCs' control over resources is also limited. They have yet to achieve the degree of control intended by Congress over the resources the services acquire and allocate to their commands.¹²⁶ Simply stated, in the GNA Congress intended that the CINCs would state their requirements and the services would fill them to the extent permitted by fiscal constraints. A process that effects this intent has yet to be perfected.

At present, and for reasons that will be explored more fully later, the services, not the combatant commands, dominate the military requirements determination and material acquisition processes. In addition to exerting primary influence within the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC),¹²⁷ the services control the concepts development and research and development capabilities that yield potential weapons systems and equipment. In establishing a priority for the systems and equipment he requires, a CINC currently must do so within the range of potential capabilities defined by the services. In short, he must select from a menu developed by the services, and his Service components may suggest priorities. The process that exists now is largely one by which the services develop programs for potential weapons systems and equipment and market them to the CINCs, often through the Service components.

The CINCs' control over joint training and joint exercises also remains limited. Currently the CINCs are not provided the funds needed for joint training and exercises they must conduct to ensure the readiness of their commands. They still rely on Service funding.¹²⁸ By controlling the necessary funds, the services are able to exert influence over joint training and exercises properly within the purview of the CINCs. The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) recommended that "the CINCs be given more control over the portion of the Service component training budgets that are integral to joint training."¹²⁹

On balance, it appears that the act strengthened the roles the CINCs play in the command of forces, operation planning and execution, and determining requirements for military capability, but perhaps not to the extent envisioned by Congress. This conclusion does not imply that the present situation is unsatisfactory. It merely points out that the act has not been fully implemented with respect to increasing the authority and responsibilities of the CINCs and, thus, practical limits remain.

Improving Strategy Formulation and Contingency Planning.

Through the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress sought to improve strategy formulation at both the NCA and CJCS levels. At the NCA level, the act required the president to "transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States."¹³⁰ The national security strategy report is to be submitted at the same time the president's budget is submitted. It is to contain,

. . . the national security strategy of the United States [including] a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:

(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.

(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.

(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1).

(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.

(5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.¹³¹

In adopting the language of this section of the act, Congress intended for the president to describe comprehensively the short and long-term national security strategies and to provide assessments of the risks associated with implementing the strategies. Congress could use the national security strategy reports to make better informed decisions regarding funding to support the various elements of national power.

An assessment of the national security strategy reports produced to date leads to the conclusion that they have not been

the comprehensive reports Congress intended. Their very general nature has prevented them from being more than broad statements of administration policies concerning national security.¹³² Consequently, their utility for enabling Congress to assess, approve, and modify fiscal programs to provide optimally balanced support of the instruments of national power has been limited. Without the integrated and substantive evaluation of the balance among the instruments of national power called for in the act, congressional efforts to support them necessarily will fractionate. For example, defense budgets largely have been debated and defended as separate and distinct issues, and not within the context of their contributions to synergy among all the instruments of national power.

Presidential decisions not to fully implement this section of the act are not surprising. First, to the extent the president commits to a specific and comprehensive national security strategy report, he yields flexibility in his ability to negotiate with Congress regarding budgets and programs. Second, the greater the specificity the president provides, the more control he relinquishes to Congress for shaping the resources allocated to support the various elements of national power. Third, the more specific the national security strategy, the more likely it will be at least partially invalidated by unforeseen geo-strategic developments. Finally, a very specific strategy, rigidly implemented, could preclude flexible foreign policy development and implementation. It is understandable that the president would seek to preserve his flexibility and minimize his vulnerability to criticism by submitting national security strategy reports that are sufficiently general to preclude invalidation and which provide for latitude in foreign policy.

Thus, the presidents' decisions not to implement fully the national security strategy provisions of the GNA can be at least partially explained by the constitutionally-created tension between the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government, a valued characteristic of American politics. Nonetheless, by producing very general reports, the president may provide greater opportunity for some members of Congress to use the defense budget to provide home states and districts ample supplies of defense "pork," even if it results in inefficient defense spending. On the other hand, it is not clear that if the president provided the specific and comprehensive national security strategy report prescribed by the act, he would be rewarded with more optimal funding for the national priorities he set forth. On the contrary, he might discover that by committing to specific national security objectives, a specific strategy for attaining them, and the precise capabilities required to effect the strategy, he may have to fight the budget battle with his hands bound by the very strategy report he submitted. A more general strategy can accommodate marginal changes without being

invalidated, a risk inherent to specific strategies.

The above considerations suggest that, the requirements of the GNA notwithstanding, the president should probably be allowed a certain amount of discretion over how much detail he provides in his national security strategy reports. This suggestion is supported by the fact that Congress has never refused to accept the general national security strategy reports submitted by the current and past presidents. The apparent absence, however, of congressional and presidential motivation for producing a more specific report does not necessarily serve the best interests of the nation. It could well be, as Congress believed when it passed the GNA, that a more specific report would result in more efficient application of national resources to national security needs.¹³³

Reluctance to address the specifics of strategy at the NCA level seems to have permeated to the level of military strategic planning as well. The GNA assigned the CJCS specific strategic and contingency planning responsibilities. With respect to strategic planning, he is to assist the NCA in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces and to prepare strategic plans which conform to resource guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense.¹³⁴

To assist the NCA in providing strategic direction, the chairman prepares a national military strategy.¹³⁵ In 1990, the chairman directed the revision of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) to incorporate "the appropriate statutory responsibilities of the Chairman . . . as delineated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986."¹³⁶ This revision called for a national military strategy contained within a larger document, entitled the *National Military Strategy Document (NMSD)*. The strategy set forth in the *NMSD* was classified, reasonably comprehensive, and specific. It consisted of approximately 50 pages of text that specified strategic objectives, assumptions, and priorities.¹³⁷ However, in 1992, the chairman significantly altered the content and format of the national military strategy. This new *National Military Strategy (NMS)* was (and remains) unclassified and widely distributed. In comparison to its predecessor, it read more like national military doctrine and policy set forth in approximately 10 pages of generalized narrative.¹³⁸ Although the chairman continues in other ways to assist the NCA in the strategic direction of the armed forces, the formal *NMS* contributes only in the most general sense to that process, notwithstanding the intent of the GNA.

The chairman provides for the preparation and review of contingency plans which conform to NCA policy guidance.¹³⁹ The chairman's translation of the policies set forth in the Secretary's *Contingency Planning Guidance* into specific planning

tasks for the CINCs is promulgated by the chairman's *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*. In response to the *JSCP*, the CINCs develop operation plans and submit them to the chairman for approval.¹⁴⁰ In addition to the operation plans deliberately developed in response to the planning tasks set forth in the *JSCP*, the CINCs, following a codified Crisis Action Planning (CAP) process, also develop plans for unanticipated contingencies. The chairman is also actively involved in CAP.¹⁴¹

Although the Joint Staff, in consultation with the services and combatant commands, continues to make improvements, the contingency planning processes effected by the chairman satisfy the requirements of the GNA. The translation of policy guidance into operation plans, using both the deliberate and crisis planning processes, was demonstrated prior to and after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Following the guidance provided by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 1989, USCINCCENT began planning for the defense of the Arabian Peninsula against a strong regional threat. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the CINC had completed a draft of Operation Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90. With the operational and tactical concepts, logistics concepts, and force requirements identified through deliberate planning, the CINC was able to apply the CAP process to convert the draft OPLAN into an executable plan that yielded excellent results.¹⁴²

In addition to providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans, the chairman is also required by the GNA to prepare strategic plans.¹⁴³ A strategic plan, global in scope, could guide the development of and integrate the regional and functional plans developed by the separate CINCs.¹⁴⁴ While the current planning processes enable the CINCs to develop sound regional plans, the chairman, due to his global responsibilities and perspective, is best situated to reconcile, rationalize, and orchestrate the CINCs' plans. The chairman's efforts in this regard must be more than merely compiling the CINCs' plans.¹⁴⁵ He should proactively set forth, in a global context, the priority of the specific objectives for the planning period, the national strategic concepts for attaining the objectives, and the national resources that will be applied, including how their application will be tailored to best serve the established priorities. By performing this strategy formulation role, the chairman could ensure that contingency planning better adheres to policy guidance and would be in a better position to provide strategic advice to the NCA.

Providing for More Efficient Use of Defense Resources.

To complement the chairman's increased strategic planning responsibilities, Congress designed several provisions of the GNA to enable the chairman to promote the efficient use of defense

resources. When combined, those provisions describe an integrated process for determining required military capabilities and ensuring their efficient provision. The process focuses on the identification, synthesis, and satisfaction of requirements identified by the CINCs. The chairman's role in the process is to solicit the CINCs' requirements, provide national level analyses of those requirements, assess the extent to which the proposed programs of the services efficiently satisfy the CINCs' requirements, and advise the NCA accordingly. Tools which the chairman can use to fulfill these responsibilities include the CINCs' *Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs)*, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the chairman's authority to evaluate the preparedness of the combatant commands,¹⁴⁶ and the Chairman's Current Readiness System.

Three additional provisions of the act also enabled the chairman to facilitate the efficient use of defense resources: his responsibility to develop doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces; his triennial responsibility to appraise the roles and functions assigned to the services; and his biennial responsibility to review the missions, responsibilities, and force structure of the combatant commands.¹⁴⁷ This section discusses the efficacy of the various tools that Congress provided to the chairman to enable him to ensure more efficient use of defense resources.

Determining Requirements. The act requires the chairman to solicit the requirements of the combatant commands, evaluate, integrate, and establish priorities for their requirements, and advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense with respect to their requirements, individually and collectively.¹⁴⁸ The secretary then should incorporate, as appropriate, the chairman's advice and recommendations into the written policy guidance he issues to DOD components for the preparation of programs and budgets.¹⁴⁹ This process should ensure that the services and other DOD components consider the requirements of the CINCs early on, as they develop their programs. Indeed, Congress intended that the chairman's assessment of program conformance to the CINCs' requirements would ensure that the services and other DOD components remained squarely focused on the CINCs' requirements.¹⁵⁰ Currently, there are two distinct vehicles by which the chairman can help determine the nation's requirements for specific military capabilities: the CINCS' *Integrated Priority Lists* and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

Integrated Priority Lists. The manner in which DOD identifies, evaluates, integrates, and assesses the requirements of the CINCs is not completely consistent with the model set forth in the act. First, the chairman does not formally solicit the CINCs' requirements. The most direct means by which the CINCS

communicate their most important requirements is by submission of their *Integrated Priority Lists* to the OSD Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, who formally requests them.¹⁵¹ The Joint Staff receives information copies. The GNA, however, clearly assigned the responsibility for soliciting the CINCs' requirements to the chairman, not to OSD.

An associated problem concerns the use of the *IPLs* once they are submitted. They are not rationalized at the Joint Staff or OSD level with any type of overarching strategic plan that might ascribe relative significance to the various requirements they contain. Without such a synthesis, it is difficult to establish an authoritative priority for the various requirements; thus, their efficacy in predetermining the contents of, or forcing changes to, Service programs is diminished. This allows the services to retain considerable autonomy in identifying military requirements and programming for compensating military capabilities.

A third problem is that, historically, the *IPLs* have not been timely. For example, the *IPLs* for fiscal years 1996-2001 (FY 96-01) were not submitted until mid-April 1994. By that time, the services were well along in the development of their recommended FY 96-01 Program Objective Memoranda (POMs),¹⁵² and it was too late to incorporate new requirements of the CINCs. The best the services could do was to compare the CINCs' *IPLs* to the services' draft program objectives and determine the extent to which they coincided with the CINCs' requirements. It is also difficult to see how the *IPLs* helped shape the up-front guidance provided to DOD components by the Secretary of Defense, given the *IPLs*' late submission.¹⁵³ The effect of these problems with *IPL* use and submission has been a lesser focus on the CINCs' definition of the requirements of their commands than Congress intended in passing the GNA.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The above conclusion is warranted, notwithstanding recent initiatives which expanded the role of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and inaugurated the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process.¹⁵⁴ The JWCA process assesses joint warfighting capabilities in nine areas, ranging from strike capabilities to warfighting readiness.¹⁵⁵ The assessments were intended to expose opportunities for improving warfighting effectiveness by identifying requirements, assessing readiness issues, addressing recapitalization issues, and developing resource recommendations.¹⁵⁶

Nine assessment teams were formed, each sponsored by a Joint Staff directorate. Although the CINCs are represented, the teams are composed almost exclusively of Joint Staff, OSD, and Service personnel. The teams submit recommendations to the JROC, which

decides the issues to be briefed to the CINCs and the recommendations which will ultimately be submitted to the chairman to assist him in formulating his advice to the Secretary of Defense. Because the JROC membership consists of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chiefs of the services, and the services are better represented than the CINCs on the JWCA teams, the services have more influence than the CINCs over military requirements determined by the JROC process.

The JROC resembles the pre-GNA JCS except the JROC consists of the vice chairman and vice chiefs of the services. It is supported by the Joint Staff similar to the pre-GNA JCS.¹⁵⁷ However, the JROC differs from the pre-GNA JCS in an important way; by design, it serves the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, it can remain consistent with the GNA so long as it does not become an independent entity wielding influence separate from that of the chairman, particularly with respect to his role as spokesman for the CINCs' requirements.

That concern can be alleviated, to some extent, by the chairman's interaction with the process. A case in point is the recent debate over Theater Missile Defense funding. The JROC recommended reduced funding for Theater Missile Defense. Additionally, the Service chiefs drafted a letter for the chairman's endorsement recommending that funding be reduced.¹⁵⁸ The chairman resisted endorsing the Service chiefs' position because the CINCs placed a high priority on Theater Missile Defense.¹⁵⁹ Thus, the chairman, in his capacity as spokesman for the CINCs, provided a counterbalance to the services.

On the other hand, the influence of the JROC could grow in a manner inconsistent with the intent of the GNA. It is noteworthy, for example, that the council recently testified before Congress. Its testimony was not confined to requirements for specific weapons systems but included advice about overall funding levels for force modernization and recommended personnel levels.¹⁶⁰ For reasons previously stated, the intent of the GNA was to improve the quality of military advice by transferring many JCS responsibilities to the chairman. It was not the intent of the act to permit the chairman to create a shadow JCS, at the vice chiefs level, to discharge the transferred responsibilities.

Presently, the JROC provides an effective forum through which the vice chairman, on behalf of the chairman, consults with the Service Chiefs through their vice chiefs. Nonetheless, if its recommendations¹⁶¹ depend more on the consensus of its membership than the integrated requirements of the CINCs, the JROC will not adhere to the intent of the GNA. One means of preventing JROC recommendations from becoming products of Service consensus is to ensure the primacy of the CINCs' stated requirements within the JROC process. If the chairman were to direct that the JROC must

consider the CINCs' *IPLs* as the principal input into the JWCA process and the basis of subsequent JROC deliberations, the requirements of the CINCs would likely drive the requirements determination process, thus furthering the intent of the GNA.

The chairman relies on the recommendations of the JROC when preparing the recently instituted *Chairman's Program Recommendation*.¹⁶² The chairman uses the *CPR* to influence the programming guidance the secretary provides to DOD components.¹⁶³ Additionally, after the secretary has issued his guidance and the DOD components have submitted their proposed programs, the chairman, as provided for in the GNA, assesses the extent to which the programs meet the requirements of the CINCs and the priorities established in strategic plans.¹⁶⁴ He provides his assessment to the Secretary of Defense via the *Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA)*. This report is also based on the JROC's recommendations, which are drawn largely from the JWCA's. While in the past the *CPA* had minimal impact due to lack of substance, the current chairman has begun to use it as Congress had intended.¹⁶⁵

The question is, however, do the *CPR* and the *CPA* adequately represent the requirements of the CINCs, given that both documents derive primarily from processes (JROC and JWCA) which do not use the CINCs' stated requirements as principal input and in which the combatant commands have limited involvement? An affirmative answer would be appropriate if the chairman would solicit, evaluate, and integrate the requirements of the CINCs via the *IPL* process, and ensure that the synthesized requirements serve as the foundation for the JROC's recommendations. The credibility of the *CPA*, the assessment of the extent to which the services' programs satisfy the CINCs' requirements, is necessarily limited by being based on the recommendations of a council composed of Service Vice Chiefs. Credibility can be assured only if it is certain that the requirements for military capability considered by the JROC focus on the requirements originally stated by the CINCs. Otherwise, the JROC might be accused of allowing the services to define the CINCs' requirements and then allowing the services to assess how well they satisfied the requirements they defined. That would be contrary to the intent of the GNA.

A second criticism of the *CPA* is that it does not assess DOD programs against the priorities established in strategic plans, as required by the GNA.¹⁶⁶ It is apparent that Congress intended for the chairman to provide a key synthesis of strategic military priorities, the requirements of the CINCs, and the programs designed to satisfy them.¹⁶⁷ Congress intended for the chairman to establish and maintain strategic plans harmonized with the defense planning period (2-8 years in the future) which would contain national-level military priorities. Those national priorities would not only assist the chairman in establishing

priorities for the requirements identified by the various CINCs, but would also provide an objective basis for assessing the services' POMs. The absence of such strategic plans denies the chairman one of the bases for conducting his assessment and prevents him from completely satisfying that provision of the act.

Preparedness of the Combatant Commands. The GNA further gave the chairman the responsibility for "[e]stablishing and maintaining, after consultation with the [CINCs], a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each [combatant] command to carry out missions assigned to the command."¹⁶⁸ The act also provided that the chairman should "[advise] the secretary on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities . . . identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans and [assess] the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans."¹⁶⁹

To effect these provisions, the chairman implemented the Preparedness Evaluation System (PES).¹⁷⁰ Under this recently abandoned system, the CINCs reported on the preparedness of their respective commands to carry out tasks assigned in the JSCP. They were also required to specify any significant force deficiencies identified during the development of their operation plans. The deficiencies reported would then serve as a basis for identifying military requirements that may necessitate programmatic action.¹⁷¹ The ultimate product of the PES was the biennial *Preparedness Assessment Report (PAR)* which was to contain the chairman's combined assessment of the preparedness of the combatant commands. Interestingly, of the three *PARs* produced, two did not go beyond the draft stage. The third was approved by the chairman but was not submitted to the Secretary of Defense.¹⁷²

The PES was based on self-evaluations by the combatant commands. The Joint Staff compiled and synthesized the reports submitted by the various commands and offered some general observations concerning overall preparedness. However, the Joint Staff made no effort to evaluate independently the preparedness of any combatant command. Nor did the Joint Staff assess the effect that force capability strengths and deficiencies identified via the PES had on accomplishing national security objectives or on executing strategic plans. Moreover, while the combatant commands reported their concerns and deficiencies, there was no effective process for translating those concerns into military requirements.

Another difficulty with the PES resulted from its asynchronous relationship with the DOD PPBS, the process by which military requirements become military capability. The PES attempted to identify requirements for military capability by

comparing current capability to currently assigned missions. If programmatic corrective action was required, the requirement had to be entered into the PPBS. However, the PPBS planning window is 2-8 years in the future, while the plans which exposed the deficiencies were near-term.¹⁷³ Consequently, if a deficiency identified via the PES resulted in programming action, there was a fair chance that, by the time the resulting military capability could be fielded, its need would have been obviated by changes in missions or in the geo-strategic environment. The DOD was vulnerable to accusations of fielding capabilities which were no longer required. Therefore, not only was the PES, as applied, of little use in evaluating the preparedness of the combatant commands to carry out assigned tasks, it had little utility for identifying the military requirements of the combatant commands. For these and other reasons, the PES was replaced in 1995 by the Chairman's Current Readiness System.

Chairman's Current Readiness System. Rising concern during 1993 and 1994 over the readiness of the United States' armed forces led to the development of a joint process for reporting and assessing force readiness.¹⁷⁴ The Chairman's Current Readiness System (CRS), codified in a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI), cited as its authority those sections of the Goldwater-Nichols Act previously cited by the PES as its authoritative basis.¹⁷⁵ Under the CRS, the services report the readiness of all major units and the CINCs report on their commands' readiness to integrate and synchronize forces to execute missions. This near-term process is based on current readiness reports and 12-months readiness forecasts.¹⁷⁶

The CRS has perpetuated, and perhaps exacerbated, the aforementioned limitations of the PES. Like the PES, the CRS allows each CINC to evaluate and report the preparedness of his command. However, unlike the PES, the new system limits the CINC's reporting to those functional areas that affect his ability to integrate and synchronize forces.¹⁷⁷ The services, on the other hand, report the readiness of the majority of the forces assigned to the combatant commands.¹⁷⁸ In doing so, the services are able to highlight the readiness issues of most concern to them, and the CINCs are not disposed to vet the services' reports.¹⁷⁹ Therefore, Service readiness issues could dominate this system that purports to evaluate the preparedness of the combatant commands to carry out assigned missions.

The foregoing assessments suggest that a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command to carry out its assigned missions, for identifying force capability strengths and deficiencies, and for assessing the effect those strengths and deficiencies have on national security objectives and strategic plans¹⁸⁰ has yet to be successfully implemented. Additionally, attempts to do so indicate that such a system would

be appropriate for identifying near-term risks to carrying out the national military strategy and could identify current force deficiencies. Those deficiencies should serve only as a point of departure for identifying requirements for future military capabilities. An effective preparedness evaluation system would have value to DOD and should be pursued.

Joint Doctrine. The GNA assigned the CJCS the responsibility for developing doctrine for the joint employment of U.S. armed forces.¹⁸¹ Joint doctrine can enhance the effective and efficient application of U.S. forces by clarifying and rationalizing the respective operational roles of the forces provided by the services. Joint doctrine can create synergies within joint forces that directly lead to increased operational capabilities at lower levels of committed resources.

Since passage of the GNA, the chairman has made great progress in developing a body of joint doctrine that does just that, and more is yet to come. Currently, about 100 joint doctrine publications are contemplated. That number will likely grow as needs for additional doctrine are identified. To date, 62 doctrinal manuals have been published, and 30 more are under development. They address topics ranging from the overall concept of joint warfare to the focused conduct of joint mortuary affairs.¹⁸² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, recently increased the impact of joint doctrine by directing that the qualifier that appears in all joint doctrine publications be changed from, "This publication is authoritative but not directive. . . ." to "The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, commanders will apply this doctrine. . . except when exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise."¹⁸³

General Shalikashvili also established the Joint Warfighting Center and charged it to broaden understanding of joint doctrine throughout the U.S. armed forces.¹⁸⁴ The chairman has implemented other measures to increase access to and understanding of joint doctrine. For example, he has begun the repackaging of joint doctrine publications into attractive, convenient, and easy-to-understand booklets and has distributed a *Joint Doctrine Professional Library Desk Set*. The set includes a CD ROM containing the *Joint Electronic Library*, a collection of all the approved joint doctrine publications, selected Service publications, and doctrine related research papers. The chairman also has made the library available on the Internet (<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/>).

While the development of joint doctrine has proceeded at an impressive pace, the development process and its products have been subject to some criticism. The criticism generally centered around the fact that the development process was consensus-based and analogous to the pre-GNA JCS system in that it fostered

watered-down, bland doctrine. There was also a perception that doctrine publications were biased by the parochial views of the services that were designated as the lead-agents for guiding the development of the various manuals. Since lead-agent responsibilities were distributed among the services, inconsistencies across doctrine publications arose.¹⁸⁵

The chairman has taken measures to improve the joint doctrine development process and thus the doctrine it produces. Notably, the Joint Warfighting Center has assumed a more assertive role in the management of joint doctrine development. It recently established the policy that early drafts of doctrine publications will be produced by joint working groups rather than by the services designated as lead agents.¹⁸⁶ That should preclude Service parochialism from gaining initial, and often enduring, footholds in joint doctrine manuals. Additionally, the Joint Warfighting Center will assist the development effort by establishing the joint perspective at the beginning and ensuring it is carried through to publication. In that capacity, the Joint Warfighting Center also will be in a position to help eliminate inconsistencies among joint doctrine publications. These initiatives and others will continue to improve the expanding body of joint doctrine.

Roles, Missions, Functions. Under the GNA, the CJCS must triennially review and recommend changes to the assignment of roles, missions, and functions to the components of the armed forces that may yield increased effectiveness and efficiency.¹⁸⁷ Since the act was passed, two formal reports have been published. The first, prepared under Admiral William Crowe, received little notice. The second, submitted by General Powell, received considerable criticism, not because it contained controversial recommendations but because it did not.¹⁸⁸ For the most part, the report endorsed the *status quo* and contributed little to the expected "peace dividend" because it did not identify ways to reduce significantly unnecessary duplication and redundancy among the services.¹⁸⁹

In response,¹⁹⁰ Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense establish an independent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM).¹⁹² Congress intended for the CORM to "review . . . the appropriateness . . . of the current allocations of roles, missions, and functions among the armed forces; evaluate and report on alternative allocations; and make recommendations for changes" ¹⁹²

After beginning its study, the CORM determined that Congress had given the commission the wrong mission and that its proper task was to assess how to better ensure that the CINCs are provided the capabilities they need to fulfill their missions.¹⁹³ Consequently, the CORM purposefully did not address the thorny

issues of roles, missions, and functions allocations.¹⁹⁴ Indeed, the vast majority of the CORM's recommendations had nothing to do with the allocation of roles, missions, and functions. Of those that did, many were already under study by DOD or in some stage of actual implementation. The CORM recommended that several other issues be studied further before being implemented. Only a few authentic, albeit relatively insignificant, recommendations concerning roles and functions were made and acted upon.¹⁹⁵

The current CJCS elected to endorse the CORM report rather than submit his own triennial report.¹⁹⁶ In short, since the GNA created the requirement for a triennial assessment and report on roles, missions, and functions, no significant additions, deletions, or reallocations have been recommended to Congress. One explanation could be that no significant changes are warranted. General Shalikashvili, however, has offered another possible explanation: such a task may be too difficult for DOD.¹⁹⁷ The latter explanation is consistent with the CORM's failure to recommend significant changes.¹⁹⁸ One may reasonably conclude that the Congressional intent regarding this subject, as expressed in the GNA, has yet to be fully implemented.

Unified Command Plan. One final provision of the act that influences the efficient use of defense resources warrants review. The act required the chairman, at least biennially, to "review the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of each combatant command and recommend to the [NCA] any changes . . . as may be necessary."¹⁹⁹ In fulfilling this responsibility, the current and two previous chairmen have performed biennial reviews of the *Unified Command Plan (UCP)*. The *UCP* is the document approved by the president that describes the unified command structure of the combatant commands.²⁰⁰ Since the end of the Cold War, various Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended several revisions of the plan.²⁰¹

The Commission on Roles and Missions suggested that additional changes to the *UCP* are necessary to support the new *National Security Strategy* and to conform to the post-Cold War strategic environment. Specifically, the CORM recommended changes that would enable the U.S. armed forces to adapt more rapidly to changing threat environments and to reduce seams between CINCs' areas of responsibility that straddle unstable areas.²⁰² The chairman's most recent biennial review, conducted after release of the CORM report, resulted in significant, but different, recommendations²⁰³ which were approved by the NCA.²⁰⁴ In any event, the chairman, like his predecessors, has complied with the letter and intent of the GNA.

Improving Joint Officer Management.

One of the more significant provisions of the GNA addressed "policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers of the . . . active duty list who are particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters" ²⁰⁵ These officers were to become skilled in "the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to national military strategy, strategic planning and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified command." ²⁰⁶ Through joint officer management measures, Congress intended to improve the quality of the Joint Staff as well as the quality of the CINCs' staffs. Former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci noted that Title IV of the GNA, *Joint Officer Management*, was "the most extensive legislation concerning joint officer personnel management in history and pose[d] the most complex implementation requirements since the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980." ²⁰⁷

To facilitate the development of "Joint Specialty Officers" (JSOs), Congress prescribed minimum requirements for the number of joint duty positions that must be filled by qualified JSOs, their education and tour of duty length, and promotion requirements for officers who have served or are serving in joint assignments. Implementation of those provisions has presented a daunting challenge to DOD. ²⁰⁸

Title IV's salient provisions included a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to publish a list of the joint duty positions within DOD and to ensure at least half were filled by JSOs or JSO nominees. Furthermore, he was to designate at least 1,000 critical joint duty assignment positions that could be held only by fully qualified JSOs. ²⁰⁹ By 1988, the secretary had published a list of 8,452 joint duty assignment positions, 1,000 of which were designated as critical. By 1995, the total number of joint positions had grown to 9,075. Although the number of positions designated as critical also grew between 1988 and 1993, former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney reduced it to the congressionally mandated 1,000 by 1994, where it has remained. ²¹⁰ This action reflects the challenge of filling critical positions with fully qualified JSOs. The difficulty stems, in large measure, from the time required to develop a JSO in accordance with the education and experience requirements specified by Congress.

Title IV of the GNA also provided that an officer may not be selected as a JSO until he/she attends a joint professional military education school and subsequently completes a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment. ²¹¹ In 1989 Congress elaborated on the educational requirement by specifying that a two-phase, sequenced approach be followed. Phase I instruction consists of a joint curriculum taught in addition to the principal curriculum

of Service colleges. Phase II consists of a follow-on, solely joint, curriculum taught at the Armed Forces Staff College to officers who are expected to be selected as JSOs.²¹² Presently, joint professional military education is not only institutionalized within the National Defense University but is also becoming a larger part of the curricula of comparable Service colleges;²¹³ all services provide Phase I instruction in their senior colleges.²¹⁴

Title IV also required the Secretary of Defense to establish a "Capstone Course" for newly appointed general and flag officers that would prepare them to work with the other services. The act required each officer selected for promotion to one-star rank to attend unless the officer's immediately preceding assignment was joint, there are no joint requirements for his/her field of expertise, or it would otherwise be in the best interest of the officer's Service that he/she not attend.²¹⁵ Of the 660 officers promoted to one-star rank over the past 5 years, only 45, or 7 percent, were waived from Capstone attendance, and, over the past 2 years, waivers have dropped to 2 percent.²¹⁶ As with the education of potential JSOs, DOD has effectively implemented the Congressional intent with respect to educating new flag officers.

Generally, DOD has also been successful in effecting the congressional intent that joint professional education be followed by the experience of a full joint duty assignment. The act defined a full joint duty tour as 3 years for flag officers and 3 1/2 years for all others.²¹⁷ In subsequent legislation, Congress redefined the full tour as 2 years for flag officers and 3 years for all others.²¹⁸ The act gave the Secretary of Defense the authority to waive tour length requirements for any officer so long as the average tour length for both categories of officers met or exceeded the 2 and 3-year standards. Additionally, the secretary could authorize tour lengths as short as 2 years for officers who had critical operational specialties involving combat.²¹⁹

Over the past 5 years, average joint tour lengths have exceeded the requirements of the act. However, in the case of flag officers, two of the services have exceeded the average joint tour length requirement, while two have failed to meet it.²²⁰ This notwithstanding, DOD as a whole has achieved the stability in joint duty tours intended by Congress.

In Title IV of the act, Congress also set forth a method for assessing whether the services assigned highly capable officers to joint duty. The method was based on the expectation that if high quality officers were, in fact, assigned to joint duty, their promotion rates should match or exceed those of officers not performing joint duty. Specifically, the act provided that officers serving or having served on the Joint Staff are expected

to be promoted at a rate not less than that for officers who are or have served on the staffs of the services. Also, officers who are serving or have served on other joint staffs are expected to be promoted at a rate not less than that for non-joint officers within the same competitive category. The act required the Secretary of Defense immediately to notify Congress if promotion rates for any selection board failed to meet the congressional expectations and to identify any remedial actions the secretary had taken or planned to take.²²¹

DOD's record in meeting the congressional expectations has been mixed, with sharp contrasts among the services. Over the past 5 years, the U.S. Air Force failed to meet joint officer promotion expectations for the ranks of colonel through major general on four occasions. For comparable ranks, the U.S. Navy failed to meet joint officer promotion expectations on one occasion. The U.S. Army, for comparable ranks, failed to meet joint officer promotion expectations on nine occasions, and the U.S. Marine Corps failed on 11 occasions. This record suggests that the implementation of the joint officer promotion provisions of the act requires continued DOD emphasis, but it also points to systemic problems yet to be overcome.

One explanation for why officers who serve, or have served, in joint assignments are less competitive for promotion to general relates to the varied promotion policies of the services. In the Army, for example, generally, superior performance alone will not result in promotion to general. In most cases, an officer also must have served in qualifying Service positions such as battalion command, key staff, and brigade (colonel-level) command. In short, it is difficult for an officer to become educated as a joint specialty officer, serve in joint duty assignments, and still attain the Service prerequisites for promotion to general.²²²

Exacerbating this situation is the fact that officers are often assigned to perform joint duty at the point in their careers when they are in critical competition for colonel-level command.²²³ Since they are obligated to serve in the joint position for 3 years, or 2 years with a waiver, they are rendered less competitive during that time for Service command selection. A delay of even a year in being selected for colonel-level command means an entirely new year-group of officers is added to the joint staff officer's competitive pool. Thus, the manner in which a Service implements the act's joint staff officer provisions can influence whether the congressional intent is realized or whether quality officers will be discouraged from seeking joint assignments.

Overall, DOD has made significant progress in implementing the complex joint officer management provisions of the act.

However, implementation has been imperfect in some respects. This has been due primarily to the act's joint staff officer management provisions' incompatibility with the promotion and command selection systems of some of the services.

CONCLUSIONS

The DOD has substantially, but not completely, implemented the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The provisions that were intended to strengthen civilian authority over the armed forces have been embedded within the DOD structure and processes. The promulgation of *Defense Planning Guidance* by the Secretary of Defense has increased his authority over the development of programs by DOD components, but the act's requirement that the secretary provide new planning guidance annually is ill-advised, and the recent trend of producing a new guidance document annually denies DOD components needed stability in program development. Major annual adjustments in planning guidance will likely result in planning and programming inefficiencies and decreased effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces. Finally, if the *DPG* were based more directly on the *Integrated Priority Lists* submitted by the CINCs and contained more specific program priorities and guidance, the services could develop programs that more efficiently satisfy the requirements of the CINCs.

As a result of the GNA, the Secretary of Defense and his designated representatives have become thoroughly involved in deliberate and crisis contingency planning. Not only has this strengthened civilian authority over the armed forces, it has also brought about increased dialogue between senior civilian and military leaders concerning the planning for potential or imminent operations. The result has been better comprehension by civilian leaders of the risks associated with various operation plans and a concomitant increase in understanding by military senior leadership of the support civilian leaders may lend to various operations.

The GNA has improved the quality and the usefulness of the military advice provided to the NCA, particularly the provisions of the act that increased the authority and responsibilities of the CJCS. The present relationship between the chairman and the NCA conforms to the intent of the GNA. However, evidence suggests that the chairman's position may have grown too strong in the eyes of the Service Chiefs. The chairman can relieve their concern by consulting them more frequently and enforcing Joint Staff procedures designed to ensure adequate opportunities for Service staff review of pertinent issues. That would have the collateral benefit of enhancing the advice the chairman provides to the NCA.

The act has not been fully implemented with respect to

improving strategy formulation. The national security strategy reports produced by successive presidents since passage of the act have not been consistent with the act's requirements. They have not been sufficiently comprehensive and specific. Although neither Congress nor the president appears concerned about the vagueness of the reports, the nation would benefit from the type of report specified in the GNA.

Likewise, the act's provision for military strategic planning has not been fully implemented. The chairman does not prepare the type of strategic plans called for in the act. He provides for the preparation and review of contingency plans via the JSCP. But without the benefit of an overarching strategic plan, the effective national level integration of the CINCs' contingency planning is problematic. Similarly, the evaluation and integration of the CINCs' requirements at the national level and the synthesized assessment of the services' programs are less coherent because they lack the substantial basis an overarching national military strategic plan would provide.

Implementation of the act expanded the authority and responsibility of the CINCs, but not to the extent intended by Congress. Congress' attempt to specify a single chain of command has not completely resolved the competition between the chains of command to the services and combatant commands. Two chains exist today except that they are called "branches" of the chain of command. A single chain of command does not reflect reality. The services must exercise command over the forces that are not assigned to the combatant commands. The competition between the two chains that still exists at the Service component level causes the CINCs' command of the Service component commanders to be diluted. That helps perpetuate the limited control the CINCs have over resources provided to the commands by the services.

The real authority exercised by the CINCs is determined, largely, by the extent to which the CJCS acts as their spokesman. If he is a consistent advocate for the CINCs, their real influence will increase. If he is more consistently influenced by the Service Chiefs, the real authority of the CINCs will be diminished. Thus, the manner in which the chairman performs his duties is the critical determinant of the relationship between the CINCs and the Service Chiefs. There are indications that the chairman could be a stronger advocate for the CINCs, while still consulting more frequently with the Service Chiefs. He must ensure the CINCs' interests are protected within the Service-dominated JROC, that the Service Chiefs do not encroach upon the authorities of the CINCs, and that the services program and spend their training funds to support the CINCs' joint training and exercise requirements. However, the chairman must also ensure the Service Chiefs are afforded the authority and latitude they need to perform efficiently the 12 Service functions.

Contrary to the intent of the act, the services have retained dominant influence in the military requirements determination process. The JROC improved the joint rationalization of military requirements, but has yet to achieve the focus on the CINCs' requirements intended by Congress. The *Chairman's Program Recommendation* and the *Chairman's Program Assessment* are more influenced by the services than by the CINCs. The CINCs' involvement in the JROC is limited and the chairman does not formally solicit, evaluate, integrate, and establish priorities for their requirements. Additionally, the CINCs are not well represented within the JWCA process. Combined, these factors have frustrated the intent of the GNA. If Service programs are to be effectively rationalized by the Secretary of Defense in this era of reduced resource availability, the CJCS must provide useful advice to the secretary. It must be based on his integration, evaluation, and synthesis of the CINCs' requirements which, consequently, provide the unifying basis for the Future Years Defense Program.

An effective system for evaluating the preparedness of the combatant commands, identifying force capability strengths and deficiencies, and assessing the impact of the strengths and deficiencies has yet to be developed and implemented.

The CJCS has developed a robust body of joint doctrine that, *inter alia*, harmonizes and rationalizes the operational roles of forces provided by the services. In doing so, joint doctrine facilitates effective and efficient application of defense resources. The chairman's recent initiatives will improve both the form and substance of joint doctrine, making it better understood and even more effective. The congressional intent regarding joint doctrine has been accomplished.

The lack of any significant reallocations of roles and functions since passage of the GNA indicates that either the roles and functions of the armed forces are optimally distributed or have yet to receive the critical review Congress had intended. The establishment of the congressionally mandated CORM suggests the latter to be the case, and that Congress' intent with respect to the triennial review of the roles, missions, and functions of the armed forces generally has not been realized.

The congressional intent for periodic reviews of the missions, responsibilities, and force structures of the combatant commands has been realized. Successive Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have conducted biennial reviews, and several significant revisions of the UCP have resulted. The DOD's implementation of the joint officer management provisions of the GNA has been generally successful. An effective joint professional military education system has been established, the

quality of joint staff officers has generally improved, and the percentage of general/flag officers with joint experience or training has increased. However, problems remain. Two services have failed to meet the act's prescribed minimum joint tour lengths for flag officers. Additionally, all of the services, on occasion, have failed to meet the joint officer promotion requirements of the GNA. There is evidence that the joint education and assignment requirements of the GNA may, in fact, inhibit an officer's potential for promotion to flag rank.

SUMMARY

The result of DOD's implementation of the GNA has been continued evolution toward unified armed forces. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and the services are arriving at a balanced relationship in which civilian authority is supreme. The lively debate that accompanied the recent Commission on Roles and Missions deliberations demonstrated that the services are still distinct and independent, despite certain movement toward unified operations and joint organizations. Implementation of the act has not resulted in the combatant commands gaining as much, nor the services losing as much, influence as Congress intended, particularly within the resource management area. Service parochialism has been significantly mitigated but still exists. An admiral assigned to the Joint Staff summed-up the current situation when he said, "I may wear a purple suit, but it is still double-breasted." Increased effectiveness and greater efficiencies are possible through further implementation of the act. However, the DOD must ensure that the services are not so reduced in stature and influence that they lose their motivations and abilities to compete for scarce defense resources and accomplish their other national security roles and functions. Determining which portions of the act require more strict implementation and what supplementary legislation is required to achieve the increases in effectiveness and efficiency Congress anticipated are the relevant issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Congress should insist that presidents produce national security strategy reports that are as comprehensive and specific as the act requires.

- The Secretary of Defense should promote stability in defense program planning by reverting to a biennial *Defense Planning Guidance* publication cycle. Congress should amend the Goldwater-Nichols Act to permit biennial publication.

- The Secretary of Defense should establish policy to ensure that the chairman adequately consults with the other members of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress should amend the act to instruct the chairman to consult the other members of the JCS on all issues with potential impact on the services, while allowing him to remain unbound by such consultation.

- The Secretary of Defense should conduct a review of the relationship of the CINCs to their Service component commanders and the latter's relationship to their Service Chiefs. The review should affirm the chain of command from the NCA to the CINCs and develop a concept for the chain of command that runs from the NCA through the military departments. Congress should amend the GNA to recognize, define, and describe both chains of command.

- The Secretary of Defense should establish policy that a certain percentage of Service OPTEMPO funding be dedicated to joint training and exercises. Congress should revise the GNA expressly authorizing the secretary to do so.

- The chairman should develop national military strategic plans keyed to the Future Years Defense Program periods.

- The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the GNA, should transfer responsibility for administering the *Integrated Priority List* process to the chairman from the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The chairman should restructure the process so that it focuses on specific capabilities needed rather than particular programs, and should use the *IPLs* as the primary basis for determining military requirements.

- The chairman should develop and implement a system for evaluating the preparedness of the combatant commands that does not rely on self-evaluations by the commands. The system should identify force strengths and deficiencies as well as assess their impact on accomplishing national security objectives and on strategic plans.

- As the Joint Warfighting Center matures, the chairman should continue to increase its oversight of the joint doctrine development process.

- If it is the sense of Congress that significant changes in the roles and functions of the U.S. armed forces are required, it should establish its own commission to identify needed changes and propose appropriate legislation.

- The Secretary of Defense should continue to emphasize full implementation of the joint officer management provisions of the GNA with the objective of bringing all services into compliance.

- Congress should add language to the act which would ensure

officers are not rendered less competitive for promotion for having received joint education and having served in joint assignments.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization and the Need for Change*, Staff Report, 99th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985, p. 49.

2. Unified operations are those that take place within the unified combatant commands which are composed of forces from two or more military departments. Unified operations is the generic term used to describe the wide scope of actions that take place under the direction of the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) of the unified combatant commands. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 23, 1994, p. 400.

3. Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, *The Department of Defense; Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978*, edited by Alice C. Cole, et. al., Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 7.

4. *Defense Organization and The Need for Change*, pp. 49-53.

5. Although some of the early proponents of unification advocated such a radical reorganization, that option has not been seriously considered since at least 1949. Lawrence J. Korb, "Service Unification: Arena of Fears, Hopes, and Ironies," *Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review*, 1976, p. 176.

6. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, p. 3. The provisions of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act have been codified in *Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces*. Several provisions have been modified by subsequent legislation; however, none have been deleted or significantly altered. Therefore, an assessment of the act's implementation, based on the provisions of the act itself is appropriate.

7. Korb, pp. 178-179. Generally, the belief is that to the extent a unified armed forces would speak with one voice, Congress would be less able to uncover and debate divergent views on critical defense issues. That, in turn, would inhibit

congressional ability to oversee the armed forces reasonably.

8. *Defense Organization and The Need for Change*, p. 50.

9. *The Department of Defense; Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978*, pp. 77-80.

10. *Defense Organization and the Need for Change*, p. 52. The 1949 Amendment also removed the secretaries of the military services from the National Security Council. *The Department of Defense; Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978*, pp. 84-86.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

12. The President and the Secretary of Defense make up the National Command Authorities (NCA). *Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, p. 253.

13. *The Department of Defense; Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978*, pp. 94-95.

14. *Defense Organization and The Need for Change*, pp. 52-53.

15. *The Department of Defense; Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978*, pp. 161-162.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 239-241. The fundamental underlying rationale for the continued movement toward unification was the belief that independent military departments and services resulted in unnecessary duplication and waste. Centralized direction and control, on the other hand, promised better rationalization of the acquisition and application of forces, leading to increased effectiveness and efficiency.

17. Paul B. Ryan, *The Iranian Rescue Mission, Why it Failed*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985, p. 6.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-43; Gregory P. Gass, *Command and Control: the Achilles Heel of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission*, Alexandria, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, February 13, 1992, p. 11.

20. "Joint" connotes activities, operations, and organizations in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate. *Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, p. 200.

21. Gass, pp. 11-18.

22. Ryan, pp. 12-16, 28-30, 125.
23. Gass, pp. 1-26.
24. Ryan, pp. 1-2.
25. Howard Husock, *Seige Mentality: ABC, the White House and the Iran Hostage Crisis*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government Case Program, 1988, pp. 1-22; Ryan, pp. 95-99.
26. Ryan, p. 105. The release of the hostages on January 20, 1981, within minutes of President Ronald Reagan's inauguration, did not assuage congressional concern.
27. U.S. Department of Defense, Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Attack, *Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act*, Washington, DC, October 23, 1983, pp. 1-34.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-34.
29. On February 7, 1984, President Reagan announced the redeployment of the Marines, and on March 30, 1984, he reported to Congress that the United States was no longer involved in the multinational force in Lebanon. Gary M. Stern and Morton Halperin, *The U.S. Constitution and the Power to Go to War*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984, p. 68.
30. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, *Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in Beirut. Summary of Findings and Conclusions of the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*, Staff Report, 99th Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983, pp.1-3.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-70.
32. In an address to the nation on October 27, 1983, President Reagan suggested a direct relationship between the Beirut bombing and the invasion of Grenada. "When Threatened, We Stand Shoulder to Shoulder," *The Washington Post*, October 28, 1983, p. A14.
33. Reynold A. Burrowes, *Revolution and Rescue in Grenada*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 71-75; "Secrets From the Reagan Years," *Newsweek*, October 30, 1995, p. 6.
34. Although planning for the Grenada invasion was underway by October 14th, the President did not give his approval for the

operation until October 24th. William C. Gilmore, *The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation*, New York: Facts on File, 1984, pp. 31-36.

35. Burrowes, pp. 79-80.

36. In an April 1984 report to the Congressional Military Reform Caucus, William S. Lind, of the Military Reform Institute, made the following observation:

The United States required seven battalions of troops, plus elements of two other battalions, to defeat fewer than 700 Cubans and a Grenadian army that hardly fought at all. Only about 200 of the Cubans were troops; the remainder were construction workers with some militia training. The overwhelmingly superior U.S. forces took three days to defeat the Cuban defense and about another five days to secure the entire island. By way of contrast, the British defeated more than 11,000 Argentines with just eight infantry battalions in the Falklands.

In addition to criticizing the disappointing performance of special operations and U.S. Army units, Lind cited deficient military planning and the insistence of the JCS that all four services be involved ("just as in the Iran hostage rescue mission"). William S. Lind, *Report to the Congressional Military Reform Caucus, Subject: The Grenada Operation*, Washington, DC: Military Reform Institute, 1984, pp. 2-5.

37. Fred Hiatt, "Many U.S. Casualties Caused by Accidents," *The Washington Post*, November 1, 1983, p. 1.

38. Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury, the Battle for Grenada*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989, pp. 221-230, 333-342.

39. Lind, pp. 2-5.

40. Burrowes, pp. 82-83.

41. *Defense Organization and The Need for Change*, p. 13.

42. *Ibid.*, p. III.

43. The acquisition process is the process by which requirements for military capabilities are converted into defense acquisition programs which yield fielded capabilities.

44. *Defense Organization and The Need for Change*, pp. 1-12.

45. David Packard, *A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to the President by the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management*, Washington, DC, June 1986, p. 1.

46. David Packard, letter dated June 30, 1986, transmitting to President Reagan the final report of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management.

47. Packard, *A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to the President by the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management*, pp. xvii-xviii.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. xvii-xxx. In the interest of brevity and since they are not central to an assessment of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, the specific recommendations concerning acquisition reform and government-industry accountability are not provided in this study.

49. Michael Ganley, "Reorganization Bill Almost Certain to Reach the President's Desk This Year," *Armed Forces Journal International*, Vol. 123, No. 10, April 1986, p. 16.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-18; Michael Ganley, "DOD Reorganization Bill Sweeps Through Senate on Unanimous Vote," *Armed Forces Journal International*, Vol. 123, No. 12, June 1986, pp. 14-16.

51. Then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger believed that congressionally mandated reorganization of the Department of Defense was unnecessary and that any increase in the influence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff would be at the expense of the Secretary of Defense. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Tidal McCoy believed that the DOD was already too centralized and that the service secretaries needed more, not less, autonomy. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman claimed that the Executive Branch had been worshipping "at the alter of the false idols of centralization and unification" for the past 30 years. Bryan Howard Ward, *United States Defense Reorganizations: Contending Explanations*, Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, 1995, pp. 324-327.

52. Although prior to establishing the Packard Commission in mid-1985 President Reagan considered defense reorganization an issue to be handled by the Secretary of Defense, his formation of the commission and rapid approval of its recommendations evinced his belief that reform was necessary. Ward, pp. 324-327.

53. On May 7, 1986, the Senate approved its version of the reorganization bill by a vote of 95 to 0. On August 5, 1986, the House approved its version by a vote of 406 to 4. It seemed that in the entire Congress, only four members did not support the type of reform under consideration. U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress, 2d Session*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 16,

1986, p. S12652; U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress, 2d Session*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 17, 1986, pp. H7005-H7008.

54. The conference met formally on August 13, and September 11, 1986. While over 100 amendments were considered, there were only three substantive areas that required resolution, and they were easily resolved. Senator Goldwater characterized the conference as the most cordial and cooperative in his memory. *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress, 2d Session*, September 17, 1986, p. H7005; *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress, 2d Session*, September 16, 1986, pp. S12652-S12653.

55. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 3.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

57. Prior to passage of the GNA, the Secretary of Defense promulgated a similar document, the *Defense Guidance (DG)*. The DPG which resulted from the GNA has proven to be a more authoritative document. For a description of the discontinued *DG*, see *Department of Defense Instruction 7045.7*, Subject: Implementation of the Planning, Programing and Budgeting System (PPBS), Gaithersburg, MD: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1984, p. 2-1.

58. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Department of Defense Directive 7045.14, Subject: The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)*, Change 1, July 28, 1990, p. 3.

59. The actual fiscal guidance upon which DOD components base their programs, for convenience, is not included in the *DPG* but provided in a separate document.

60. The type of review the BUR represented would have normally been conducted using the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The reason given for not using the established JSPS was that the Secretary of Defense wanted to be able to affect the FY 95 budget and the formal JSR timeline was too long. However, the *Report of the Bottom-Up Review* was not published until October 1993. The JSR could have produced a report months earlier.

61. Contingency planning is the deliberate and crisis oriented operation planning conducted by the CINCs. Unlike DOD's program planning that addresses the mid-range planning period, contingency planning is for potential near-term operations that

may be conducted during the next 2 years. Contingency planning considers the best ways to use existing military capabilities while program planning helps develop future capabilities.

62. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 5.*

63. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

64. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Defense Reorganization, Compliance with Legislative Mandate for Contingency Planning*, GAO/NSIAD-91-312, Gaithersburg, MD, September, 1991, *passim*.

65. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Memorandum of Policy No. 7, Joint Strategic Planning System*, 1st Rev., Washington, DC, March 17, 1993, p. VII-3.

66. Edward N. Luttwak asserts that presidential appointees are not allowed to examine contingency plans and that the plans may be reviewed only by a small cell of selected officials who have been extended the "privilege" by the Joint Staff. ("Washington's Biggest Scandal," *Commentary*, May, 1994, p. 31.) This comment is misleading, if not inaccurate. The Goldwater-Nichols Act provides that the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) will assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and in actually reviewing the plans. (*Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 7*). To implement this provision of the Act, the Secretary of Defense has authorized the USD(P), and other members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to review contingency plans. Based on this authorization by the Secretary, the Joint Staff provides the plans for review by the appropriate OSD officials.

67. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 5.*

68. *Defense Organization and The Need for Change*, p. 158. The President and the Secretary of Defense make up the National Command Authorities (NCA). *Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, p. 253.

69. *Defense Organization and The Need for Change*, p. 159.

70. *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress, 2d Session, October 3, 1985, p. S12535.*

71. *Ibid.*, pp. S12533-12534.

72. Packard, *A Quest for Excellence*, p. 35.
73. *Ibid.*; Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 17, 15, 19 and 94, respectively.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 30. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components*, Washington, DC, September 25, 1987, p. 6.
76. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 18.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 19, and 23, respectively.
82. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.
83. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," *passim*; Colin Powell, John Lehman, William Odom and Samuel Huntington, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest*, Summer, 1994, *passim*.
84. Luttwak, p. 29.
85. Powell, *et. al.*, pp. 23-25.
86. Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control, the Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest*, Spring, 1994, p. 11.
87. For example, General John Shalikashvili did, in fact, assess the programs of the services and offered alternative program recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. General Colin Powell stopped short of actually criticizing the services' programs and his assessment, only a page in length, essentially said that they were all satisfactory.
88. Kohn, p. 11.
89. Powell, *et. al.*, p. 23.

90. Kohn, p. 9.

91. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 18. In part, section 153 of the act requires the Chairman to submit to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

93. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Interim Report to Congress*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991, pp. 26-1, 26-2.

94. *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress, 2d Session*, September 16, 1986, p. S12655.

95. *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress, 2d Session*, September 17, 1986, p. H7006.

96. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5711.01, *Policy on Action Processing*, Washington, DC, July 12, 1993, pp. 2-3.

97. This is based on discussions with Joint Staff officers who have had access to the JCS meeting schedules. Also, the office of the Special Assistant to the Chairman for Joint Matters, which was charged to manage such meetings, has been eliminated.

98. "Blue Mundy," *Wall Street Journal*, January 2, 1995, p. A-1.

99. The Joint Staff developed the report for the current chairman without the normal lower-level coordination with the services. The Chairman provided the Service Chiefs with a copy of the finished report 24 hours before he was to provide it to the Secretary of Defense. This left the Service Chiefs with insufficient time to have their staffs assess the adequacy and fairness of the report from a Service perspective. According to Joint Staff officers involved in preparing the CPR, the Chairman submitted the report to the Secretary without consulting the Service Chiefs because he considered the report to be personal correspondence between him and the Secretary. (Nonattribution interview with a senior Joint Staff officer familiar with the preparation and submission of the CPR.)

100. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to*

Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, p. xxv.

101. A unified command is a command with broad continuing missions under a single commander and composed of forces from two or more military departments. A specified command is a command that has broad continuing missions and is normally composed of forces from a single military department. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, Washington, DC, February 24, 1995, p. xv. Although presently no specified commands exist, their creation remains provided for in *Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces*, and the UNAAF recognizes their viability.

102. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 24. During the joint conference, a Senate amendment was introduced that would have had the act specify the basic CINC responsibilities such as security of the command, mission accomplishment, and directing coordination among subordinates. The conferees determined the general responsibilities of the CINCs would be better promulgated by administrative regulation, and they have been via the Unified Command Plan.

103. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 24-25.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

106. *Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces*, p. III-5.

107. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 23.

108. *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 56, 68. The 12 functions are: recruiting; organizing; supplying; equipping; training; servicing; mobilizing; demobilizing; administering; maintaining; construction outfitting and repair of military equipment; and construction, maintenance, and repair of real property.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

110. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 24. For example, the Chairman is responsible for soliciting, evaluating, integrating, and establishing priorities for the CINCs' requirements and advising the Secretary

of Defense accordingly.

112. *Ibid.*, pp. 47, 56, 69.

113. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress*, pp. 91-92.

114. If, after passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Air Force was to maintain a Directorate of Plans for Warfighting Concepts, it seems that the directorate should have been primarily concerned with developing plans to support the CINC's concept of operations, not in developing a war-fighting concept of its own. The Air Force should not be singled out in this regard; the other services, at one time or another, have also encroached upon the authority and responsibility of the CINCs. It should also be noted that USCINCCENT had the final authority to accept or reject the operation planning conducted by the Air Staff. The point here is that this type of warfighting planning should have been performed by the CINC's staff in collaboration with the CENTAF staff (the CINC's Air Force component).

115. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66. Also note that the GNA assigned the Chairman responsibility for preparing strategic plans. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 17.

116. *Defense Organization and The Need for Change*, p. 309 (quoting *Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces*).

117. *Ibid.*, pp. 307-317.

118. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 23-24.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

120. *Ibid.*, pp. 121-122.

121. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

122. The GNA expressly permits the Secretary of Defense to overrule a CINC's objection to the assignment of an officer if the Secretary determines such action to be in the national interest. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

123. This concern is somewhat mitigated by the GNA's requirement that the Secretary of Defense provide a Chairman's evaluation of an officer's joint duty performance for all recommendations to the President for appointments to lieutenant general, vice admiral, general, or admiral. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

124. *Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces*, p. I-7.

125. The GNA assigned the Service Secretaries "authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department . . .," and specified that Service Chiefs would "exercise supervision, consistent with the authority assigned to [CINCs]" The GNA did not provide a more complete description of the channel of authority that runs to and through the military departments. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 46, 53. Nevertheless, S3074 of *Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces* provides that a Service Secretary may create "commands" and assign officers to those commands.

126. John P. White, *Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces*, Washington, DC, May 24, 1995, pp. 2-4. The Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) found that "[t]he CINCs must have greater influence over the processes and priorities used to acquire the weapons, equipment, and forces they need to accomplish their warfighting and other missions"

127. The membership of the JROC includes the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (chairman) and the vice chiefs of the services (members). The purpose of the JROC is to assist the CJCS in evaluating, validating, and establishing priorities for military capability requirements. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *MCM-76-95, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council*, Washington, DC, February 7, 1995, pp. 1-4.

128. A staff officer with the Joint Exercises and Training Division of the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate of the Joint Staff (the division responsible for coordinating joint training and exercises with the combatant commands.) reported that the CINCs are currently funded for some transportation and incidental costs only, and that they must rely on the services' training (or OPTEMPO) funds to conduct joint training or exercises.

129. White, *Directions for Defense*, pp. 2-8.

130. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 88.

131. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

132. Don M. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March, 1995, pp. 9-10, 14; U.S. Congress,

Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *National Security Strategy, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate*, 100th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 1054.

133. Congressional expectations were summarized by Senator John Warner when he said "[t]he National Security Strategy Report should become the foundation document for Members of Congress as we measure the value and relevance of individual programs ranging from Pentagon spending to foreign assistance. It will enable those of us in Congress to assess how each of these programs contribute to our overall national and military strategies and foreign policy." *National Security Strategy, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate*, p. 1052.

134. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 19.

135. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Memorandum of Policy No. 7, Joint Strategic Planning System*, 1st Revision, March 17, 1993, Washington, DC, p. I-2.

136. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Memorandum of Policy No. 7, Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington, DC, January, 1990, p. 1.

137. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: National Military Strategy Document FY 92-97, JSSM-162-89*, Washington, DC, September 21, 1989, *passim*.

138. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States*, Washington, DC, January 1992, pp. 5-16. The *National Military Strategy* does not focus on what must be done specifically to protect or promote U.S. interests, but addresses the types of activities in which the United States should engage to pursue its interests and why those activities are important. The national military strategies that have been published starting in 1992 have followed the new, unclassified format.

139. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 17.

140. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *User's Guide for JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System)*, Washington, DC, May 1, 1995, pp. 10-13.

141. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

142. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, Final Report to Congress, pp. 32-33.

143. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 17.

144. Recalling the Packard Commission's charge that the NCA requires better integration of the efforts of the CINCs, it seems logical that the Chairman should provide this integration, in part, through the development of overarching strategic plans harmonized with the 6-year defense planning periods. For a more complete discussion of the need for a national military strategic plan, see Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September, 1995, pp. 14-32.

145. For an explanation of why the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is not, as its title might imply, a strategic plan as defined by the GNA, see Lovelace and Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus*, pp. 16-17.

146. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 21.

147. *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 22.

148. *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 24.

149. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

150. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

151. U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, *Memorandum for the Commanders-In-Chief of the Unified Commands, Subject: Submission of the FY 1996-2001 Integrated Priority Lists*, Washington, DC, March 2, 1994, pp. 1-2.

152. Each military department submits a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to the Secretary of Defense, nominally every 2 years. A POM contains all the programs a military department proposes to the Secretary of Defense for approval, given the fiscal guidance previously provided by the Secretary. As the POMs are collectively reviewed within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reconciliation occurs. This typically results in modification of the POMs.

153. This conclusion is reached with the understanding that the *FY 1996-2001 Defense Planning Guidance* was not published until May 23, 1994, 5 weeks after the IPLs were submitted. When

asked how the Secretary can issue the *DPG* in late May and expect its guidance to be reflected in the POMs submitted the following month, OSD officials explained that concurrent planning on the part of the services and OSD reveals the substance of the guidance much earlier than the formal publication date of the *DPG*. There is difficulty in extending that reasoning to the *IPLs*. One might postulate that the concurrent planning conducted by the services and their components within the combatant commands informs the services of the CINCs' requirements long before the formal *IPLs* are submitted. Even if that were true, the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act would not be accommodated. Relying upon the service components to identify the CINCs' requirements (and then filter them through the services' headquarters before they are reflected in the POMs) does not achieve the focus on the requirements of the CINCs vice the desires of the services that Congress intended, nor does it provide the CJCS the opportunity, *a priori*, to integrate and establish priorities among the CINCs' requirements.

154. *MCM-76-95, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, passim.*

155. Currently, the nine assessment areas are: strike; ground maneuver; strategic mobility and its protection; air superiority; deter/counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; command and control and information warfare; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; overseas presence; and joint warfighting readiness.

156. *MCM-76-95, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, pp. 1-2.*

157. The JROC Secretariat is provided by the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) of the Joint Staff. The Secretariat, *inter alia*, provides administrative support to the JROC, coordinates and integrates Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments (JWCAs), promulgates JROC decisions, and coordinates actions of the Joint Staff in its support of the JROC. Additionally, the Joint Staff provides the JWCA sponsors. *MCM-76-95, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, pp. 4-5.*

158. Daniel G. Dupont, "Shalikashvili Balks at Chiefs' Letter on Missile Defense Spending Cuts," *Inside the Army*, January 8, 1996, p. 3.

159. *Ibid.*

160. Rowan Scarborough, "For the Bang, Brass Want Bigger Bucks," *Washington Times*, March 28, 1996, p. 4.

161. One of the functions of the JROC is to support the Vice Chairman in his role as Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The JROC also validates to the DAB the need for acquisition programs to satisfy the requirements of the CINCs and assigns priorities to the requirements. The DAB, chaired by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, recommends acquisition programs to satisfy the requirements.

162. Non-attribution interview with a senior Joint Staff officer familiar with preparation of the CPR.

163. Lovelace and Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus*, pp. 20-21.

164. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 17-18.

165. For example, the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) for the FY 1994-1999 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) was an unclassified memorandum a little over 1/2 page in length that essentially said the POMs all conformed to the CINCs' requirements. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Chairman's Program Assessment FY 1994-1999*, CM-1435-92, Washington, DC, September 3, 1992. The CPA for the FY 1996-2001 FYDP was a classified document of significant substance that offered several alternative program recommendations.

166. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 17.

167. Lovelace and Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus*, pp. 3-5, 18-19.

168. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 17.

169. *Ibid.*

170. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 1-03.31, Preparedness Evaluation System*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1993, pp. II-1 through IV-3. Note that this joint publication is no longer in effect because the Preparedness Evaluation System has been abandoned.

171. *Ibid.*, p. I-1.

172. Information provided by an officer assigned to the Evaluation and Analysis Division of the Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability of the Joint Staff, the

division that was responsible for preparing the PAR.

173. The plans became effective upon completion of the deliberate planning process and were subject to major review/revision at least biennially. Therefore, the useful life of a capability deficiency analysis associated with plan development or review was from the present out to 2 years.

174. Representative of this concern was the Defense Science Board's Task Force on Readiness report, published in June 1994. It recommended that DOD place increased emphasis on joint, vice unit or service, readiness, and develop a system for assessing joint readiness. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness*, Washington, DC, June 1994, pp. ii-iii.

175. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCSI 3401.01, Current Readiness System*, Washington, DC, October 1, 1995, p. 1.

176. *Ibid.*, pp. A-1, D-1.

177. *Ibid.*, pp. D-3 through D-6.

178. *Ibid.*, pp. D-1, D-2.

179. The Joint Monthly Readiness Reviews (JMRR) are attended by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the vice chiefs of the services, the Joint Staff directors and representatives of the CINCS, who are normally their liaison officers. While the chairman's Current Readiness System purports to evaluate the preparedness of each combatant command to carry out missions assigned to the command, in actuality it is more focused on unit readiness reporting by the services. Such readiness data is processed through service channels and the CINCs have limited opportunity to review it before it is officially reported. Nonattribution interview with a senior Joint Staff officer familiar with the JMRRs.

180. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 17.

181. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

182. *A Common Perspective, the Joint Warfighting Center's Newsletter*, Fort Monroe, VA, September 1995, pp. 12-16.

183. On behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the Staff, the Director of the Joint Staff issued on July 28, 1994, a memorandum (MCM-90-94) to all Service Chiefs and Unified

Combatant Commanders-in-Chief regarding joint doctrine. In this memorandum the Chairman directed that the authority statement found in the preface of all joint publications be changed.

184. John Boatman, "Spreading the Word," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 22, No. 23, December 10, 1994, p. 19.

185. For a more complete discussion of the perceived problems with joint doctrine development, see Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, *Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine and Antipodean Insights*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October, 1995, pp. 7-12.

186. *A Common Perspective, the Joint Warfighting Center's Newsletter*, pp. 4, 8-9.

187. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

188. See, for example, Jose R. Lopez, "Military Plan for Cutting Services Falls Far Short of Clinton's Vision," *The New York Times*, February 13, 1993, p. A-9; Thomas E. Ricks, "Consolidation of Maintenance Work Is Recommended in Report on Military," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 16, 1993, p. B-11F.

189. White, *Directions for Defense*, *passim*.

190. Art Pine, "Panel Rebuffs Plan to Alter Military," *Los Angeles Times*, February 25, 1993, p. A-14.

191. Robert Holzer, "U.S. Military Braces for Massive Mission Review," *Defense News* (Washington), August 29-September 4, 1994, p. 3.

192. White, *Directions for Defense*, p. ES-1.

193. *Ibid.*, pp. ES-3, 1-4.

194. *Ibid.*, p. ES-5.

195. Of the 63 specific recommendations made by the CORM, 50 had nothing to do with the allocation of roles, missions, and functions. Of the 13 that were related to roles, missions, and functions, many were already under study by DOD or in some stage of actual implementation. The CORM recommended that several others be studied further before being implemented. Only a few authentic, albeit relatively insignificant, recommendations were made and acted upon. White, *Directions for Defense*, pp. 2-1 through 4-27.

196. Information received from an officer assigned to the Joint Staff Directorate for Strategic Policy and Plans, the

directorates responsible for preparing the Chairman's roles, missions, and functions report.

197. "The Battle for Superiority in U.S. Roles and Missions," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, Vol. 22, No. 14, October 1, 1994, p. 27.

198. Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, "Armed Services Battle to Standstill Over Roles," *Baltimore Sun*, May 15, 1995, p. 1; Mark Yost, "Mission Partly Accomplished," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 24, 1995, p. 14. The chairman of the CORM, upon the commission's dissolution, was reappointed to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

199. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 22.

200. Office of the President, *Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Unified Command Plan*, Washington, DC, December 28, 1995, *passim*.

201. For example, the Strategic Air Command and Forces Command were disestablished as specified commands; the Strategic Command was created, and the Atlantic Command's mission was expanded to include joint force training and integration of most forces based in the continental United States. White, *Directions for Defense*, pp. III-2 through III-7; Office of the President, *Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Unified Command Plan*, pp. 5-16.

202. White, *Directions for Defense*, pp. 2-12, 2-13.

203. Captain John McGillvry, *Unified Command Plan*, documented briefing, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff, Washington, DC, November 6, 1995. The changes recommended by the Chairman included realignment of boundaries between some areas of responsibility, and clarification of the missions assigned to two CINCs.

204. Office of the President, *Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Unified Command Plan*, pp 6-7. Two CINCs objected to changes recommended by the Chairman because they could potentially result in a shift of naval forces from combatant commands that had traditionally been commanded by sea-service officers to commands that had always been commanded by Army officers. Beth Jannery, "Perry Likely to Reject Unified Command Plan Following CINCs' Objection," *Inside the Navy*, December 18, 1995, p. 1.

205. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 36.

206. Kathleen Van Trees Medlock, *A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act on American Officership*, unpublished PhD. dissertation, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, 1993, p. 61 (quoting U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Reorganization of the Department of Defense*, HASC No. 99-53), 99th Congress, 2d Session, February 19-March 12, 1986.

207. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress on the Amended FY 1988/FY 1989 Biennial Budget*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 11, 1988, p. 154.

208. Even before the Act became law, DOD began work on the recommendations of the Packard Commission, many of which were reflected in the Act. Nonetheless, 2 years elapsed after passage of the Act before provisions of Title IV began to take root. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress for FY 88/89 Budget*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 12, 1987, p. 114.

209. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 37-41.

210. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1991, pp. 122-123; Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February, 1992, pp. 144-145; Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1993, pp. 156-157; Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1994, pp. E-4, E-5; Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1995, pp. E-5, E-6.

211. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 37.

212. U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces* (No. 2, as amended through December 31, 1994), 104th Congress, Committee Print for the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995, pp. 189-190.

213. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, *Military Education Policy Document*, CM-1618-93, Washington, DC, March 23, 1993, *passim*.

214. As in many other areas of the act, Congress provided implementation flexibility by giving the Chairman the authority to grant exceptions, on a case by case basis, to the sequence requirement.

215. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 38.

216. *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, January 1991, p. 124; *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, February 1992, p. 146; *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, January 1993, p. 158; *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, January 1994, p. E-6; *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, January 1995, p. E-7.

217. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, p. 39.

218. *Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces*, p. 189.

219. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 37-39.

220. *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, January 1991, p. 121; *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, February 1992, p. 143; *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, January 1993, p. 155; *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, January 1994, p. E-3; *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, January 1995, p. E-4. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force have exceeded the average tour length requirement.

221. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 37-38.

222. Medlock, p. 67.

223. For example, many of the billets on the Joint Staff require, or request, officers who are graduates of senior service colleges. Such officers come to the Joint Staff when they are in the zone of competition for colonel-level command.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

BUR	Bottom-Up Review
CAP	Crisis Action Planning
CD ROM	Compact Disc Read Only Memory
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CORM	Commission on Roles and Missions
CPA	Chairman's Program Assessment
CPG	Contingency Planning Guidance
CPR	Chairman's Program Recommendation
CRS	Current Readiness System
DOD	Department of Defense
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
FY	Fiscal Year
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
GNA	Goldwater-Nichols Act
IPL	Integrated Priority List
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities plan
JSO	Joint Specialty Officer
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment
NCA	National Command Authorities
NMS	National Military Strategy

NMSD	National Military Strategy Document
NSC	National Security Council
OJCS	Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPTEMPO	Operating Tempo
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAR	Preparedness Assessment Report
PES	Preparedness Evaluation System
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
UCP	Unified Command Plan
USCINCCENT	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command
VCJCS	Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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