

WARRIORS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Edited by
Douglas V. Johnson II

January 25, 1999

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FOREWORD

The Personal Experience Monograph Program provides U.S. Army War College students the opportunity to write about their personal involvement in their profession. The monographs written through this program cover a wide range of subjects and stem from a variety of motivations. Students in the USAWC Class of 1998 wrote a unique group of monographs focused on operations in Bosnia. This compendium is comprised of a set of those monographs covering experiences by branch, thus presenting a fairly comprehensive overview of the deployment of U.S. forces in support of the Dayton Accords.

The contributors were all commanders of battalion or equivalent-sized units. They were encouraged to write in their own personal style and relate events as they experienced and interpreted them. Some conclude their monographs with explicit "lessons"; in other monographs the lessons must be teased out.

The reader is encouraged to use this publication as a goad to reflect upon his or her own personal experiences in military service, and perhaps to take the time to write thoughtfully about them. While official after-action reports are valuable, the business of command and leadership as treated in such reports is generally presented in relatively sterile terms. In these monographs, the reader will see a more thoughtful and expressive examination of the art of command and leadership.

LARRY W. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II

This collection of monographs has been assembled from the 42 Personal Experience Monographs written by the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Class of 1998. The Personal Experience Monograph program was instituted immediately after the Gulf War with the original purpose of capturing first-person histories of various aspects of that war. The program rapidly expanded to include any military experience that might prove useful to others. When the USAWC Class of 1998 arrived, it was evident that a great many had recent experience in Bosnia that might prove useful to others who would eventually serve there. The collection assembled here was chosen for the wide variation of branch functions and the centrality of the initial deployment issues addressed. The authors speak for themselves with minimal editorial interference.

The reader should draw his or her own conclusions from this collection, but I would like to suggest that some of the following thoughts are worthy of further consideration and discussion.

- We have an incredibly talented military at present, capable of doing what seems impossible with little warning and limited guidance.
- While our operations are tightly centralized so far as policy formulation is concerned, we have been forced by circumstances to rely upon decentralized execution to an unusual degree. This has forced us to depend upon junior officers and noncommissioned officers in ways we have talked about for decades, but have

seldom practiced. The actual practice seems to be bearing fruit and is worth extending.

- The imagination and inventiveness of American soldiers have not diminished one whit; neither has their capability to endure senseless guidance, rotten conditions, and lousy weather. They continue to demonstrate that essential soldierly quality, the ability to endure.
- Whatever peace operations training is being conducted at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTTC) is right on the mark. Further, that training appears fully effective in transforming combat soldiers into peacekeepers/ enforcers. To reverse that training after the soldier departs his peace operation assignment—i.e., to restore a combat orientation—does not appear to take undue effort.
- We have a married Army. A major consequence is that the most important position in a deploying unit, after the commander (and arguably after the operations/ plans officer), is the Rear Detachment Commander. Captain Basil H. Liddell-Hart was correct in noting that “even the bonds of patriotism, discipline, and comradeship are loosened when the family itself is threatened.” The state of morale on the home front underpins that on the operational front.
- Finally, muscular peacekeeping is not really that different, operationally, from real combat. But tactically the differences are substantial, and at the tactical level, where junior leadership is operating, the training and discipline of the American soldier, his NCOs, and officers shine brilliantly.

This compendium is offered on behalf of those who did their duty well.

CHAPTER 2

SIGNAL PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR IN THE FORMER REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Colonel Peter G. Dausen

FIRST KNOWLEDGE

I first heard of the Yugoslavia problem in early 1992; it had been going on for awhile. But as I recall it had not been looked at seriously as a potential contingency operation until about that time. I was working as the Chief of the Communications Watch Division for the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon, so I had a pretty good view of all the hot spots for the U.S. foreign policy. I also heard a lot of the scuttlebutt. As 1992 grew to a close, the talk was that we were heading off to do Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia to avoid becoming involved in Bosnia, which was viewed as a "tar baby": Once in, you do not get out. April 1993 found me deploying to Somalia for RESTORE HOPE as well for a United Nations (U.N.) follow-on operation, CONTINUE HOPE. While deployed in Somalia, I learned that my future assignment would be to command the 72nd Signal Battalion, a European Theater tactical signal battalion for supporting echelons above corps (EAC). In the winter of 1994, while attending Pre-Command Courses and corresponding with my future command, I discovered that the 72nd was already on the books to be used in Bosnia if the United States agreed to get involved on the ground there.

BATTALION COMMAND

I assumed command of the 72nd Signal Battalion on June 10, 1994, and was immediately briefed on the "Bosnia Plan." It was apparent that this plan had been pretty fluid for some time because there were a lot of blank parts—and even more that others did not agree with, particularly within the 7th Signal Brigade itself. We already had elements of the 72nd deployed to provide "Bosnia Theater" support: a large extension node switch (LEN) and a large tactical satellite (Tacsat) hub terminal (TSC 85B), with a team of wiremen and signal leadership in Zagreb, Croatia, to provide communications for the Joint Task Force (JTF) Operation PROVIDE PROMISE; a small extension node switch (SEN) attached from our sister battalion, the 44th, with a Tacsat link terminal (TSC 93B), wire team, and leadership to provide communications support for JTF Operation ABLE SENTRY in Skopje, Macedonia, formed to prevent escalation of the conflict into Greece; and a large message switch (TYC 39) in Dal Molin Air Base, Vicenza, Italy, to provide record copy of the air tasking order for Operation DENY FLIGHT, which was restricting a potential Balkan air war. However, 1 month later, instead of the expected Bosnia deployment, we found ourselves deploying to Africa. For me it was redeploying, but this time to Rwanda, for Operation SUPPORT HOPE. SUPPORT HOPE needed only a small but well-conducted network.

We learned many worthwhile lessons. A key lesson dealt with task organizing: Putting complementary signal equipment together from different organizations into flyaway packages. On the equipment/team level, this consisted of medium and large packages of switching equipment and transmission equipment (normally Tacsats). On the battalion level, this involved the division of network areas of responsibility.

SUPPORT HOPE had no sooner ended than the brigade was involved in putting in the theater architecture for Exercise Atlantic Resolve, a massive simulation-supported

exercise that looked at a NATO deployment to Atlantis, a hypothetical European country in conflict. Three guesses as to who Atlantis was. (Hint: It starts with the letter B.) This time the network was fairly large; the exercise lasted an entire month. Again we all learned some great lessons. Again the battalions were task-organized, but this time we sent out both battalion control elements (BATCONs). And the brigade put together a "joint SYSCON" (systems control element). Although the joint SYSCON had its supporters and detractors, the idea worked. It had a future. During this exercise, the 44th mainly supported the areas inside the immediate exercise box at Grafenwoehr, Germany, while the 72nd had responsibility for the western side of the network, which was everything outside Grafenwoehr to Kaiserslautern and Stuttgart. Although no one knew what the future would bring, the experience for the 72nd in command and controlling (C²) an extensive network, widely spread geographically, would prove to be indispensable. I was on an autobahn overpass observing our convoy procedures when I had another foretaste of the future. My Mobile Radio Telephone (MRT) rang, with the "Brigade Three" giving me a warning order to deploy yet another Tacsat team to the Bosnia theater—this time to the island of Brac for support of a high-level intelligence mission called Operation LOFTY VIEW II. The team deployed in early December 1994. This should have been an omen for us, but there was too much to do, and the future was probably the last thing on our minds at that time.

Near the end of 1994, the priority for the entire brigade was the coming move from its home in Karlsruhe to Mannheim, Germany. It was a move that consumed all of us for at least 6 months, maybe a bit more. Again, the lessons from Operation MOVE TO MANNHEIM were many. The first for us was in organizing large-scale movements by rail. We had no idea at that time that this would later prove to be the transportation of choice to Bosnia. Second was in wargaming and establishing subordinate organizations in two locations, Mannheim and Karlsruhe, while continuing

all training, maintenance, and other programs. This split operation proved to be the "straw-man" for split operations for the 72nd in Bosnia. Third was the lesson in conducting split operations themselves throughout the entire battalion: what information was critical, what absolutely needed to be tracked, how did you conduct meetings in two places, how did you keep critical members of the organization informed in real time, how did you keep team cohesion over a large geographic separation? These lessons proved to be greatly beneficial when we got ready to do the deployment.

In late May 1995 while we were still in the midst of the move, the brigade got a good scare: Deployment looked likely, and we did some intense planning. This planning helped a great deal in getting us ready later. However, some new plans came out of this intense time. The U.N. was losing control; the fighting was reaching a new level of intensity. There was a lot of concern about U.N. peacekeepers getting captured as well, especially in the so-called U.N. safe havens of Gorazde, Srebrenica, Bihac, and even Sarajevo. Even as we were planning for helicopter airlift to get the peacekeepers out of these safe havens, Srebrenica and then Gorazde quickly fell to the Serbs. It seemed like Bihac would be next. Brigade plans at that time had the 44th, with its battalion headquarters in Italy, controlling all the reach-back locations from Italy to Central Region. The 72nd was supposed to support downrange with its battalion headquarters at Zagreb because it was already controlling the assets there. The Mountain Shield series of exercises was born out of this planning. They were supposed to simulate the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) performing helicopter rescue of U.N. peacekeepers in Bihac, with assistance from V Corps aviation. The 44th had the lion's share of these exercises, since SETAF was supposed to be executing them from Italy. We supported with tactical satellites and set up our BATCON at our Heidelberg switch location, which was the reach-back for the Zagreb and Skopje missions. The first exercise was in June 1995. We were supposed to use a new bird for our tactical satellites,

the NATO 4B. This satellite had not been used before, but it was planned to support any possible Bosnia network. NATO 4B quickly became a new cussword for tactical satellite operators. It was obvious that there was a significant problem. Our most experienced operators were having great difficulty getting on the bird. And once on, we were experiencing significant problems with the switch digital transmission groups (DTGs). Every time we would troubleshoot and seemingly isolate the problem, the symptoms would change. The tactical satellite operators struggled through. We sent e-mail forward through command channels documenting the problems.

During July, the brigade decided to run the entire Grafenwoehr rotation for weapons qualification and soldier skills. It was a week with a tremendous amount of moving parts, forcing a lot of decentralized decisionmaking, with a centralized command and control. In terms of synthesizing staff coordination across the brigade, the week at Graf was an outstanding success. We got our share of weapons qualification done, too. Brigade Exercise Rolling Eagle was next on the calendar—2 weeks in August. Colonel John O. Welch was the Brigade Commander. What made this exercise so worthwhile was his decision to use this exercise to train by the numbers. We had many new soldiers since the move in June, creating almost completely new organizations. The net result was that the soldiers gained renewed confidence; all transmission shots came in, including great performance by TROPO. The 72nd BATCON put its fledging crew through its paces, and we built on the coordination among BATCON Operations, S2/3, and Administrative Logistics Operations Center (ALOC), S1/4, that had served us so well through Atlantic Resolve the previous year. The 324th Signal Company put its new switch teams through their paces as well, and the Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) continued a great support tradition. All in all, it was a tremendous train-up exercise! September was supposed to be an off-month to allow the unit to catch up on some necessary

company training and log efforts, as well as finish off leave schedules before the school year got into full swing again. It was not to be. Although Srebrenica and Gorazde had fallen, the new push was for Bihac. SETAF wanted to ensure that its TF Lion could adjust to a new possible location, so on short notice we combined forces for Mountain Shield II. MS II was again in Graf. The 72nd provided C² over the reach-back locations in Heidelberg. Again, there were lots of problems with the NATO 4B satellite. At least this time we got to meet with the NATO Communications Organization and Signal Support Activity (NACOSA) and the Regional Satellite Support Center (RSSC) representatives about the problem during the exercise. This set the stage for a follow-on test later in November.

October 1995 brought a plethora of new training requirements, mine awareness, etc. The only real difficulty was that certification for these tasks could be acquired only through the Seventh Army Training Center (7ATC) at Grafenwoehr, which led to large logistics requirements as we worked to get soldiers trained through each of the required U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) wickets. At the same time, we (the commanders and staff) were meeting regularly to work what we knew of the mission requirements. At this time the battalion still had not gotten firm guidance on missions and customers. Consequently, and coincidentally, no one was allowed down-range to see the actual ground we were to set up on. An Allied Force Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) team, which really had no concept of our needs and really was not concerned with them, had done the only surveys of our NATO sites. They were mostly accounting for the Tactical Satellite Ground Terminal (TSGT) and other NATO assets that they would be bringing into the theater. EOM October/November brought planning for Brigade Exercise Soaring Eagle, which was originally planned to be the follow-on exercise for Rolling Eagle. It would incorporate several networks together, including 22nd Signal Brigade (MSE) and ARRC. As it turned out, the dynamic nature of the planning at this

time led to a significantly down-scaled exercise, executed within the greater Mannheim area within our kasernes. 1st PERSCOM was exercising their ability to put out support teams at the same time; they used our exercise to provide their transmission paths. Additionally, it was the first time we got to integrate the 414th Signal Company (NATO) into the picture, which was especially significant for the 72nd; we received two complete platoons for attachment in Zagreb and Sarajevo. Finally, 5th Signal Command used our exercise as a vehicle for providing their certification of our capabilities to perform the assigned mission.

During the previous summer, there had been a significant military occupational specialty (MOS) change for the Signal Corps: all satellite operators were put into one MOS—31S. During the same period, we had a tremendous turnover of our tactical satellite operators. As a result, we did not have nearly enough 31Ss to man all our tactical satellites, nor many experienced operators. We put together a plan to integrate a school-trained 31S with an experienced senior operator or team chief, who intensely trained them for approximately 1 month. We were unable to fence the whole month because of the amazingly high operations tempo (OPTEMPO): every other day Pre-Deployment Preparations (PDPs) (does the clinic have DNA kits now or not?), every day a new training requirement, etc. Hence, during the certification, 5th DCSOPS expressed some doubts whether we would be able to do the mission. Needless to say, we were stung by their evaluation, which did not consider our plan or where we were on the timeline. But performance over time is the true test. So our plan was eventually justified by the great performance of the tactical satellite operators and network throughout the deployment. On the final day of the exercise, Commander-in-Chief USAREUR General William W. Crouch came to visit and check on us. He seemed to be impressed with our state of readiness.

The next couple weeks of November were absolute craziness. Any new requirement that could be thought up by

the USAREUR staff was thought up and implemented, requiring us to execute as soon as possible, of course. We were all convinced that the sooner we deployed, the better off we would be. Thanksgiving came with visits from our new Commanding General, Brigadier General Robert L. Nabors, as well as a visit from the 21st TACOM Commander, Major General James Wright, who told us that he had been traveling throughout Hungary looking for a place to stage the U.S. National Support Element, with no luck so far. So the planning continued. We were still without "eyes on ground." Mission assignments within the brigade were finally solidified: the 72nd would provide NATO support, and the 44th would support U.S. forces. Task Force 72nd Signal was slowly being formed. We were having regular mission briefs with extensive reviews of personnel assignments; each person's qualifications and state of training were intensely scrutinized. We were also having soldiers packed out at this time; their private vehicles (POVs) were interned into special covered warehouses at Spinelli Kaserne.

When were the trains coming? Everything was lined up in the motor park and ready to go. Fortunately, we had an extra area where we could post the different vehicle serials dependent upon their mission area. We continued to work through the Thanksgiving weekend. Then we got word that rail cars were being posted for us out at Coleman Barracks. USAREUR Forward was trying to get out at the same time. So it turned out to be a bit of a race to see who would load the first trains. This was quite a turnaround, since the previous estimate was that the 44th, providing U.S. national communications support, would deploy to theater first because the peace treaty agreements were still being worked, and U.S. troops were not supposed to enter the box until there was complete executive approval. Well, we started moving the MilVans to Coleman Barracks amidst tremendous press coverage. CNN, Reuters, and all our local publications interviewed us. The troops handled the press superbly.

That night we started moving the first serials out and started loading onto the train. This went on throughout the night and the next few days. Every time a new German rail inspector came, we had to change the method of loading; no one seemed to have a clear understanding of the required standards, including the Deutsches Bundesbahn. We still did not know what to expect on the passenger cars and dining cars. The Branch Movement Control Team (BMCT) said there would be a dining car, but that was about it.

Things were really beginning to move fast now. We finally got authorization to send an advance party down to Croatia. We would send the S3 as well as Lieutenant Feher and Lieutenant Kelly, who would each be heading an element to Ploce and to Split. The train loading was going well now, in full swing. By close of business (COB) Wednesday all the trains for the NATO enabling forces were loaded. But there was no order to move the trains, so they sat on some rail sidings outside of Mannheim while we waited and waited. Families were anxious, but no information came. Rumors were that Friday, December 8, was the day. The advance party flew out of Frankfurt early Thursday, so we cut the soldiers loose to spend some final time with their families and friends—a 4-hour string was required. Friday started out the same way, no news. We had a 0900 formation and cut the soldiers loose again. By 1200 I figured that nothing was going to happen that day. But I thought that I had better get my bags squared away just in case. I still figured it would be Monday. Out of the blue, at 1430 my MRT started ringing. It was Colonel Welch. They got approval, and the first two trains were to pull tonight, at 2100 and 2330. Would we be ready?

I started the alert process with the first formations set at 1700 hours. Things were going well; it had been well rehearsed. At 1500 I got another call on my MRT while I was working double-time to get my bags packed. Colonel Welch again. They moved up the times on us: would we be ready at 2000 and 2100 for the trains to pull out? No problem, everything was still on track, and it should work with the

new times. Ops Center at the battalion was already being established. At 1615 hours, as I was heading out the door, my MRT rang again: They moved up the time again to 1800 and 2000. Would we be ready? Also, for the first time we heard something about needing only a supernumerary guard force of five soldiers to travel with the trains. I told the boss at that time that no changes could be made. We will ride it out and see what happens. It was bedlam at the battalion; phones were ringing off the hook; families were milling about. Command Sergeant Major got the first formation together. Trucks with personnel bags were to follow the buses to Coleman Barracks and then to the train station. The weather was bitterly cold, as it had been all that week during the rail-load.

Somehow we got the first buses out to Coleman Barracks loaded with soldiers, with a separate bus for family members. I drove out to Coleman Barracks with my family in our car. Confusion reigned out there as well. Where was the first bus? A big send-off committee was there, complete with USO music, the American Red Cross with lots of goodie packages, families, the Commanding General, and a huge American Flag. The 293rd BSB had done a super job of staging the event. Finally, the first bus got there. I found out that the first train had to pull by 2000. We were still on schedule.

Yes, it was true, only a guard force of five soldiers was required for each of the trains with the complement of soldiers for those lifts traveling by buses to Croatia on Monday, December 11. We had organized the teams that way when we first got the news, just in case. Finally, after loading personal bags, inventory, and securing weapons in the baggage car, amidst flashing of cameras and well wishes from loved ones, the first train pulled out. The second went faster, the tense moments were over. There was no word on when the rest of the five trains would pull out or when the additional buses would go.

Saturday morning began with the holiday parade through the housing area. The day before seemed almost like a memory already. Yet I felt like a deathrow prisoner savoring his last few hours. Noon hit, with the phone ringing again. The rest of the trains would pull out that night, between 2000 and 0200. Again, only five guards per train were required. The remaining soldiers would travel by bus on Tuesday. Saturday night went infinitely better. Amazing what a day of practice will do! It was another long cold night; we finally got home about 0330. I got to celebrate Sunday Mass one last time with the family. Then we spent a quiet day, resigned to a Monday departure. Monday was well organized. The buses were there. However, it was difficult just getting everyone to finish their good-byes and get on the road. Good-byes are so tough! We were finally on our way.

The buses were fairly comfortable, at least for the first 6 hours. Power on the MRT went fast, so I found myself scrambling at the rest stops trying to find places to get a charge. The sun set, and we were still on the road, traveling through Austria to Slovenia. At the Slovenian border we encountered our first difficulty in crossing. I remember seeing some young men, locals, who were encouraging us, declaring that only the United States could fix the present situation. The Croatian border was next.

We were beginning to close in on Zagreb. When we had left, we were not sure where we would be staying the night. Now it was locked in; we would be staying at the Panorama Hotel. The bus drivers originally stated that they knew where they were going. But now it became apparent that once in Zagreb, they were clueless. We wandered around in two tourist-sized buses, trying to find the Panorama Hotel. Fortunately, because it was 0130 in the morning, there was not a lot of traffic on the streets. It was a bit of a helpless feeling, without phone communications (MRT did not work once we passed the Slovenian border), and without maps. So we wandered about searching for the Panorama. It felt a bit

like the Jewish exodus wandering around the Sinai trying to find the promised land.

Finally we saw a small sign marked Panorama Hotel and navigated to it. Then the bus drivers figured that the front awning was too low for them to get under, so they parked in the rear of the hotel and wanted all of us to carry all of our bags around the building. There was no rear entrance. After a bit of haggling, they finally reconsidered and got the buses pulled back around. It was now 0230. But we had arrived for our first night in Croatia!

SETTLING IN AND INSTALLATIONS

The Panorama Hotel was like a class B communist hotel. But it sure beat tents! Of course we had our tents, stoves, latrines, and all the field gear you can imagine coming on the trains. Zagreb was a big city—you cannot imagine camping out in the middle of it. It would be like setting up at Rockefeller Center in New York City with business still going on. Without a reconnaissance and survey of the mission area and customers, we were certainly burdened with a lot of extra equipment.

Several of the trains were combined at the border. One of them was already in. The other was due in the next few hours. The trains for Split and Ploce were going straight through to Split, where both would unload. The Ploce team would then road-march to their final destination. So we found ourselves in quite a different type of situation—planning a rail unloading operation after just a wink of sleep in the lobby of a hotel in downtown Zagreb. December 12 dawned early, with cloudy skies and some snow on the ground. There were lots of unknowns and concerns. Topping the list was where we supposed to set up. Our major customers, Implementation Force (IFOR) Headquarters, were in a military compound downtown now called the U.N. compound because that's where the U.N. had its headquarters and would still operate from until the Transfer of Authority (TOA) to NATO. My S3 Operations Officer, Major

Gordon Johnson, who had come a few days earlier as part of an advance party, told me that there was a military compound across a busy city street that looked promising. It was still being used as a high-level school for Croatian senior officers. But the Croatia military authorities had relinquished control of a large building for the IFOR Support Command Headquarters, commanded by Major General Farmen, another one of our customers. There was a large parking lot, complete with basketball goals in front of the building. It looked very adequate for our needs as long as the look angle for our satellite dishes could clear the four-story buildings.

I could check that out in a bit. But now we needed to find out who was in charge of the land to provide some sort of permission for putting one of our signal sites there. I found a colonel in the U.N. compound who was assigned as the IFOR HQs Commandant. The IFOR staff was not fully functioning at this time; it was still being organized. I introduced myself and explained why he needed to allocate space to us in the adjacent compound parking lot. He had a Croatian officer on his staff. They deliberated. After a bit of haranguing and wringing of hands, he agreed. We parted amiably. Later I found out that there was a turf dogfight between him and the IFOR Support Command HQs Commandant who also claimed to be responsible for the same ground.

Meanwhile, that OK was good enough for me. The S3 and I then set off to check out the rail unloading operation under the responsibility of the 72nd Signal Battalion HQs Company Commander, Captain Shorty Glover. We were still confined to traveling together in the S3's rental car acquired during the advance party. Shorty also had his hands full trying to coordinate his transportation assets (a 26-passenger bus and a 9-passenger van), meals for the troops, and accounting for all the soldiers. Just as we arrived at the railhead, so did the press. And I found myself giving an interview to CNN in the midst of snow flurries. Fortunately, true to his character, Shorty was doing a

marvelous job of coordinating the efforts at the railhead. Work was progressing well.

The next critical issue was where to locate the additional equipment that was not being positioned downtown at our newly acquired signal site in the Croatian compound. We had two unit motor pools with us, as well as all the support equipment necessary to conduct field operations for an entire year. Camp Pleso, a U.N. site by the Zagreb airport about 12 miles away, was a possibility. So that was the next stop to arrange for parking the equipment.

Again, space was at a premium. Only potential mud holes were left—not conducive to conducting maintenance operations. Clearly no one was in charge. The U.S. Marine Corps Commander of the USJTF Operation PROVIDE PROMISE claimed that he still had a viable mission; he did not acknowledge the pending transfer of authority (TOA) that was to take place in 2 weeks. He refused to release any assets for our use. We had been providing communications support for PROVIDE PROMISE for the last year and a half—now we had to convince the commander to let us swap out our own equipment (an AN/TSC 93B satellite link terminal for the AN/TSC 85B satellite hub terminal). The smaller terminal would easily be adequate for requirements of the JTF. However, the larger hub terminal was necessary for the major signal center we were constructing downtown. Even though the JTF would not lose any service, no one likes to see their mission being taken over. So negotiations were tougher than they needed to be.

Finding an administrative parking area conducive to maintenance for approximately 40 vehicles (one-and-a-half tons to 10 tons in size) was a problem. The U.N. was no help whatsoever. They really seemed to resent our presence. Finally, with no solution in sight, I decided to exercise squatter's rights. There was a road on the edge of the airfield that did not appear to be getting too much use. So we started parking the vehicles on both sides of the road, keeping them out of the mud and leaving a single center lane. That would

have to do for the time being. It was not pretty but we could sort it out later, maybe even acquire a contract in town. At least we were out of the mud.

The U.N. had the only heavy crane in Zagreb, so we needed to coordinate the use of it to download our communication shelters off the trucks and position them in the Croatian compound parking lot. Fortunately, the U.N. crane operator was easy to get along with. He provided some really great assistance.

Things seemed to be coming along well. By the end of the first day, we had the setup of the downtown signal site pretty well underway. The larger train still needed to be unloaded the next day. More coordination meetings were necessary. Guards were required for the trains, for the downtown signal center, and for the vehicles parked at Camp Pleso. And another several busloads of soldiers arrived in the middle of the night and needed to be quartered. Some were sent to another hotel, the Hotel Holiday. The Brigade S3, Major Frank Grove, was coordinating a contract for this entire hotel complex. It was on the outskirts of Zagreb and could house the entire brigade headquarters as well as our battalion. This was a much more modern hotel right off the highway, a trucking firm behind it with a large fenced in motor park area. It looked ideal for our needs too, especially with the potential of contracting for motor-park space inside the fenced yard.

The next day was extremely cold, with blizzard conditions. Captain Shorty Glover really had a tough job now. On top of the limited transportation, he had to get soldiers from two locations and rotate them to prevent any cold injuries. The only redeeming factor from the cold weather was that the media decided it was too cold for them. So at least we had time to ourselves to get the job done.

When I arrived at the Croatian compound, Captain Dwaine Boteler, the signal site commander, immediately told me that he had been ordered to move by the IFOR Support HQs. This was their area; they were responsible for

it. They did not want us there or need us. I did not have to wait long to hear their point of view personally. Only a moment after I heard the news from Captain Boteler, a very large and irritated U.S. Army colonel came up, loudly announcing himself as the Chief of Staff for the IFOR Support Command. By the look of things, this was not going to be easy. But I was bound and determined not to move from this location, especially since they wanted this parking lot to have room to park their administrative vehicles close to the building. After much bantering and negotiating, we finally agreed on a solution. He needed additional guards for the street-side post. I agreed to contribute them, but I wanted some space closer to the building. So we agreed to reposition our vans as long as our Tacsat communications terminals stayed put. I provided him a working tactical telephone so he could call his home station in Germany, the continental United States (CONUS), or anywhere else. He quickly realized our value to him. We were quickly assimilated into his headquarters, complete with security badges and a large office room to put our Administrative and Logistics Operations Center (ALOC) into. So things moved along well for awhile.

The next 3-4 days were filled with crises and more coordination. At the end of 72 hours, despite all the additional challenges, we already had our base network in, with signal sites at Sarajevo, Ploce, Split, Naples, Heidelberg, Mannheim, Landstuhl, and Hungary. The technical part of the mission was progressing well. The soldiers were performing outstandingly, beyond all expectations—they were making a tough mission look easy.

The director of the Combined Joint Command Control Communications Center (CJCCC) was Colonel Rodakowski, the 5th Signal Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS). He was in charge of coordinating all the communications assets for the mission—a very daunting task considering all the diverse communications contributors to this mission. During a meeting that first weekend (December 16, 1995), he shared his concern about

the Sarajevo site for the IFOR Forward HQs at the Residency (the former residence of Yugoslav Prime Minister Marshal Joseph Tito). It seems the plan was to link up the communications with Zetra Stadium, the signal site on the outskirts of the city: it supported the Ace Ready Reaction Corps (ARRC) Forward HQs. The link was less than a mile as the crow flies, but it had to go across a high ridge and apartment buildings and was connected by no less than four different communications means. Since signal support for the IFOR Forward HQs was the mission of my battalion, he asked me to go to Sarajevo and do some on-the-ground signal surveys. The following Tuesday (December 19), the first flight out found me and CW2 Banner, our brilliant Tacsat warrant officer, aboard a C17 bound for Sarajevo.

Once in Sarajevo, we soon discovered the dire living straits of our soldiers supporting the ARRC at Zetra Stadium. Captain Dave Alexander and the 58th Tacsat Signal Company had arrived 5 days earlier. They had put in communications and were bedded down at Zetra. This was the location of the ice skating events of the 1984 Olympic Games, where Dorothy Hamill of the United States had won the gold medal. The stadium roof was very badly damaged from the shelling. The main stadium floor was flooded with approximately 3-4 inches of water throughout. The toilet facilities were Mideastern, only a hole with footprints. They were inoperable, overflowing with an unbelievable stench. The water did not work anywhere in the building: no showers, no laundry. Water for cooking and cleaning had to be carried in. Our soldiers had to sleep on cots in hallways under the stadium seats—the driest place they could find. But they were still under water. I quickly found the Headquarters Commandant (HQ Commandant), an Australian officer assigned to the ARRC, to tell him of my displeasure and to hear his assessment of the situation. According to him, his engineers were working very hard but had been unable to fix the plumbing. Maybe in another week or two. But they had already been there 5 days. In addition, he said he would be moving in Karomic portable toilet

containers as well. I told him I understood that he felt he was doing the best he could, but this was a very unhealthy and unsatisfactory condition. It was not being fixed fast enough. I intended to inform my higher command and request assistance. When I informed my Brigade Commander about the deplorable conditions, he told me to report it directly to the Commanding General (CG) of 5th Signal Command. The CG was very supportive and assured me that he would do whatever he could to improve the situation for the soldiers. Next I called the ALOC to contract for floor lumber for the tents to get the soldiers out of the water—but there was no guaranteed method to get the supplies to Sarajevo. Postal service was not working yet, and the flights in were extremely erratic. There is really a price for being the first in!

The next day I awoke in four inches of water that had seeped in during the night. Breakfast consisted of cold eggs and baked beans, served in a dimly lit area. Water constantly dripped onto the food. It felt similar to being in Fort Douamont in Verdun, where we had taken the battalion officers for an Officer Professional Development (OPD) just 5 months previously. Today was the TOA to IFOR; it was time to survey the communications for the Residency, located in a heavily wooded lot in the city, with an extremely high ridge on one side and high-rise apartment buildings on the other. It did not look like a promising location to set up a Tacsat for a direct shot. The look angle would not clear the trees, the ridge, or the high-rise buildings. Additionally, the IFOR Forward HQ Commandant, a U.S. Army colonel assigned to AFSOUTH, was not very inclined to give any assistance. In fact, he made it plain that he had no room to quarter any more soldiers. He did not care about communications. His sole concern was how to accommodate CINC IFOR Admiral Smith and his staff, who were arriving in about a week to man the forward headquarters.

After looking around, CW2 Banner and I both agreed that our only possibility was to elevate the Tacsat

antennas so that the look angle would have a higher baseline, thereby clearing the obstructions. Then we hit upon the idea to download the communications shelters from the vehicles and put the entire shelter on the flat part of an adjacent roof, with the antenna mounted on top of the shelter for additional height. The roof looked strong enough. But we double-checked with an engineer, who verified our assessment. An ambitious plan: but according to our calculations, it looked workable. It had to work—there was no good alternative. Admiral Smith was due in a week. I made a couple of calls to Colonel Rodakowski to let him know the promising results of our survey, then another to the Battalion ALOC to get them started on acquiring more lumber for the roof platforms. Our other trains, full of signal equipment under the control of Captain Doug Muller, C Company of 44th Signal Battalion (attached to Task Force 72nd for the support of IFOR Forward), were on the way to Split.

Our flight back was due in that afternoon, but a sudden snowstorm kept the plane on the ground at Zagreb. We were stuck at the airport with no communications to either Captain Alexander at Zetra or to the IFOR personnel at the Residency. We needed to get back as soon as possible to work the planning. Time was critical! We met a German colonel who was in a similar circumstance; he thought he might be able to get a couple vehicles to try it by road if the plane did not fly in the morning. He offered us a ride the next morning at 0800. He would come back and pick us up at the airport. CW2 Banner and I had neither a place to go nor any way to contact anyone. So we looked around for a place to bed down for the night. The airport area was the scene of the heaviest fighting around Sarajevo. It was really battered, not much resembling an airport at all. But we found a couple of cots, and even a German newsman hunting for a story. The next morning the plane again did not fly. But promptly at 0800, the German colonel came by to pick us up. He explained that we were going to take the Serb corridor, a more direct route, because the TOA declared it open. Then he smiled and

promptly chambered a round in his pistol. Well, there was no turning back now. We followed suit, climbed in the rear of the vehicle, and began a wild trip through the Serb corridor and down the snow-covered mountain passes to Mostar and Ploce. After one major rest stop, we arrived back in Zagreb the next morning at approximately 0400. After thanking our German comrades, we quickly reported in and hit the sack for a couple hours of sleep. The next day would begin very quickly, with much planning for the return trip to Sarajevo with convoys of equipment.

The first thing the next morning was an operational situation report (SITREP) from the battalion headquarters. Everything was progressing extremely well under the able leadership of my Executive Officer, Major Phil Minor, and my S3, Major Gordon Johnson. Major Minor had developed a very effective administrative and logistics operation using the ALOC. And Major Johnson was handling the reins of the Battalion Control (BATCON) with uncommon savvy. During an early visit to the CJCCC, Colonel Rodakowski verified the need for urgency for the Sarajevo IFOR communications mission. "Need you to lead the convoy to Sarajevo ASAP and ensure the communications installation for the CINC. The communications need to be in by the 28th of December," he explained. I told him there were lots of moving parts to this operation. If everything went according to schedule and the planets were aligned perfectly, we had a good shot. The plan: CSM Spence, my Battalion Command Sergeant Major, and I, along with CW2 Banner and some able NCOs, would set out early the next day (Christmas Eve) in a four-vehicle convoy filled with lumber and supplies to Split. At Split we were to join up with Captain Muller, help organize their convoy on Christmas Day, and lead them to Sarajevo early the next day. That would give us about 2 days to build a roof support, coordinate crane support to lift the shelters and antennas, and get the satellite shot in—certainly a daunting task, to say the least.

Meanwhile in Zagreb, Major Johnson had his hands full working military/commercial interfaces so that anyone

could dial through the U.S. system or the U.N. system (now leased by NATO) to reach their party. Additionally, we found that our big-city downtown location was fraught with problems for communications. We originally thought that we would overhead our cables across the street from high-rise building to high-rise building. However, a city ordinance forbade that. Even a special plea to the mayor did not help. He did say that he would provide city engineers to assist us in putting our cables under the street in a sewer pipe. The Croatian engineer who came to put our five PCM coaxial cables through the sewer pipe decided the ends were too large (the connecting hocks). To our horror, he had chopped them off to accommodate them to the pipe. No one had ever spliced a PCM cable before—there was no technical instruction on how to do it, because the PCM cable carried an electrical charge. There was too much margin for error. Two of our other outstanding warrant officers, CW2 Lori Bobzien and CW2 Ken Dempster, met the challenge. After a tedious day of trial and error, they got the cables to work, providing much needed additional service to the IFOR HQs. We had already installed a single Tacsat link on the U.N. compound to the IFOR HQs, but until these PCM cables were installed, the link was not networked through our main switching center on the Croatian compound. Now there were multiple communications routes, giving us a significantly improved reliability of service. The brigade headquarters was also busily preparing for a Christmas party and a possible visit from President Bill Clinton, both of which we would miss.

We took off early the next morning amid a light snowfall. The maps we had were very small scale and barely adequate. CW2 Banner and I were the only ones who had been along this route before but that was in the middle of the night. We still managed to find our way through the rugged terrain and burnt-out villages. We arrived in Split around 2300 amid a cacophony of celebratory fire. Now we had to find the railhead and Captain Doug Muller's unit. Working the map the best we could along with some reconnaissance

techniques, we found the railhead and Captain Muller, along with Major Vince Speece, the brigade S4, who had flown down a couple of days earlier to work billeting and parking contracts for the unit and its equipment. Major Speece quickly got us billeted for the night as well, but not before we had a brief visit out to Lieutenant Kelly, of TF 72nd, and his communications element, which was providing support to the British National Support Element (NSE) located about eight miles north of the city. Major Speece got us billeted in a former luxury hotel on the southern side of Split, right on the water's edge. However, it was in absolutely terrible shape. It had been housing war refugees for the last 3 1/2 years. The night was filled with the sounds of automatic fire and the light of tracers shooting out over the bay.

Christmas 1995 dawned early with lots of work to do. Captain Muller and his soldiers had not been fully briefed yet on all the details of the plan, and all the equipment had to be checked out, shelters remounted on vehicles (for rail load they are downloaded and transported separately), convoy topped off with fuel and inspected, and everyone briefed for safety. The soldiers were anxious too, because they were to be the first unit convoy to come into Sarajevo since the TOA.

We set out early on December 26. Our route took us down the Dalmation coast along a coastal road, offering beautiful vistas, and then north from Ploce to Mostar and through the mountains to Sarajevo. I was primarily concerned about the road between Mostar and Sarajevo. It runs along the Nevertva River, a swift river flowing through jagged mountain passes. All the bridges were blown, the shorter ones having been replaced with snap-link bridges. But two longer ones required long bypass roads/trails around tributary rivers. One in particular was very treacherous, a mud-like logging trail only about a lane and a half wide in its best locations. CW2 Banner and I witnessed a vehicle narrowly miss going over the side on our earlier trip coming back from Sarajevo with the Germans. There had been no

improvement in the road. The warring factions had tried to destroy the tunnels as well. All were without lights; several had deep ditches where the road surface had been blown away in an effort to render them impassable. It was a long, laborious road march. We arrived in Sarajevo about 2200 that night, very tired. As we got to Zetra, we were told that there was no room to billet us there. Furthermore, no one was even allowed in, according to the orders of Brigadier General Raper, the ARRC Signal Officer and Commander of the 1st Signal Brigade, the unit that provided the communications support for the ARRC. I quickly got on the phone with the General; he allowed us to stay one night. OK, one step at a time, at least we got a foot in the door. Captain Alexander and his troops were delighted to see us, especially since we had brought lumber for their floors to get them off the water—now ice—because of the cold temperatures. It was now snowing through the remnants of the destroyed roof. Then we heard some accounts of our soldiers being sniped at while on duty at their signal vans outside the stadium on the soccer field adjacent to the Lion's cemetery. As with so many of these events that would take place over the next couple months, no full explanation was found. But I took comfort in the knowledge that our soldiers took the proper actions and were safe.

While in Zetra, we coordinated with the Danes for use of their crane and planned our installation the next day. Living conditions in Zetra had improved; several toilets worked. Hot water was promised for showers within a day or so. Compared to a week prior, it was like the Holiday Inn. I thanked the HQs Commandant for his diligence. The next day when we arrived at the Residency, the IFOR Army colonel looked as though he had seen a ghost. He reluctantly gave his OK; then we started work on the roof. But he also said in the same breath that he had no place for our soldiers to stay. No room at the inn, we were not welcome for another night at Zetra, and we were not welcome at the Residency either. Providing service sometimes is not easy. Captain Muller worked hard; he was not going to take no for an

answer. He quickly made himself and his soldiers indispensable to the IFOR staff, so they *had* to find room for some of them. Meanwhile Brigadier General Raper faced an unpleasant situation as Lieutenant General Walker, the CG of the ARRC, saw Zetra and said that he would not accept it under any circumstances as his headquarters. He would wait in Kiseljak (approximately 15 miles outside of Sarajevo) until the Hotel complex in Iliadza (Serb section of Sarajevo) was completed for his command post (CP). Now all the communications at Zetra were not fulfilling any functional role except as a signal node. He needed U.S. communications service in Kiseljak. I was the only potential provider, with two separate Tacsat links that were in the process of being installed on the Residency roof. Well, he must have gotten to Colonel Rodakowski, because the colonel called me just a few minutes later and directed a change of plans to put one of the links in Kiseljak until the ARRC moved to Iliadza, planned for mid-January. I WILCOed his request and directly called Brigadier General Raper, telling him I could get him communications the next day so long as my soldiers had a reasonable place to live and park our equipment. Desperation makes the best of friends. We made an agreement.

The roof installation of the first system was progressing nicely; communications came in well within the pre-set deadline. We planned to travel to Kiseljak the next day to install the other system. Morning began with blizzard conditions, which continued throughout the day. Traveling was treacherous on the mountain roads. Again time was critical, this time for the ARRC. After another harrowing journey through the foothills around Sarajevo, we arrived in Kiseljak in a blinding snowstorm. Again, we had to force our way and find a place to set up—nothing was ever easy at the outset. But with an expert team led by Staff Sergeant Gomez, the Tacsat shot was in with communications run to the headquarters within approximately 2 hours of our arrival on site.

This change of plans caused a delay in our departure because now we had to wait for another 93B for the Residency installation to be flown in by C17. The New Year of 1996 came in with an unbelievable display of celebratory fire coming from the Serbian-held hills around the city—there was no question that the Serbs still had plenty of weapons (more than small arms) and ammo. CW2 Banner proved his indispensability again by solving a very complex communications problem for the British, much to Brigadier General Raper's chagrin. He was convinced that it was a problem with the U.S. communications. During these days another of our comrades had a close call. He found a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) round sticking out of the fender cowling of his HMMWV after driving down Sniper's Alley to the airport to pick up a passenger who just flew in. For one of those very lucky and blessed reasons, the RPG did not detonate. But he was not the only one with a close call. Captain Dave Alexander took me on a site survey for the Tacsat installation at Iliadza. British sappers had already cleared the ground of mines. Yet during a thaw on the following day, two British soldiers installing concertina over the same ground Dave and I had walked stepped on a mine. It was a small anti-personnel mine known as a kneepopper, about the size of a cigarette lighter, designed to injure and disable an enemy, rather than kill him. The two British soldiers suffered multiple shrapnel wounds in their backs and legs; one soldier lost a testicle. And while I prayed for their recovery, I also thanked the good Lord for His protection.

Finally the second 93B arrived. The immediate installation was completed, and we returned to Zagreb on January 4, 1996. During these initial days of providing service to the IFOR staff and Admiral Smith, we realized the shortcoming of not having a major switch in Sarajevo. Captain Doug Muller really wanted his switchboard to have the flexibility to provide a full measure of signal support to the admiral. It would also provide an extra measure of redundancy that we presently lacked from terminating the

Tacsat systems with two independent remote multiplexers. After long discussion of pros and cons with Colonel Welch, my Brigade Commander, and Colonel Rodakowski, we agreed to put a large switch into Sarajevo. So plans were made to redeploy back down to Split and convoy the switchboard and crew to Sarajevo. Captain Muller was to prepare a site for it at the Residency—no easy task, with space at such a premium. After just 3 days in Zagreb, long enough to receive full SITREPs on the battalion and the many remote signal sites, we were on the road again to Split. This journey went much smoother. Roads were already being improved. Within a week, we were back again in Zagreb.

With the initial installations completed, it was time to settle in and resume our normal battalion administrative, logistics, maintenance, and training systems. Although I felt guilty that I had neglected the battalion headquarters, I had focused my efforts where they were most needed. The signal part of the mission was being accomplished superbly through the expert planning of the CJCCC under the leadership of Colonels Rodakowski and Dempsey, supported by outstanding execution by professional communicators. The first month was over. The next weeks would bring many changes both in the network and in our living conditions. Sites were added in Doboje and Iliadza; so I visited the soldiers out there again just a few short weeks later. For reasons of force protection, the entire brigade in Zagreb was moved out of the Hotel Holiday just weeks after a contract was secured, to be billeted at Camp Pleso in field-type conditions. The staff of the IFOR Support HQs moved into the Hotel Holiday in our place. For some reason, they were not subject to the same force protection rules. But then again, plenty of things did not make sense on this mission.

The greatest challenge for the soldiers was yet to come—the looming boredom once the initial work was over. But the first hectic month was over. Now we were in for the long haul.

CONCLUSION

Our arrival in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) really brought a lot of relief to the leadership and the soldiers. It was a lot like being on the kickoff team waiting for the whistle to blow. Then the game would begin, and we could execute our gameplan. After a time, those great planning ideas that all the Major Command (MACOM) staffs were thinking up were really beginning to detract from the job ahead. It was time to just do it, and do it we did. The resulting communications network has been described as the most complex and successful ever. The keys to the success were the signal and interoperability exercises in Mannheim, Germany, and the decision of NACOSA to reconfigure the NATO 4B satellite. But most of all, the outstanding signal leaders and soldiers really made it happen!

CHAPTER 3

THE BLUE FALCONS IN BOSNIA

Lieutenant Colonel Curtis M. Scaparrotti

PREFACE

This personal experience monograph is an account of the 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team's (ABCT) participation in JOINT ENDEAVOR. I commanded the 3-325 ABCT from June 1994 to April 1996, which included the ABCT's participation in JOINT ENDEAVOR. My battalion was the first U.S. combat unit to enter Bosnia-Herzegovina for JOINT ENDEAVOR. It secured Tuzla Airbase, enforced the Dayton Accord Agreement in the Russian Brigade Sector prior to the Russian Brigade's arrival in theater, and executed designated security missions in the Task Force EAGLE area of operation (AOR) between December 18, 1995, and February 19, 1996.

The 3-325 ABCT, the "Blue Falcons," is a unique, combined arms, rapid reaction force normally stationed in Vicenza, Italy. The Blue Falcons provide the European Command (EUCOM) with a forced entry capability that is deployable in 18 hours. The ABCT is also the American contingent of NATO's Allied Mobile Force (AMF).

It is a subordinate command of the Southern European Task Force (SETAF). The ABCT's parent is the LION Brigade, which was commanded by Colonel James McDonough during this period. Although the LION Brigade did not deploy for JOINT ENDEAVOR, I must note its critical role in the ABCT's training, preparation, deployment, and redeployment. Also, a significant slice of the brigade—e.g., engineers, military police and civil

affairs, military intelligence, medical, communications, maintenance, logistics, and other support personnel—deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina as an element of TF 3-325. Therefore, my reference to the “Blue Falcons” or TF 3-325 includes the fine augmentation soldiers from the LION Brigade.

The 3-325 ABCT is the only unit of its type in the U.S. Army. Its base organization consists of the following:

- Headquarters and Headquarters Company. This company included the Scout Platoon and 81mm Mortar Platoon.
- Three airborne rifle companies.
- The Heavy Weapons Company, E Co. This company included five weapons platoons. Each platoon had four armored HMMWVs that could mount a TOW, 50 cal machine gun, or M60 machine gun. Each platoon had four TOW systems, two 50 cal machine guns, and two M60 machine guns.
- D Battery, 319th Field Artillery. This battery had six M119 105mm howitzers and an organic fire direction center.

The 3-325 ABCT, augmented by elements from the LION Brigade mentioned earlier, was organized into Task Force 3-325, especially tailored to participate in JOINT ENDEAVOR.

This monograph was written from memory and the hasty journal notes that I kept during the operation. I believe the dates and events to be correct. However, any errors in the monograph are mine. My purpose is to provide a personal account of the Blue Falcons’ participation in JOINT ENDEAVOR. It is not a complete account by any measure. For example, the coverage of the exceptional contributions of the Task Force’s combat service support elements is very brief and is worthy of a separate

monograph. My omission of such elements or other events does not imply their insignificance. I simply chose to cover the major missions in the time I allotted to write this monograph.

Finally, this is a salute to the soldiers of TF 3-325. Because of their professionalism and service, the Blue Falcons accomplished every mission.

INTRODUCTION

On the evening of December 18, 1995, soldiers of Task Force 3-325 stepped off the ramp of a C130 aircraft into the cold, snowy night at Tuzla Airbase, Bosnia. The first U.S. combat unit to enter Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Blue Falcons would play a key role in JOINT ENDEAVOR. The purpose of this monograph is to provide a personal account of the Blue Falcon's participation in JOINT ENDEAVOR.

The monograph is organized in chronological order. The Blue Falcons' preparation, deployment, operations, and redeployment follows, covering a time span of mid-November 1995 to March 1996. The final section of the monograph, presenting lessons learned, is focused on company-level leaders preparing for deployment to Bosnia. However, many of these lessons are applicable to leadership in any peace enforcement operation.

BACKGROUND

As the rapid reaction force for EUCOM, the Blue Falcons had been focused on the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina for more than 2 years prior to their deployment. For at least a year prior to my assumption of command in June 1994, the battalion combat team's staff tracked the conflict in Bosnia and maintained a CONPLAN for their most likely employment if the United States intervened. Also, the commander and staff briefed and wargamed the CONPLAN with the 1st Armored Division in Germany. The battalion combat team S-2 shop maintained a large wall map of the

region that displayed the current unit locations of warring factions. In short, the potential employment in Bosnia was a constant in the life of the battalion.

The battalion combat team's frequent deployments to Grafenwoehr and to the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Hohenfels, Germany, focused on the battalion's essential tasks for a combat or a peace enforcement mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our first CMTC rotation in September 1994 was designed around our core Mission Essential Task List (METL) of deliberate attack, movement to contact, and defend. The CMTC rotation coupled with a follow-on training phase at Grafenwoehr provided the battalion 45 days of near continuous training in our fundamental warfighting tasks. After additional home station training in Italy and a break over the Christmas–New Year holidays, the Blue Falcons deployed to Germany in February 1995 for another CMTC rotation.

The second CMTC rotation and the follow-on Grafenwoehr training phase focused upon the battalion combat team's unique mission essential tasks: conduct a parachute assault, conduct air assault, and conduct non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). We also integrated supporting small-unit collective tasks common to peace enforcement missions, such as establish a checkpoint.

The Blue Falcons had executed two intensive training cycles, each over 40 days in length, that trained all of the battalion's Mission Essential Tasks to standard in less than 7 months. However, when the Blue Falcons returned to Italy in late March 1995, we did not realize that our training pace was about to gain greater momentum.

In June 1995 the battalion combat team was alerted to conduct an extraction of encircled U.N. forces in Srebrenica or Gorazde. The United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) established these "safe havens" within Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect surrounded Muslim populations. However, the Serb forces continued to press

their advance around the safe havens, threatening the safety of both the populace and the UNPROFOR. In order to prepare for the extraction mission the battalion combat team deployed to the Grafenwoehr training center with its habitual higher headquarters, the LION Brigade and SETAF.

The plan to extract the UNPROFOR from the endangered safe havens was very complex. The operation included a night time helicopter insertion and extraction with a 2-hour flight each way across the Adriatic Sea and over hostile Bosnian airspace. At the peak period, 98 aircraft were in flight along several flight corridors. Over the next 3 weeks the battalion combat team, as the ground combat element of TF LION (SETAF headquarters and the Lion Brigade), conducted four complete rehearsals, 2 day and 2 night rehearsals, of the extraction of UNPROFOR from the Srebrenica enclave. These rehearsals were controlled and evaluated by Headquarters, V Corps, and subordinate units. They included live-fire exercises and were executed employing realistic flight times by placing refuel points and objectives areas in distant locations within Germany (Kitzingen, Grafenwoehr, and Hohenfels). The night live-fire iterations included Apache, AC-130, and Air Force close air support. By the end of this rehearsal phase the units at the point of the bayonet—the company teams of the Blue Falcons—had executed the air insertion, actions on the objective area, and the extraction 24 times. Following the night certification exercises, we were ready to execute the mission. Initially, our movement to an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) was considered, but we redeployed to Vicenza to await an execute order.

The situation in Bosnia continued to deteriorate, and the battalion was alerted again in late August to extract the UNPROFOR. Once again, we deployed to Germany and conducted refresher training to ensure proficiency in our essential tasks and then redeployed to Italy. Again, the execution order did not come.

This near continuous series of intensive training events, all fully resourced and externally evaluated, placed the battalion combat team at peak readiness in the fall of 1995. Additionally, leader turnover had been carefully managed and the key leaders, both officer and NCO that experienced this intensive training, would lead the battalion combat team during JOINT ENDEAVOR. I doubt that many battalion commanders, other than the Ranger battalion commanders, experience such an ideal training environment. As a result, the 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team was a confident, cohesive, and ready team when it got the call to lead U.S. forces into Bosnia.

PLANNING AND PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

The Blue Falcons received the initial notification to participate in peace enforcement operations in former Yugoslavia on October 10, 1995. The original plan called for an initial entry force, TF LION commanded by Major General Nix, the SETAF Commander, to secure Tuzla Airbase and to conduct operations in the U.S. sector until relieved by TF EAGLE (1st Armored Division/IFOR) scheduled to enter Bosnia across the Sava River. However, as the organization of TF EAGLE evolved, leaders realized that the logistical and communications support for two task forces would be difficult to resource and would create unnecessary complexity. By late October, it was clear that the battalion combat team would enter Bosnia as an attached unit of TF EAGLE rather than TF LION, its habitual headquarters.

Insight and guidance concerning our mission were gained from a series of phone conversations between SETAF and the 1st Armored Division leaders and operations officers. I do not recall a single written document prior to late November 1995. This is not a criticism of TF EAGLE. The TF EAGLE staff was trying to determine their organization and requirements at a time when the Dayton Accord's outcome was unknown. Nor do I think that this was

unusual. In today's environment, a commander and staff must be comfortable with using their judgment and available information to develop a plan. I found this to be the case in our planning for Operation SUPPORT HOPE (humanitarian relief mission in Rwanda and Zaire) executed prior to JOINT ENDEAVOR as well as my experience during Operation ASSURED RESPONSE (the NEO in Liberia) executed directly after JOINT ENDEAVOR.

Despite the uncertainty, the Blue Falcon staff initiated the mission analysis and course of action development on our most probable mission. This early planning was valuable—and fortunate. On November 10, 1995, and with short notice, we were required to brief General William Crouch, the USAREUR Commander, on our concept for entry into and security of Tuzla Airbase. The concept brief, favorably received by General Crouch, provided an azimuth check on our concept, an opportunity to gain his insights on how the initial phase of the operation was expected to unfold, and an unexpected but welcome question on what items of equipment we most needed. Our response, armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) for E Company (Heavy Weapons), led to the delivery of 20 new armored HMMWVs prior to our deployment to Bosnia.

The planning increased in intensity and pace throughout November. The Dayton Accord Agreement was announced on November 21. That evening I received a call from the 1st Armored Division G3. Major General William L. Nash, the Division Commander, wanted me to attend the mission planning conference at their division headquarters the day after Thanksgiving. I learned that the full Airborne Combat Team, which included many brigade slice assets, would be employed. The G-3 requested that we be prepared to brief the CG on our plan to enter and secure Tuzla Airbase.

On November 24, my S3, Major Skip Davis, and I attended coordination meetings with the 1AD staff and

briefed Brigadier General Cherrie, the Assistant Division Commander, on our concept of operations. Brigadier General Cherrie approved our plan and provided the following guidance:

- 3-325 ABCT is the fighting headquarters at Tuzla Airbase.
- Commander, 3-325 ABCT, is responsible for the security of Tuzla Airbase and the tactics employed, including the security patrols in the Tuzla area.
- 3-325 ABCT will have the Air Force Security Police element and two Military Police platoons from 1AD under its Operational Control (OPCON).
- 3-325 ABCT was responsible for the security of 1AD Headquarters (Forward). He added that he did not want a palace guard.

The Secretary of Defense visited Bad Kreuznach and spoke to the TF EAGLE leadership on this day also. I recorded what he believed were the compelling reasons to go to Bosnia:

- The United States had vital interests in the stability of Europe. The conflict in Bosnia was likely to spread if not checked and was too great a risk to ignore any longer.
- This was an opportunity for peace and redefinition that NATO must seize.
- This peace was not possible without U.S. involvement.

He assured the leaders that TF EAGLE would be a robust force with full authority to move anywhere in Bosnia and to use deadly force. Also, he stated that if deadly force were used, our soldiers would have the support of their commanders, his support, and President Clinton's support.

He also provided his timeline for JOINT ENDEAVOR. He expected deployment to commence in mid-December with the force build-up phase lasting approximately 2 months. Reduction of the force and redeployment was envisioned to begin at about 9 months into the operation. Also, he stated that the administration would do all that it could to prevent mission creep.

Major General Nash, TF EAGLE Commander, also addressed the leaders. I recorded his "four main points":

- TF EAGLE will implement the military tasks required by the Dayton Peace Accord.
- We will make the multi-national division work.
- We will assist in the humanitarian aid and civil affairs as much as possible.
- We will protect the force.

Major General Nash stated that our primary threats were the winter, the mines, and the rogue elements. His keys to success were discipline, informed soldiers, a common view of the situation among commanders at all levels, the judgment of leaders, and professionalism.

On November 25-26, we continued the detailed coordination with the TF EAGLE planners and the U.S. Air Force liaison officers. In particular we planned the initial airflow from Aviano Airbase, Italy, into Tuzla Airbase. We agreed on 21 C-130 sorties per day for the first 4 days to insert the battalion combat team.

Additionally, we met Major Angelosante, the commander of the Air Force Special Police element that would be OPCON to the battalion combat team. We discussed their security responsibilities. Essentially, they would be responsible for the security of the tower area, the ramp area, and the aircraft on the ground. The battalion combat team would conduct all the perimeter security

responsibilities. This first meeting was very positive and reflected the effective working relationship that developed during the operation.

On the November 26, I met an Air Force Officer from AFSOUTH who had recently visited the Tuzla Airfield. Colonel Steve Bryan had a wealth of information concerning the physical layout of the airfield, the condition of the perimeter fence, as well as the daily environment. In particular, he stated that the locals entered and departed the base through gaps in the perimeter fence, and that theft was the biggest problem at the base. He told us that large generators had been pulled through the perimeter fence at night without alerting the U.N. security force at the base. His insights refined our plan and helped guide my personal reconnaissance of the airfield later in November.

LEADERS' RECONNAISSANCE

I was one of the ten leaders from TF EAGLE who conducted a reconnaissance of the Tuzla Airbase and the U.S. sector between November 28-December 3, 1995. Colonel Brown, the 1st Armored Division Chief of Staff, led the party. This was an exceptional experience that paid significant dividends throughout the deployment in Bosnia.

The means of entry and the route we took to and from Tuzla were nearly as important as the opportunity to reconnoiter the airbase. We departed Ramstein Airfield in a C-21 aircraft on November 28 enroute to Split, Croatia. Departing Split in U.N. 4-wheel drive vehicles, we drove along the Adriatic coast to Ploce and then turned north through Mostar and Konjic, arriving at Kiseljak just prior to midnight (Figure 1). We stayed overnight at the U.N. compound in Kiseljak. Early the next morning, we loaded Swedish APCs for the second and more dangerous leg of our journey to Tuzla. Recently, U.N. vehicles had been ambushed. In fact, a U.N. captain was slain and his vehicle stolen near Tuzla the day prior to our departure. Therefore, our escort was a Swedish mechanized platoon.

Within about an hour I was reminded of why in my career I had not sought mechanized infantry assignments. Realizing that this trip was going to take about 10 hours, I tapped the gunner on the leg and asked if I could take his place. I remained in the gunner's hatch for the entire journey except during the entry to Tuzla Airbase. The gunner was happy to be out of the cold and asleep on the deck of the APC, and I was equally happy to be breathing fresh air. Most important, I gained an appreciation for the terrain and the environment during the trip that played a significant role in my decisions during our later deployment.

Our route from Kiseljak traversed poor, narrow, snow-covered roads through mountainous terrain. Sheer, long drops on one side of the road were common, and several



Figure 1. Route To and From Tuzla Airbase.

tunnels were encountered which were barely large enough for the APC to pass. The route was from Kiseljak through Visoko, Vares, Ribenica, and Zivinice. The roads steadily improved as we approached Tuzla. Along the way we passed relatively frequent "checkpoints" established by local factions demanding a toll for passage. Many cargo trucks were lined up at the checkpoints while their drivers attempted to negotiate passage. The U.N. soldiers explained that the truck drivers usually had to release some of their cargo to gain passage. However, the U.N. security force's negotiations were direct and effective. We lost little time at the checkpoints.

We arrived at Tuzla Airbase at about noon on November 29. After a short meeting to coordinate our reconnaissance plans, the UNPROFOR provided vehicles and security for my reconnaissance of the area surrounding the airfield. In particular, I conducted a reconnaissance of the two airfields in close vicinity to the airbase, known as Tuzla West and Tuzla East. These were short, single airstrips connected to the airbase by roads that also served as connecting taxiways. Both airstrips were being considered as possible camp locations. Tuzla East was a potential location for TF 3-325's artillery battery and counter-battery radars.

During the morning of November 30, I conducted a reconnaissance of the open area south of the airfield perimeter. I was interested in the trafficability of the terrain and whether the artillery battery could be sited in a field just outside the perimeter fence. The area was extremely muddy and was not cleared of mines except for the dirt road that ran south of the southern perimeter fence. In fact, we mired one of the Swedish APCs in the mud on this trail.

I spent the remainder of this day walking the entire airbase, including most of the perimeter. The airbase had been heavily mined over the years, but there were no mine records. Therefore, my reconnaissance was limited to the paths that the UNPROFOR patrols used along the perim-

eter. Even along these paths, I had to be alert. The UNPROFOR patrols warned us that they had found mines along their "cleared" routes on several occasions.

At one point along the northern perimeter fence, a little girl about 6 years old yelled "boom, boom," and shook her head no. She then pointed to turn back, that the area was mined. I would later learn that a young girl had recently lost a leg due to a mine strike in the same area.

During the next 2 days I was able to meet the UNPROFOR leaders on the airbase, coordinate for our future transfer of responsibility for security, and view all the buildings on the airbase. This coordination included the commander of the UNPROFOR security force, the Danish tank company commander who provided the reaction force, and the U.N. administrators who managed the facilities. These meetings provided significant information about the daily operation of the base and the security vulnerabilities.

The security officer told me that the most significant problem was theft. Penetration of the perimeter fence and theft of the U.N.'s fuel and supplies were common. My belief was that the U.N. security force soldiers were disciplined and competent, but there were far too few soldiers to secure the 9-kilometer perimeter. Also, I learned that 320 U.N. vehicles had been stolen in the past 10 months, and that the "Black Wolves," a Muslim special forces unit, used an undetected penetration of the airbase as a final training standard for their new soldiers.

Additionally, I realized that most of the base was not cleared of mines. Unexploded ordnance was visible while we walked around the base. The only safe place at Tuzla Airbase was on pavement or concrete. Therefore, clearing operations would be required to establish effective security patrol routes and to establish firing points for the battery and the associated counter-battery radars. Finally, the U.N. forces had pointed out that the high water table and clay soil precluded dug-in fighting positions. All our security positions would have to be built up from the surface.

Two significant coordination meetings were held the day prior to our departure. I met with the Danish Deputy Battalion Commander and planned the relief of his security force at Tuzla Airbase. Although this was our only meeting prior to our link up with his forces on the night of December 18, the relief operation was executed with minimal friction. Also, I visited the Norwegian field hospital and coordinated medevac and treatment for our soldiers. At the end of the day, I refined our security plan for the airbase and briefed the 1st Armored Division Chief of Staff. Tuzla Airbase is a relatively small base, and the allocation of limited real estate would be difficult. I wanted to determine early the use of buildings and the location of key elements such as the battalion CP, maintenance platoon, medical platoon, artillery battery, mortar platoon and counter-fire radars. Colonel Brown agreed to about 90 percent of my plan for siting ABCT elements on the airbase. Some of the locations would not be resolved until we arrived on the base.

On December 2, the reconnaissance party departed Tuzla Airbase and began the journey back to Split. We returned on a different route: Zivinice, Ribenica, Zavidovici, Zenica, Travnik, Bugojno, Livno, and Split.

I will never forget driving through one valley at approximately midnight. For over 30 miles we did not see a living creature. The APCs' spotlights, directed right and left of the road to spot an ambush, highlighted barren villages with bullet-riddled homes. Many of the houses had two or three gravesites in the front yard, and the spotlight beams reflected off the headstones and crosses as we passed.

We arrived in Split early on the morning of December 3, got some sleep, and then caught a C-21 back to Ramstein. I transferred to a C-12 and flew back to Dom Lin airfield in Vicenza. The reconnaissance was short and intense, but it was critical to refining our security plan and properly preparing the force for their mission in Bosnia.

While I was in Germany and Bosnia, the battalion conducted sustainment training and prepared equipment

for deployment. The pre-deployment training, coordinated and resourced by the LION Brigade, was excellent. It included a comprehensive mine awareness training program that was developed by the Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Every soldier in the Task Force went through this training program.

The effectiveness of this mine awareness training was demonstrated in Bosnia. Despite daily operations in heavily mined areas, the Blue Falcons experienced no mine strikes while deployed. There were many examples of mines discovered—the right way. For example, one squad, applying the proper techniques, discovered booby traps in a house they were clearing near the Zone of Separation (ZOS). Each of the doorways had been rigged to trip hand-grenades.

Also, platoon Situational Training Exercise (STX) lanes were executed in late November and early December. These training exercises placed the platoons, and particularly their leaders, in a series of situations they were likely to experience in Bosnia. This training also proved to be beneficial to platoon-level leaders. The situational training exercises were:

1. Dismounted STX Vignettes.

- Mine Strike (evacuate casualty; extract from minefield; mark and report a minefield);
- React to Sniper (evacuate casualty);
- Apply Rules of Engagement (encounter armed former warring factions (FWF) element that restricts freedom of movement);
- Apply Rules of Engagement (FWF element leader threatens use of force); and,
- React to Indirect Fire (evacuate casualty).

2. Mounted Vignettes.

- Encounter Roadblock/Checkpoint (apply Rules of Engagement; understand basic Serbo-Croat);
- Apply Rules of Engagement (react to hostile force);
- Mine Strike (apply Rules of Engagement; evacuate casualty from minefield; react to contact); and
- React to Sniper/Built-up Area (react to sniper; evacuate casualty).

The TF staff, led by the Deputy Commander, Major Rich Hooker, continued to work on a comprehensive and detailed plan that included deployment plus relief and security operations in Bosnia. The Operations Order was briefed to the TF leaders on December 6, and company commanders provided brief-backs on the same day. The next day, the Operations Order (OPORD) 96-4 (IRON ENDEAVOR) was published. The TF 3-325 Mission was "On order, 3-325 ABCT inserts by air to secure TUZLA Air Base in support of TF EAGLE peace enforcement operations."

The Commander's Intent was expressed as follows:

I intend to insert the ABCT by air early on G-Day to quickly secure TUZLA Air Base with sufficient combat power to overwhelm or deter any resistance to our presence. Follow-on forces will reinforce security of the airfield and expand our ability to conduct patrols in the immediate vicinity. Keys to our success are force protection, soldier discipline, strict impartiality, freedom of movement, and the ability to dominate any situation. Desired end state is complete security in and around the airfield and the ABCT postured for link-up with 1 AD.

The following day I flew back to Bad Kreuznach for the TF EAGLE OPORD and Rock Drill. These were held on December 8 and 11, respectively. Meanwhile, the battalion combat team purchased and palletized Class IV supplies, loaded vehicles and ISU-90 containers, and conducted equipment inspections. On the December 12, we conducted

a rehearsal for leaders, using a very detailed scale model of Tuzla Airbase. After this rehearsal, I was confident that the Blue Falcons were loaded, trained, and ready to deploy for JOINT ENDEAVOR.

DEPLOYMENT AND INITIAL OPERATIONS

Our Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) was Aviano Airbase, approximately 2 1/2 hours north of Vicenza. At 0630, December 13, the first vehicle convoy departed Vicenza en route to Aviano Airbase. We dispatched vehicles and ISU-90 containers in deployment order to Aviano throughout the next several days. The Vicenza garrison command and the LION Brigade established the Departure Airfield Control Group, executed the staging and inspection of vehicles, and assisted our S-4 at the ammo issue point at Aviano.

A heavy snow began to fall at approximately 1400, and we decided to stop the flow of vehicles to Aviano after the first day's chinks had departed. Additionally, we delayed the departure of troop buses until the afternoon of December 14. Such a snowfall was rare in the Vicenza area; this was the first snow of any significance in the Vicenza region for the past 5 years.

I received a call from Major General Nash at my quarters that evening. He stated that he was sending Mr. Kirk Spitzer, a print journalist, to travel with me into Bosnia. We discussed my comments to the media who would surely be awaiting our arrival at Tuzla Airbase, as well as a few tactical matters. I appreciated this guidance and the fact that he took the time to personally call me prior to our departure.

The execute order, citing G-Day as December 15, was received on December 14, and TF 3-325 began movement of the troops to Aviano Airbase that afternoon. Most of the family members were there to see us depart. Also, many of the major news services were present to film the departure.

The presence of the media was a constant for the remainder of this mission. Journalists were covering the battalion's preparation for the week prior to our departure, and three embedded reporters would travel with me as the combat team flew into Bosnia. As a result, I requested a public affairs officer (PAO) for the battalion. We received a reserve public affairs officer who had served in the same capacity during Operation DESERT STORM. I also assigned one of the ABCT's senior artillery officers as a PAO. This team of two officers was fully employed on a daily basis throughout our deployment. On one day in Bosnia there were 35 media personnel covering some element of the Blue Falcons.

A proactive public affairs plan ensured that the media could get the story without interfering in our operations. In fact, we allowed an experienced film crew equipped with night vision cameras to accompany a platoon on a night patrol. The green-filtered footage was shown on the six o'clock news across the United States that week. Because of a good working relationship with media, the battalion received frequent and positive press.

The deployment plan called for the entire ABCT to deploy into Tuzla Airbase by C-130 aircraft over a 4-day period. C-17s would transport the heavy engineer platoon's equipment and the Bradley platoon. The sustainment and ammo pallets for the battalion would take several additional days of airflow.

The general concept for the insertion of the Blue Falcons was to flow sufficient combat power on the first evening to begin the relief of the UNPROFOR security forces and to secure the airbase in the case of hostilities. Due to the size of the airbase and the airflow constraints on the first evening, we planned to deploy the following combined arms force:

- Two rifle company teams (C Company followed by B Company);
- Battalion assault command post;

- Heavy weapons platoon from E Company (HMMWVs with TOW anti-tank weapons, M-19 grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns);
- Three 105mm howitzers from D Battery with two TPQ-36 counter-battery radars;
- Scout sniper teams; and
- Advanced Trauma Life Support Team (ATLS) led by the battalion surgeon.

This package, coupled with the available close air support, provided the essential combat power to ensure the security of Tuzla Airbase. However, I would not be comfortable with the security until the third rifle company and the remainder of the heavy weapons company arrived in Tuzla. The planned airflow to insert the remainder of the ABCT was:

- Day 2: A Company (-), three heavy weapons platoons from E Company, a TPQ-36 and a TPQ-37 radar section, and the TF Tactical Operations Center;
- Day 3: Remainder of E Company (Heavy Weapons), A Company (-), D Battery (-), and Combat Service Support elements; and
- Day 4: Combat Service Support Elements, and supply and ammo pallets.

The planned deployment on December 15 was not executed due to adverse weather in Bosnia. The snow, fog, and limited instrumentation at Tuzla Airbase prevented C-130s from landing for 3 days. During this waiting period, the Blue Falcons conducted rehearsals and squad training, and rested in the hangers at Aviano Airbase. We were ready to go, and this delay was frustrating for all of us.

The Transfer of Authority (TOA) between TF EAGLE and the UNPROFOR was to occur on December 20—in less

than 5 days. The weather delay was causing concern about TF EAGLE's ability to get into Bosnia with sufficient command, control, and combat power to execute the TOA as planned. During the delay, we were asked to consider options for entry into Bosnia. Earlier in the year, the ABCT had developed a CONPLAN that inserted the ABCT into Bosnia by vehicle road march. The route from Italy would take the Task Force no more than 3 days travel from Aviano, Italy. Two courses of action were considered. One option was to road march the TF through Croatia to Tuzla, similar to the reconnaissance route that I had taken earlier in the month. The other course of action included a route through Zagreb to the bridges between western Serbia and eastern Bosnia. Of course, either option was a significant change in the plan and required coordination, including country clearances. The TF staff refined these COAs until we received word on the night of December 17 that only the TF EAGLE TOC would go in by ground if the weather continued to delay air insertion. This was an interesting planning exercise. These options were feasible, but probably not acceptable politically.

The weather cleared on December 18, and the airflow was initiated. However, the number of available aircraft was impacted by the delay, and the Blue Falcons learned that our planned sorties would be cut by approximately 50 percent each day. This meant that the closure of the TF would now take approximately 8 days.

Finally, five C-130s departed Aviano at 1600 en route to Tuzla. It was a good feeling to be on our way. During the flight I noted that our aircraft, the lead C-130, had released chaff and I asked the load masters about it. I was told that our C-130 was painted by an air defense radar system as we crossed Bosnia, just a reminder that this was not a training exercise. Otherwise, the flight was uneventful; on our second approach attempt, we made a successful landing in the snow and fog at Tuzla Airbase. It was 1807, December 18, 1995.

The Blue Falcons exited the aircraft as soon as the ramp hit the tarmac, and they fanned out to their pre-planned link-up points with U.S. Special Forces soldiers from 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces. The SF guides were added late in the planning process, but I favored the change. I was confident that they would ensure a smooth link-up of our force with the UNPROFOR security force. The 1st Battalion, 10th SF soldiers were well known by our leaders; we had worked with them frequently during the extraction rehearsals during the past year. This habitual relationship enabled us to conduct link-up and movement with minimal confusion despite the fact that we had coordinated their assistance telephonically. Our leaders were familiar with one another, and our soldiers were familiar with each other's standard operating procedures.

While the rifle platoons moved to link up with the UNPROFOR security forces and to establish their security positions, I provided a brief statement to the media pool waiting just beyond the runway. Then I moved to the Special Forces TOC and received a situation update from their intelligence NCO. Afterward I located the UNPROFOR Security Force Commander, Captain Martel, and visited the U.N. Base Commander, Colonel Botten.

The meeting with Colonel Botten was a bit surprising. Although we had met and discussed my plan during the reconnaissance earlier in the month, he stated that my soldiers were not to occupy any security positions along the perimeter and that he expected my soldiers to stack arms until the official TOA on December 20. I explained to Colonel Botten that the TF EAGLE commander expected me to secure the base with U.S. forces, and I intended to do so. I reminded him that our plan called for joint patrols and security at the entrance gates until TOA. Colonel Botten was polite, but insisted that he was in command and that I would follow his orders. At that point, I told Colonel Botten that I took my orders from Brigadier General Cherrie, the TF EAGLE Deputy Commander, and that I intended to drive on with my plan. I saluted and departed his office. I did

not see Colonel Botten again. The transition between the UNPROFOR security forces and our force proceeded smoothly.

This was the only friction between the UNPROFOR and TF EAGLE that I witnessed. If one considers the sacrifice and work of the U.N. in Bosnia prior to our entry, his reaction, as the U.N. Base Commander, could perhaps be understood. Nonetheless, it was an unexpected challenge during my first in Bosnia.

My guidance to the company commanders was to jointly occupy the UNPROFOR security outposts and to ease into patrols along the base perimeter. Arriving during limited visibility, I wanted to ensure that our soldiers became familiar with the area and that we did not experience a mine strike due to haste. Any patrols would be with UNPROFOR patrols in the lead to learn their cleared routes, to become familiar with their assigned security areas, and to ensure joint coordination of UNPROFOR and TF activities. As additional Blue Falcons arrived and our engineers checked areas for mines, we would expand the perimeter and patrol routes around the airbase.

It was extremely cold, and a heavy snow fell throughout the first night. This would be the first of many snowy, cold nights on a checkpoint or patrol in Bosnia for the Blue Falcons. The soldiers worked through the night to improve their positions. C Company, responsible for the main gate entrance to Tuzla Airbase, made a noticeable difference in the security posture at the front gate. Over the next 24 hours, the Blue Falcons built hasco bastion barriers to prevent a forced entry at the gates and established sandbagged security bunkers around the perimeter. In accordance with Brigadier General Cherrie's instructions, it was clear that there was a new sheriff in town.

The leaders and soldiers of the 10th Company, Swedish Army, provided excellent coordination and assistance throughout the relief operation. Although we continued to work together, the Blue Falcons assumed greater

responsibility for the base security as time progressed. At 0300, December 20, the relief of the Swedish security force at the base gates was initiated, and at 0600 the Blue Falcons assumed full responsibility for the security of Tuzla Airbase.

At the time of the relief, the Blue Falcons had 352 soldiers on the ground, including a heavy weapons platoon, an artillery section, and a counter-battery radar section. The Blue Falcon TOC set up in a warehouse near the TF EAGLE TOC, and our Aid Station was established in what had been the base commander's quarters. The company commanders established platoon living areas in interior base buildings or in the aircraft bunkers in the vicinity of their security positions. This was done to increase the protection of our force. The airbase had been shelled in the past year and was directly below the Serb positions on Mount Vis. Also, I recalled the bombing of the troop barracks in Lebanon and wanted to disperse our soldiers. Despite our best efforts, approximately one-third of the battalion had to be billeted in tents. We sandbagged these sleeping areas, but I was never comfortable with the tent city. Lined up in one of the parking lots, the tents were an inviting target.

The first few days in Tuzla were hard for the soldiers. They established their positions and executed their first security patrols. Until all the ground forces closed, each platoon pulled extended security periods and an increased number of patrols. When not on their security positions, the rifle platoons were filling sandbags. The Blue Falcons used over 80,000 sandbags during their deployment in Bosnia.

As we became more familiar with the base and the surrounding areas, we began to adjust our security plans. The B Company Commander, Captain Scott McCulloch, uncomfortable with the distance and broken visibility between Combat Outpost (COP) November at the West Gate and A Company's COP Falcon at the Main Gate, established COP Bravo along the western perimeter. Also,

increased civilian activity and limited visibility at the eastern end of the runway where the C-17s were off-loaded required us to establish a COP at the southeast and southwest ends of the base perimeter. Alpha Company would occupy these positions and patrol the southern perimeter of the base.

All of these positions had to be cleared of mines before occupation and before trails could be established to expedite supplies. As a result, the battalion's two engineer platoons were among the busiest soldiers in the TF. Their job was dangerous, but essential. Any place where there was a need to move off the roads on the airbase, our engineers were called to clear the area first.

The heavy engineer platoon was in constant demand, particularly during the initial weeks prior to 1AD's crossing of the Sava River. They repaired the existing roads, and built new roads to expedite traffic past the TF EAGLE HQ and to route traffic around the airfield ramps and runway. They also repaired drainage culverts, performed essential facility maintenance, and prepared the foundations for the military bridges. Each morning we reviewed the priority of work for each of the engineer platoons. I wanted to ensure they were doing the right jobs among the many requested, and that they were rested enough to do the work safely.

One of the difficult problems we faced early in the deployment was locating a mine-free site for D Battery's six M-119 howitzers. We initially planned to build a firebase in a field just south of and connected to the base perimeter fence. However, the time required to clear this field and the deep mud in the area required that we look elsewhere. Given the need to place the full battery into action as soon as possible, the D Battery Commander recommended a novel solution. Captain Robert Pierce recommended that we place the battery in a tactical formation on the parking lot in the center of the base. This would require cutting a ring through the blacktop to allow them to swing the tube in a full 360 degree arc. The gun sites, ammo points, and FDC would be

sandbagged for force protection. That is what we did. D Battery remained in this location until the lot was required for a tent city to accommodate the growing number of soldiers at Tuzla Airbase. After a week of searching for another acceptable position, D Battery displaced their tubes in a linear formation just to the south and parallel to the runway. It was their fate to labor in the mud along the runway until their redeployment.

On December 22, a coincidence occurred that electrified both the Blue Falcon and TF EAGLE TOCs. The counter-battery radar crews reported three mortar round acquisitions and the call "Red leg!" pulsed across the command nets. "Red leg" was the code word that a counter-fire mission was in progress. Just as this occurred, several distinct, loud blasts reverberated along the southern portion of the airfield. At the time I was moving in my HWMMV on the southwestern end of the perimeter and believed that the explosions were artillery rounds impacting someplace south of the airbase. In about two minutes D Battery reported that the tubes were laid and ready to execute the counterfire mission. Brigadier General Cherrie and I talked briefly on the command net. No one had seen the impact of the rounds, and he wisely directed a checkfire until we had more information. In a short time, the TF EAGLE HQ received a radio call from the Danish Battalion to inform them that their tank company was firing on an expedient gunnery range south of the airfield. Most leaders in the TF EAGLE or the Blue Falcon TOC, or those listening on the command net, remember this incident. It was the first target acquisition, and it was reinforced by what sounded like artillery fire in close proximity to the base. Also, this occurred at a time when both factions remained armed and their reaction to our presence was still uncertain.

By Christmas Eve 1995, the majority of the battalion combat team was in Bosnia. For most of the Blue Falcons, this would be a Christmas Eve to remember. The press was extremely active at Tuzla Airbase. We had been in Bosnia

less than a week. It was Christmas Eve. What a great newscast! The battalion TOC was filmed giving the familiar "Good Morning, America!" greeting. Many reporters interviewed soldiers for the evening news, and several news crews spent the night with our soldiers in their bunkers or on their combat outposts.

Christmas Eve was busy in other respects too. The amount of stray gunfire along the perimeter was greater than the norm. This was celebratory fire—"shlivovitz fire"—and was not directed at our positions. However, two incidents did get our attention on this evening. At both COPs Alpha and Lima, the northern and northeastern airbase gates, a car full of men accelerated toward the barriers and came to a screeching stop just prior to reaching the gate. In both cases, one individual was firing a pistol into the air. The security force at both locations prepared to open fire on the vehicle, but did not do so. The squad leader in each case demonstrated exceptional calm and discipline. We could not have blamed them had they decided that the car was not likely to stop and had given the command to fire.

We did not have another incident such as this during the remainder of our deployment. However, we did experience attempts to breach the perimeter. In each of these cases, we usually fired an M203 illumination round just above the individuals. This was sufficient threat to cause them to run.

Also on Christmas Eve, a UH-60 carrying NATO and IFOR officials was forced to land due to transmission failure. The Blue Falcon Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was alerted and flew to the site near Banja Luka to secure the aircraft, crew, and passengers. The QRF, led by the A Company Commander, Captain Bill Burleson, was briefed and ready to launch via UH-60s in less than an hour. The downed aircraft landed in a field just forward of one of the faction's lines. Captain Burleson secured the crew and passengers, established a perimeter around the aircraft, and made contact with the warring factions in the area.

Weather continued to deteriorate over the next 2 days, and extraction of the downed helicopter and the QRF was not possible. The Bosnians in the area offered their homes to allow the soldiers an opportunity to briefly escape the harsh weather. Also, the battalion sent a convoy to resupply the QRF. After 3 days, their extraction was executed, and they returned to Tuzla Airbase.

December 24 was also the date of our first foot patrol into Dubravnic, the town just outside the airbase. From this date until our redeployment, the Blue Falcons executed foot patrols and vehicular patrols in the areas surrounding Tuzla Airbase. Often the patrols would pass through the factions' camps in order to exercise the IFOR's right to move anywhere in Bosnia and to allow the collection of detailed intelligence on the layout and personnel in the camps.

Each of these patrols consisted of a combined arms team with fire support officers, tactical air liaisons, and medical support. A complete patrol plan including fire support was coordinated with the battalion staff, and the entire patrol was debriefed by the S2 afterwards. The TF EAGLE G-2 frequently lauded the intelligence gained by these patrols. The performance of the platoon leaders and squad leaders in executing these patrols was exemplary. I was always impressed with the attention to detail these leaders demonstrated. When the Blue Falcons departed Bosnia, we had executed over 1,400 reconnaissance and surveillance patrols.

On December 25, E Company (Heavy Weapons), commanded by Captain John Lightner, secured the first Joint Military Commission (JMC) meeting held by the TF EAGLE Commander with the warring factions' leaders. Also, at about 1100 on the same day, E Company linked up with elements of 1st Battalion, 1st Cavalry, the first elements to cross the Sava River.

Throughout the remainder of the deployment, the Blue Falcons ensured the security and support of TF Eagle elements at Tuzla Airbase. The service provided by the Task

Force's Supply and Transportation Platoon, Medical Platoon, Maintenance Platoon, and Mess Section was exceptional. These elements supported all the Army and Air Force personnel at Tuzla Airbase until the 1st Armored Division's combat service support units relieved them. In some cases the relief did not occur for approximately 4 weeks.

For example, the TF Mess Section established and operated the TF EAGLE Dining Facility and served between 1,500 and 2,500 breakfast and dinner meals daily. The TF Medical Platoon, led by our Battalion Surgeon, incorporated the Air Force's and 1st AD's medical personnel and established the TF EAGLE medical facility on the airbase. Our Headquarters Company's Arrival Airfield Control Group (AACG) executed the coordination and control of personnel and supplies moving through Tuzla Airbase. Also, the Supply Section established and operated the break-bulk point, while the battalion ammo personnel established and operated the TF EAGLE ammo storage site. The Blue Falcon Maintenance Platoon provided equipment repair and service to all the TF EAGLE elements. The robust MTOE of the ABCT and the excellent officer and NCO leadership in these elements made this level of support possible. I was constantly surprised by their ingenuity and ability to do so much with so few resources. The contribution of these CSS elements to arming, fueling, fixing, and feeding TF EAGLE elements in the initial weeks of JOINT ENDEAVOR was enormous.

OPERATIONS IN THE RUSSIAN BRIGADE SECTOR

On January 1, 1996, the Blue Falcons received an unexpected mission. During the TF EAGLE evening staff update, Major General Nash stated that the Russian Airborne Brigade would not arrive in Bosnia until early February. He directed TF 3-325 to assume responsibility for the Russian Brigade Sector and to ensure the factions met the D+30 requirements. Also, he directed that we open the

east-west roads crossing the Zone of Separation (ZOS) as soon as possible.

As the staff began planning the operations in the Russian Brigade Sector, I made a reconnaissance of the ZOS along Route Georgia. Route Georgia had been cratered at the ZOS, and both factions claimed they did the job. It was extremely well done! The cratering charges had been placed so that the hillside was cut out both above and below the road. Our engineers and a bridge company from 1st Armored Division would bridge this crater on January 13, opening the road for the first time since the war began.

The S3 and I briefed Brigadier General Cherrie on our operations plan for the Russian Brigade Sector on January 4. The plan was relatively simple. First, we would meet the senior leaders of both former warring factions in the brigade sector to coordinate the separation of their forces and to gain their assistance in clearing the major roads in the sector. Our intent was to ensure compliance with the Dayton Accords and to advance freedom of movement in the sector. The D+30 requirements stipulated that the former warring factions would evacuate the ZOS, declare all heavy weapons, and consolidate the weapons at designated sites no later than January 19.

Our priority would be to first clear Routes Georgia and Kansas between Simin Han and Lopare and Priboj; then Route Kansas between Lopare and Brcko, and Route Georgia between Priboj and Zvornik. (See Figure 2.) In clearing these roads and the surrounding areas, we would require the former warring factions to detect and clear all mines. Our forces would provide security for the clearance operations and ensure that both factions adhered to the Dayton agreements.

Brigadier General Cherrie approved our plan, and I departed on the same day for Lopare. The force consisted of my Alternate Command Post (ACP), the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), an Advanced Trauma Life Support Team (ATLS), an engineer element, and a reinforced heavy

needed from his forces. This coordination meeting was typical of those with other Serb commanders. They did not like to get directly to business. Usually they would offer coffee and talk for about 20 minutes. Often the discussions would involve their perspective of the war and why the American press had it wrong. They would sometimes ask for our personal views or our opinion of the Croat-Muslim forces. During this first visit to Lopare, the brigade XO said something that I've always remembered: "If the U.S. stayed in Bosnia for 100 years, there will be peace for 100 years." He did not have to tell me what would happen if the United States left Bosnia.

After the small talk, we would get out a map and chart our plans for the day, explaining where we needed their soldiers and what type of capability was required. They always had an officer writing down what was said in each meeting. The Serb commanders were frank about their concerns and stated any preconditions. However, they met their agreements every time. Their subordinate leaders were always knowledgeable of their requirements and of our intentions. This indicated an effective, professional chain of command. They always provided a liaison officer to travel with us.

The experience was not similar with the Croat-Muslim commanders. They tended to be harder to establish a meeting with and more formal once the meeting was underway. They went directly to the business at hand, agreed with everything, and then met about 50 percent of their agreements. We generally had to ask for a liaison officer. I never figured out if their failure to have leaders and soldiers at the appointed time and place with the right equipment was deliberate or if it was due to a less professional chain of command. I suspected that it was actually the latter.

Our operation to clear each of these major routes and the surrounding ZOS followed a common model. I would make prior coordination with the senior commanders, usually

brigade commanders, of the warring factions on each side of the ZOS. At an agreed date and time, one of our security forces, usually a heavy weapons platoon, would link up with the company or battalion commander of one faction and provide security as his engineer force cleared the road of mines and debris. They would clear the road to the center point in the ZOS. Meanwhile the opposing faction commander would clear the road from the opposite direction with security provided by another of our security elements.

Usually the Deputy Commander, the S3, or I led one security element and the E Company Commander led the other element. When the forces met at the mid-point in the ZOS, I usually invited the commanders to walk the road with me. If they showed any hesitation, I required them to clear the road again. In any event, we walked the road before our vehicle convoy traversed it.

In most cases we left a security element to patrol these road nets to ensure that they stayed clear and to encourage the locals to use the road. Most of these roads had not been used during the 4 years of the war. Clearing them was not a simple task.

Our operations in the Russian Brigade Sector took place throughout January. Clearance operations as described above were executed January 4-6 and 10-13. The clearance operation to open Route Carolina was a little more precarious. The areas near Sapna and Priboj were hotly contested during the war and heavily mined. However, we opened the road networks, and the former warring factions began to pull out of the ZOS just prior to the deadline of January 19.

On January 13, the engineer platoon and a 1st Armored Division Engineer Company emplaced a medium girder bridge across the crater on Route Georgia. This opened a direct route between Lopare and Tuzla, simplifying our reconnaissance and security patrols into the Russian Brigade Sector. In order to secure the medium girder bridge, we established COP Shark on key terrain above the bridge.

This COP was manned by a reinforced rifle platoon from A Company from January 14 until relieved by a Russian airborne unit on February 1. To ensure responsive fire support, we coordinated with the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division and, when required, displaced a two-gun section of our D Battery to Simin Han. On January 18, E Company established another COP—COP Metal—along Route Kansas in the ZOS.

The Blue Falcons executed ZOS enforcement missions in the Russian Brigade Sector during January 18-21 and 23-30. Most often the Deputy Commander or the S3 led a reinforced security element to check compliance with the D+30 requirements in specific areas in the ZOS. We coordinated the ground movement with air reconnaissance craft whenever the weather allowed. Beginning on January 18, I flew the ZOS once a day to check for heavy weapons or troops in the ZOS. We experienced only a few violations of the Dayton Accords during these missions. The DCO confiscated several heavy machine guns. Also, our engineers disabled a Serbian T-54 tank with thermite grenades. The policy was to destroy heavy weapons that had not been moved out of the ZOS in accordance with the Dayton agreements.

During January 18-21, the Blue Falcons were stretched pretty thin. The rifle companies continued to secure Tuzla Airbase, provide an airmobile QRF, and occupy COP Shark on Route Georgia. E Company also manned COP Metal along Route Kansas, provided heavy weapons platoons for the ZOS enforcement missions, and provided escort for our logpacks and the mobile QRF to TF EAGLE. The average odometer reading on E Company's new armored HMMWVs was 2,200 miles at the end of January, a good indicator of E Company's OPTEMPO.

On January 18, I informed Major General Nash that we could not provide the mobile QRF, support the operations in the Russian Brigade Sector, and meet the need to maintain and rest one heavy weapons platoon a day. I was concerned

about the increased security risk we were assuming by decreasing security elements at Tuzla Airbase. He directed that we continue our mission in the Russian Brigade Sector. He also directed the G-3 to task a tank platoon to serve as a mobile QRF for Tuzla in the interim.

The mission in the Russian Brigade Sector was challenging and extremely interesting. It provided an insight to the former warring factions, the people, and the war's impact that was not as clear at Tuzla Airbase. The destruction in the towns near the ZOS was sobering. Entire villages were destroyed, standing as ghost towns. We learned to identify the signs of ethnic cleansing. We watched Serb families leave their homes on New Year's Eve because the Dayton Accords turned their land over to the control of Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation forces.

Also, we watched the Serb families celebrate their first peaceful Christmas with their families in 4 years. Many pigs were slaughtered in the few days prior to the holiday, as each family gathered in their yard to roast a pig and celebrate.

Another memorable event happened during one operation in the Russian Brigade Sector. While clearing the road to Celic, one of the Bosnia-Herzegovina soldiers recognized that the Serb company commander had been his professor in high school. He shouted "Professore!" and asked to go meet him. Despite having been enemies, they were soon exchanging information about the students they both knew. They wanted to know who had been killed or wounded in the war. The soldier went back to his lines and returned with several other soldiers who had also been this commander's students. They shared a cigarette and talked for quite some time.

On January 15, I visited the Russian Airborne Brigade Commander at his headquarters in Ugljevik to provide a relief-in-place briefing. This was an event that I would not have believed possible 10 years ago. A U.S. airborne

battalion commander was executing a relief with a Russian airborne brigade commander.

The meeting was not what I had hoped it would be. The Russian commander was brash, stating that he was too busy and then leaving the room. Therefore, the S-3 and I provided the information to his executive officer, who impressed me. The XO was attentive and asked perceptive questions. It was a good exchange. However, before we had finished, the commander returned and told us that he needed the conference room. Our exchange was over.

Fortunately, however, our junior leaders and soldiers did develop a better working relationship with the Russians. We continued to execute ZOS enforcement missions within the Russian Brigade Sector throughout January. We executed a formal relief-in-place of COPs Shark and Metal on January 1-2, 1996, respectively. The exchange of positions with the Russian Brigade drew extensive press coverage and was a good way for the Blue Falcons to close their operations in the Russian Brigade Sector.

RELIEF AND REDEPLOYMENT

Redeployment of the Blue Falcons was a subject of extensive discussion throughout our deployment. The 3-325 ABCT and the Marine contingent in the Sixth Fleet were EUCOM's rapid reaction forces. In order to free the Blue Falcons for potential contingency missions, our involvement in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was intended to be approximately 30 days in length. The initial planning called for our relief by a battalion of the 82d Airborne Division. The 4th Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment was designated, and their staff visited us in Vicenza prior to our deployment. We continued to coordinate with the 4-325 AIR after our deployment to Tuzla.

Another aspect of our redeployment was an agreement between Major General Jack P. Nix, Jr., and Major General

Nash that we would redeploy elements of TF 3-325 when their capability could be replaced by 1st Armored Division elements. The size of TF 3-325 increased during the initial deployment to a high of approximately 920 soldiers on December 27, 1995, and then decreased steadily until the redeployment of the main body. This manning policy affected primarily the following elements of TF 3-325:

- The LION Brigade Forward Support Company (-) assisted in operations of the Arrival Airfield Control Group, materiel handling equipment services, maintenance services, and medical services.
- The 3-325 ABCT Mess Section operated the TF EAGLE Dining Facility.
- D Battery, 319th Field Artillery Regiment provided fire support.
- The Heavy Engineer Platoon provided road repair and limited construction capability.

These elements redeployed, sometimes in groups of two or three soldiers, directly from Tuzla Airbase to Aviano Airbase on the C-130s that made resupply runs several times a week. D Battery and the Heavy Engineer Platoon redeployed as units.

By the end of January 1996, the 1st Armored Division Artillery and sufficient engineer assets were deployed in Bosnia to provide complete coverage in the TF EAGLE sector. Therefore, D Battery prepared for redeployment during the last week of January and departed Tuzla on C-130s on January 31. The Heavy Engineer Platoon redeployed to Aviano on February 7.

The troopers of D Battery and the Heavy Engineer Platoon had endured the snow, rain, and knee-deep mud in order to do their job. Throughout the operation, D Battery was always ready to provide responsive and accurate fires, and the engineers demonstrated perseverance and

creativity in accomplishing every assigned task. Their contribution to JOINT ENDEAVOR, when they were the only show south of the Sava, was critical in those early, uncertain days.

Although the remainder of the Blue Falcons had little idle time, the million-dollar question as I visited the combat outposts was, "What is the latest on redeployment?" I always believed, and told the soldiers and their families from the first, that we would return when the job was done, most likely in about 60 days.

In early February the momentum of the redeployment planning picked up. EUCOM wanted the 3-325 ABCT to prepare for possible contingency missions. Trouble was brewing in Algeria, Central Africa, and Liberia, and the JCS contingency planning for an Initial Force in the Golan Heights included 3-325 ABCT.

On February 3, we received a USAREUR FRAGO, through TF EAGLE, that directed our redeployment. During this week the staff worked both the redeployment planning with the TF EAGLE staff and future training plans with the LION Brigade staff.

On February 10, we learned that 4-325 AIR was not going to replace us in Tuzla. Although 4-325 AIR was trained and completely packed for deployment, their deployment was canceled. This presented the problem of a replacement, and the TF EAGLE staff began work on the options. On or about February 11, the decision was made to form a composite unit under 5-3 Air Defense Artillery Regiment to assume responsibility for Tuzla Airbase. This unit was called TF Striker, consisting (to the best of my memory) of the following elements:

- 3d Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment,
- C Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Cavalry,
- 212th MP Company.

Our combined staffs went to work immediately to determine the best method for the relief-in-place at Tuzla. This was not a simple problem since the units were not even remotely similar. We also initiated a training program for their NCOs and soldiers that focused on the predominantly infantry-related tasks required by the mission.

The relief operation took 4 days to execute. Basically, TF Striker's key leaders conducted a reconnaissance of their positions and patrol routes 1 day prior to the assumption of responsibility for the COP. We conducted the relief of the southern portion of the perimeter first. The major phases of the relief were:

- February 14: TF Striker Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Wolfe, and I walked the entire perimeter.
- February 16: Key leaders reconnoitered COPs Oscar, Romeo, and Delta. Joint, day, and night patrols were executed.
- February 17: TF Striker occupied COPs Oscar, Romeo, and Delta. 3d Battalion, 4th Cavalry relieved platoon on Hill 425. Key leaders reconnoitered COPs Alpha and Lima and Observation Posts 1 and 3. Joint, day, and night patrols were executed.
- February 18: TF Striker assumed responsibility for Tuzla Airbase security. TF 3-325 ACP co-located with TF Striker TOC. TF Striker occupied COPs Alpha and Lima and OPs 1 and 3. Key leaders reconnoitered COPs Bravo and November. Joint, day, and night patrols were executed.
- February 19: TF Striker occupied COPs Bravo and November. Relief-in-Place was completed.

TF 3-325 units deployed to the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) in Taszar, Hungary, as they were relieved.

On February 11, TF 3-325 began coordination with 21st TAACOM at the ISB in Hungary. Their mission was to receive, refit, and redeploy the Task Force to Italy. On February 14 we issued the TF Redeployment Order, and flew the Deputy Command Post (DCP) and Advance Party to Tazsar on February 16. Under the command of the Deputy Commander, Major Bob Avelle, this advance party coordinated the reception, refit, and redeployment of the Task Force in detail.

TF 3-325 departed Tuzla Airbase in three ways: convoy to the ISB, airmobile to the ISB, and direct flight to Aviano Airbase, Italy. The TF convoys departed Tuzla on February 17 and 19 at 0730. I was pleased that all the vehicles completed the road march to Hungary without a maintenance problem. The airmobile operations were executed with "Big Windy," the CH-47 company, on February 17, 19, and 20. Finally, the TF Executive Officer, Major Greg Muilenburg, stayed behind at Tuzla and supervised the redeployment of our oversized vehicles and ISU-90 containers directly to Aviano Airbase on C-17 and C-130 aircraft.

In the ISB at Tazsar, the Task Force turned in their ammo; inspected, repaired, and replaced our equipment as necessary; and rested. We also planned and executed the redeployment by rail and C-130 to Aviano, Italy. On February 23-24, the Task Force loaded 50 rail cars, while soldiers departed the ISB aboard 13 C-130s between February 23 and 25.

On February 26, the direct airflow from Tuzla Airbase was initiated. This airflow entailed approximately one C-17 and 12 C-130s, ending on March 4, 1996.

The redeployment of the Blue Falcons required the movement of 77 vehicles, 23 trailers, 43 ISU-90 containers, 22 pallets, and 657 soldiers. The deliberate and smooth execution of an element of this size by multiple means over a 2-week period was impressive.

CONCLUSION


Although the Blue Falcons' participation in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR spanned only a 2 1/2-month period, its contributions to the operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were uniquely significant. TF 3-325, a light task force, was structured and trained to ensure a rapid, secure entry into the theater and to complement the mechanized forces of TF EAGLE. In addition to the base security mission, the Blue Falcons provided responsive service support elements and a flexible combat force for contingency missions. The day before TF 3-325 departed Bosnia, Major General Nash noted the Blue Falcons' service during the evening staff update. He stated that at first he did not know what he would do with an airborne battalion combat team, but now he did not know what he would do without it.



LESSONS LEARNED


Shortly after the Blue Falcons' redeployment from JOINT ENDEAVOR, I was assigned as the G3, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). While the G3, I used the following slide presentation in a 3-hour block of orientation with company-level leaders that were preparing to deploy to Bosnia. It was based on my experience in Bosnia, aimed at the company commander and first sergeant. Due to positive feedback after the first presentation, company-level officers and senior non-commissioned officers attended the subsequent presentations.



My intent was to provide a picture of what they would experience, emphasizing the fundamentals. I do not believe that there is anything "new" in the lessons learned. In fact, the major thread throughout the presentation is that our Army has excellent doctrine and standard operating procedures and that soldiers must be disciplined in adhering to them. Also, I wanted to impress upon leaders that Bosnia was a dangerous environment. The lack of open conflict must not influence them and their soldiers to relax



their security. Hence, the title emphasizing "combat" leadership.






































CHAPTER 4

THE "IRON DUKES" SUPPORTING OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Jones

At about 0900, December 13, 1995, I received a phone call from Colonel Greg Fontenot, the Commander of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. He told me the Commanding General, Major General William L. Nash, wanted me go to the division Headquarters in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. He said I would help run the division's Deployment Operations Center for the impending deployment to Bosnia. When I asked starting when and for how long, he said if I could make it, by noon (it's about an hour and a half drive), and "for a long time." At the time, I was the Commander of the 2nd Battalion, 67th Armor, the "Iron Dukes," in Friedberg, Germany. After talking to Colonel Fontenot, I gave Major Jim Henderson, my executive officer, the order to take over the battalion, and gave a warning order to Major Dick Tracy, my S-3, to be prepared to bring some staff personnel to help me beginning that afternoon. Then I went home to pack a week's worth of clothes. This event seems in retrospect to be abrupt, surprising, and chaotic, but it was reflective of the lives of most of the soldiers and family members in the First Armored Division during the fall of 1995 through December of 1996. This monograph is the story of my involvement in Bosnia as a Battalion Commander, Deployment Operations Center Commander, and Rear Detachment Commander in the First Armored Division. It is the story, to some degree, of the forgotten soldiers, those who were left behind.

My involvement in Bosnia began indirectly almost immediately after I assumed command in June 1994. I

deployed with the battalion to the Combined Arms Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) 6 days after assuming command. For the first 7 days we performed the normal set of high-intensity tasks of deliberate attack, movement to contact, and defense. Then we transitioned to a peace-keeping phase for 3 days, where we established a zone of separation between belligerents, established checkpoints, escorted convoys, and performed a host of other peace-keeping tasks. The First Armored Division had incorporated these tasks into its training in anticipation of deploying to Bosnia.

For the next 14 months my battalion, along with the rest of the division, continued to train on peacekeeping as well as conventional warfighting tasks. There was always talk of the division deploying to Bosnia if a peace settlement should ever be reached. In fact, the division staff was furiously working on plan after plan on how it would accomplish possible missions it was told to be prepared to do. Fortunately, because of the foresight, discipline, and wisdom of Major General Carter, the division Commander, and subsequently Major General Nash, as well as commanders of the 1st Brigade (Colonels Steve Robinette and his successor Greg Fontenot), the "what if" drills were kept above the battalions. We were able to concentrate on training our units.

We established a semi-annual training event for 2-67 Armor, called either Spring Break or Fall Harvest depending on the season, which trained Bosnian-type tasks at home station. The concept was to take the entire battalion to the field at Friedberg Training Area and practice some of our combat skills, while also training on peace operations tasks. The scenario we used was that the battalion had been deployed to Bosnia to enforce a peace plan. We were in an assembly area as the division reserve and were preparing for combat operations while refining our skills with some last-minute training. Inherent to that was protecting ourselves with normal security measures

and dealing with some of the other troublesome issues we would likely face on an actual deployment.

Fortunately, there was a road that ran through Friedberg Training Area that the local Germans liked to use as a shortcut between several towns. I decided to use two checkpoints along this road to control access and give our soldiers the practice of running a checkpoint with real civilians who unwittingly became our training aids. Since many soldiers did not speak German, we had to develop ways to explain to the civilians that we were training in the area and wanted to caution them to drive carefully and watch for maneuvering tanks. The soldiers had to deal with sometimes belligerent or ill-tempered Germans who were in a hurry, while remaining polite but firm. Sometimes they had to hold up civilian traffic while a military convoy used the road, again having to keep the civilians calm, but firmly insisting they wait until they had permission to move. The S-2 produced preprinted slips of paper with a caution in German that the soldiers handed out. We also incorporated role players that represented everything from factions to terrorists to news media personnel. We performed patrolling, convoy escort missions, tank crew gunnery skills tests, tank crew proficiency courses, and other training, all while commanding and controlling the events from the Tactical Operations Center and sustaining ourselves in the field. What we were doing turned out to be more realistic than I could ever have dreamed.

It was during Fall Harvest in early September 1995 that things really began to heat up. Major General Nash had assumed command of the division that summer, and he was flying in one day to visit our training. The United States had recently participated in bombing missions in Bosnia, and it looked like there might be some positive prospects from a conference that was to be held in Dayton, Ohio, to try to come up with a peace agreement.

I briefed Major General Nash on our training plan and showed him some of the training we were doing. We stopped

at a confrontation going on at a checkpoint between a faction (my mortar platoon) and the platoon manning the checkpoint, which was under orders not to allow a faction with weapons through. Staff Sergeant Campbell, one of my mortar section leaders, should have been nominated for an Oscar for the performance he put on as the factional convoy commander. He was a very belligerent, tough, realistic role player. The perplexed platoon leader was getting some excellent training. After eating lunch, a Meals Ready to Eat (MRE), with Captain Kevin Dunlop, my A Company Commander, Major General Nash told me to get my XO and S-3 and a Bosnian map. Also, he had me see if I could get the brigade S-3 to join us.

After lunch, Major General Nash drew a few lines on the Bosnian map, telling us that if the peace process in Dayton worked out and the division was deployed, this was the area the 1st AD would be assigned. He then explained a concept to operate out of base camps, establish a zone of separation, set up checkpoints, conduct patrols, etc. He showed us the 1st Brigade sector, which included a key area called the Possivina Corridor, an area near Brcko that was the only link between Serb areas in the east and west. As he laid out the task organization, he showed 2-67 Armor going, but leaving two tank companies at home and bringing two infantry companies.

As Major General Nash departed, I realized things were really serious, and there was more likelihood than ever that we would be deploying to Bosnia. We could not share this information with the rest of the battalion, but we knew we had to be serious about taking advantage of every bit of our training time, making sure we were ready to deploy and take on the Bosnian winter, ready to enforce the peace, ready to fight if necessary.

Speaking of the Bosnian winter, another event during that period had an impact on me later. Soon after Fall Harvest, we conducted what we called a "TENEX." I had been working for over a year to correct a deficiency I had

discovered very soon after taking command at our first CMTC rotation. Our tentage and heating stoves were in bad condition. We did not have anywhere near what was needed, and what we did have was often not working. This was a result of a general lack of funds to buy anything but the necessities for training during the prior years and the fact that the battalion seldom needed tentage. At Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, the troops lived in hard buildings most of the time. Because we did not know when base camps would be built, I thought it was important we ensure we could house the battalion in the tentage we carried with us. Major Jim Henderson hit on the idea of the TENTEX. We set up every tent and stove in the battalion at the same time on a football field. Leaders were present as I walked through, checking the tents for serviceability and stoves for completeness and functionality. It was actually quite a sight to see a whole battalion's worth of gear set up. We were still short some equipment, and a little was still unserviceable, but I was very proud of what I saw, knowing our status just a year before. It just happened that we were having a command post exercise (CPX) at that time, and the brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was set up near the TENTEX. The Brigade Commander, Colonel Fontenot, saw this magnificent sight as well, which would later cause me a problem.

An incident during another training event a few weeks later in the Czech Republic also indicated that things were very serious. The battalion participated in Cooperative Challenge, a Partnership for Peace exercise practicing peace operations. We provided a response cell, role playing a battalion that was part of a multinational brigade, led by 1st Brigade, 1AD. General William W. Crouch, the commander-in-chief of U.S. Army Europe, visited the exercise. When we were walking from one place to another, he stopped, looked me in the eye, and asked if the battalion was ready to go to Bosnia. I told him we were not ready yet, but would be with a couple more weeks of training. Although that is all he said, I could tell from the way he asked and by his expression that

he was deadly serious. I was convinced at that point that what was happening at Dayton was going to cause the division to deploy.

A few days later I got one of the biggest shocks of my career. At the end of the exercise, Colonel Fontenot asked me to sit down in his office and told me that if the division deployed, he had to leave one of the battalions in the brigade at home. He had decided it would be 2-67. He explained that his rationale was two fold. First, he needed a strong rear detachment commander for the brigade and for all the units who would not deploy. That rang a little hollow with me at the time. Secondly, I was going to change command next June, which was halfway through the deployment, and he wanted to keep the same battalion commanders the whole way through. So 4-67 Armor would deploy and 2-67 would stay at home.

My first reaction was supportive, since I could see that he was having a very hard time telling me. I told him I understood, was not happy about the decision, but would do the best job I could and he could count on the battalion to do what was necessary to support the brigade. Later, after having thought about it, I went up to Colonel Fontenot's office and asked to revisit the issue. I told him that I thought the battalion was the best, most ready outfit to deploy for this mission, and the fact I was leaving would not change that. The fact that I would be replaced was significant, but Dave Neidringhaus, the incoming commander, was a good man and would be as good as me in running the battalion. As I expected, it did not change his decision.

One question I had at the time was whether my wife had an impact on the decision of which battalion would deploy. My wife is a professional woman who has been very successful in her own right as a computer systems analyst. It was no secret she was not particularly happy at having to give up her career for 2 years so I could command the battalion in Germany. She certainly did not fit into the stereotypical "commander's wife" role, that is, someone who

volunteers with alacrity and gets tremendous personal rewards in supporting her husband's unit and career. I would later find out there were really few commanders' wives who did fit into the mold, but that is another story. Regardless, I had told Colonel Fontenot recently that my wife, Pat, was thinking about leaving Germany to go back to the United States to Kansas City to take a job in the spring, a little before my change of command. He had been pretty neutral in his reaction, basically saying he understood and that it was totally our decision. He mentioned I would have to get someone else to pick up the slack in leading the family support group. However, I had an uncomfortable feeling he was displeased and wondered whether Pat's lack of commitment had influenced his decision to leave my battalion behind. I have never directly asked Colonel Fontenot whether that was the case.

Very soon after returning from the Czech Republic, we deployed to Grafenwoehr for our normally scheduled tank gunnery rotation. However, things had developed at Dayton, and it was looking like there would be an agreement. It also was clear that the division was well on the way to deploying. The task organization had changed again, and it looked like I would deploy only one tank company, which would be attached to 3-5 Cav, the brigade's infantry battalion. I would keep three behind, along with the battalion headquarters. 4-67 Armor would deploy its battalion headquarters but leave two tank companies behind. I never did figure out why 4-67 just did not deploy three companies, leaving my battalion intact, and I never met anyone on the division or brigade staff who had any insight as to why the division task organized that way.

I chose A Company to deploy because the commander and 1SG were my most experienced pair, and the leadership within the company seemed to be most able to perform independently. I had the same difficulty with the other commanders that Colonel Fontenot had with me in explaining why they would not deploy.

As I reflected on the emotions I was feeling—disappointment, sadness, bitterness, guilt, and so forth—I realized I needed to figure out why and determine how to deal with them. Otherwise I would not be effective as a commander or be able to deal effectively with the trauma that the rest of the battalion was beginning to go through.

On the surface, not having to deploy to a miserable, cold, wet, disease-ridden country to perform a difficult mission under oppressive strain and with questionable objectives and uncertain political leadership would seem like a good deal. However, I felt genuine disappointment in not deploying. I attributed it to several factors. First, we are taught from an early age that we are part of a team. We become tightly bonded with the team—with the other commanders and units in the organization. Therefore, when you are broken away from the team, excluded to some degree, it hurts your feelings. Although, to his credit, Colonel Fontenot recognized this and went to great trouble not to exclude the Dukes from the brigade's efforts, it was clear that in the minds of some we had immediately gone from being team members to outsiders. It is something that just happens naturally when there are some who do not share the hardships and risks of the others. The second factor was that we are taught that leaders never send their people to do things they are not willing to do themselves. We share the hardships and risks with our men. But here I was, sending some of my soldiers off to God knows what while I would be comfortably at home with my family. Although hard to admit, I was also feeling some embarrassment at not being chosen for something. In the movie "Patton," George C. Scott, portraying General George S. Patton, delivers a speech about when, after the war 30 years from now, when your grandchild on your knee asks what you did in the great WWII, "at least you won't have to say . . . well . . . I shoveled sh—in Louisiana." Somehow, being the Rear Detachment Commander did not seem much better than being the head shovel man. All of these factors made it difficult to deal with having to stay behind. This recognition of why I was feeling

as I did not make the feelings go away, but it did make it possible to deal with my feelings, continue to command, and begin to take actions to deal with the feelings that my officers and men were experiencing.

The two hardest issues to deal with while we were at Grafenwoehr were remaining calm while being treated like second class citizens and maintaining the morale of the battalion.

Although I do not believe there was an intentional snub of the battalion, as soon as it was clear we would not be going to Bosnia, the battalion lost priority for everything, including interest and information. While it was easy to understand why the priorities for ranges would naturally go to deploying units, the lack of information was less understandable and more frustrating. The range availability issue caused a major deterioration in the battalion's training. We were delayed several times and ended up canceling on some ranges. We practically eliminated maneuver training and modified our platoon gunnery qualification. I decided to redeploy the battalion to Friedberg rather than remaining at Grafenwoehr to complete the training to standard. This was because of the uncertainty of resources, and the fact that the deployment to Grafenwoehr was continuing to stretch out with little gain. The lack of information was not deliberate, but the battalion staff found access to the brigade staff dried up—phone calls were taken less often, few calls returned, and meetings occurred where the battalion was not invited to send representatives.

I got some insight into some of the factors causing the problems when Colonel Fontenot had a death in the family and I became the acting Brigade Commander for about a week. During the period I was in command, the brigade staff was working on the real plan for Bosnia, a plan for deploying to Hohenfels, the tactical plan for the CMTC rotation, the redeployment back to home station, and a major fire coordination exercise (FCX). In fact, the FCX was executed

three times. The first time some key leaders were called away (although the training went just fine without them), the second time the Air Force was not able to participate, and the third time was OK, but we had fired most of our key ammunition in the first two exercises. Needless to say, the pressure on the brigade staff was enormous. Simultaneously, we were conducting an accelerated fielding of SINCGARS radios. It was obvious the brigade TOC was not as well organized as it needed to be, but given the conditions I decided not to interfere and just try to help them get through the immediate problems.

An interesting event occurred during that week that had an impact on my future in a different way. Major General Nash called me up and asked me to come to the division Command Post (CP) and spend some time with him. I watched activities in the CP for a while, then watched a training Joint Military Commission that Major General Nash conducted, and then went back into the CP to talk some more. The major impression I had was how disorganized the CP seemed to be—far too many tasks for the people on hand and not organized functionally. Major General Nash had a van that had a large round table in it that was his “thinking area.” But it also had a video-conference (VTC) terminal in it and was on a major route between vans in the command post. A vivid remembrance I have was the stern, rather caustic chewing out Major General Nash gave the G-3 over there being no one monitoring and taking notes on a VTC the Corps was conducting. The relationship between the two was obviously not very close or warm. The other vivid remembrance I have is how exhausted everyone was in the CP. They were all obviously working their hearts out.

I watched a Battle Update Briefing (BUB) where Major General Nash received an update on the situation. Rather than using a mapboard, most of the briefing was done presenting a series of Powerpoint slides on a large monitor. I remember a long line of staff officers coming into a very crowded van, stumbling over each other getting in and out,

not knowing the answers to the dozens of questions Major General Nash kept firing, and then asking for a staff officer who was not in the van (“G-2!!!, get the G-2 in here . . .,” followed by a long wait getting the G-2 back in the van . . . then a question, and the G-2 having to reply, “I do not know sir, I’ll find out”). I’m not sure who was more frustrated, Major General Nash over the staff’s inability to anticipate and know the answers to his questions or the staff’s frustration with a CG who never seemed to be satisfied. It seemed to me the staff was whipped. Later toward the end of the day, Major General Nash asked me what I thought of the CP and what they should do there. I made two comments that I can recall. One was it seemed the Command Post needed to be reorganized along the functional lines necessary for this kind of mission. The other was that I thought the staff needed a little rest more than anything else.

I do not know if it had anything to do with what I said, but the next weekend the division sent most of the staff home for a weekend off. By the time they traveled there and back, there was not much rest, but it was well-intentioned.

I have concluded since then that what was really happening that day was that I was being interviewed for my next job. Later in the week, Major General Nash sat down with me and told me he was not making an offer, but if he asked, what would I think of becoming the division G-3. I said I was very flattered, and that if he had to have an answer right then I would give him one, but knowing the implications, I would prefer to talk to my wife first. He said that was a good idea. I’m not sure if he really thought it was or not, but eventually I would wind up being the G-3 after I changed command.

My greatest lesson from this period was how traumatic it is for those who must stay behind when you split up a unit and deploy part of it. The emotions and trauma are very difficult, demanding positive self-help to mitigate them. Such self-help is very hard to accomplish, given the

pressure, intensity, and rigor of activities and issues that have to be dealt with while you prepare for deployment.

My approach within the battalion was to try to keep things calm. Further, I planned to deal with what would be a major disappointment when it became clear which units would not deploy. Finally, I determined to make the most of the opportunities to develop the unit and our people.

As the Dayton process ended, the battalion was returning to Friedberg. It became clear, despite a lack of actual orders, the division would be deploying, and it looked like the latest plan (excluding most of the battalion) would hold. What I had to tell the troops was (1) the division had no orders to deploy yet; (2) we were obviously planning for the division to deploy if and when we did receive orders; (3) right now, the plan was for only one company in the battalion and two companies in 4-67 to deploy in the package; and (4) the plan had changed so many times before, do not bet on anything. More or fewer units and people could deploy based on a changing situation, and the best thing we could do was to avoid speculation, do our duty, and be prepared if called.

Simultaneously, I discussed with Majors Jim Henderson and Dick Tracy (my XO and S-3) the need to analyze and be ready to accomplish the tasks we would have to perform to support the deployment of the other units and assume command of the rear detachment. The work they did in the next several weeks was admirable. They developed plans for assisting the upload and deployment of the brigade, assuming control of the rear detachments of deploying units, securing the brigade's installations, and running the brigade-level Rear Detachment Headquarters. We decided to establish the Rear Detachment Brigade Headquarters in our Battalion Headquarters building. This was with considerable opposition. Mrs. Fontenot was opposed to us not occupying the brigade Headquarters building at Kirchgoens. However, I felt strongly that this needed to be a battalion mission. The sense of purpose, pride, and

teamwork I felt we could generate by retaining the identity of the battalion was more important than the convenience and symbolism of relocating to the brigade Headquarters. Also, I anticipated that in the long term, we needed to remain a combat battalion, continuing to train and maintain, and not take on the identity (and image) of a rear operations type unit. Colonel Fontenot allowed me to make the call.

About this time, the really difficult problems began for the battalion. As I stated before, we had made a great effort to get our tentage and stoves squared away. We began to be levied for this and other equipment to fill the shortages of deploying units. We also had to begin reassigning some of our people to deploying units. We had cross-leveled personnel to A Company to fill their shortages, and that had created second and third order effects in the other companies. Now we began to get levies for low-density specialties and other special needs. We had to give up our mortar platoon leader and about half of the already short platoon, and we had to create a Brigade S-5 section. These and other personnel changes created domino effects throughout the battalion.

All these changes left me with essentially a new team of new teams. Although most of my key leaders stayed in place, most of their units and sections underwent extensive changes in personnel and roles. Our battalion's mission had changed, and we modified our organization to take on the role of deploying the brigade and running the rear detachment.

Given the situation, I felt I needed to do some significant team development and decided a method I could use would be assigning missions and tasks to allow my company commanders and staffs to rebuild their teams. Therefore, we gave each company a railhead to run, upload site to conduct, installation to secure, or some other important mission, thus exercising troop leading procedures and

gaining the sense of teamwork and satisfaction that comes with accomplishing something to a high standard.

One issue created some controversy with my Base Support Battalion and Area Support Group. I decided to secure the installations at Friedberg and Kirchgoens with guards, and to secure the railheads with guards in combat field gear and with weapons. I had several reasons for that decision. First, during the deployment, I wanted the installations and railheads to remain secure. I had no information that a terrorist threat had developed, but I believed it made sense to mitigate the risk.

More likely, however, was the possibility of criminal activity. At the Friedberg Training Area, there is an old Hawk air defense artillery site. The Hawk battery was inactivated or redeployed long ago, and I remembered the first time I saw it. It looked from a distance like a great facility—nice buildings and maintenance areas. On closer inspection, I noticed parts of roofs missing, windows broken or missing, and most things of value, down to electrical fixtures and outlets, stripped. I learned that local Germans had stripped the facility of all usable items after the battery departed. I was concerned that with a practically deserted post at Kirchgoens and portions deserted at Friedberg, we would see similar problems if we maintained open posts. Finally, there is a significant refugee problem in Germany, and I was concerned that homeless people would be tempted to try to occupy vacated barracks if the opportunity presented itself.

The Base Support Battalion Commander felt securing the installations was unnecessary and would cause more anxiety in the community. There was also a turf battle of sorts. Technically, the BSB is in charge of installation security. However, I found the security plans nonexistent. The security manager for Friedberg was a disabled civilian employee who apparently had no supervision and little purpose. Also, the BSB had no assets to secure the installations. Therefore, in the absence of anything better, I

gave the mission to two company commanders and let them conduct assessments and develop plans. We created a problem for the BSB by securing the installations. Although it was a requirement for civilian employees to have identification cards, the practice had not been enforced in several years. Therefore, we began requiring civilians without the proper documentation to be signed in until cards could be created. This caused some friction between the BSB and the battalion, but ultimately the procedures for security were revitalized throughout the Area Support Group and on other installations in Europe. Ironically, they adopted procedures similar to the ones we created.

Another issue with the BSB was control of the railheads. According to the plan, the BSBs were in charge of railheads. However, BSBs do not have any soldiers to speak of to perform such tasks. All the expertise on how to rail-load rests in the units who do it all the time, not the BSB who never does it. So it made no sense for the BSB to run the railheads with all the labor provided by non-deploying units. Fortunately, the company commanders I assigned to run railheads and the captains whom the BSB assigned to be in charge worked out arrangements on the ground to break out responsibilities. Basically, the company commanders took charge of the unit-related activities and things they had resources for: marshaling, uploading, medical support, security, etc. The BSB leaders were responsible for the transportation-related activities: liaison with the movement coordination teams, scheduling, train inspections, manifesting, etc.

As we continued to work, there were other issues that began to surface that made it clear the concept of "force tailoring" had not been completely thought through. The Army in Europe had not prepared for deploying units to leave behind portions of their organizations. A good example was maintenance. With the brigade's Forward Support Battalion and the division's Main Support Battalion deploying, we did not know who would provide maintenance support to the battalion, the two companies

from 4-67, and now three tank platoons from 1-1 Cavalry, which were not deploying. The solution seemed to be to piggyback on a maintenance unit in Hanau. That seemed a reasonable solution until we talked to the maintenance warrant officer there. He said they could help us with small arms, but he did not have the capability to give us any vehicle maintenance support. This was one of our first indicators of how unsynchronized the overall rear detachment plan was. It would take 2 months before an agreement would be reached that 3d Infantry Division would provide our backup maintenance and parts support.

By December 13, when I received the call to report to Bad Kreuznach, the Dayton Accords had been completed, and we knew deployment was imminent. We were only waiting on the final signing in Paris and the orders to be issued. Although I was unhappy with the situation, I was satisfied we were making the best of it. We were prepared to deploy the brigade rapidly and safely, had started developing necessary relationships with the rear detachment commanders of the other battalions, established contact with family support group leaders, and in general were ready for the challenge that awaited us. It was at that point I received the phone call from Colonel Fontenot telling me to report to Division Headquarters. That created even more significant challenges.

My driver and I moved quickly to Bad Kreuznach, and upon arrival I reported to the Chief of Staff, Colonel John Brown. Colonel Brown told me that the Deployment Operations Center (DOC) needed some help. He expected the division to get the order to deploy soon, and enabling forces were already moving. He told me to go see Gary Addison, the division G-4, and get a tour of the DOC, which was located across from the Division Transportation Officer's (DTO) office and make an assessment of when I could assume control. I went down to Gary's office, but he was not in, so I went down to look at the DOC myself. After looking for a long time, I finally discovered that the DOC did not exist, and that there had not been enough time both to

get ready to deploy and to create a deployment operations center. I went back to see Colonel Brown, told him the DOC required a lot of work, and that I needed to get some more folks from the battalion down to help me, and needed more phones and computers immediately. He said to get whatever I needed, and to bring down whomever I thought was necessary. So I set out to create something I had never even seen before.

I called Major Henderson and told him to get Major Tracy, 1st Lieutenant Chris Hsu (my S-3 Air), and some other staff officers down that afternoon. I talked to the DTO, Major Jay Warren, and immediately determined he did not have the assets in the DTO's office to run the deployment. He was overwhelmed with solving immediate crises and did not have a clear picture of the entire situation. I saw a G-3 planner and found out the G-3 was not really controlling the deployment process either. I tried to piece together what the deployment process was, and was surprised that there was no one in the headquarters that knew more than I did.

That evening, I went to my first "real" Battle Update Briefing (BUB). The Division had set up a command post in the recreation center on post. The CP had been significantly revamped since I had seen it at Grafenwoehr. It had a large map board with the division sector in Bosnia on it, and a couple of large monitors where information was displayed. In principle, the area around the map board was an expanded version of what I had seen in the CP at Grafenwoehr, with the addition of a VTC capability and additional monitors. The big difference, however, was behind the Commanding General's (CG) seat. The division staff was seated at tables tiered behind the CG in a semicircle that looked like a bandstand. Each staff officer had a computer that was hooked into the classified local area network, a telephone, and a small work area. I would later become very involved in this setup, but for now the only thing I could think of was how noisy this place must be in a crisis.

Although the setup had changed in the CP, and it appeared to be organized more on functional lines, some things had not changed in the last month. The long line of briefers paraded in front of the CG were asked very tough questions; many did not know the answers. The very evident frustration was not much different from what I had seen in November. Again, the staff was whipped, except now the deployment was a matter of being a few days away.

That night Major Tracy and I worked well past midnight, trying to determine the best way to organize the DOC. There was the basic housekeeping task of getting the assigned rooms organized to become a command and control center. Then there was the issue of creating tracking charts, phone rosters of key points of contact, and determining what elements of information we needed to track and how information flow would occur. We determined we would need more personnel to help us run the operation. We also decided we needed primarily to track trains. Eventually, we learned we also needed to track aircraft, buses, and convoys.

The next day, in anticipation that we would get a deployment order immediately after the signing of the Dayton Accords (officially the General Framework Agreement for Peace), we continued to deploy the "enabling forces." These were units that would set up deployment nodes along the way. These forces would assist units deploy into the Area of Responsibility (AOR) as soon as we received the deployment order.

On December 14 we continued to learn more about how the deployment system was supposed to work. The more we learned, the more we realized how convoluted the system was. I saw a fascinating chart about this time.

The Battle Command Training Program had sent a team from Fort Leavenworth to observe the division and give us some assistance. General (Retired) Lindsey, the head of the team, visited the embryonic Deployment Operations Center about this time. He showed me a chart the team had created which graphically described the deployment process. There

were boxes, circles, and lines all over the page. So many, in fact, it seemed as if the system had been designed to be so complex and disjointed that it could not possibly succeed. It was apparent why there seemed to be no one in the headquarters that understood exactly how things were supposed to work. There was a comment in red ink, which I later learned was what Major General Nash used. It only said "Wow!"

I have seen numerous articles and speeches in which people have lauded the deployment to Bosnia as a great success. I would categorize it as more of a triumph of the human spirit over an insane system, one that only narrowly averted catastrophe.

The deployment system had changed three times in the preceding month. The one we were operating with on December 14 was extremely complex. The division had determined the priorities for deployment and recorded them on an Excel spreadsheet. This became known as "the flow": a listing by day and unit for each train or aircraft load. This was adjusted by the division as priorities changed, but more often (practically daily), it was adjusted to account for poor execution of the plan. Some reasons, such as aircraft being delayed because of weather, were unavoidable. Others, such as unavailable trains, were clearly avoidable.

In the early stages of planning, I was told by 21st TAACOM representatives that a planning figure of 10 trains per day had been given to Division and corps planners. Although we loaded trains from 23 locations, the limitation to 10 trains per day was based on several factors: number of rail lines in countries we would transit, download sites available in Hungary and Croatia, and rail cars on hand. Despite this advice, planners insisted on scheduling 20 trains per day (no one could ever tell me who specifically was driving this). As a result, many trains were delayed due to lack of cars or lack of rail and download capacity, causing the constant modification of "the flow." Incidentally, when we counted in mid-January, we had achieved precisely 9.7

trains per day to that point, thus vindicating the original planning figure given us.

Ideally, the way the system should have worked is for the division planners to have told someone (presumably 21st TAACOM, since much of the V Corps staff was deploying to assume the role of USAREUR Forward in Hungary) what the required delivery dates (RDDs) for each unit were. Then the deployment headquarters, again presumably 21st TAACOM, would develop and issue a deployment plan which included transportation mode, load, and pull dates to achieve those RDDs. Unit TC-ACCS data would be used to determine transportation requirements, and all necessary STANAGs and other documents would be produced by the deploying headquarters (again, 21st TAACOM).

Instead, the division collaboratively developed "the flow" with 21st TAACOM and V Corps. Company-level units manually filled out STANAGs (TC-ACCS data could not be converted into JOPES or other usable automated data) and other documents. I am not aware of any headquarters that issued a complete deployment plan. It certainly was not readily available or used extensively, if it was, in fact, issued.

The command and control of deployment was equally confusing, which is why I believe Major General Nash gave us the mission to create the Deployment Operations Center using 2-67 Armor's staff. Movement Control Teams were under the control of 21st TAACOM and were notified of the scheduled trains and units for the various railheads. Often, the MCTs would notify the company-level unit directly. Additionally, Area Support Groups were notified of trains, who notified Base Support Battalions, who notified units, often at battalion or brigade level. Sometimes, units were issued copies of the "flow" from the division headquarters. Often, because of the number of changes taking place, particular units received conflicting instructions. This led to a lot of confusion.

The process for air movement was different, because we were using both theater and strategic aircraft, and a movement control board was initiated to regulate the priority and flow of units. Still another system was used for busses, and yet another for ground convoys. With this many different systems, and the number of changes occurring as weather delayed aircraft, incapacity delayed trains, and these delays in turn forced convoys and busses to be rescheduled to match train and air flow, it is no wonder confusion reigned. Centralizing command and control for TFE units' deployment in the newly created Division Deployment Operations Center (DOC) solved some problems. However, the fundamental flaws of the system created a situation whereby no level of effort could have made it a smooth process.

There were a few other issues that we confronted as we tried to run the DOC. The automated systems did not support the combination of theater and strategic transportation assets. JOPES was used for aircraft, but not for convoys or trains. An automated system that was available, but not adequately used, was STACCS, a European theater command and control system.

Early on, I went to Kaiserslautern to visit the operations center 21st TAACOM had established there and to meet some of their key players. As I wandered around the very busy headquarters, I pulled out my list of the trains we had loading that day and their status, obtained about an hour before by my folks telephoning units who were loading. I decided to do a quick check of the system, so I went to the "train control" cell. I asked for whom I could talk to about today's trains, and was told a soldier on the other side of the cell. So I asked him if he could tell me what trains were running that day. What he showed me was a copy of "the flow," which 1 AD had produced. I knew it had been modified and asked if that was actually what was on the ground that day. I was told no, if I wanted to know that, I would have to talk to another soldier, so I went to see him. He showed me a list on a butcher paper chart. Again, I asked this other

soldier why there were differences between his list (different from the flow but still not like mine) and mine. He explained that his was the list of what was actually ordered for the day (as opposed to the flow, which is what was planned for the day, and reality, which is what actually showed up). So I asked how do I know what actually showed up for the day. He told me that to find out, I would have to go see another soldier. So I did. This new person showed me his status on STACCS, the automated command and control system. This was remotely accessed by MCTs to update information, with different coding available to sound alarms based on certain parameters. For instance, if a train were late in pulling, the train symbol would flash. This system looked great. Although its capability for planes, busses, and convoys was not being utilized, I thought it was a wonderful way to get information that the DOC was manually calling around for now. Then I asked the soldier whom he notified when one of the symbols started flashing, indicating some task had not been achieved on time (either a train not spotting, not being loaded, or not pulling out on time). I was shocked when he said "nobody, no one cares."

As a result of this visit, I got a STACCS terminal installed in the DOC in Bad Kreuznach. Unfortunately, I found the information on the STACCS was not being updated enough to remain current, and that our manually acquired information was always more accurate by a large degree. This was less true for data on aircraft, but probably close to half the time, manually acquired data was more current than STACCS. So STACCS was pretty useless, other than as a good classified e-mail system, in controlling the deployment.

The plan for oversized cargo was weak. Although the French rail strike did not help matters in this area, there was an overall shortage of deep well cars. These are the kinds of cars needed for oversized cargo, and they often did not arrive with the train for which they were needed. This resulted in what we called "frustrated cargo." We did not have a plan for frustrated cargo initially, and we never

anticipated the amount we would have. As a result, we had to develop a plan to move a significant number of built-up trucks and other oversized vehicles to Bosnia by other means.

One method was to move frustrated cargo by road convoy. Captain Dave Korty and his company, C Company, 2-67 Armor were real heroes in this respect. We developed a plan with the staff of 21st TAACOM to convoy most of this cargo. However, the unexpected road march of most of this equipment concerned us. We anticipated having numerous vehicles that would have a difficult time making the trip. There was a convoy center at Mannheim we decided to satellite on. However, the increased number of vehicles would overwhelm the element there running the Movement Control Center (MCC). At a meeting at 21st TAACOM, I agreed the 1st Armored Division would provide an additional MCC at Mannheim to handle frustrated cargo.

I called Dave Korty, gave him a warning order, and told him to come see me en route to Mannheim. When we met that night, I gave him the mission to develop an MCC at Mannheim that would be functional within 3 days. His specified tasks were to receive frustrated cargo, marshal it for convoys, check vehicles for maintenance deficiencies and correct them, house and feed the soldiers accompanying the vehicles (in coordination with the installation staff), prepare them for movement, and supervise departure of the convoys. I instructed him to coordinate with the DOC and also the MCC already there for the details on how we would establish the composition and timing of the convoys. I told him he had his company to draw from for resources, and to let me know if he needed anything else. That was all the guidance I gave him. With this, Captain Korty set up an MCC and supervised the movement of all the frustrated cargo for TF Eagle to Bosnia. This illustrates, more than anything else we did, the value of junior leaders who are capable of executing mission orders. He and his company did a superb job.

One piece of frustrated cargo defined the term. The Armor Launched Vehicle Bridges were too large to get to Bosnia by rail. Although Brigadier General James P. O'Neal, the ADC-S, had suggested months before that we send such cargo by barge, that idea had been dismissed by someone up the chain outside the division. Instead, there was insistence we send everything by rail. The bottom line was that the bridges could not be shipped there in time for use during the river crossing. We argued with several people at corps and 21st TAACOM about disassembling the bridges for shipment. We insisted we could not do it and get them reassembled in time to meet the requirements. We ended up shipping six bridges, I believe, by C-17 cargo aircraft.

Another difficult issue we had to deal with almost immediately was determining priority for movement of cargo and units by air from Ramstein Air Base. There was a board process for determining priority for air. However, there was a difference between USAREUR movement board decisions and priorities on the airfield. The Division G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Ed Kane, sent Major Tom Muir, the G-3 Air, to Ramstein to represent the Task Force and to ensure our priorities were executed. It was a constant struggle. Part of the problem was the requirement that everything be done on JOPES; however, the lowest-level JOPES terminal was in Heidelberg at corps Headquarters. The primary JOPES operator, Mr. Oliphant, was almost a one-man show. Moreover, units were responsible for filling out JOPES worksheets so that he could input information from them into the computer. As movements changed, it required a stream of officers going to Heidelberg to sit down with Mr. Oliphant to update JOPES input. This was very disruptive for units trying to deploy. The next problem was what was happening on the ground at Ramstein. Sometimes, Air Force personnel would load lower-priority pallets before the higher-priority pallets. Muir's efforts were invaluable as he helped get critical items flown to Tuzla in the early days.

The deployment was an unbelievable operation. The conflict between headquarters, the resentment built up based on conflicts, and the personal turmoil affecting soldiers and families were significant and to some degree avoidable. Although the mission was accomplished, it was not nearly as “successful” or pretty as those who write hyped articles for various publications attest.

Most of the problems for the deployment were induced by several key factors. First, despite the fact that the Dayton meeting was concluded in November, the military was not given authority to mobilize reservists or begin deployment of “enabling forces” to ensure a smooth deployment of the forces who would perform the mission until the last minute. Secondly, in establishment of the transfer of authority (TOA) date, the time required to deploy was apparently not considered. TOA was established as December 2, 1995, and we were not given permission to deploy until December 15. No single deployment headquarters was established for the deployment. Possibly this was because 21st TAACOM is primarily a reserve organization, and authorization to activate personnel was received late.

There were some self-inflicted wounds as well. TFE was not able to plan adequately because of simultaneous training and deployment requirements. I remember one day at Grafenwoehr when the brigade staff was planning the real Bosnian mission—planning deployment, participating in a fire coordination exercise, planning the movement of units from Grafenwoehr to Hohenfels, planning the exercise mission at Hohenfels, and installing a new communications system in all their vehicles. This was all in the same day, with a staff so sparsely manned that it had a difficult time planning a future operation while executing a current one.

The result was considerable risk of mission success. Had the Bosnian factions not been cooperative, I believe it would have been very difficult for us to enforce compliance in accordance with the timeline established at Dayton. The other result was the immeasurable suffering by numerous

soldiers who deployed into an area with inadequate facilities for coping with the Bosnian winter. Although the American soldier triumphed, it did not have to be this difficult.

There were some major success stories in the deployment. The C-17 aircraft that deployed essential forces to Tuzla for employment in the early days was an unexpected success. The movement control board eventually developed into a functional and reliable entity. The communication system that allowed us to talk to Task Force Eagle in Tuzla and USAREUR Forward in Hungary was excellent. The rapid development of the division Deployment Operations Center (with three successive reinforcements by the battalion) was a marvelous thing to watch. Lieutenants and sergeants, never trained in deployment systems, used their basic troop leading procedures, initiative, and versatility to develop and manage systems to control the deployment. Finally, the indefatigable will of the task force soldiers to overcome all obstacles in achieving the mission is a testament to a great Army, even though the deployment command and control were not.

It took about 10 days for the DOC to develop satisfactory systems for controlling all methods of deployment. Eventually, four systems were developed, one each for trains, air, busses, and convoys. We were able to accurately track preparation and execution of movement of all four modes and to solve the problems that surfaced along the way. Interface with 21st TAACOM and USAREUR Forward improved, and by Christmas there were well established procedures and trained personnel in place. The first days had been extremely hectic. I was working about 20 hours a day for the first 10 days or so. By Christmas, I was able to cut down to about 16-18 hours a day. I remember for Christmas, Pat came down with some treats for the troops. I remember a green plastic cookie plate shaped like a tree was pinned to the wall as our Christmas tree for that year. We got to share a couple hours together before I got so tired, I fell asleep. By

January 1, I was working a more reasonable routine of 14-16 hours a day.

By mid-January things had settled down and became routine for the rest of the deployment. On February 6, I returned to Friedberg, giving Major Tracy control of the DOC. He would finish deploying the last few units and hand over the DOC to division rear detachment personnel who would run it until it was time to redeploy the division.

When I returned to Friedberg, the battalion and the brigade Rear Detachment were in great shape. Major Jim Henderson had done great work: continuing to organize the rear detachments of the deploying battalions, deploying the units, securing the installations, and setting up a structure which would function for the next year.

We organized with the battalion, assuming control of the two companies in 4-67 Armor and three tank platoons from 1-1 Cavalry that did not deploy. I was dual-hatted, as the battalion commander and also as the brigade rear detachment commander. My battalion functioned as both the battalion and brigade headquarters. Likewise, the commander of one of the 4-67 companies was dual-hatted as the rear detachment commander for the 4-67 Armor. Each of the other battalions that deployed (2-3d Field Artillery, 23d Engineers, 501st Support Battalion, and the brigade Headquarters Company) had a rear detachment commander and first sergeant. They were in the unenviable position of working for me as the rear detachment commander and also their battalion commanders who were deployed. It was not a clean command relationship, but we worked it out.

Maintenance support was still a debacle when I returned to Friedberg. We had not sorted out who would or could provide us maintenance support. Fortunately, Lieutenant Colonel Tony Young had left me a very strong Maintenance Support Team (MST) from the 501st Support Battalion, but there were numerous issues about who would provide higher-level maintenance, parts supply, and special tool

support. After several false starts, the 3d Infantry Division (soon to become the 1st Infantry Division) was designated to support us. They did a magnificent job. Their DISCOM commander and shop officer were wonderful, treating us as their own, and often with more responsiveness and effort than we were used to from our own DISCOM.

One issue arose immediately when I returned. 2-3 FA had numerous Heavy Expanded-Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMETTs) which had not been turned in after they had been replaced with newer vehicles. They were in various states of readiness, and it was immediately obvious that my maintenance personnel could not get them prepared for turn in. Additionally, my maintenance personnel could not even maintain the vehicles I had under my control. I had lost 14 tanks and all of the mechanics that would normally work on them when A Company deployed. However, I gained 45 tanks with the rear detachments that came to me. Additionally, in order to fill their shortages, the deploying units had stripped the mechanics and crews for those tanks. In fact, we had more tanks in the brigade rear detachment than the brigade which had deployed to Bosnia, but with a much smaller portion of maintenance assets. So maintenance of this equipment became a major issue.

Despite a lot of resistance from TF VICTORY (the Corps rear detachment) and the maintenance community in general, we managed to push through the idea of contract maintenance. We hired some contract personnel who performed organizational and direct support maintenance on the non-battalion equipment left behind. It was really the only way that we could have kept the equipment maintained, and I believe the concept was very successful. In fact, the equipment was probably in better condition when the units returned than when they departed. They even managed to get the 2-3 FA HEMETTs to standard so they could be turned in, which was no small feat.

Although maintenance was a significant issue when I returned from Bad Kreuznach, the biggest issues were

family-support related. I found an unintended consequence of the battalion staff's and my departure and execution of the DOC mission was the signal it sent the family support group (FSG) leaders. Some felt that it minimized their importance and the importance of the rear detachment in general. There was resentment that the rear detachments and families were not first priority. While undoubtedly it was the right thing to do to keep deployment as the first priority, in retrospect we should have communicated better with the FSG leaders.

In one of the first meetings I attended with the Base Support Battalion, Family Support Group Leaders, and Rear Detachment leaders, I saw the major problem with the relationship among the three. That is, roles and responsibilities were not well defined, and, in my opinion, the Army's community side had not taken responsibility for family support as they should.

The particular instance I remember was a briefing by one of the people from the community on Family Assistance Centers (FACs). She talked about their role, describing the Family Support Groups as the first line of defense, with the rear detachment reinforcing the FSG, and the FAC as the last line of defense. I was very upset at this line of reasoning and felt I had to speak up. In my mind, the Family Assistance Center was the *first* line of defense, not the last. It is at the FAC where the paid professionals exist whose job it is to support families. It is not, in my mind, the primary job of the unit rear detachment, nor the Family Support Group. My feeling was that the rear detachment supports the deployed unit first, then the soldiers who are not deployed, and then serves the families as a conduit of information. The Family Support Group role, in my opinion, was one of emotional support to each other. That is, any support group's purpose seems to me to be emotional support. Parents Without Partners, Lupus Support Groups, Alcoholics Anonymous, and others do not provide community assistance. They provide emotional support to individuals. I felt it was unfair to saddle Family Support

Group leaders, who were not paid professionals, with the responsibility of providing community support. This would remain an issue between the Base Support Battalion and me as long as I was in command.

This all goes to what I think is a major problem with the Army's thinking on family support. My observations of family support leaders and interaction with them both in the brigade and throughout Europe has led me to become very concerned. I believe the Army has always had family support groups. They were spouses (wives, primary, throughout history) who got to know one another and relied on each other for emotional support. That resulted in coffee groups, or just close friendships among wives. There were no designated leaders, although there was deference to wives based on the rank of their husbands.

However, after the Gulf War, regulations were developed which made the family support group the responsibility of commanders. Spouses were automatically included in membership (whether they wanted to be or not). At the same time commanders were being given this responsibility, the Army was drawing down, and resources were decreasing. Personnel shortages have become increasingly acute. Resources for other community support functions have decreased, causing an increased number of troop diversions. As a result, the well-intentioned but mistaken trend in family support resulted in some very negative second order consequences.

By putting family support on the forefront and emphasizing how serious the Army is about it, but then failing to fund or provide manning to family support functions, the Army displays a difference between what it says and what it does. It says to family members, "We'll tell you you're important, but deep down we don't really mean it." The Army implies we will take care of all needs, creating an unrealistic expectation by some of what we can and will do for them. It is hard to find a family support group leader who has not gotten a call asking for someone to baby-sit

children so a wife can run some errand, or asking for a ride to the commissary because the car is broken. The espoused philosophy is that anyone can be the family support group leader, but by default it almost always falls to the commander's wife. The senior leadership of the Army will tell you the commander's spouse has no required role, but the pressure on commanders' wives to volunteer and lead the FSG is palpable. The informal system is sexually biased and reinforces sexual stereotypes. It is an unwritten rule that even if your spouse works, she is still expected to fulfill her obligations as a volunteer and spouse. However, if the commander's spouse is in the military, that rule does not apply. Likewise, husbands who are commanders' spouses are not expected to play the role that wives are.

The family support system has raised some significant issues and problems, unintended, but significant none the less. First, there is tremendous pressure on commanders' wives. This has led to significant emotional stress. The reliance of commanders' wives on Prozac is a joke among many of them, but it is a symptom of a serious problem. Junior officers' wives are seeing the stress that commanders' wives are going through and are dreading their husbands being selected for command. But most importantly, there seems to be a breach of faith with them by the Army. The difference between what the Army says and what it does is eroding trust between families and the institution.

This is a dangerous trend. As an institution, we need either to resource family support and designate specific responsibility to agencies (that is, make it an Army program and do not rely on volunteers), or be up front about families being on their own when we deploy. The logic of making commanders responsible for a nonmilitary organization, which serves its primary function when they are deployed, seems flawed. It certainly should be a community responsibility. Regardless, if it is not going to be resourced, it should not exist as an official program.

Another lesson I learned was the very different ways that wives and military people look at things. Just one example was an incident that took place early on in the time I was back at Friedberg. I received a call from my Brigade Family Support Group leader who had a complaint about one of the battalion rear detachment commanders. Apparently, a FSG leader in the battalion in question had raised an issue with the rear detachment commander, and he had "blown her off." So I promised to investigate. I called him and asked him if he was aware Mrs. so-and-so had a problem. He said yes, and that he had solved it. He explained that she had called with the problem, he had told her he would take care of it, and then he had. The problem had been solved. I thought that would be an easy answer, but it was not. When I called my Brigade FSG leader back and explained that the problem was solved, she obviously was not satisfied and still quite irritated with the rear detachment commander. In discussing why, she said, "He never called me back!" I admitted my surprise at why she would expect a call back if he had promised to take care of the problem. She said, "If your boss told you to do something, wouldn't you tell him when you got it done?" That is when the light bulb came on for me. I said, "No, the only time I tell my boss is either if he asks me specifically to inform him when something is completed or if we *can not* get it done." This seemed insane to her. She just could not understand how we could operate that way. I finally recognized how important feedback was for her and the other FSG leaders. There is a book by John Gray called *Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus* (HarperCollins, 1992) that discusses differences in views between men and women. While I hate to generalize about attitudes of either gender, and I am sure there are many exceptions, I found in my dealings with military wives that the book was surprisingly accurate. I would make it required reading for rear detachment commanders if I had it to do again.

Besides family support, the other big issue that confronted us was replacement operations. The division had

not been given a “stop loss” authorization, so we had to rotate soldiers to replace normal losses. The new replacements had to be equipped and trained prior to deployment. Because of the limited number of training allocations per unit and shortages of some items of issue, it was a constant battle to get soldiers prepared for deployment. We were also trying to take a reasonable approach, and let new soldiers at least get their families settled into quarters, as we were encouraging them to bring their families when they moved to Germany. This was because of the negative impact that fewer and fewer families would have on the communities of deployed units.

As a result of the difficulties, individual replacements were managed at an unbelievably high level. The corps rear detachment (called Task Force VICTORY) was managing down to individual level. We were sending reports to them on the particular shoe sizes individuals needed. This is exactly opposite to the mission order approach Captain Dave Korty had so successfully executed in creating the frustrated cargo movement control center. We wasted a lot of human energy because of this different approach. It worked, but I believe a more mission-oriented method would have worked better.

By March, rear detachment operations were smoothing out, and we began concentrating on putting units back together again. We could not approach it with a business-as-usual attitude. Units had rear detachment-associated missions, such as guarding installations, that prevented us from having a normal training program.

However, we started incorporating training events into these missions. One example I recall was moving some tanks to Kirchgoens during a guard operation so that the unit could conduct Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Tests while guarding the installation. The company commanders were very creative in developing training plans to take advantage of available time.

We also developed a rotational gunnery schedule. This was the only way we could maintain qualified crews. We took the crews who were most ready (in platoon groups) to shoot, while two companies remained at home station to perform rear detachment functions. The first gunnery rotation was essential to maintaining morale within the battalion. We conducted two successive rotations after I changed command, and I was very proud of the fact the battalion conducted a Combined Arms Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) rotation at Hohenfels in the fall of 1996. This commitment to continued training was an important signal to the soldiers of the rear detachment that they were still very highly valued combat soldiers, even though they were not currently deployed with the division. I also made it clear that I believed if 1AD were deployed for a contingency, we would go with them as a powerful combat force.

On May 20, 1996, I changed command, turning over the reigns to Lieutenant Colonel Dave Neidringhaus. I deployed to Bosnia at the end of the month to take over the job of Division G-3 for Task Force Eagle. I was very sad to say goodbye to the battalion, although I was fortunate to be given the opportunity to be the division G-3. The experience of not deploying the battalion had been a bitter one. However, I count it as one of the most intense learning periods of my career.

There were some key lessons I drew from this experience. First, trying to form, train, plan for, and execute a deployment and employment on a mission simultaneously is practically impossible. We were lucky we did not have to fight our way in. A unit cannot deploy itself. There must be a command and control headquarters that, based only on required delivery dates provided by the deploying unit, gets them there. Also, I learned the USAREUR deployment system was broken. To do missions of this magnitude, you must have and use an automated system. The plan for what to do with non-deploying units and personnel is an essential component of the overall plan and needs some deep thought during the planning process. Our approach to family

support is causing some problems based on unintended consequences and needs to be relooked. Force tailoring is a great concept, but we are not well structured for those who will stay behind. As new structures have less redundancy and more centralized support, this will become more of a problem. We need to address it as part of our force redesign.

Finally, the most important lesson I learned was that General Patton was right. Mission orders are the way to do business. Whenever possible, never tell anyone how to do a mission. Tell them what you want, and let them amaze you with their creativity. Time and time again, soldiers in 2-67 Armor impressed me with how great they were in executing missions with minimal direction when I gave them clear guidance.

This monograph could have been about my experience with forces in Bosnia. I could have discussed the enforcement of the GFAP, the reshaping of the force, the relief in place, or numerous incidents in country. Instead, because I believe there will be many who will write about those events, I wanted to write about some unsung heroes. The Dick Tracys, Jim Hendersons, Chris Hsus, and countless others I have not mentioned, both in the battalion and throughout Europe, were key to the success of the mission. Those soldiers and spouses who supported the deployed Task Force were an inspiration to me, and I hope in some way I have helped to tell their story.

CHAPTER 5

COMMANDING A FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION IN A PEACE ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENT—OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery W. Hammond

INTRODUCTION

Sir, We did a pretty good job in Bosnia. Guess it's because those hardheaded soldiers really listened to us. About time someone listened to the noncommissioned officers.

SFC "Smoke" Peterson/4-29 FA

The purpose of this Personal Experience Monograph is to share the experience of Field Artillery battalion command in a peace enforcement environment. To this end, I will address predeployment, deployment, operations, and redeployment activities of the 4th Battalion, 29th Field Artillery Regiment in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This monograph is organized into two sections. In section one, I present a historical summary of the battalion's actions leading up to and in support of the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. My intent is to "tell the story" focusing on the battalion both in Bosnia and at home station in Germany. Section two identifies lessons learned for future commanders when faced with a similar mission and/or operational environment.

The reader must understand this perspective is mine alone and thus extremely opinionated. This monograph tells the story of how I did things in command—right or

wrong. In this regard, the deployment provided an excellent opportunity to examine equipment, doctrine, and people over 11 months in support of a unique operation. My troops were family; we lived, ate, and slept together 24 hours daily. Thus, the lessons learned are numerous and based on practical experience. However, one must recognize the unique circumstances surrounding Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Any insight gained from this paper must receive full consideration in the context of its impact on Field Artillery and Combined Arms Operations doctrine.

BACKGROUND

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was initiated in December 1995 as a NATO-led peace enforcement operation in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. U.S. forces from the 1st Armored Division served as the peace implementation force (IFOR) in accordance with the General Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina concluded at Dayton, Ohio, in December 1995.

The 4th Battalion, 29th Field Artillery (4-29 FA) was an organic unit of the 1st Armored Division, V Corps, and United States Army Europe (USAREUR). It deployed in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR from December 17, 1995, through November 30, 1996. The battalion no longer exists as an active unit, as it was redesignated the 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery in February 1997.

4-29 FA was a M109A2 equipped, 3x8 155mm cannon unit based in Baumholder, Germany, and assigned a direct support mission to the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Armored Division. The unit was organized as a standard self-propelled Field Artillery battalion consisting of five batteries: three cannon, one service, and one headquarters. The battalion was reorganized for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR as a Field Artillery Task Force (TF) with the addition of a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Platoon from Baumholder, Germany, and a Firefinder

Target Acquisition Battery (B/25 FA TAB) from the 3rd Infantry Division (Bamburg, Germany).

Ultimately the Field Artillery TF community comprised seven full-up batteries, consisting of over 9,000 soldiers and 1,800 family members residing in Baumholder and Bamburg, Germany. The battalion TF deployed to Bosnia and maintained 81 tracked and 219 wheeled vehicles, plus all authorized equipment throughout the duration of the peace enforcement operation.

Initial elements of the battalion entered the Bosnia theater of operations as part of the 1st Armored Division advanced party via C-17 Aircraft on December 17, 1995. The battalion's soldiers and 18 Palletized Load System (PLS) Trucks redeployed to Baumholder, completing the mission on November 30, 1996.

SECTION ONE: THE STORY

Predeployment.

Starting early the summer of 1992, the entire 1st Armored Division had been training in preparation for the anticipated Bosnia mission. Prior to my departure from the Pentagon to assume battalion command in the summer of 1995, I was fully aware of the likelihood of the deployment. Serving on the Joint Staff, I had worked as the J-1 representative to General John M. Shalikashvili's Bosnia planning team and prepared numerous deployment orders placing individuals in theater for an eventual peace enforcement operation. In fact, one of the last items I reviewed prior to departing the Pentagon was the 1st Armored Division troop list to ensure my battalion was earmarked for the Bosnia mission. In my mind, if U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) was going to Bosnia, I wanted to be a part.

Upon arrival in Germany for the battalion change of command in July 1995, I discovered few of the troops who

had been in USAREUR over the years actually believed a deployment would ever occur. Too often the units had been alerted to conduct intensive and consuming command and control exercises, only to stand down and resume business as usual. My take on things was that battalion level leaders considered any deployment to Bosnia along the lines of the story, "The Boy Who Cried Wolf." My predecessor in battalion command had warned me that much of my time would be spent answering "wolf calls" for Bosnia, and "it would never go down." Coming from Washington, DC, and having personally witnessed the process already in action, I knew better. My last words to my wife, Diane, prior to the battalion change of command were, "Be prepared, we are moving out sooner rather than later."

Following the change of command, the battalion deployed to Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany, in mid-October 1995 to conduct annual gunnery training. The original intent of this training deployment was to conduct battalion-level gunnery qualification, satisfying part of our Mission Essential Tasks. Following 2 weeks of artillery gunnery at Grafenwoehr, we were scheduled to "rotate" to the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels to train on our combined arms fire support tasks.

The battalion successfully met gunnery training objectives at Grafenwoehr. However, it was clear from the start that the focus for training at the CMTC would be upon low-intensity rather than high-intensity operations. There was a clear hint of an impending alert for deployment to Bosnia. I attended at least two division-level sand table discussions with the brigade commander where the focus was on how we would conduct business in the event of an alert for Bosnia. During both these sessions, I was amazed at the amount of intelligence and information sharing between American and British military personnel. We also had the pleasure of listening to Mr. Rick Atkinson, a noted *Washington Post* reporter, discuss military and media relations.

Rather than the anticipated three weeks of high-intensity training, we quickly shifted our main effort to accommodate a compressed 2-week schedule of non-stop and relentless peace enforcement training. All this was no surprise to me, however, for all the "old guys" in the battalion suspected that Bosnia might, in fact, become a reality.

In hindsight, these 2 weeks at the CMTC proved to be the most realistic mission essential training I had experienced in almost 20 years service. The CMTC did everything within its power to prepare the force for Bosnia. The CMTC Observer/Controllers worked overtime to ensure we practiced under stress in all the likely peace enforcement tasks in Bosnia.

My soldiers had difficulties in understanding fire base operations and thus received constant "harassment" from the Observer/Controllers to "get it right." At one point, the Senior Observer/Controller informed me that if the Field Artillery troops did not start to catch on and meet established standards, we risked failing to earn certification for the deployment. This caused me to pressure leaders to get more personally involved and hands-on in what we were trying to accomplish. I expected sergeants to personally dig 4-foot fighting positions if they were unable to persuade their troops into achieving the standards by normal mentoring. Needless to say, one of the main lessons we captured from the CMTC experience was direct involvement in the business of the troops. Sergeants had to do more than bark orders. Instead they had to supervise and involve themselves in what had in the past been considered mundane tasks (e.g., constructing fighting positions, patrolling, guard mount).

One point worth mentioning is that when we returned from Bosnia, I wrote a memorandum to the Field Artillery Observer/Controllers expressing my appreciation for their efforts during the pre-deployment train-up. Their efforts more than replicated Bosnia, and, in my opinion, they

deserve a great degree of credit for the success of the IFOR. In my opinion, the training environment at the CMTC was in many ways more challenging than that actually encountered in Bosnia.

As the unit returned from Grafenwoehr and the CMTC to home station at Baumholder, we continued to train specific skills necessary for success in Bosnia. These included the basics of mine awareness, patrolling, squad level forward observer activities, cold weather survival, and Rules of Engagement. It was finally clear to most of the battalion that Bosnia loomed in the near future—the question was simply how soon. I made clear to the battalion the urgent need to prepare immediately for future contingency operations (See memorandum shown in Figure 3). We could not waste time; the clock was working against us. Officials were meeting in Dayton, Ohio, and it was only a matter of time before we would deploy.

The news of our deployment actually came down via CNN. We were aware Armed Forces Network (AFN) had scheduled a special program from Washington, DC, regarding the results of the Dayton Peace Accords. As I remember, it was a Monday evening somewhere around 1830 hours, and many of the troops, having already been released from work detail, were hanging around to see the news. Many of my leaders were positioned in front of the television in the battalion dining facility when the official announcement was delivered. Many of the soldiers were despondent because of the news, and I simply told them to go home, and there would be more news to follow. However, that night we must have received more than 25 telephone calls from concerned wives inquiring when we were leaving, etc. My standard answer was, "Yes, we were likely to deploy but any other information has yet to be released." The fun was just starting.

Once alerted for deployment, the battalion progressed in an orderly manner to meet all predeployment requirements and activities. The soldiers accepted the mission without

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH BATTALION, 29TH FIELD ARTILLERY
APO AE 09034

AETV-THT-P

8 NOV 95

MEMORANDUM FOR BATTERY COMMANDERS

SUBJECT: Commander's Intent for Training

1. As we return from our training deployment to Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, I do not want to waste any time or lose momentum in accomplishing a series of tasks critical to our near and long-term future. In this regard, my goals for this battalion between now and the end of November 1995 are as follows:

a. Conduct the most thorough, intensive, and complete AORP we have ever done in our professional lives. This means full equipment inspections and "putting away" our combat equipment for immediate use as required.

b. Synchronize training and predeployment activities preparation through the end of the year.

c. Accomplish the following by the end of November 1995:

(1) SINCGARS installation and training. The S-3 will publish plan under separate cover.

(2) Complete SRP (15-17 NOV).

(3) Develop logistics and operations SOP for stability operations. Short, concise, to the point. XO and S-3 accomplish this.

(4) Update Family Support Group and rosters. This includes a battalion-commander-led Family Support Group AAR.

(5) Identify and place on orders a rear detachment OIC/NCOIC to include a supporting structure.

(6) Conduct in-depth and accountable cold weather training. This is serious business which I will personally manage. Commanders take note and think "outside the box" on this one. Battery First Sergeants owe me their plan by 15 NOV 95.

(7) Mine Awareness make-up training for those who did not participate in the CMTC-led training conducted at Grafenwoehr. 40th EN will help on this one.

(8) Weapons qualification. Focus here is on both small arms and crew-served weapons. S-3 has lead.

(9) All soldiers will participate in a reasonable but aggressive PT program. *All* must pass the APRT.

(continued)

(10) TA-50 must be cleaned, inspected, and replaced, and additional cold weather items issued to each soldier. This is sergeants business. CSM lead. Also, until further notice, soldiers can no longer wear jungle boots. Too much of a cold-weather risk.

(11) All individual soldier equipment must be inspected and packed (A+B bags). Packing lists complete, bags labelled. Again, sergeants business.

(12) Class IV UBL ordered, procured, and combat loaded. S-4 work with battery commanders.

(13) Inspect all tents, cots, and heaters. Order what we need. Soldiers will no longer sleep in vehicles.

2. We must conduct measured, planned, and deliberate training and preparation for a possible cold weather deployment—DO NOT WASTE TIME.

3. Take care of our soldiers and their families by taking this approach as serious business. Failure could result in the loss of life. Work normal duty hours with weekends off; however, this may not be possible for all in view of SINCGARS fielding and other events. Schedule 13 and 20 November 1995 as training holidays and do the best you can to ensure quality of life "time off."

4. In closing, don't let up. Look at the little things and enforce lieutenants and sergeants to be accountable for their people. I will not tolerate any more "half-stepping" by our junior leaders. Every man counts—every family is critically important. Remember to think 360° while continuing to operate on a 6400-mil spectrum.

JEFFERY W. HAMMOND
LTC, FA
Commanding

Figure 3. Commander's Instructions.

complaint. My leaders in particular were true professionals who wanted to be successful and thus were more than willing to do whatever was asked. The toughest task was convincing family members the merits of a 12-month deployment. Diane and I personally spoke to every battery contingent and their family members at least twice prior to deployment and regularly communicated between Bosnia and Baumholder on a daily basis. I felt as if I were running a public relations campaign to convince family members of the merits of the deployment. The general attitude was that we had no business being in Bosnia and certainly no

business taking their husbands away for 12 months. I could not argue their points—they did not want to listen anyway. It was all very frustrating, especially when it was obvious so many soldiers had failed to properly prepare their families for any type of operational deployment, much less Bosnia for 12 months.

From the start, the Family Support Groups (FSG) formed a strong and cohesive team to provide requisite care for family members. Foremost was educating people on where we were going, why we were going, and how long we would be there. FSG events occurred on a weekly basis starting prior to the deployment and included such activities as monthly newsletters, videos, fund raisers, and a series of social and educational events to interest families and maintain morale.

My greatest frustration was the initial reluctance of many families to join the FSG circle. Some opted to go home to the United States rather than wait out the deployment in Germany. I opposed such an approach in that it would remove the family from the information loop. Additionally, once the deployment was complete and the soldiers returned home to Baumholder, the United States Government was not going to transport family members back to Germany. Most families understood; however, at least six families ignored my pleas and left for the United States and home. In time, most of the families softened and entered into the FSG circle as they discovered in hard times a renewed need for each other.

Much to my chagrin, the battalion provided the cover story for the December 25, 1995, issue of *Army Times*, focusing on the family aspect of the Bosnia mission. My friends from the *Army Times* visited at the height of our deployment and, to my surprise, told an accurate story. I was initially concerned they would tell the wrong story and make things worse than they actually were. However, they published an accurate portrayal of a major operational deployment and the impact on families. The writers

indicated that the families would be fine in our absence; however, most of the wives were opposed to the whole ordeal, thus making it tougher than necessary on their deploying husbands. In my opinion, that was the story unfolding as we prepared to deploy.

In sum, the family support endeavor worked, starting with the predeployment. That it was important to everybody was not a debatable issue. However, the wives of my senior leaders, particularly battery commanders' wives, paid a price in damage to their respective egos. Everyone seemed to need something at one time or another. But, it seemed that no matter how much effort the commanders' wives placed on meeting the needs of others, it was never enough to please all. A few of my battery commanders' wives probably did not really care about the people in their units. I relieved them of their volunteer responsibilities. Other commanders' wives were young, inexperienced, and learning on a daily basis. When these young ladies married their officer husbands, they never dreamed that someday they would be responsible for the family members of their husbands' commands. Most of my battery commanders' wives had their own careers, had little or no prior military familiarity, and had been married less than 3 years at the time of our deployment to Bosnia. Nevertheless, most of the commanders' and senior noncommissioned officers' wives were great, no matter what the demands on their time and energy.

In this regard, it is interesting to note how times have changed since I first entered the Army almost 20 years ago. Back in 1979, family support groups simply did not exist. As a battery commander in Schweinfurt, Germany, I concentrated solely on training for war and left the business of family care to the individual soldier. In the event of a war in Europe, families would evacuate to a safe haven via execution of the Non-Combatant Evacuation program. Wives were very dependent on their husbands for many of the routine tasks encountered in a foreign country (i.e.,

transportation, shopping, and personal property maintenance).

Nothing really changed until the end of the Gulf War in 1991. When my battalion was alerted to deploy to the Persian Gulf in 1990, we did not have a family group structure. It was nothing more than a "telephone tree" in the event someone needed assistance. As a result, when the unit deployed, the field grade officers' wives struggled with "taking care of people." The battery commanders' wives either did not get involved or moved home. More often than not, few problems were resolved, and struggling family members moved home to live with relatives throughout the duration of the war.

Unfortunately, in today's Army we have institutionalized a family support group system that asks volunteer wives to perform quasi-military duties for which they are generally unprepared and unrewarded. The wives of unit leaders are expected to participate, and, more or less, lead a family support group program that is inherently unfair to them. It bothers me that so much is expected, and so little reward is rendered to those wives who lead our family support groups during a unit deployment.

My wife was prepared for all this, for we had gone through the Gulf War deployment together (I was a battalion S-3 in the 24th Infantry Division). Thus, she was able to mentor the younger wives. In fact, she discovered that many of our most supportive and innovative wives came from the junior enlisted corps who were more than willing to contribute in any fashion. We discovered an incredible source of talent in the wives of our junior soldiers. These ladies, more than any other group, proved to be invaluable in supporting the cause and assisting without gripe in time of need. Unlike some of the battery commanders' wives, the junior enlisted wives were not trying to impress anybody and expected nothing in return for their efforts. My wife, to this day, is indebted to the

enlisted wives for their honesty, care, and support under all conditions.

In addition to the family support endeavor, I often felt overcome by all the changing deployment requirements coming down from USAREUR, V Corps, and the 1st Armored Division. It seemed like not a day passed in which a new idea failed to filter down, requiring the expenditure of more time and effort. Often I would receive a direct telephone call from V Corps with some new requirement, which had yet to work through the 1st Armored Division chain. I could not believe the involvement of USAREUR and V Corps. On any given day, I would receive telephone calls from all three levels of command (USAREUR, V Corps, and 1AD) regarding some deployment requirement. I did not have time to answer what appeared at times to be ridiculous questions regarding my unit status, etc. Needless to say, we had all the help and more than we ever needed from all levels of command.

In order to manage all mission requirements and expedite deployment activities, we devised a spreadsheet which was used daily in command and staff meetings at all levels (Figure 4). This spreadsheet worked well to keep the leadership of the battalion focused on where we were and where we needed to go. It also served as a contract between the battery commanders and me, defining what we had to accomplish in order to deploy. Many long nights were spent around a table with the battery commanders and their spreadsheets, addressing deployment activities and the status of affairs. Without this spreadsheet, we would never have been able to answer all the various questions from the different headquarters.

To put the troops in the proper mindset, I established a set of rules (similar to those established for soldiers assigned to the 2nd Brigade) for all my troops to live by (Figure 5). These rules were defined early in the deployment and set the tone for how we would conduct business in Bosnia. Easily understood and transmitted, all soldiers

SCHEDULE		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	AB	AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK	AL	AM	AN	AO	AP	AQ	AR	AS	AT	AU	AV	AW	AX	AY	AZ	BA	BB	BC	BD	BE	BF	BG	BH	BI	BJ	BK	BL	BM	BN	BO	BP	BQ	BR	BS	BT	BV	BW	BX	BY	BZ	CA	CB	CC	CD	CE	CF	CG	CH	CI	CJ	CK	CL	CM	CN	CO	CP	CQ	CR	CS	CT	CU	CV	CW	CX	CY	CZ	DA	DB	DC	DD	DE	DF	DG	DH	DI	DJ	DK	DL	DM	DN	DO	DP	DQ	DR	DS	DT	DU	DV	DW	DX	DY	DZ	EA	EB	EC	ED	EE	EF	EG	EH	EI	EJ	EK	EL	EM	EN	EO	EP	EQ	ER	ES	ET	EU	EV	EW	EX	EY	EZ	FA	FB	FC	FD	FE	FF	FG	FH	FI	FJ	FK	FL	FM	FN	FO	FP	FQ	FR	FS	FT	FU	FV	FW	FX	FY	FZ	GA	GB	GC	GD	GE	GF	GG	GH	GI	GJ	GK	GL	GM	GN	GO	GP	GQ	GR	GS	GT	GU	GV	GW	GX	GY	GZ	HA	HB	HC	HD	HE	HF	HG	HH	HI	HJ	HK	HL	HM	HN	HO	HP	HQ	HR	HS	HT	HU	HV	HW	HX	HY	HZ	IA	IB	IC	ID	IE	IF	IG	IH	II	IJ	IK	IL	IM	IN	IO	IP	IQ	IR	IS	IT	IU	IV	IW	IX	IY	IZ	JA	JB	JC	JD	JE	JF	JG	JH	JI	IJ	JK	KL	KM	KN	KO	KP	KQ	KR	KS	KT	KU	KV	KW	KX	KY	KZ	LA	LB	LC	LD	LE	LF	LG	LH	LI	LJ	LK	LL	LM	LN	LO	LP	LQ	LR	LS	LT	LU	LV	LW	LX	LY	LZ	MA	MB	MC	MD	ME	MF	MG	MH	MI	MJ	MK	ML	MM	MN	MO	MP	MQ	MR	MS	MT	MU	MV	MW	MX	MY	MZ	NA	NB	NC	ND	NE	NF	NG	NH	NI	NJ	NK	NL	NM	NN	NO	NP	NQ	NR	NS	NT	NU	NV	NW	NX	NY	NZ	OA	OB	OC	OD	OE	OF	OG	OH	OI	OJ	OK	OL	OM	ON	OO	OP	OQ	OR	OS	OT	OU	OV	OW	OX	OY	OZ	PA	PB	PC	PD	PE	PF	PG	PH	PI	PJ	PK	PL	PM	PN	PO	PP	PQ	PR	PS	PT	PU	PV	PW	PX	PY	PZ	QA	QB	QC	QD	QE	QF	QG	QH	QI	QJ	QK	QL	QM	QN	QO	QP	QQ	QR	QS	QT	QU	QV	QW	QX	QY	QZ	RA	RB	RC	RD	RE	RF	RG	RH	RI	RJ	RK	RL	RM	RN	RO	RP	RQ	RR	RS	RT	RU	RV	RW	RX	RY	RZ	SA	SB	SC	SD	SE	SF	SG	SH	SI	SJ	SK	SL	SM	SN	SO	SP	SQ	SR	SS	ST	SU	SV	SW	SX	SY	SZ	TA	TB	TC	TD	TE	TF	TG	TH	TI	TJ	TK	TL	TM	TN	TO	TP	TQ	TR	TS	TU	TV	TW	TX	TY	TZ	UA	UB	UC	UD	UE	UF	UG	UH	UI	UJ	UK	UL	UM	UN	UO	UP	UQ	UR	US	UT	UU	UV	UW	UX	UY	UZ	VA	VB	VC	VD	VE	VF	VG	VH	VI	VJ	VK	VL	VM	VN	VO	VP	VQ	VR	VS	VT	VU	VV	VW	VX	VY	VZ	WA	WB	WC	WD	WE	WF	WG	WH	WI	WJ	WK	WL	WM	WN	WO	WP	WQ	WR	WS	WT	WU	WV	WW	WX	WY	WZ	XA	XB	XC	XD	XE	XF	XG	XH	XI	XJ	XK	XL	XM	XN	XO	XP	XQ	XR	XS	XT	XU	XV	XW	XX	XY	XZ	YA	YB	YC	YD	YE	YF	YG	YH	YI	YJ	YK	YL	YM	YN	YO	YP	YQ	YR	YS	YT	YU	YV	YW	YX	YY	YZ	ZA	ZB	ZC	ZD	ZE	ZF	ZG	ZH	ZI	ZJ	ZK	ZL	ZM	ZN	ZO	ZP	ZQ	ZR	ZS	ZT	ZU	ZV	ZW	ZX	ZY	ZZ
184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225	226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300	301	302	303	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311	312	313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	321	322	323	324	325	326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350	351	352	353	354	355	356	357	358	359	360	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372	373	374	375	376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386	387	388	389	390	391	392	393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400	401	402	403	404	405	406	407	408	409	410	411	412	413	414	415	416	417	418	419	420	421	422	423	424	425	426	427	428	429	430	431	432	433	434	435	436	437	438	439	440	441	442	443	444	445	446	447	448	449	450	451	452	453	454	455	456	457	458	459	460	461	462	463	464	465	466	467	468	469	470	471	472	473	474	475	476	477	478	479	480	481	482	483	484	485	486	487	488	489	490	491	492	493	494	495	496	497	498	499	500																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																							

Figure 4. Predeployment Requirements Spreadsheet (continued).

were required to carry these 12 rules along with the Rules of Engagement at all times. I posted these rules in the battalion headquarters for families to read and constantly referred to the words throughout the deployment.

- | |
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| <p style="text-align: center;">Task Force 4-29 Field Artillery
TWELVE RULES</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. WE TAKE CARE OF EACH OTHER—WRITE HOME.2. THE SERGEANT IS IN CHARGE WITH IRON DISCIPLINE.3. BUDDY SYSTEM—2-MAN CONTROL.4. PMCS TO STANDARD EVERY DAY.5. CLEAN WEAPONS DAILY.6. DRINK PLENTY OF WATER.7. NEVER ALLOW AN ATROCITY TO HAPPEN.8. LIVE BY THE ROE.9. WHEN IN DOUBT, DIG—USE THE DIRT.10. VEHICLES MOVE IN 4s.11. CHANGE AND CLEAN SOCKS DAILY.12. FAMILIES MAKE THE DIFFERENCE—SUPPORT IS ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL. |
|--|

Figure 5. Troop Rules.

One of our major concerns in preparation for the deployment was force protection. Because we planned to employ howitzer platoons in a firebase configuration rather than in an aggressive shoot, move, and communicate mode, there was much concern for troop safety. My troops were not trained to fight from a permanent static site. Mechanized artillery seldom sits in one place for a long time. We worked this painful issue at the CMTC and relearned numerous valuable lessons often overlooked in mechanized warfare (e.g., digging-in, self-security). My officers went “back to school” and studied to see how the artillery conducted business in Vietnam. They examined the current state of

training at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Once again, a visit by the *Army Times* staff brought this issue to light as part of the December 25, 1995, cover story. As a battalion, we learned the key to our success, from a force protection perspective, was situational awareness and an aggressive approach to self-defense (e.g., fighting positions, sand bags, crew-served weapons, etc.). This translated to sergeants in charge, checking all the time, and understanding that failure to do so could result in the deaths of soldiers.

DEPLOYMENT

The "Thunder Battalion," as we were referred to, was tasked by the 1st Armored Division Artillery Commander, Colonel Alan Thrasher, to be the lead Field Artillery unit into Bosnia. My top battery, 1/C/4-29, deployed via C-17 Globemaster within a week following implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Its mission was to provide force protection and heavy combat credibility on the ground in Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was the first utilization of the C-17 involving heavy combat equipment and thus received major media coverage. The "NBC Today" show put a reporter and camera crew on-board the aircraft with plans to provide on-site television coverage to New York upon the battery's landing in Bosnia. I created a minor stir for NBC television when I refused to allow the C-17 to depart on time unless appropriate artillery ammunition was on board. I was not going to allow the howitzers and crew members to deploy into Bosnia without the capability to protect themselves and others. NBC was up in arms because such a delay would run counter to plans for live television coverage back in the United States. The NBC crew failed to understand that this was the real thing and not a show. I was amazed at the attitudes of these people. Nice folks, but they had a "show to do" and really did not appreciate the need for ammunition. Eventually the ammunition arrived, and the broadcasters back in New York had their on-the-scene live coverage.

The remaining combat elements of Charlie Battery deployed as the lead elements out of Baumholder, Germany, via rail to Zupanja, Croatia. The rail load process out of Baumholder went smoothly without any problems. The Base Support Battalion had rehearsed such an operation over the years and, in my opinion, executed without flaw. The only problem of any note was obtaining the appropriate cold weather gear, which had been a major shortage throughout USAREUR. Eventually that issue was resolved, and the unit moved out without delay. On January 2, 1996, 2/C/4-29 completed its rail journey through former Eastern Bloc countries and moved one track pad at a time as the first Field Artillery unit to cross the Sava River. Charlie Battery provided the initial fire support for 1st Armored Division forces spearheading peace enforcement operations over the Sava and into Tuzla.

One challenge complicating the Charlie Battery deployment was communications with Baumholder. I was concerned that the unit might experience several difficulties during the rail move simply because we were transiting countries where we had not been since World War II. Many of the rail conditions were subpar, and I was concerned whether the battery might confront some problems which could be best resolved through my chain of command. Other than the theft of some ammunition and soldier gear, the unit encountered no real problems. The battery commander maintained telephonic communications with me, using simple calling cards. Minor problems were quickly resolved as I further communicated with the 1st Armored Division Headquarters, and family members were kept apprised of the status of their husbands. In fact, one of my junior officers spoke limited Serbo-Croatian and thus was able to arrange for warm food and indoor sleeping areas. The capability to communicate with the unit in transit paid great dividends, as choke points were identified and resolved for follow-on rail traffic.

While Charlie Battery was deploying, my target acquisition battery (TAB) from the 3rd Infantry Division

moved simultaneously via rail convoy from Bamberg, Germany, and C-130 aircraft directly into Sarajevo. Part of the TAB was to remain in Sarajevo, providing radar force protection during the initial stages of the deployment. The rest of the unit was to deploy initially into Tuzla and then further south into the sector to protect the force.

During the TAB rail movement, one of the TAB soldiers was nearly electrocuted when he departed his assigned vehicle and climbed aboard another vehicle near a drooping high power line to retrieve a personal item. The soldier survived; however, the lesson learned early in the deployment was that all soldiers must listen to their sergeants and conduct all business with a heightened sense of situational awareness. With the TAB headed to Bosnia, the remainder of the battalion completed fielding of the SINCGARS radio system and then deployed by rail to the Intermediate Staging Base at Taszar, Hungary, as follows:

- BN TOC, Rail, December 30-31; C² Battalion Commander.
- Alpha Battery, Rail, January 1-2; C² Battery Commander.
- Service Battery, Rail, January 1-2; C² Battery Commander.
- Bravo Battery, Rail, January 11-12; C² Executive Officer.

The Command Sergeant Major, assisted by the battalion Executive Officer, deployed last from Baumholder to ensure control and ease of operations at home station. These two most trusted agents played a key role in pushing the battalion out the door in a timely and safe manner. They also helped to soften the blow to family members. The battalion closed in theater by late January, despite delays encountered with weather and the rail system.

As we departed Baumholder, I felt confident the deployment was proceeding as planned, and the needs of family members back home were being adequately met. To this end, I retained one of my best captains, Grant Goldsmith, as rear detachment commander to care for family member affairs and those soldiers unable to deploy for a variety of reasons. One of my charters to Captain Goldsmith was to clean house while the battalion was deployed. This involved the need to fix, repair, and improve working and quality of life conditions for the soldiers. The other charter was to take care of my families and solve problems before they reached Bosnia. He proved more than adequate for the task.

OPERATIONS

The battalion was tasked with providing fire support coverage and radar force protection throughout the huge 2nd Brigade area of operations (AOR) in southeast Bosnia. Colonel John Batiste, the 2nd Brigade Commander, made no secret of the fact that he expected the Field Artillery to provide a timely, accurate, and decisive blow—if necessary. This was no easy mission due to the size of the sector, poor road network, and terrain limitations. Colonel Batiste's mission for my battalion was as follows:

- Deploy to AOR Tuzla via air and rail; expand in sector.
- Provide direct support fire to 2nd Brigade Combat Team.
- Assist as required in peace enforcement operations.
- Implement military provisions of the Peace Accord.

The 2nd Brigade Commander's intent for fire support dictated how cannon, radar, and supporting units were emplaced throughout the depth of the sector. His intent was clear and, in my mind, could be executed without any major problems:

- Maximum centralized control; decentralized execution.
- Radar assets managed at TF 4-29 FA TOC.
- Clearance of fires by voice on the Brigade Command Net.
- FA/Close Air Support and Attack Aviation assets require positive visual identification and clearance in accordance with 2nd Brigade Graduated Response Decision Matrix (Figure 6).

This matrix, developed by Colonel Batiste and my Brigade Fire Support Officer during the train-up at the CMTC, provided a simple tool to arrive at a decision for the employment of indirect fire assets. This tool was later adopted as the standard for Task Force Eagle and incorporated into the plans for follow-on units. By design, the matrix made it fast but simple for commanders at any level to reach a decision to execute indirect or air-to-ground fires on a target.

To support the Brigade Commander's intent throughout an expansive sector marked by mountainous terrain, we opted to assume position as FA platoons occupying maneuver battalion lodgment areas. This accommodated force protection needs and ensured maximum indirect fire coverage synchronized with maneuver platoon and company schemes of maneuver. Each cannon-firing battery was virtually in direct support of a maneuver battalion; however, in reality their positioning provided for mutually supporting, indirect fires under the direct C² of the direct support Field Artillery Battalion. This relationship actually enhanced combined operations because the FA role was an active part of the maneuver battalion commander's estimate and decisionmaking process. My firing battery commanders, along with the battalion fire support officers, actively participated in all drills, hence ensuring the planning and synchronization of fires. My battalion tactical




Figure 6. 2nd Brigade Graduated Response Decision Matrix.

operations center (TOC) was equally involved with the brigade and battalion headquarters in planning fire support for all operations.

I placed each FA cannon battery under operational control of maneuver units for movement and Combat Service Support. I had no choice. Given the limited road network and terrain, I could not physically provide timely and adequate logistic support to my force. Instead, I retained C² and integrated my logistics fleet with the maneuver battalions to provide a complementary effort. Throughout the brigade sector, logistics trains routinely consisted of assets from each battalion supporting all units. Equipment maintenance remained my responsibility (nobody wanted to help me on this one), and my battalion maintenance teams were on the road continuously for parts or repair work.

TF 4-29 stationed units in the following maneuver brigade/battalion lodgment areas (LA) located in the southeastern sector of the 1st Armored Division AOR (see map, Figure 7):

- LA Alicia (1/1 CAV)—1/A/4-29 FA
- Steel Castle (DIVARTY)—2/A/4-29 FA & 1xQ-36 Radar
- LA Pat (4/12 IN)—1/C/4-29 FA
- LA Demi (4/12 IN)—2/C/4-29 FA
- LA Linda (2/68 AR)—1/B/4-29 FA & 1xQ-36/1xQ-37 Radar
- LA Lisa (2nd Bde)—2/B/4-29 FA & 1xQ-36/1xQ-37 Radar
- LA Lisa (2nd Bde)—4-29 TOC/Radar & C2/Metro/MLRS Battery




Figure 7. 1st Armored Division AOR.

- LA Angela (47th FSB)—Svc Battery/Battalion & Cbt Trains.

Field Artillery combat configuration within a lodgment area usually consisted of a platoon occupying a corner of the base camp in a box formation with a 6,400 mil firing capability. Each howitzer section was fortified with sand bags and engineer barrier material for force protection. My guidance was to provide sufficient force protection for troops to remain out of sniper sight and hand grenade range from any external site. Fighting positions were prepared to standard, constantly improved upon, and occupied 24 hours daily. Soldiers filled thousands of sandbags. At night, movement in sector seldom occurred; however, firing platoons maintained hot gun status at all times. Until living conditions improved at the base camps (once Brown and Root arrived in sector), troops lived in sandbag reinforced tents within feet of their howitzers.

From these lodgment areas (or base camps, as they were commonly referred to), the battalion focused on four major tasks: artillery raids and demonstrations (force protection and fire support); Former Warring Factions (FWF) weapons storage site inspections; howitzer and small arms gunnery; and support to the force.

By narrowing our efforts to these four mission-essential tasks, we were able prevent ourselves from being piecemealed for “hey you” tasks. My unit remained engaged in one or more missions at a time. For example, Cannon Platoons and Radar Sections moved and repositioned on a daily basis to support operations in sector. Our standard rule within the brigade was that no maneuver unit would operate outside radar or cannon range. This often meant repositioning platoons in sector for extended periods of time, as did response to changes in maneuver task organization and closing of lodgment areas. Headquarters Battery personnel were deeply involved in weapon site inspection. Training and logistic support to the force never stopped,

forcing Service Battery to expend an enormous amount of effort.

From a distance, I watched the 1st Armored Division Artillery Headquarters receive continuous taskings for non-artillery related activities. I vowed to prevent this from filtering down to my battalion. Thus we remained steadfastly focused on our four main tasks at hand.

OPTEMPO—ARTILLERY “RAIDS” AND DEMONSTRATIONS

The battalion conducted artillery “raids” and demonstrations on a daily basis throughout the depth of the 2nd Brigade’s sector to signal NATO’s resolve and provide force protection to maneuver forces. These raids or demonstrations usually involved two or four howitzers with accompanying fire direction center capability, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support.

A typical raid would entail troop-leading procedures by junior and senior battery level leaders, to include pre-combat inspections, maintenance and weapons checks, rehearsals, reconnaissance, and selection and occupation of a position. The unit would move to a specified location and set up in typical artillery fashion. From this location the troops would prepare to fire in support of an ongoing mission. The raid would not terminate until the maneuver mission was complete. Often this meant more than 12 hours in a single raid site.

Often we would task organize to include an MLRS or radar section as part of a raid. Daily execution of raids and demonstrations established one of the highest OPTEMPOs in the Army—over 700,000 miles driven by Field Artillery-tracked combat vehicles during the operational deployment. This high OPTEMPO continuously kept my soldiers engaged, and clearly signaled to the Former Warring Factions the resolve of our force. No operational missions (e.g., checkpoint operations, patrols, or Zone of

Separation enforcement) were conducted in the 2nd Brigade sector without force protection provided by the guns, rockets, and radar of the supporting Field Artillery.

I recall one day when Colonel Batiste and I were meeting at an old motel in the Serb sector (Vlacenica) with the Srpska Drina Corps Commander and his staff when an issue came up regarding U.S. military professionalism and resolve. It so happened we had planned an MLRS raid that afternoon to occupy a position outside the motel in view of the entire township. Timing being everything, we walked to the balcony of the motel at the instant the MLRS Platoon was arriving to occupy and prepare its systems for firing. Needless to say, this artillery raid caught the attention of the Drina Corps leadership and quickly put to rest any discussion of U.S. military capability.

One contentious incident occurred involving a Field Artillery raid on May 10, 1996, during which my junior officer on the ground did everything right. One of my platoons (A2/A/4-29 FA) was conducting a deliberate platoon raid in support of a maneuver company operation east in sector. During the raid, the platoon leader (Lieutenant Phil Brooks) spotted seven personnel in camouflage uniforms armed with automatic weapons crossing a nearby major supply route (Route Sparrow). Soon thereafter, automatic weapon fire was heard, and the seven personnel entered the Field Artillery platoon raid site. The personnel laid down their weapons and surrendered to my platoon leader. The individuals claimed to be Muslim soldiers attempting to egress to friendly lines when they encountered enemy resistance.

The seven individuals had no identification tags or documents. Senior U.S. and International Police Task Force representatives arrived on scene to address the situation. In time, a decision was rendered to release these individuals to Republic of Srpska Police and transport them to the city of Zvornik (in the Serb sector). When U.S. forces proceeded to

Zvornik to regain control of the seven individuals for further interrogation, they were met with armed resistance.

This early and apparently minor incident later developed into a near national-level issue, with the captured men being referred to as the "Zvornik Seven" (see Appendix at the end of this chapter). The key point to take from this incident is that soldiers at the lowest levels must be prepared to deal with situations during a peace enforcement operation that could have far-reaching consequences. In peace operations, soldiers must understand the big picture and be able to perceive the potential consequences of their actions. Unlike in a high-intensity environment, seemingly trivial incidents become major issues in a matter of minutes. The actions of a single soldier can easily escalate into a major international contretemps.

RADAR FORCE PROTECTION

As previously stated, my TAB was a non-organic unit that joined me upon arrival in Bosnia. I met the battery, B/25 FA "Wolfpack," initially at the CMTC prior to deployment, but even then was uncertain if they would be a part of my team in Bosnia. The battalion proved to be the most talented and energetic unit I have ever served with in over 19 years active duty. The radar force protection mission was likely the most critical aspect of taking care of the force, and the "Wolfpack" did it all day and night without complaint.

B/25 conducted 24-hour radar operations from start to mission completion and managed to maintain an incredible 97 percent operational readiness rate. Because a civilian Logistics Assistance Representative was attached to the battalion, hard-to-acquire radar repair parts were acquired within days rather than weeks or months.

Despite the wear and tear on its equipment, my TAB had over 5,000 radar acquisitions. These acquisitions were typically Former Warring Factions (FWF) small arms

celebratory fire and oftentimes unauthorized use of rotary wing aircraft in violation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Even though the radar systems did not actually acquire any indirect fire (to our knowledge), they did maintain a constant vigilance that was highly respected by FWFs. More than once FWF military representatives remarked that the presence of radar prevented anyone from attempting to fire mortar shells or other indirect fire assets. Anytime the 2nd Brigade faced a potential confrontation with the FWFs, Colonel Batiste was quick to satisfy himself concerning the coverage provided by our radar assets.

FWF WEAPONS STORAGE SITE INSPECTIONS

Early in the peace enforcement operation, the brigade task force faced the challenge of locating, identifying, and tracking FWF weapon systems. This proved to be a most challenging task, as the factions seldom revealed weapon site locations and did whatever they could to limit our ability to find any such sites. More interesting, this challenge expanded the role of the Field Artillery beyond just providing fire support when needed.

Typically the FWFs were reluctant to cooperate with the United States in any instance involving the location and number of their medium-heavy military weapons. For example, in May 1996, Colonel Batiste, the Division Artillery Commander, and I, along with a team of military police, attempted to enter what we believed to be an intermediate-size weapons storage site. However, we were detained and not allowed to proceed further without consultation by senior leaders in the faction chain of command. Colonel Batiste elected to proceed without further delay, calling on the Air Force and Army aviation for a show of force to demonstrate our authority and determination. In minutes we were allowed to enter what appeared to be a medium-size barn complex. As we opened one barn door after another, we were quick to realize this was one of the largest weapons storage sites in country,

likely a key storage site for a mechanized corps consisting of all types and large numbers of combined arms equipment. We spent hours inventorying all this equipment. From then on we used such techniques to track all heavy weapons in sector.

Over time, the mission of conducting inspections of FWF weapons sites was tasked to my battalion because we asked for it, feeling we possessed the requisite expertise. Much of the equipment and ammunition was related to artillery or mortars, and my troops were well-suited to the job. In fact, throughout the entire division, the Field Artillery was tasked to assume this responsibility. For the 2nd brigade, this meant bi-weekly inspections over a 9-month period of more than 20 weapon storage sites. Oftentimes this resulted in confiscation of undeclared weapons in the evenhanded application of the Dayton Peace Accords.

For the battalion's fire supporters, the weapon storage site inspections resulted in the creation of target folders in the event activities escalated into combat. For each weapon storage site, we maintained a target folder consisting of ground/air/J-stars photos, targeting coordinates (GPS accuracy), and any relevant information to ensure accurate targeting for indirect and air to ground fires. This initiative expanded and further refined existing Fort Sill targeting doctrine, becoming a key piece of evidence in the event weapons declaration and accountability rules of the Dayton Peace Accords were violated.

BOSNIA ELECTION SUPPORT

TF 4-29 FA performed a crucial role in support of Bosnia elections in August 1996. The 2nd Brigade initiated the process of reshaping the ground force, anticipating the upcoming elections and a need to reduce the proportion of heavy combat power. A military police battalion from the United States was received, and the 2/68 Armor battalion was redeployed to Baumholder. My battalion supplemented the military police task organization with battalion and

company fire support elements (to include forward observers). Fire support personnel were internally reassigned from redeploying tank companies headed back to Baumholder. This nondoctrinal supplement allowed the military police to execute their mission as a maneuver force by conducting all patrols supported by fire support planning and execution.

The 2nd Brigade Fire Support Officer also trained the incoming military police (employing the GUARDFIST Trainer) in the conduct of fire support operations in a peace enforcement environment. For the most part, this meant training in planning and executing indirect fires utilizing the decision matrix. Additionally, we repositioned three cannon platoons and a radar section to cover crucial election "hot spots."

My battalion was also assigned the mission of escorting Belgian, Luxembourgian, German, and Austrian representatives carrying completed refugee absentee ballots from Visoko, Bosnia, to a Sarajevo warehouse, and throughout the entire 2nd Brigade sector. My battery commanders assumed this responsibility in four separate groups of four vehicles each. They did the job without flaw, spending long nights on the road under tough conditions. The battalion also provided a Special Investigation Team to examine allegations and reports of voting irregularities or misconduct. During the crucial election period, the role of the Field Artillery battalion expanded once again because the brigade commander trusted the character and discipline of the troops.

GUNNERY

Despite the high OPTEMPO within the AOR, the battalion planned, organized and conducted eight live-fire exercises to include two Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) exercises in theater. The 3rd United Kingdom Division established the Glamoc artillery impact range in the Multi-National Division (Southwest) sector early in the

deployment. When offered the opportunity by the Division Artillery Commander, I deployed each of my six cannon platoons and radar sections over 300 miles by Heavy Equipment Transport (HET) and wheeled vehicle convoy to spend 1 week of tough and aggressive live-fire gunnery training. When I did this, a battery from the 2-3 FA (Direct Support to the 1st Brigade) moved into my sector to provide adequate coverage. I provided the same exchange for 2/3 FA when they rotated platoons to the Glamoc range.

This live-fire training was essential to maintaining combat readiness and keeping the soldiers' heads in the game. My battalion operations officer executed tough and challenging Field Artillery Table VII Gunnery and certified firing platoons and radar sections as trained. The Glamoc range was unique in that all artillery fires were shot into a mountainside visible to the cannoneers. For the first time ever, most of my cannon crews were able to actually see artillery rounds impact. This training provided the troops a break from the stress of guard duty, artillery raids, etc. It also provided the opportunity for me to work with young leaders and assess first hand gun line, forward observer, and radar C² skills.

The two JAAT exercises attracted visitors from NATO countries to include military leaders of the FWFs. The brigade commander used the live-fire opportunity to demonstrate the firepower potential of the U.S. Army. I can still recall the smile on Major General Nash's face and contrasting frown on the visiting Russian Brigade Commanders when one of my copperhead rounds destroyed a FWF T-62 tank during a JAAT exercise.

Two cannon platoons and radar sections also conducted live-fire training at the Taborfalva Training Area established by the 7th Army Training Command at Taborfalva, Hungary. This range, unlike the one at Glamoc, was designed for Bradley and Tank Gunnery with minimal Field Artillery capability.

U.S.-RUSSIAN FIELD ARTILLERY TRAINING

We worked hard when presented the opportunity by the Division Artillery Commander to foster a working relationship with the Russian 2S-9 Field Artillery Battalion serving in support of the Russian Brigade. I like to tell the story that we virtually laid to rest any remnants of the Cold War by establishing a unique and enlightened partnership with our Russian counterparts.

Unlike my battalion, the Russian unit was a self-propelled airborne battalion, which looked good but, for the most part, seldom ventured outside their barracks while in Bosnia. In this regard, we took most of the initiative for training exchanges, which included small arms familiarization, combined fire support operations in the Russian sector, positioning a cannon battery and radar section in the Russian sector for combined operations, officer and enlisted soldier exchanges, and holiday visits (e.g., July 4 activities in the U.S. sector).

Interactions between the enlisted soldiers were impressive. Language was no barrier, and the troops were quick to exchange uniform items and stories of girls and friends. Among officers, it was a bit different. The young Russian lieutenants appeared distrustful of my officers and almost incredulous when visiting living, morale, and recreation facilities in the United States sector. As I recall, when we escorted the Russian officers through the Steele Castle Post Exchange (which was full of attractive items), they simply appeared uninterested and wanted to move on. However, hours later when left alone, the Russian officers quickly ran to the PX and purchased stacks of goods to take back to their unit. My impression was that the Russian lieutenants simply did not trust my leaders, were Communists at heart, and were standoffish by nature.

My counterpart, the Russian battalion commander, was uniquely different from his lieutenants. Foremost, he was a veteran of both the Afghanistan and Chechnya wars and

was due to retire from the Russian Army in months. He was very open and saddened by the contrast between his drab life and the attractive opportunities afforded an American citizen. More than once he told me the young Russian officers “have it all wrong and are too hard—caught up in the military fever.”

I was impressed with the professionalism of the Russian Field Artillery Battalion, and the more time we spent together, the more relaxed the young officers became. Their attitudes improved; they looked like soldiers, and I was impressed with the way they performed their role in Bosnia.

REDEPLOYMENT

Before I discuss redeployment to home station at Baumholder, Germany, I will mention the official Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave program made available to the troops during the mid to latter stages of the deployment. All soldiers were authorized under normal leave conditions the opportunity to take 2 weeks R&R leave. This proved a great morale booster. Fortunately, the number of soldiers failing to return to theater following R&R leave was minimal. I had only one absent without leave (AWOL) and, in his case, he had a serious personal problem best addressed by “signing in” at the United States military installation nearest to his home.

Two R&R programs were in place. In one, the soldier could fly back to Germany and remain there or within Europe throughout the 2-week leave period. The other program allowed him to fly, all expenses paid, to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and depart from there for leave in the United States. To manage the program, we had to resort to an order-of-merit list based on time in theater. Hence, those soldiers from C Battery who arrived the earliest in Bosnia were afforded the opportunity to take R&R leave first. Nevertheless, all eligible soldiers in the battalion were provided the opportunity for R&R leave—most took advantage of the program.

Also available was a 4-day pass program to Budapest, Hungary, for soldiers and, if possible, their spouses. The spouse would have to fly from Frankfurt to Budapest and link up with their husbands. Diane and I opted for this program and met at the Budapest Hilton for a wonderful 3-day break. In short, the R&R leave program was a huge success and had no noticeable negative impact on the continuation of highly competent operations in theater.

Back to the redeployment. The battalion redeployed one battery at a time in the same order the units arrived in Bosnia. C Battery led the way back to Baumholder, and the force on the ground in Bosnia gradually decreased in size and structure.

It was important to my wife and me for the homecoming phase of the redeployment to go like a charm, thus providing a lifelong memorable event. We have, to this day, warm memories of our DESERT STORM redeployment and the class act put on in that regard back at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

In order to redeploy out of Bosnia, each company-size unit had to turn in all excess, completely clean all vehicles and equipment, qualify in gunnery skills (we had already accomplished this at Glamoc), and pass a tough 10/20 maintenance inspection. We were well prepared for all this and had no problems. In fact, A and C Battery were two of only a handful of units in the division to meet all redeployment standards at 100 percent.

We planned far in advance for the redeployment. Previously, the battalion had entered the Division/Corps/USAREUR Excellence in Maintenance Competition and won at all levels. This was accomplished while deployed in Bosnia. We had initially entered this competition with the intent of winning the division title and thus receiving Division MAIT assistance to fix our equipment for the redeployment. In this way we could prepare ourselves well for the maintenance recovery phase of the redeployment. My executive officer had the vision to prepare all excess

equipment for turn-in both at Baumholder and in Bosnia long before the redeployment. We simply worked what we guessed would be the redeployment issues early during the Bosnia deployment and thus encountered no problems during redeployment.

At the home front we prepared to receive each battery one at a time with the joint assistance of all battery FSGs and the rear detachment. Baumholder had a separate plan to receive each unit. However, since it failed to measure up to my expectations, we, unlike other units, did our own. As my batteries arrived at Baumholder, soldiers turned in weapons and sensitive items, then marched to the gymnasium where music, food, family, and pageantry greeted their arrival. We filmed all this and later put together a music video as a keepsake for each soldier in the battalion.

Following closure, soldiers were released for 4 days after which we initiated 2-weeks recovery at home station. After a successful home station recovery (move into barracks, draw privately owned vehicles, reestablish shop operations, etc.), soldiers were allowed 30 days leave, and the battalion virtually stood down.

One of the toughest challenges upon redeployment was integrating the new soldiers with the Bosnia veterans. Upon return from Bosnia, we had over 120 new soldiers waiting to join a battery. To ease transition and ensure acceptance without alienation, we maintained the rear detachment structure (consisting of these new soldiers) to execute routine upkeep missions until the 30-day block leave period expired. Following everyone's return, we assigned the soldiers to a battery and went about business as usual.

THE REAR DETACHMENT

This story would not be complete without once again addressing the work of the battalion rear detachment in

Baumholder, Germany. This operation was a great success for two reasons. One, I designated a highly capable captain, Grant Goldsmith, for the job. Second, we talked about the job daily, and I empowered him to make major decisions.

Captain Goldsmith prepared and deployed almost 200 replacement soldiers, and processed at least that many out of country back to the United States. He coordinated efforts to deploy and redeploy all soldiers and equipment, assisted in storage for privately owned vehicles and personal property, provided continuous support to installation support activities and families, turned in over \$11 million in excess equipment, reorganized battalion living and working areas, and, in short, took care of all business, treating people with dignity and respect.

Other battalions in Baumholder were nowhere as successful in the rear because battalion commanders failed to leave behind a quality leader, or attempted to rotate the rear detachment commander. Neither of these options worked. Life continued back in Germany, and family members expected their needs to be consistently met without abrupt change. When the FSG faltered, my rear detachment commander took care of business. Other than with my wife, I worked more closely with my rear detachment commander than anyone else.

SECTION TWO: KEY LESSONS LEARNED

Most of the key lessons learned have already been discussed in this paper. Such lessons are more likely to be principles and standards that were reinforced or complemented during this peace enforcement experience. In summation, I recommend future or current Field Artillery battalion commanders consider the following when planning for a peace enforcement operation:

- Make the FSG a priority and ensure advisors to family members can communicate with the majority of your population. Battery commanders' wives tend to

assume the FSG advisor role for their husbands, but often are unable to connect with enlisted spouses. This means you should strongly consider a senior noncommissioned officer's wife for this role. My experience is that it works best this way. Remember that most of your population is enlisted. Sergeants lead the way.

- Limit the number of trusted agents, and speak with one voice on all matters that may relate to issues involving family members. My wife, executive officer, and rear detachment commanders were my points of contact regarding all family and Baumholder issues. No other players were in the official loop. Too many players often distort the message during a lengthy and distant deployment.
- Select your best captain as your rear detachment commander. Put the structure in place on a routine basis rather than waiting for an operational deployment. Upon return from Bosnia, I appointed a permanent rear detachment commander and sergeant assistant (operating full time) to handle things such as voters assistance, new soldier/family orientation, etc. If the battalion were to deploy today, we would not have to regenerate the rear detachment and FSG leadership. It is already in place and trained.
- Start now to gain a firm handle on nondeployables. You cannot wait for the alert order to discover who has what sort of problem. I identified 12 soldiers as medically nondeployable at the start of the Bosnia experience, but was previously unaware of their status. We sent these soldiers through the medical boards, and almost a year later they were still in my unit when we redeployed to Baumholder. The Medical Evaluation and Screening process is slow and does not work to meet the needs of a field commander. Identify

the medical profiles and those in hiding. Work it from day one, before you are alerted.

- Get to know the Division Inspector General long before you deploy. You will no doubt hear from him on more than one occasion, and it helps to know each other and appreciate roles.
- You will have your share of individuals who simply do not want to deploy. They may resort to various pretexts such as feigning suicide, hurting themselves, etc. Know the proper policy and legal methods for handling such cases. I had an officer feign suicide and learned that the proper management of such a situation is difficult and distracting, particularly when preparing for an operational deployment. Do not get caught short here.
- Train your Field Artillerymen in their basic combat skills, and they will be successful in any peace environment. The tough and realistic training imposed on my soldiers translated to successful peace enforcement operations. We were successful because we were trained to fight a war. Honing the combat skills prior to deployment was made easy because of the high standards and expectations of combat MOS training.
- Units must continue to train during the deployment. Basic skills need constant attention. Soldiers are not accustomed to carrying loaded weapons around all the time. We had problems in the 1st Armored Division with regard to small arms misfires. Fortunately nobody was hurt; however, soldiers who carry loaded weapons every day must receive constant safety awareness training. Also, everyone needs to fire individual weapons as much as possible when deployed. We constructed our own small arms range and routinely familiarized/qualified soldiers on

assigned weapons. It was a great confidence-building measure.

- Maintain high standards at all times. Our soldiers should look the part of a tough and professional Army. This means leaders must constantly check things and possess the moral courage to enforce discipline at all times. This was one of my constant themes, hammered into the officers and noncommissioned officers on a daily basis. Remember, someone is watching every step you take and they notice everything.
- Security must be stressed in all you do. We allowed no vehicle movement unless the plan was briefed, rehearsed, PMCS verified, and mission certification approved by the battery commander. Keep your vehicles off the road in a peace enforcement operation. Otherwise, vehicles should move in fours for force protection. For my battalion, the 2-minute rule was in effect at all times. This meant when a convoy stopped for more than 2 minutes, drivers disembarked to chock wheels, clean windows, and assume a force protection stance. I held leaders accountable for this rather simple activity, and in time the precautionary attitude rubbed off on other things we did.
- Maintaining high standards of appearance in lodgment areas was critical. Other units relaxed rules. Those that did routinely suffered accidents and other problems. I did otherwise. Uniform standards were in effect whenever soldiers were outside a tent or living area. Leaders were expected to enforce what we called "Thunder Standards." That meant our soldiers were always a cut above the others. Remember, if you leave soldiers to their own devices, they will tend to become bored and sloppy. It is simply human nature. Pride in the unit should drive an intense desire to look and be number one.

- Maintenance is everything. We eventually won the Army Maintenance Award during the Bosnia rotation simply because I made maintenance a top priority. I personally stopped every vehicle marked 4-29 FA and inspected it. It can be done even in a harsh operational environment. Do not forget routine maintenance of weapons, NBC gear, sets, kits, and outfits. Include ammunition and tools. We took our eyes off the battery mess trailers for a few months because troops were eating in Brown and Root mess facilities. We quickly discovered how fast these trailers could fall to pieces if not properly maintained.
- Take note to educate your unit on use of the Form 5988-E for vehicle maintenance. If you do not know what this document is used for, get help now. Proper utilization of the 5988-E by all concerned, to include drivers and noncommissioned officers, is your key to maintenance success.
- Force protection can never be sacrificed. All must understand and be able to recite the Rules of Engagement. Prepare your soldiers by placing them in practical learning situations to develop skills. Soldiers must wear body armor at all times. Force protection by sandbag construction is a continuing process. There is a right and wrong way to construct fighting positions. Most Field Artillerymen do it the wrong way. We had the task force engineers inspect every fighting position and certify it as safe. First time through, 75 percent of the positions were unsafe due to overhead cover weaknesses.
- Keep the troops informed. Do whatever you need to ensure they are the first to receive news from home. Mail delay is always a problem in any operational deployment. Solve it yourself. On a routine and daily basis, my battalion established a four-vehicle convoy to pick up and drop off mail at every battery location.

This created a daily stop at every lodgment area to see that our troops had mail in hand. Other units waited for the system to reach their locations. We virtually became the system for the battalion and thus ensured our troops were always receiving mail. Soldiers sincerely appreciated this approach to business. We were looking out for them.

- I purchased a few VCR cameras to film the activities of each battery on a monthly basis. This provided the families back home a good picture of life in Bosnia. Diane did the same from Baumholder, and, over time, each battery established a routine process of exchanging films between the FSG and Bosnia.
- Educate new soldier-parents. Plan orientation sessions for soldiers prior to redeployment. A birth is likely to occur for many of your troops during the deployment. Some of your troops are likely first-time parents. With the stress of the deployment, they may not be properly prepared to assume parenting responsibilities. Reception and integration following a lengthy deployment are often a tough process for soldiers and their family members. Ensure that your chaplain is on top of this one, and you will have the early warning on which soldiers are at risk.
- Work with the news media and nongovernmental organizations. They were all over the place in Bosnia. Take the opportunities provided to tell the success stories of your unit. Also be careful as to who serves as an official spokesperson. In my battalion that responsibility was limited to commanders and field grade officers. In addition, we constantly had to deal with letters to the editor. Some soldiers vented their unhappiness through the European *Stars and Stripes*, which often proved embarrassing to the chain of command.

- Pursue after-work outlets for your soldiers. Pent-up frustrations are best released in sports competition or recreational activities.
- Plan on having to use the palletized load system (PLS) trucks for every mission outside the prescribed one. My 18 PLS trucks virtually hauled the entire Division from Germany to Bosnia and back. My drivers and young sergeants were worn out and seldom provided a break. Keep track of these soldiers, or you will lose them to the system. Maintain positive control of the PLS flat racks.
- Supply accountability continues even in a peace enforcement environment. Monthly inventories and twice daily serial number accountability checks are a necessity.
- Keep an eye on discretionary funds. We discovered in the 1st Armored Division that soldiers were ordering all sorts of “nice to have” things such as knives, thermos bottles, and watches. Do not let this happen. It turns out that the order descriptors (DNSN) for these items were listed in an issue of *PS: Preventive Maintenance Monthly*, and troops from all units attempted to take advantage of the tempting but ill-advised situation.
- Ensure the FA Battalion tactical operations center (TOC) is in charge of all fire support related missions. For us, this meant my TOC conducted nightly rehearsals of each maneuver battalion task force fire support plan and the employment of FA in support of ground operations. This served command and control well and kept the battalion fire support officers in the loop. I also employed the TOC to track all vehicle movement in sector, much as a taxi cab dispatcher operates. I would not allow any vehicle of mine to move without positive FM radio contact with the TOC

(at all times) and constant reporting on the surrounding situation on the ground.

- Develop a liberal awards policy and make use of impact awards. I probably awarded more Army Achievement Medals than any other lieutenant colonel in sector because it caught the attention of the soldiers. It also served as a reminder that the senior leadership cared. I even impact-awarded medical and Combat Service Support soldiers from other units for taking care of my men. We also purchased numerous "battalion coins" and dropped one on a good soldier at every opportunity.
- Communications are everything. We placed a Defense Switched Network (DSN) line in my quarters at Baumholder, and I spoke daily to my wife and rear detachment commander. Often I would call from my mobile telephone in my wheeled vehicle. I also used this capability to provide soldiers instant communications with the rear and their families when a personal crisis warranted.
- Work with your young leaders. Any operational deployment is usually a career-defining moment for your young officers and sergeants. Make it a good one for them. You have their attention 24 hours daily, so spend time with them and the troops. Mentor, coach, teach. Develop the young leaders and treat them the way you would want to be treated. Morale plays a key role, and, without the enthusiastic support of your junior leaders, life on the prairie is tough.
- Define your roles and missions early in the deployment. I found that as the threat diminished, people assumed the Field Artillery was no longer needed and simply taking up space. Fight the urge to accommodate such an attitude by working closely

with the Brigade Commander to assume roles of your choosing.

- Trust your noncommissioned officers. This type of environment is where they truly earn their money. You cannot be successful without their translating your intent into action at ground level. I referred to my unit as "A Sergeant's Battalion" because I recognized true ownership of morale, proficiency, and getting things done.
- Get out in front of the soldiers. Conduct award ceremonies, promotions, information briefs, etc. It means something when it comes from the battalion commander. It is great for morale.
- Make sure you are on top of the business of containerized shipping. You will likely deploy in this mode. Too often soldiers failed to employ loading plans and stow the right equipment. We had to send back to Baumholder for some overlooked items, a real embarrassment. At home base, check what you have inside the conex containers and supply rooms. Much of this stuff will not go with you in a deployment. Get rid of the unneeded surplusage. When we redeployed, I required that we remain uploaded for a future operational deployment. This caused the leaders to get rid of the junk and retain only the items necessary for warfighting.
- Take a long look at your Prescribed Load List (PPL) of Class IX Repair Parts. We were doing away with this in the 1st Armored Division as I departed. However, the PPL kept my fleet operational during the first 90 days of Bosnia. Without these repair parts, we would never have made it in the beginning. Make sure you have the right items to maintain the fleet for 90 days. It took that long for the repair parts system to start flowing in Bosnia.

CONCLUSION

The opportunity for battalion command in a peace enforcement environment was special from start to finish. Rather than commanding from a garrison environment, I had the splendid opportunity to command from the front in an operational environment with my soldiers around me 24 hours daily. I learned more about myself as a leader and the potential of others than I have in over 19 years of service. The soldiers did everything asked of them and more. The leaders learned always to place the soldiers first and force protection foremost. Most family members supported the cause and never gave in to the tough times.

Following our redeployment back to Baumholder, I commanded the battalion for another 7 months. For those last few months in command, we continued to capitalize on the Bosnian experience and take advantage of the fact more than 50 percent of the unit were Bosnia veterans. The team aspect of Bosnia carried the battalion long after the redeployment.

Frequently I converse with some of my former soldiers who served in support of the Bosnia mission, and all feedback has been positive. On the whole, they believe what we did was right and are proud to have served their country and unit. I personally believe we did things right from the start because we were serious and had the moral courage to enforce discipline at all times. We had sergeants in charge with the character to do the right thing. In all, 4-29 FA was an outstanding unit that met or exceeded all mission requirements in Bosnia.

APPENDIX

“ZVORNIK SEVEN” QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. Was it the correct decision to hand the seven Muslims, who had surrendered to IFOR, to the Republika Srpska Police?

A. Yes, it was. This was clearly an armed group within the meaning of the Dayton agreement. Military or civilian, it constituted a threat to peace inside RS jurisdiction. As such, we were obliged to turn them over to the local civilian authorities if they had an interest in them.

We cannot, on the one hand, insist that the local civil authorities accept their responsibilities as required under the agreement and then, on the other, keep them from exercising those responsibilities when they have a clear and legally justifiable opportunity to do so.

2. Would you do the same, given similar circumstances again?

A. Yes, for the reasons I have just given. However, with the benefit of hindsight, we would have held them longer ourselves in order to establish their bona fides within a neutral environment. Notwithstanding this option, we would still have had to hand them over to the RS authorities within 72 hours.

3. Why did General Nash countermand the major's decision and try and recover the prisoners?

A. He did not countermand the major's orders. When he learned what had happened, he decided to seek an opportunity to question the prisoners further before the Serb police proceeded with their investigation. The Zvornik authorities decided not to relinquish custody, but did agree that IFOR and the IPTF, whose mission is to monitor police procedures, could observe and even participate in the questioning of the suspects.

4. How long did IFOR hold the men before they were handed to the RS Police, and how long were they questioned?

A. They were in our troops' custody for just over 2 hours, from about 1240 when they reached the IFOR position until approximately 1440 when they left for Zvornik. They were questioned by IFOR from 1300 and in the presence of Military Police and the IPTF from approximately 1400.

5. Do you not think that if there was a possibility that those men were from Srebrenica, and it would appear now that there is, that you had a moral duty to ensure that they did not fall into the hands of those they had been trying to escape from for the past 9 months?

A. The war is over. Civilian policing and justice are now the order of the day. Just as the international community has the right to investigate those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, so do both of the entities created at Dayton have the right to investigate crimes that occur within their jurisdiction. The IPTF will monitor the progress of this investigation and ensure that proper standards of police behavior are applied.

6. Have you issued new instructions to the MNDs as a result of this incident?

A. We have reviewed our procedures and reminded subordinate formations of their powers and the procedures for detention.

7. Did the RS Police “lock and load their weapons” in response to the U.S. presence at the police station?

A. A number of RS policemen were seen with loaded AK 47s. There was also a large crowd which gathered around the Police Station during the time that IFOR was present. I understand that some threatening gestures were made.

8. What was the response to what was surely a challenge to their authority?

A. The IFOR party left without taking any steps that would have escalated the tension that was already evident. Dealings between IFOR and the police were amicable, but there was a crowd outside, attracted by the incident. Talks concerning the prisoners had reached the stage where the Zvornik police had put the issue to the federal ministry, and no answer was expected until the next day. The IFOR party had no reason to remain.

The police are not prohibited by Dayton from carrying long weapons outside the ZOS. This was not an issue of noncompliance. IFOR withdrew so as not to create an unnecessary and potentially dangerous situation.

CHAPTER 6

THE 28TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION: "EN TEMPS" SUPPORT TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Lieutenant Colonel James D. Sharpe, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

I witnessed world events in the Nineties impinge upon the United States Army Europe (USAREUR). During assignments in Germany, from 1990-92 and again from 1994-96, I saw how USAREUR's mission changed to meet the challenges of a New World Order. USAREUR forces, which once included four divisions and two corps headquarters, no longer direct their resources and training against the Soviet threat at the Fulda Gap. Instead, their focus extends to more than 100 nations in the European Command (EUCOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM) areas of operation.

Today, USAREUR's mission is to maintain a combat-ready, forward-deployed force of 65,000 soldiers, capable of providing immediate responses in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. bilateral, U.S. multilateral, and U.S. unilateral objectives. On any given day in 1996, as many as 30,000 USAREUR soldiers were deployed outside the NATO Central Region (CR) in support of such activities as joint contact teams, combined training events, humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation, and peacekeeping missions. Humanitarian relief operations in Africa and Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE) in the Balkans are just a few examples of the expansion of USAREUR's new mission.

OJE is the largest military operation conducted in Europe since World War II. USAREUR provided the majority of the personnel required to support this NATO operation. One unit involved in this operation since USAREUR began planning for its involvement in the former Yugoslavia is the 28th Transportation Battalion, headquartered in Mannheim, Germany.

The 28th Transportation Battalion (28th TB) is USAREUR's largest transportation truck battalion, and its sole line-haul operator. The battalion's motto is "EN TEMPS" (ON TIME). Its "On Time" performance played a significant role in the deployment of USAREUR forces to the Balkans and their sustainment during the accomplishment of their peacekeeping mission. The purpose of this monograph is to describe in some detail my experiences with the 28th TB and the hardworking soldiers who contributed to the success of OJE. Many of my recollections can be credited to personal notes and briefings prepared by Colonel Bob Kubiszewski and his staff, the staff of the 28th TB, and Lieutenant Colonel Donnie Horner. Thanks for the "mind-joggers."

BACKGROUND

The 28th TB is the Army's largest line-haul truck transportation battalion. It is subordinate to the 37th Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), which is the theater transportation mode operator for the EUCOM CR encompassing Germany and the BENELUX nations (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg).

In the early 1990s prior to OJE, USAREUR implemented force reductions along with the rest of the Army. Force reductions reached the TRANSCOM and had both positive and negative impacts on the 28th TB. On the positive note, the battalion increased its overall strength with the addition of one medium Truck Company (TC) and one trailer transfer detachment (TTD). On the negative side, these units came to the battalion as the result of the

deactivation of the 53rd Transportation Battalion, its sister organization. The net effect was that the theater lost the command and control capabilities afforded by a transportation battalion headquarters and the line-haul resources of three medium truck companies. As deployment in support of OJE became reality, theater line-haul responsibilities rested solely with my battalion, and it would continue to do so throughout the planning, deployment, and sustainment phases of OJE.

The 28th Transportation Battalion is composed of a headquarters and headquarters detachment (HHD), five line-haul transportation companies, and two trailer transfer detachments. As OJE began, our personnel strength was at 1,015 soldiers.

Prior to the onset of OJE, the battalion provided 200 trucks daily in support of the CR Theater. Crucial to the morale of all U.S. personnel stationed in the CR is the delivery of mail to every postal unit. The battalion dedicates a third of its committed trucks daily to haul over 60 tons of mail. During the Christmas mailing season, the battalion increases the number of dedicated mail trucks to meet requirement surges of up to 90 tons a day. Other key battalion missions are the Theater Hub and Spoke Distribution System, which supports nearly 80 units from Bremerhaven, Germany, to Vicenza, Italy, with all classes of supplies and the aerial port clearance at Ramstein Air Base.

I assumed command of the 28th TB on July 19, 1995. The first year in command can best be described as eventful. As with all new command relationships, the soldiers of the command adjusted to my style of leadership and patiently waited while I adjusted to command. Operationally, the battalion worked hard supporting the increasing transportation demands of the theater.

PLANNING FOR OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

In the summer of 1995, world events generated long-range planning requirements for the battalion. Although the possibilities for U.S. involvement in the Balkans seemed remote at the time, the new 37th TRANSCOM commander directed that my battalion train and prepare for possible deployment. Specifically, Colonel Kubiszewski directed that the battalion be prepared to operate the Arrival/Departure Control Groups (A/DACG) at multiple locations, deploy two truck companies to the Balkans, conduct rear detachment operations, and continue line-haul operations in support of the theater. Although everyone's best guess was that no one would deploy, training schedules for the coming months reflected this guidance and also included soldier survival skills. We focused on "needs training" tasks that were identified during company Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPS) conducted during the spring and summer.

Perhaps the smartest thing we did was to conduct a 2-day mission analysis. Immediately, I brought together my entire staff, company commanders, their first sergeants, truck masters, motor officers, and platoon sergeants. From A to Z, we covered every known and possible contingency we might face as we prepared for worst case operations. None of us had ever been to the Balkans or had experience in deploying units during the dead of winter. Always in the back of my mind, and that of my senior folks, was the possibility of entering a combat environment.

During the mission analysis, we set priorities for training and work, decided which units would deploy first, identified rear detachment commanders, determined which unit would be used to provide personnel filler, established supply and maintenance requirements, and developed a timeline for reaching our goals. We left the 2-day analysis with some unknowns; however, we were all singing from the same sheet of music. We had a plan. Without a doubt, the efforts we expended on this analysis were the primary

factors allowing us to stay ahead of what was eventually about to occur.

What became apparent from the start was the role our mission analysis played in our successes. My Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO), CW3 Mike Dunn, and Battalion Property Book Officer, CW2 Curtis Brown, had accurately determined that the requisition system would be late coming on line. As a result, they recommended that the deploying units increase their lines of supplies and repair parts. Supplies for the A/DACG and convoy support missions were also requisitioned and were on hand as deployment operations began in December 1995. Later comments from numerous senior-level sources indicated that the 28th TB units were some of the best-prepared units to deploy and support OJE missions. Much credit goes to these two warrant officers, in my opinion, the best the Army has to offer. They always planned ahead; worked my company commanders hard; and never left us wanting for supplies, repair parts, or good advice.

In September 1995, the battalion S3 officer, the battalion S3 noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), and I joined my brigade commander and his staff at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, to participate in a theater-wide logistics-planning cell chaired by Major General Jim Wright, Commander, 21st Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM). The purpose of this planning cell was to look at all possible logistics issues and confront any challenges posed by the upcoming deployment to the Balkans. Soon after the planning cell was convened, Colonel Kubiszewski directed me to return to Mannheim so that I could supervise my battalion's preparations for deployment. Major Glenn Grothe, the battalion S2/3, remained in Grafenwoehr. His Training With Industry experience with Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation proved invaluable in the overall development of the OJE transportation concept.

Colonel Kubiszewski and the transporters in the Grafenwoehr planning cell quickly realized that the overall

transportation concept must include surface lines of communication (LOC) from CR to the OJE area of operations. Many planners believed that success of the operations depended on three things: a quick deployment; keeping American soldiers safe; and providing reliable surface re-supply of high-priority, outsized, or overweight cargo on a regular schedule. In order to accomplish the latter, Colonel Kubiszewski and his OJE transportation planning staff developed plans for EAGLE EXPRESS.

Hauling cargo over EAGLE EXPRESS became the battalion's first of six missions in support of OJE. As events matured, trucks assigned to the 6966th Civilian Support Center, my German counterpart within the TRANSCOM, picked up most of my battalion's theater support mission so that we could dedicate more trucks to deployment and re-supply operations. EAGLE EXPRESS was divided into three legs extending nearly 1,000 miles through Germany, Austria, Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. To provide overnight rest and maintenance facilities along EAGLE EXPRESS, the planning cell planned for two Convoy Support Centers (CSC)—to be manned and operated by my battalion. To be established later, rest stops in Taszar, Hungary, and Slavonski Brod, Croatia, would be manned/operated by other units, although we would have liaison personnel at them to coordinate movement of our assets.

Conceptually, the CSCs had to support and service convoys of up to 150 soldiers and 50 vehicles per day. The United States contracted for billeting, meals, facilities, and fuel. At the request of the U.S. Army through German and Austrian liaisons at the 21st TAACOM, the German Bundeswehr and the Austrian Government made available the Prince Leopold Kaserne in Regensburg, Germany, and the Benedek Kaserne in Bruck, Austria, sites with the resources to support the U.S. convoy requirements. Their locations also coincided nicely with daily operating-time restrictions imposed on drivers by USAREUR in view of the harsh winter driving conditions. These rules dictated that

drivers could not operate a motor vehicle in excess of 10 consecutive hours within a 24-hour period.

To accomplish the CSC mission, we deployed a squad-size element to each location. With a lieutenant in command, the tailored squads had a large contingent of mechanics, a strong NCO, some truck drivers, and two administrative personnel. Fortunately for us, several lieutenants and NCOs were fluent in German and developed trusting relationships with their host-nation partners. Soon after, we instituted a 90-day rotation policy for personnel at the CSC sites, and continued to support these sites until relieved by V Corps in June 1996.

A battalion mission complementary to EAGLE EXPRESS was providing convoy escorts for deploying 1st Armored Division and V Corps units. We were directed to provide command and control vehicles with maintenance trail parties to each V Corps convoy that departed CR for the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) at Tazsar, Hungary, via EAGLE EXPRESS. V Corps planners, division transportation officers, and my S3, who returned to Mannheim after a month's stay in Grafenwoehr, developed a schedule to meet the convoy requirements.

All 1st Armored Division convoys originated in my battalion motor park. The 109th TC was given the escort mission. Company officers and senior NCOs were designated as convoy commanders. The 109th TC oftentimes resorted to borrowing wreckers from sister companies in order to provide the maintenance trail party. From December 11-20, the 109th TC escorted V Corps unit convoys without incident. The unit escorted two convoys per day over the 2-week window. Each convoy averaged 20 vehicles and 50 personnel.

In late October 1995, our brigade headquarters was designated as the Theater Executive Agent for Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) of units inbound to CR. An essential mission for the RSOI was the operation of the A/DACGs at Ramstein and Rhein Main

Air Force Bases, located in Kaiserslautern and Frankfurt, Germany, respectively. Per Colonel Kubiszewski's direction early in August, the battalion had trained and was ready to execute the fourth of its six missions supporting OJE. As luck would have it, I had two subordinate commanders with some A/DACG experience—Captain Mike Frego and 1st Lieutenant Mike Johnson. Captain Frego commanded the 69th TC in Mannheim, and 1st Lieutenant Johnson commanded the 15th TTD in Kaiserslautern. I assigned the 69th to Rhein Main AFB, which was supposed to be the primary aerial port of embarkation/debarkation (APOE/APOD) for deployment. I assigned the 15th TTD to Ramstein AFB. Ramstein was initially intended for processing sustainment cargo only, but eventually wound up as the APOE for much of the 1st Armored Division headquartered at Baumholder, Germany.

The previous experience these two young officers had in A/DACG operations proved invaluable when weather impacted the deployment plan. As weather delayed and/or cancelled rail, barge, and highway movements, the A/DACG missions increased in volume of work and visibility.

A crucial battalion mission was to prepare two units—one truck company and one trailer transfer detachment—for deployment to the Balkans. My commanders, staff, and I had long anticipated this call. We did our homework early on during our mission analysis and identified the 70th TC and the 260th TTD as units that would be early deployers when the word came. V Corps—specifically, the 181st Transportation Battalion (a detail that would cause some concerns later)—would operationally control my two units.

Attaching units to other battalion headquarters is not unusual in the Army, especially when accomplishment of the mission is at stake. In this case, it made sense. V Corps was in charge of the Balkan mission. The Combat Support Command of V Corps was also going to deploy along with the 181st, which was its only transportation battalion. Since USAREUR's only other transportation truck battalion was

tied up with A/DACGS, CSCs, EAGLE EXPRESS, and CR mail deliveries, its headquarters and a majority of assets were not available to deploy. What the 181st TB lacked, and what the 28th TB had, were line-haul, medium truck companies and trailer transfer units. The logical decision was to give the 181st TB what it needed, and that is what we did.

Colonel Kubiszewski knew the moment he gave me the assignment that I would not like the arrangement. It is not that I had anything against the 181st TB or its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Roger Moore. In fact, the battalions had a good working and social relationship. Both battalions were located in Mannheim, Germany, and it was not unusual to have soldiers or NCOs serve back-to-back assignments in each battalion. But like most commanders, I felt that I alone could best take care of MY soldiers. And all of us in the battalion were itching to go to Bosnia and be part of the game—not just support it from afar. The bottom-line was that the 70th TC and 260th TTD came under the operational control of the 181st TB and deployed via their own means on December 11, 1995. As a matter of history, this convoy was the first U.S. military convoy to depart for the Balkans in support of OJE.

I vowed to the soldiers and the families of these two units that I would soon be there to command them again. With the help of our brigade commander, that vow was fulfilled sooner than I thought.

Preparing the two units for deployment was an experience worth discussing. When we received the September notice to deploy them, the accompanying instructions directed that the 70th TC would draw from Combat Equipment Group, Europe (CEGE) sites the Palletized Load System (PLS) equipment. Since the PLS was not organic to the battalion, few drivers were licensed to operate it. As a result, a crash familiarization and licensing program was conducted.

This program was successful and was soon expanded to include the other companies' personnel as time and mission allowed. When training was completed, we coordinated with CEGE to draw 48 PLS systems (to include pallets) on December 1. The equipment draw never occurred. Instead, on/around November 15, Colonel Kubiszewski informed me that the 70th TC would deploy with its own organic M915 tractors and M872 trailers. V Corps' tactical 181st TB—specifically, the 51st TC—would perform the more tactical PLS mission. Traditional line-haul from the ISB to forward operating bases would remain the 70th TC mission.

This last-minute change in mission almost became a showstopper. When given the PLS mission, I directed Captain Woody Willis to place his M915 tractors in "ADMIN" storage. Essentially, this meant that the equipment would receive only the necessary maintenance to prepare it for long-term storage. The new order demanded detailed maintenance preparation and renewed emphasis to beef up our repair parts inventory. For the first time since our mission analysis, time became our enemy. I was not sure when the unit would deploy.

My BMO, Mike Dunn, had the solution. Under his direction, the battalion established a maintenance surge team, consisting of critical key maintenance NCOs and mechanics from all the units. Its job was to conduct a thorough inspection of the units' equipment and fix what they could while the equipment was over the pit. Repairs that required more time were the responsibility of the deploying units. This team concept worked great. Equipment inspections by both the V Corps Inspector General and the 21st Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics, elicited outstanding comments.

The units were ready to deploy when the actual deployment orders were received. As a matter of fact, soldiers had some time (although not as much as promised) to spend with their families prior to departing Mannheim. This was an important point, as I remembered how much

heat I received from the families because the battalion was directed to draw cold weather gear from the Mannheim Clothing Issue Facility on Thanksgiving Day. Despite my opposition, I was overruled by USAREUR and 21st TAACOM senior leaders. As an early deployer, the unit had to meet this issue schedule. With flack vest on, I took every heat-round the families delivered during the family support group meeting that followed the next week. A memorable experience!

OJE DEPLOYMENT

December 1995 was a busy time for the battalion and soldiers. Every day we had 10-15 trucks hauling cargo along EAGLE EXPRESS. The CSCs were fully manned and operational with battalion personnel. Operation CONVOY ESCORT was in the capable hands of the 109th TC. The 69th TC and 15th TTD were fully engaged at the A/DACG APOEs, and the 70th TC and 260th TTD were in the Balkans, fighting the harsh winter environment.

What were the remaining units of the battalion doing? The 66th TC and the short-handed 68th TC (which I used as a personnel filler for the 70th TC) were fully employed as the Holiday surge in Christmas mail was in full swing. The battalion staff was working 24-hour shifts, maintaining watch over a hectic operational program. My executive officer, battalion S3, command sergeant major, and I split our time among the numerous sites where battalion soldiers were working. Everyone was engaged and busy!

Arrival/Departure Control Group Operations.

The A/DACG mission was planned for, but not considered likely to be executed to the degree it ultimately was. During initial planning, 90 percent of 1st Armored Division, V Corps, and echelons above corps (EAC) assets would rail and/or convoy to the ISB at Taszar, Hungary. The original transportation concepts for deployment of

USAREUR forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina were by European rail overland convoy.

The A/DACG missions turned ugly on December 20 when weather precluded navigation of the land and river routes that were the primary modes for deployment of the 1st Armored Division. Rail strikes in France and internal sabotage by German rail workers resulted in insufficient railcars to meet the demanding workload imposed by the U.S. deployment. As a result, air deployment became the immediate fix for a deployment scenario that was rapidly falling behind schedule.

Both the 69th TC and the 15th TTD successfully handled the shift in primary deployment transport modes with the normal confusion and inconvenience associated with last-minute changes. The combination of long hours, teamwork, and strong NCOs helped these two units process 4,000 passengers, 2,500 pieces of rolling stock, and over 40,000 short tons of cargo through their APOEs. The 69th TC and 15th TTD remained in place until relieved by 1st Theater Army Movement Control Agency (TAMCA) in early February 1996. But their relief was short in duration. In March, I began deploying the units to the Intermediate Staging Base at Taszar, Hungary, as relief for the 70th TC and 260th TTD that deployed to the Balkans in December.

OPCON Issues.

I mentioned earlier that the 70th TC and 260th TTD were placed under the operational control of the 181st TB prior to deploying to the Balkans. That did not negate my responsibility to support my two subordinate units. From the time they deployed, the two unit commanders looked to me for moral and physical support. Almost daily, the 28th TB sent a tractor/trailer combination via EAGLE EXPRESS to rapidly reinforce the units with re-supply and emergency repair parts. The 181st TB did not have M915 tractors, forklifts, or "Yard dogs" within their Modified Table of Organization and Equipment; therefore, the 70th TC and

260th TTD relied entirely on the 28th TB for support of its equipment.

Failure to cut the umbilical cord with my two subordinate units caused some friction between the two transportation battalions. The friction centered over dual loyalties and which battalion's Family Support Group would service the families of the deployed soldiers. What added fuel to the fire was a rumor that began before deployment and continued throughout December.

When the two units deployed with the 181st TB, no one was certain how long they would remain under the 181st TB. My brigade commander told me that my battalion headquarters must be prepared to deploy—when he was not sure, but more likely prior to February 1. However, there were rumors that organizations deployed for the expected 1-year tour of duty in the Balkans could expect to remain intact as part of the restructuring of USAREUR. This information caused great consternation for the soldiers of the two deployed 28th units, but also for the families of these same soldiers.

The dual-loyalty issue was the result of poor communication between the commander of the 181st TB and myself. This was quickly remedied when Lieutenant Colonel Moore and I agreed that the 28th would remain the resupply channel for the 70th TC and 260th TTD until the requisition process became established in the ISB. Day-to-day command and control of the two units was the 181st TB responsibility. Operationally, this arrangement worked smoothly due to the professionalism of all commanders and personnel involved; however, the 70th TC and 260th TTD remained emotionally tied to the 28th TB. Herein lies the problem with the Family Support Groups.

Both battalions were proud of the efforts of their Family Support Groups whose leadership came from the wives of the battalion commanders. Both wives were energetic, enthusiastic, and proud individuals, believing that their individual FSG was the best to service the families of the

deployed 28th TB units. Trouble was quickly stemmed when Lieutenant Colonel Moore and I agreed that the 28th FSG would support the 70th TC and 260th TTD. This was another example of where better “up front” communication was needed at the battalion commander level.

Once the deployment phase ended, 28th TB units involved in A/DACG and convoy escort operations were relieved of these responsibilities. Simultaneously, the Holiday mail surge came to an end. Theater line-haul assets were now focused to support EAGLE EXPRESS and the Balkan-deployed units. On February 1, Colonel Kubiszewski received the warning order from Major General Wright, the Commander, 21st TAACOM, to deploy the 37th TRANSCOM and 28th TB headquarters. This was the battalion’s fifth mission in support of OJE. The deployment of the battalion headquarters resulted in the return of the 70th TC and 260th TTD to the 28th TB family and helped me keep my vow to my soldiers and their families.

Split-Based Operations.

In order to manage simultaneously two major operations spread over 1,000 miles, Colonel Kubiszewski and I concluded that split-based operations for our headquarters were in order. Each command selected key staff and support personnel to deploy to the ISB. We established a combined TRANSCOM and 28th TB operations cell at the staging area in Tazsar, Hungary. Colonel Kubiszewski positioned key personnel at sites throughout the AOR as the brigade’s eyes and ears. In essence, these key officers and NCOs became the brigade’s liaisons to V Corps, 21st TAACOM, and 1st Armored Division headquarters. They provided invaluable information and increased his ability to send trucks and personnel when and where they were most desperately needed. Split-based operations proved critical to the success of the battalion and key to the rotation plan that I was later able to work out with Colonel Kubiszewski.

When I split my battalion headquarters, 50 percent of each staff section deployed. Section chiefs and their NCOICs were separated. If one deployed, the other would remain in garrison to run their operations in the rear. Since a joint operations cell was formed, I was able to leave Major Grothe—much to his dismay—in Mannheim, to orchestrate EAGLE EXPRESS and the increasing theater support missions. Also, he would remain responsible, along with my Command Sergeant Major, for ensuring that training and preparation for phase II (rotation) continued.

On February 15, 1996, I deployed with approximately 40 soldiers from the battalion staff and the 109th TC. The total deployed package for the 28th was two medium truck companies, one trailer transfer detachment, and one-half of my battalion staff—approximately 410 personnel. In the battalion rear, my executive officer, Major Donnie Horner, commanded three medium truck companies, one trailer transfer detachment, one-half of the battalion staff, and rear detachments for each of the deployed units—approximately 600 personnel. As we later reflected on our duties, we agreed duties in the garrison rear were far more demanding than duty in the Balkans. Most demanding of all were the family support issues.

For the next 6 months, Major Horner and I split time at both locations. My rotation looked like this: 3 weeks forward, then 3 weeks in garrison. Colonel Kubiszewski, Major Horner, and I agreed that this arrangement allowed me the flexibility to command my battalion best. Just as important to the battalion, it kept Major Horner and me involved in both arenas and minimized any disruptions to ongoing coordination, training, and/or operations. The biggest benefit from this arrangement was the continued communications link that we maintained with all the battalion's soldiers and their families. Soldiers and spouses appreciated that their senior leadership shared the same experiences as the deployed soldiers. Upon our return to garrison, we would share some of the experiences with them at family support gatherings. Additionally, my returns to

garrison permitted me to review our battalion's training, operations, and maintenance programs to ensure that they were in keeping with my intent. I also got to attend the battalion newcomers' briefings, which I believed were essential to our new personnel integration program.

REAR DETACHMENT OPERATIONS

Perhaps one of my most pleasant surprises was the conduct of the battalion's rear detachments. During our mission analysis, unit commanders identified NCOs to perform the duties of the rear detachment commanders. We established two criteria for these critical personnel. First, we wanted an NCO who was very familiar with the Mannheim community and Germany. The minimum requirement was that the NCO must have served multiple tours in Germany and in Mannheim. I mentioned earlier that many NCOs moved between the 28th and 181st TBs often, so this criterion was not too difficult to meet. We looked for NCOs married to Germans or who spoke German. And we wanted NCOs who had, at least, 1 year remaining on their current tour. Second, we wanted an NCO who everyone considered to be one of the unit's best, brightest, and strongest. Nothing less would make it in this job. We anticipated numerous family problems: pay, health, children, school, jobs, ID cards, and transportation, even though we did our best to resolve issues before they became problems when deployment began.

We did a pretty good job in selecting winners for our rear detachments. The leadership, organizational, and people skills these fine NCOs displayed during OJE were instrumental to our battalion's successes. They initiated unit car pools for commissary and Post Exchange runs. They ensured that mail got to the families without privately owned vehicles. They ran down pay issues, ID card issues, child care issues, and landlord issues. They secured a van from the community motor pool and operated a hospital shuttle 3 days each week. To their great credit, we received

no IG or congressional inquiries related to rear detachment and family support/service issues during OJE.

One of our better decisions, and one designed to relieve some of the pressures on the rear detachment commanders, was the decision to consolidate them at offices within the battalion headquarters and place them under the operational control of Captain Chuck Meadows, the commander of the 68th TC. The 68th TC had the best overall family support group program and was not designated to deploy since I used the unit to fill personnel shortages in the other units before they deployed. And since Chuck's FSG program was so strong, I knew the rear detachment commanders would get genuine support, to include UCMJ, from him when required. Chuck did not disappoint me; neither did the rear detachment commanders.

USAREUR's Drivers' Academy (Forward).

As the deployment proceeded and more personnel arrived in the Balkans, my boss directed that we establish a USAREUR Driver's Academy (Forward) in the ISB. With our sixth battalion mission now assigned, my Command Sergeant Major, Tim Lynes, identified key personnel from our battalion's garrison Driver's Academy to deploy to the ISB and act as instructors and administrative facilitators. The academy party deployed to Tazsar in early January and within 2 weeks was conducting the initial drivers' course to approximately 20 soldiers.

To be eligible to attend, soldiers must already have had in possession a valid USAREUR driving license and Standard Form 46 (Operator Vehicle License). The course was not designed to teach soldiers how to operate assigned vehicles. Its curriculum was designed to augment mine training that was mandatory for all deploying USAREUR soldiers. The forward academy provided to soldiers going into Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina a 3-day orientation course, with classes covering situational awareness, convoy

procedures, driving techniques, operator maintenance, and safety.

I was very proud of this training achievement. In short time, the USAREUR Drivers' Academy (FWD) successfully trained over 4,000 soldiers from various military occupational specialties to include infantry, military police, artillery, tankers, and truck drivers. Remaining under the battalion's administration, the faculty expanded to include both 21st TAACOM and V Corps instructors. A testament to the professional impact that these instructors and their training had on USAREUR soldiers is evident in the low number of vehicle accidents that occurred during OJE. The facility hosted numerous visitors to include Secretary of the Army Togo West; General William W. Crouch, Commander-in-Chief, USAREUR; and Lieutenant General John Abrams, V Corps Commander.

More OPCON Issues.

Soon after the deployment phase ended and the battalion headquarters was in place in Tazsar, we received operational control of Bravo Company, 701st Main Support Battalion. This is a heavy truck company outfitted with the Heavy Equipment Transport System (HETS). The unit deployed to the Balkans to assist the 181st in the movement of heavy armored vehicles south of the Sava River. When deployment was completed, HET assets organic to the 181st were sufficient to support operations south of the Sava River. Heavy support in the ISB was the responsibility of the 29th Area Support Group. Logically, B/701st should have re-deployed to CR. In fact, Major General Wright directed that the unit return to CR; however, Lieutenant General Abrams rescinded his order. Instead, the unit was placed under my control.

Morale quickly became a problem in this unit. With the unit having no obvious mission, I volunteered it as a VIP stop to give them some semblance of worth. Additionally, and with the support of Colonel Kubiszewski, I sent half the

unit home to Wuerzburg, Germany. Unit personnel rotated from CR to the ISB every 30 days. Quickly, morale turned around. The unit proudly and professionally showed off their equipment. Tours of the ISB inside HET systems became the norm for visiting dignitaries from our allies and own country. In coordination with the 181st, my operations cell was able to secure some HET missions south of the Sava River. For 4 months, this unit operated as one of my subordinate units and always performed in a magnificent manner. I was proud to be associated with them. The unit returned to CR after the deployment phase of Operation JOINT GUARD was completed.

Defense Transportation Tracking System.

The battalion's execution of EAGLE EXPRESS provided the Army an opportunity to test emerging technology in support of in-transit visibility initiatives. One type of tracking technology field-tested by the Combined Arms Support Command during OJE was the Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTTS).

DTTS is designed to ascertain the location of trucks and cargo via satellite tracking connectivity. It provided us with in-transit visibility over our trucks and drivers, which proved crucial since safety oftentimes took a back seat to the extreme weather and road conditions endured by my drivers. Operationally, it permitted communications between vehicle operators and their units. This particular capability proved to be a lifesaver when 1st Lieutenant Glen Hampton, serving as a convoy commander, initiated a call for help using this communication means.

On February 6, 1996, as a platoon leader in the 109th TC, he was leading a convoy of 20 trucks from Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, to Slavonski Brod, Croatia, when one of the lead trucks hit a patch of black ice as it emerged from a tunnel on the road. The driver lost control, causing his truck and trailer to jack-knife in the middle of the road. As his truck jack-knifed, the truck next in line hit the first truck

and flipped. Trucks emerging from the tunnel could not react quickly enough to avoid collision. As a result, six trucks were involved in the accident. Drivers from two vehicles were seriously hurt, with leg and neck injuries.

Lieutenant Hampton, who had FM radio and CB communications, was unable to raise any stations for assistance. As the hurt drivers were stabilized, he transmitted a help message via the DTTS to any monitoring station. The 28th operations cell in the garrison rear immediately retrieved the message to include the convoy's location. The rear operations called the forward operations cell, which alerted local area MEDEVAC for assistance. Within 30 minutes of the accident, a MEDEVAC helicopter was at the scene of the accident. Both injured soldiers were treated and released back to their units.

MAINTENANCE RECYCLING PLAN

Support of OJE took a tremendous toll on the M915s assigned to the battalion. Prior to OJE, my battalion's operationally ready (OR) rate averaged 94 percent. After 4 demanding months of supporting the 800-mile EAGLE EXPRESS and suffering the wear and tear accelerated by the immature road conditions, the OR rate struggled to stay above 86 percent.

M915s were designed with a wear-life of 300,000 miles per chassis and engine. During their deployment, 70th and 109th TC trucks accumulated on the average 140,000 miles on chassis that had 200,000 plus miles on them prior to deployment. On an average, the 28th TB supported the ISB and V Corps sustainment operations with 45 trucks a day. This equated to approximately 232 tons of cargo each day, covering an average of 9,700 miles a day. By comparison, trucks in CR and even those supporting EAGLE EXPRESS accumulated on the average 93,000 miles per chassis over the same 4 months.

Drivers were also beginning to show signs of fatigue. The number of fender benders was growing, although the number of major accidents remained extremely low. What to do? If the current USAREUR policy of 1 year on station (meaning in the Balkans) remained in effect, the declining availability of assets in the 70th and 109th could have a serious effect on redeployment operations. Colonel Kubiszewski and I devised a plan to fix our maintenance problem—a maintenance-recycling plan. The plan permitted my deployed units to recycle to garrison and concentrate on much-needed maintenance repairs to overworked equipment.

Under the aegis of EAGLE EXPRESS, we executed a recycling plan designed to gradually transition units from Central Region to relieve the units in Tazsar. Fresh trucks and drivers from the 66th and 69th TC with resupply from CR began to infiltrate into the ISB every other day, while tired trucks and drivers from the 70th and 109th recycled back to CR via EAGLE EXPRESS with retrograde equipment on the same schedule. To the supply and transportation system, there was no evident degradation in the support or service we provided. Essential overlap of key personnel (truck masters, first sergeants, and supply and motor sergeants) took place over the course of a few days. The departing commander relinquished command and control to the inbound commander only after each company transitioned 51 percent of personnel and equipment to their new locations.

In mid-March, the 70th TC recycled back to CR, while the 69th deployed to the Balkan AOR. Once this rotation was complete, the 109th recycled to CR and was relieved by the 66th TC. Since maintenance priority demanded the quick rotation of M915 trucks over yard dogs and forklifts, I kept the 260th in the Balkan AOR until May, when it was relieved by the 15th TTD.

The maintenance-recycling plan successfully enabled the 28th TB to provide reliable, seamless line-haul support

for OJE. It allowed us to continue the same degree of support to Operation JOINT GUARD (OJG). Equipment got the maintenance that was long overdue; equally important, soldiers' and families' morale reached unequaled heights. Our soldiers, who had proven themselves under tough conditions and who were proud of themselves for their accomplishments, returned to heroes' welcomes and some well-deserved rest.

For the newly deployed soldiers, the precedence was set. We had in place an approved maintenance-recycling plan supported by all the USAREUR leadership. Fully aware that they would return to garrison in late summer, these soldiers eagerly and proudly assumed the missions their predecessors had earlier accomplished.

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN

Despite the significant achievements, the battalion and I also endured some tough experiences. For example, throughout the planning phase, we were not sure until mid-November that deployment operations were going to go. And not until December 8, did we get the final GO to deploy the 70th and 260th on December 11. For families and soldiers, the waiting was terrible. On top of that, the deployment mode for the units varied week by week. I've already described the CEGE draw scenario. Coupled with the equipment draw, the unit was scheduled to deploy to the Balkan AOR by rail—then by barge—then back to rail. This flip-flopping of carrier mode continued for months until the decision to void the PLS draw was issued. When I was told that we'd use our organic equipment, my decision to convoy was quickly endorsed by my senior chain of command.

We never expected to operate a full-scale A/DACG at Ramstein Air Base. Every planning session indicated that major unit deployments would originate from Rhein Main. Ramstein would be dedicated for resupply operations only. The CG, 1st Armored Division argued that convoy operations from Baumholder to Rhein Main would cause

unnecessary wear and tear on his units' equipment and demanded the use of Ramstein as a major APOE for his headquarters—despite the vocal protests of senior Air Force personnel.

Our battalion's safety record was pretty darn good; however, close calls did occur. I earlier described the black ice incident. Several more black ice incidents occurred, as well as an accident caused by the decay of the road surface by heavy rain. In this incident, a tractor and trailer slid down a 25-foot embankment as the road surface collapsed. Fortunately, the worst accidents resulted in only broken legs and/or arms.

A not-so-proud incident occurred when two soldiers assigned to the 109th TC violated General Order #1, which stipulated zero consumption of alcoholic beverages. The soldiers were in the ISB and returning to their company area from an ISB-sponsored event. During a routine Military Police (MP) gate check, they became belligerent with the on-duty military police. A quick search of their utility vehicle revealed an open container of coke. Closer inspection revealed the odor of alcohol from the container, and the two soldiers were arrested. I was furious and embarrassed by this violation of policy. The soldiers eventually were processed out of the Army.

Two other incidents that caused the pucker factor to rise were a tent fire and the near loss of a weapon. During the height of deployment operations, truck platoons operated independently from their company headquarters. In one incident, a platoon from the 70th TC was supporting the movement of containers across the Sava River. During this operation, a fuel spill occurred while soldiers were lighting kerosene stoves. A fire ensued and could not be contained by the NCO at the scene. As a result, the fire spread to the tent. All articles within the tent were destroyed; however, no injuries occurred. We were extremely lucky on that day!

Luck remained with us throughout our deployment. On another occasion, a platoon from the 109th TC, while

supporting the movement of fuel tankers, lost an assigned weapon belonging to a young soldier. After reporting the loss through the chain of command, the platoon spent an entire night looking for the weapon. Finally, the platoon leader went to the local MP unit for assistance. To his great relief, the weapon was in the possession of the military police who found the weapon lying alongside the road.

CONCLUSION

Despite these close calls, I am very proud of the overall accomplishments of the battalion and its soldiers. The battalion proved its worth by its operation of the A/DACG sites at Ramstein and Rhein Main Air Bases, conduct of convoy escorts and convoy support centers, and line-haul operations in support of Theater and EAGLE EXPRESS missions. Consider that the battalion also deployed half its strength to Tazsar, Hungary, re-deployed that half and then deployed the other half, concurrently while conducting a majority of its CR theater support mission. Adding to that the conduct of the USAREUR Drivers' Academy (FWD), it is hard to contain my pride and admiration. Finally, and I intentionally did not mention this in the main text of this monograph, is the fact that my battalion won both the USAREUR Battalion Maintenance and Supply Excellence competitions while supporting OJE.

Teamwork and professional pride contributed to our successes. Every soldier played his/her significant role in helping the 28th support the Army's largest military operation conducted in the European Theater since World War II. From December 1995 to the time of my change of command in July 1996, the battalion drove nearly 8 million miles; moved over 172,000 tons of cargo and equipment; and exceeded the Army's safety standard for military vehicle accidents.

This accomplishment over 7 months is phenomenal when compared to the battalion's entire performance during the previous calendar year. The total battalion

mileage during my first year in command was six million miles—the same annual mileage incurred during my predecessor's total watch.

More than anything else, I believe the thoroughness of our initial mission analysis prepared us to succeed. From it, my staff and subordinate leaders received direction and priorities. By constantly massaging requirements as reality changed, we were able to stay ahead of the power curve and properly prepare for MOST contingencies. Weekly updates, which turned into daily updates as deployment neared, provided us the mechanism to track sensitive requisition issues or adjust priorities of work as envisioned by the maintenance surge team concept.

I am indebted to the professional efforts of a seriously dedicated staff, led by Donnie Horner, and to some very aggressive company commanders and first sergeants. I will always be grateful to the soldiers and families for their hard work and teamwork. Together, they executed the plan I gave them. I appreciated the guidance and mentoring of Colonel Bob Kubiszewski. A great boss—he knew when to lead, when to teach, and when to stand by and just watch. Kudos are due to his staff, who always worked in concert with mine to accomplish the mission. Finally, my love and appreciation to my wife for her constant support, allowing me to play soldier when she would much rather I was delivering the mail in Columbia, South Carolina.

CHAPTER 7

WORKHORSE IN BOSNIA

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Dockens

BATTALION PROLOGUE

The 127th Aviation Support Battalion (ASB), which we affectionately call "Workhorse," signifies the outstanding combat service support provided to the 4th Aviation Brigade and 1-1 Cavalry Squadron. This battalion's 518 soldiers, with specialties of 56 different military occupational skills (MOSs), provided quality aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) and direct support ground maintenance (DS). This support included all classes of supply and coordination for medical, ammunition, and secure communication maintenance. From May 1, 1995, through May 15, 1996, the battalion professionally supported 140 helicopters, including two AH-64 battalions, one UH-60 battalion, and one Air Cavalry Squadron. Additionally, the battalion supported 27 M-1 Tanks, 47 M2/3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, and 850 wheeled vehicles. The 127th ASB also provided area community support and proudly continued to uphold its IRON EAGLE support tradition.

INTRODUCTION

This personal experience monograph offers my account of the deployment and operations of the 127th Aviation Support Battalion (ASB) in support of Task Force Eagle from May 1, 1994, through May 15, 1995. Task Force Eagle was the American-led peace enforcement headquarters deployed to Bosnia. My account will describe unit train-up, predeployment requirements, and maintenance and

logistics operations in support of the 4th Aviation Brigade, 1-1 Cavalry Squadron, and eventually of all Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR aviation forces.

The 1st Armored Division commander, Major General William Nash, commanded Task Force Eagle. Task Force Eagle deployed following the 1995 NATO-imposed cease fire, which halted the carnage in the Former Yugoslavia. (Figure 8 shows the IFOR Deployment). Following the Dayton Peace agreement, the 1st Armored Division, as a part of NATO's Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, was ordered to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. (See Figure 9.) The Task Force assumed Area of Responsibility (AOR) control in Tuzla on December 20, 1995. After the historic bridging of the Sava River on December 31, 1995, the Division entered Bosnia-Herzegovina. The mission was to enforce the cease fire, supervise the marking of boundaries, and maintain the zone of separation (ZOS) between the former warring factions (FWF). (See Figure 10.)




Figure 8. IFOR Deployment.




Figure 9. Dayton Agreement Map.



Figure 10. Zones of Operation.

The 127th ASB is a Combat Service Support (CSS) unit consisting of three companies—a headquarters company, ground maintenance company, and aviation intermediate maintenance company. The unit personnel authorization is 518 soldiers who are responsible for over 100 pieces of rolling stock—six 5,000 gallon fuel tankers, one tank recovery track vehicle, 35 5-ton tractors, and over 30 vans and flatbed trailers.

The ASB's structure provides maximum flexibility to the overall Division Support Command (DISCOM) and Aviation Brigade commanders, based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). The battalion actually works for the DISCOM commander. However, in real-world deployments such as Bosnia, the ASB is colocated with the aviation brigade and task-organized as required. The mission of the ASB is to provide direct logistical support to the aviation brigade in concert with the overall Division Support Command's support plan. This logistical support achieves the tactical logistics functions of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving the force, and sustaining soldiers and their systems.

PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

The battalion started the initial train-up at Grafenwoehr, Germany, on May 1, 1993. This was the 1AD's scheduled semiannual gunnery exercise for individual and crew-served weapons training and qualification. The battalion conducted weapons and qualification training as well as logistical support for both the 4th Aviation Brigade and 1-1 Cav for the entire month of May. The battalion gunnery exercise continued for 1 week, with emphasis on weapons maintenance, battle sight zero of weapons, and qualification on basic weapons. The support operations lasted 3 weeks and included maintenance, refuel and arming, supply, and movement of supplies in support of M-1 Abrams tanks, M2 Cavalry Fighting vehicles, and AH-1 Cobra and AH-64 attack helicopters. The unit also

conducted extensive basic soldier skills training (first aid, call for fires, NBC, and communication skills) throughout the 4-week training period. All training, exercises, and operations involved peacekeeping or peace enforcement scenarios. In addition to normal training, each soldier received area specific training, particularly mine lane training. This training was mandatory for all soldiers in United States Army Europe (USAREUR) prior to deployment to the Bosnia AOR. At the end of May, the battalion deployed to Hohenfels, Germany, for transition to peacekeeping/peace enforcement exercises at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). This training lasted an additional 4 weeks.

The exercise at CMTC started with a 1-week train-up, followed by 3 weeks "in the box." In the box designates the evaluation process during CMTC exercises. Observer Controllers (OCs) provide exercise oversight and an After Action Review (AAR) at the conclusion of training.

The training for the battalion CMTC rotation tested the physical, mental, and operational mettle of the battalion. The unit conducted arm, fix, fuel, and sustain logistical support operations for both the 1-1 Cav and 2-227th Attack Helicopter Battalion (AHB). The 1-1 Cav ground and air troops conducted operations in the CMTC training area, and the 2-227th AHB conducted operations in an assembly area located 35 miles from CMTC. This separation presented a significant problem, with the available support assets dispersed among four different task-organized teams conducting 24-hour operations. Little did the battalion anticipate that this would be the mode of operation for the deployment to Bosnia. This exercise prepared the unit for flexible and forward-support activities that would prove valuable in the months ahead. The next challenge for the battalion came by means of scenarios with media and civilians on the battlefield. Through these scenarios, most of our soldiers encountered new situations that provided a valuable learning experience. Also, the battalion's perimeter defense and internal base security were tested

along with a myriad of situations to test the commanders and battalion staff. The CMTC (OCs) continued day and night. In situation after situation, trainers checked and re-checked battalion Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and overall training readiness.

After 3 weeks in the box, the battalion was ready to move back into CMTC proper for clean-up and a day of rest. However, on the last night of training, the 2-227th AHB was conducting a simulated AH-64 deep attack mission. The mission involved two companies of 16 AH-64s. At approximately 0230 hours, the battalion S3 came to my tent for an unexpected and abrupt wake-up call. At 0200 hours, one AH-64 from the 2-227th had flown into wires 30 miles south of our location. The aircraft had struck the wires with the tail rotor blades. This sudden stoppage of the blades caused the shaft of the tail rotor to break. The pilots then lost control of the aircraft and crashed into the side of a large German distribution building. There was significant damage after the aircraft slammed into the side of the building and crashed on a trailer parked at the loading dock not five feet from the building. The trailer actually softened the blow, and the pilots escaped without injury. Ironically, the trailer was filled with toilet paper. A team departed the battalion area the next morning for recovery of the crashed AH-64, while the rest of the battalion deployed to CMTC proper. The completely destroyed AH-64 spilled approximately 200 gallons of jet fuel, creating an environmental crisis. Firemen, the mayor, the police, and, of course, the media were there to give advice and guidance. This aircraft recovery turned into a major mission—a highly visible one. The German authorities as well as the USAREUR chain of command had a vested interest in the clean-up and recovery operation. The recovery took 6 days. All three of the battalion's companies performed well in this unexpected and demanding mission. So our vigorous predeployment training concluded with a very realistic mission that tested the unit's mettle; but not without significant problems.

THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND THE REALITY OF DEPLOYMENT

President Bill Clinton visited 1AD in Baumholder in early December to tell us face-to-face about his decision for deployment. The 127th ASB luckily formed 15 feet from the stage as the President revealed the impending deployment, which we all had anticipated. The deployment to Bosnia would commence as soon as possible. Our President and Congress had once again summoned the U.S. military to serve our nation in a foreign land. The President's visit set the stage for deployment of the 127th ASB to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Certainly the possibility of a lengthy deployment in the middle of winter worried the 1AD leadership—myself included. The 1AD forces were already exhausted from training and predeployment activities. We were now concerned for the safety and welfare of our most precious asset, our soldiers. But I recalled a passage from Clausewitz's *On War* about the essence of a soldier's spirit and a professional Army:

There are only two sources of this [military] spirit The first is a series of victorious wars; the second, frequent exertions of the Army to the utmost limits of its strength. Nothing else will show a soldier the full extent of his capacities. The more a general is accustomed to place a heavy burden on his soldiers, the more he can depend on their response. A soldier is just as proud of the hardship he has overcome as of the dangers he has faced. In short, the seed will grow only in the soil of constant activity and exertion.

DEPLOYMENT

At 2230 hours, Sunday, December 17, 1995, the DISCOM commander called. He wanted to know if the battalion could load a train for deployment to the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) in Hungary the next day. The answer was yes and no. The battalion had equipment staged, inspected, and ready for rail operations. However,

the battalion movement was not scheduled for 3 weeks. This meant an acceleration of single soldiers' turn-in of personal property and cars, interruption of Christmas plans, and a complete change in the overall battalion deployment plan. Another minor point: We still did not have a plan from our higher headquarters. Yes, the battalion was in the process of loading trains; but we did not have a deployment plan.

The first train arrived configured for MilVans (a 40-foot metal container). However, the battalion's MilVans were still en route to our location. The battalion staff quickly assembled the first priority rolling stock for rail deployment, six 5,000 gallon fuel tankers. The tankers were a priority item because of the requirement to establish a Forward Area Rearm and Refuel Point (FARP) before the arrival of aircraft in the ISB. The first train departed the next day with fuel tankers and 40 soldiers on board to provide en route security. This was the beginning of the battalion deployment by rail from three different railhead locations.

The rail operations continued as the battalion readied the aviation brigade for aircraft self-deployment. This self-deployment to the ISB in Hungary would include over 100 helicopters. The battalion coordinated refuel support in Germany, Austria, and Hungary along the route of flight. Also, CH-47 aircraft transported maintenance soldiers for support and possible recovery aircraft operations.

The advance party deployed to the ISB by C-17 aircraft on December 20. Their mission was to coordinate aircraft parking and maintenance facilities at a small Hungarian commercial airfield (affectionately called Workhorse International Airfield, or WIAA). An additional mission was to locate an environmentally appropriate location for the FARP. This crucial task was time-sensitive because of the requirement to deploy eight AH-64s through the ISB to Tuzla's main airfield. The division commander wanted attack aircraft on the ground in Tuzla, so the refuel issue

established our sequence plan for logistics operations in the ISB.

I deployed on Christmas Eve by C-17 and landed as two battalion trains arrived in the ISB. There were 100 soldiers from the battalion on the ground conducting rail off-load and aircraft support operations on V Corps aircraft from the 12th Aviation Brigade. We got the picture quickly: the battalion would support all aircraft involved in the mission both north and south of the Sava River. This was absolutely an unplanned requirement, but the soldiers quickly improvised and provided quality assistance to all. This total support requirement hit home Christmas eve. I received a call from USAREUR Forward Headquarters—the command and control headquarters located at an old MiG airbase in Tazar, Hungary, approximately ten miles from WIAA. The message: report to headquarters to receive a mission for recovering an aircraft that had gone down in Bosnia.

The UH-60 aircraft of the Intervention Force (IFOR) Commander, Admiral Lopez, had encountered maintenance problems in Bosnia, but his pilots safely landed the aircraft. It was located in Bosnia near the area of Banja Luka. Because of severe mechanical problems, the aircraft could not continue flight and would require an aircraft aerial recovery mission in Bosnia. This recovery was completed before the 1-1 Cav crossed the Sava River. Thus the 127th ASB conducted the *first* tactical operation in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The aerial recovery mission team included an infantry squad deployed from Tuzla for security, two AH-64s, two UH-60s, one CH-47, and a downed aircraft recovery team from the battalion. The team deployed on December 27, with the mission to rig the aircraft for a CH-47 sling load and fly the downed aircraft back to the ISB for repair. The team departed at 1000 hours and returned 6 hours later, mission complete—a successful operation.

INITIAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS, ISB

After arriving at the ISB, the unit provided maintenance support for all aviation units involved in the mission, to include the command and control aircraft supporting the V Corps commander and the Commander in Chief of USAREUR. This was not a planned activity. Eventually, over 130 aircraft were supported under the logistical umbrella of the battalion in very extreme weather and austere working and living conditions. Furthermore, the command and control structure that the battalion would operate under was ambiguous, to say the least.

As stated earlier, the battalion was assigned to the 1AD DISCOM and worked for the DISCOM commander. During deployments, the battalion worked for the 1AD 4th Aviation Brigade commander but was under the direct control of the DISCOM and Assistant Division Commander, Support (ADC-S). However, while in the ISB, the battalion had another command layer, USAREUR Forward Headquarters (a three-star headquarters) and 21st TAACOM (a two-star headquarters). This meant that on a given day, the battalion received missions from four different headquarters, usually involving competing resources. This placed the battalion in a tenuous situation. The fact that the battalion was deployed in Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary placed the soldiers directly under units with different guidance, rules, and policies. However, we had one rule that we lived by: do not violate the 1AD Division commander's guidance, rules, or policies. This proved to be a very wise decision, which kept the battalion and myself out of trouble!

Upon arrival in the ISB, we found only one small hanger available for maintenance. There were no plans for any other facilities, and absolutely no consideration for soldiers working in extreme weather conditions. We were suppose to improvise until called forward for movement to Tuzla. The basis of this rationale was that Army equipment did not break so why have facilities for maintenance. This mind-set quickly changed when the "commander's" aircraft could not

launch for early morning flights because of ice and snow. When helicopter rotor blades are exposed to snow and ice, they tend to freeze up. This requires an extended period for de-icing and snow removal, which is very manpower and resource intensive, a process the chain did not understand, causing frustrations and agony for the aviation battalion and brigade commanders.

The battalion closed at the ISB on December 28, with 438 soldiers and 98 percent of organic equipment without an accident or incident. The snow was approximately eight inches deep, with the average temperature hovering at 25 degrees Fahrenheit. The battalion had the one small hanger for aircraft maintenance and one maintenance building for ground vehicles. These facilities were to support over 100 aircraft and 500 vehicles for the first 3 weeks of the operation, a task too great with the limited available space. We could perform some operations outside, but these were very limited. Frankly, it was too windy and cold for the conduct of any extended outdoor maintenance operations. Moreover, the majority of the tools were loaded for transport down range. Where were the maintenance tents? The answer: same as the tools, loaded in Milvans ready for shipment to the Bosnia AOR.

The aviation brigade began conducting daily training and support missions in the local flying area, as well as operational missions to Bosnia. Continuity was the key for sustained CSS to the brigade. The battalion adopted flexible maintenance policies to support continuously changing missions and force-projection AH-64 operations in Tuzla. The aviation brigade commander and I formulated a logistic support plan to accommodate the fluid operational environment. This plan had to be flexible, sustainable for an extended period, timely, and forward-looking to achieve success.

SUPPORT PLAN

The aviation brigade would be located Tuzla West Airfield in Bosnia. Because of the horrid weather and limited space at Tuzla West Airfield, we decided to establish a maintenance hub in the ISB. In other words, the battalion would build a base camp in Hungary. This concept supported immediate aircraft and ground maintenance, and provided our troops with a workplace somewhat sheltered from the frigid outdoors.

The availability of immediate maintenance is particularly important for aircraft because 75 percent of the scheduled phase maintenance depends on the number of hours flown. Phase maintenance requires an extensive inspection of the aircraft. This inspection usually takes 2 weeks of down time. The AH-64 phase inspection comes with every 200 aircraft hours, and the average flight time for each aircraft per day was 4-6 hours. At this rate, without sustained maintenance operations, the entire fleet would require phase maintenance inspection simultaneously. Also, the aircraft and vehicles had to stay ready for immediate deployment into Bosnia.

CLAM SHELL CONSTRUCTION

Clam shells are temporary aircraft maintenance facilities controlled by the Aviation Support Command (AVSCOM) in St. Louis. The battalion was allocated seven clam shells for Task Force Eagle support, three in the ISB and four earmarked for Tuzla. The distribution and priority for clam shells were a battalion responsibility in concert with the DISCOM and Assistant Division Commander-Support (ADC-S). Erection of these shells required a team from AVSCOM with augmentation from the ASB or supported unit. The clam shell is 100' x 50' and 40 feet high, with an electric door on each end. They come with lights, heaters, and generators—basically self-contained. The clam shells proved to be worth their weight in gold because they warded off the snow, ice, and extreme temperatures. Of

course, this was the coldest winter in 10 years for this area, and every commander in 1AD wanted his own clam shell. Yes, you guessed it, a controversy developed on priority and need for clam shell support.

The clam shell issue abruptly became a daily briefing item for the USAREUR Forward and 21st TAACOM commanders. All clam shells had been designated for 1AD units in support of Bosnia operations, but this plan was abruptly changed. USAREUR Forward was now the decisionmaker for distribution of all clam shells in support of OJE.

CLASS IX OPERATIONS, ISB

The battalion was the first unit from 1AD to close on the ISB. The other three division forward support battalions (FSB) and main support battalion (MSB) were still in central region loading trains. Because the MSB was not available, the ASB was assigned the mission as the main Class IX (repair parts) supply point for Task Force Eagle. This meant that every class IX supply part and requisition would come through the ASB for the next 30-45 days. The class IX section processed over 300 parts requisitions a day until the MSB established operations in late January. At one time, the battalion had over 300 Air Force 463L pallets fully loaded for distribution down range into Bosnia, to include a pallet loaded with tank mine rollers. The 21st TAACOM commander had been looking for these mine rollers for 3 days and was told that they were still in Germany. He called me on a different subject to discuss five-ton truck support in support of Sava River operations when the mine roller issue came up. After I told him where the equipment was, he wanted the mine rollers, and he wanted the ASB to deliver them to the Sava River. The reason he wanted the battalion to transport this equipment was that it was the only unit closed on the ISB with the right equipment and personnel. To put this in perspective, the battalion was receiving missions from the 21st TAACOM

commander while assigned to the 1AD DISCOM while working for the 4th aviation brigade commander. As discussed earlier, this command relationship continued until I changed command May 15, 1996.

FORWARD AREA REFUEL REARM (FARP) OPERATIONS

The designs for the refuel and rearm site factored in safety margins for blast zone consideration. The blast area of 30 millimeter ammo and Hellfire missiles required establishment of a protective surrounding area free of troops and aircraft. MilVans filled with MREs partitioned the area from an accidental discharge of a weapon system; in other words, we improvised based on METT-T. Because of this safety requirement, the safety officer located the rearm pads at the northern edge of the airfield away from maintenance and living facilities.

FORWARD SUPPORT PLAN FOR BOSNIA AOR

The battalion developed the concept of support as far forward as possible with four task-organized teams. The first two teams deployed in association with 1-1 and 1/4 Cav ground and air troops. The aviation brigade deployed to Tuzla West Airfield with two ASB task-organized teams of 130 battalion soldiers and support equipment. This team included the class IX warehouse, a section from the III/V platoon (fuel and ammo), a heavy ground/air maintenance section, and a robust command and control element.

INITIAL OPERATIONS, TUZLA AOR

Tuzla West Airfield is an old MiG auxiliary airfield connected to Tuzla Main airfield by a 3-kilometer access road. The only facilities on Tuzla West were four open concrete bunkers that we used for supply and maintenance. The clam shells had not arrived when we started using the airfield, so the severe weather restricted aircraft

maintenance. The weather also restricted flight operations because of low ceilings, poor visibility, and ice and snow on the aircraft blades. These adverse conditions posed a tremendous problem for early morning flight operations. The de-icing process commenced 4 hours before scheduled flights.

The battalion received another unplanned mission in the Tuzla AOR. This mission called for the battalion to construct a JP-8 fuel bulk storage system in support of the Tuzla area. A bulk storage system is built by means of a series of 10,000 gallon collapsible fuel bags laid on the ground in four-sided revetments. The engineers constructed the system. In this instance, the bulk system fuel amounted to 40,000 gallons. Besides this bulk storage, the battalion operated the retail fuel facility (gas pumps, if you will) on Tuzla Main Airfield in support of Task Force Eagle headquarters. The total fuel dispersed from these two systems averaged 35,000 gallons a day. We operated for 6 months without an accident or environmental incident.

Again because the MSB had not arrived in Tuzla, the ASB established class IX warehouse and supply operations. This mission called for transaction of requisitions, supply distribution, and storage of all Task Force Eagle parts and equipment for a 45-day period.

SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS, ISB

The battalion continued to prepare for internal and external operations. The internal preparation involved construction of the airfield base camp and tactical loading of equipment for convoy into Bosnia. External preparation and support involved continued CSS to supported units. The ground and aircraft maintenance hub enabled us to overcome the weather and sustain the intense OPTEMPO of the aviation units. Without this hub, the aviation brigade's phase maintenance schedule would have come to a grinding halt.

The ground/air refuel and supply functions—to include aviation intensively managed items (AIMI)—were fully operational by December 28. The supply distribution point had developed into a half-acre storage area, which facilitated distribution of supplies to units in Bosnia. The distribution of supplies included medium-lift CH-47 aircraft, intra-theater Air Force C-130 assets, and internal five-ton tractor-trailers. Within a 2-week period, the battalion airlifted and convoyed 300 pallets containing over 10,000 parts and equipment to the Tuzla AOR. The CH-47 unit assigned to the battalion flew over 35 sorties in support of this critical resupply mission, which included mine rollers for M-1 tanks and M-2 Bradley engines.

The phase inspection schedule continued with two AH-64s and one UH-60 inducted in the program. Our primary objective was to complete as many phase inspections as possible in order to build the flying hour reserve (bank time). Given the average number of daily flight hours, the battalion staff estimated the requirement for 30 phase inspections to keep pace with the first 6 months of operations. This amount was three times the number of man-hours needed during normal operations in Central Region, Germany.

CONSTRUCTION OF WORKHORSE INTERNATIONAL AIRFIELD

Another unplanned requirement was construction of a working airfield at the ISB. This airfield was not a part of the operational plan, so the battalion started from zero. The airfield layout included a tent city, crash rescue facility, and air traffic control tower, and it entailed establishment of a perimeter defense plan. This tent city would include tents, latrine/shower facilities, an aid station, and a dining facility. This base camp supported over 600 soldiers and civilians from eight different units. Battalion soldiers' living facilities (the actual tents) were our first priority. The battalion Command Sergeant Major (CSM) arranged for the Air Force unit (code name Prime Beef) to construct the tent

city. Each 20-soldier tent had a wooden floor, half-wood sides, with lights and electricity.

Next we had to construct shower/latrines and a dining facility large enough to accommodate this small city. This effort included coordination meetings for funding and approval with 21st Theater Command and Brown & Root, the military LOGCAP representative. Brown & Root provided construction support for all units deployed in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The construction process for shower/latrines and dining facility involved 3 weeks of detailed planning. The next big construction project provided a 4-acre motor park and a huge tent for tactical vehicle maintenance. Guard towers were also built on the four corners of the airfield perimeter for additional security.

SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS, TUZLA

The forward support sections continued to provide CSS to all aviation units operating in the AOR. Unscheduled maintenance and day/night launch and recovery operations proceeded on a normal schedule. The brigade averaged approximately 25 aircraft flights per day.

A team of civilian contractors from commercial companies deployed to provide specialized aviation maintenance support. The majority of this augmentation serviced the AH-64 night system and OH-58D aircraft survivability equipment. The contractor's service proved a valuable asset in minimizing aircraft downtime due to problems with these highly technical systems.

Clam shell construction continued into late February. Tuzla Main Airfield received two clam shells, and Tuzla West received one for aviation maintenance activities. Clam shell construction consumed a tremendous amount of the battalion's time and resources. However, the effort paid huge dividends for sustained maintenance operations.

Force protection became a necessary burden for all support missions; security details took soldiers away from assigned duties. Perimeter/gate guards and other security details consumed 12-15 soldiers per 12-hour period. Further, the Task Force Eagle commander's four-vehicle convoy rule limited the unit's ability to provide timely resupply and maintenance. This four-vehicles rule entailed convoy movements at platoon level and required eight soldiers for each convoy mission. Also, at least one convoy vehicle required a crew-served weapon.

SUMMARY

The battalion was able to accomplish this very tough and demanding mission because of the highly trained and motivated soldiers assigned. One in particular was the battalion CSM. We were blessed with this outstanding soldier who loved his job and the soldiers that he led. Tough, determined, stubborn, and professional, CSM Bedford was an inspiration to the soldiers of the 1AD and to me.

The doctrinal guidance provided in FM 100-5 and FM 1-500 provided the framework for the battalion Combat Service Support plan. However, our soldiers' ability to anticipate and provide responsive support enabled the aviation units to project their might. The most important characteristic of this deployment was the battalion's ability to respond flexibly to any mission. The individual soldier's performance and the team effort of the "Workhorse" battalion ranged from outstanding to superb. The unity of effort and integration of tactics, techniques, and procedures created an atmosphere of skilled professionals delivering sustained and reliable logistical support. This support guaranteed the success of all Task Force Eagle's aviation assets. Despite harsh weather and unanticipated missions, the battalion supported the process of bringing peace to a war-torn area of the world. I feel extremely honored to have been a part of this mission. A bonus was to have served with and commanded the 127th Aviation Support Battalion.

CHAPTER 8

PREPARATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE INITIAL MEDICAL FORCE IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Colonel William T. Bester

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR began in December 1995 in an attempt to enforce a peaceful resolution to the ongoing ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Over 20,000 American soldiers deployed into the Bosnian Theater in support of this effort. A critical part of this deployment was the medical support for soldiers deploying into or through the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) in Tazsar, Hungary; along the Main Supply Routes (MSR) in Croatia; and in key locations in the American sector in Bosnia. This monograph will look at one portion of that medical support, that provided by the 67th Combat Support Hospital (CSH), home-based in Wuerzburg, Germany.

The 67th CSH is a 236-bed, Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) hospital. In 1995, it was the only hospital in the U.S. Army that served a dual role as both a full-up TO&E hospital and a full-time TDA facility supporting the Wuerzburg, Germany, catchment area. This meant that all the professional and personnel resources designated to deploy with the 67th CSH also served day to day in the Wuerzburg Medical Activity (MEDDAC) hospital caring for those soldiers and their family members needing peacetime health care.

Upon my arrival at the unit in June of 1994, I quickly realized that the 67th CSH had, for some time, been preparing for a possible deployment into the Balkans to support some form of peace enforcement by the U.S.

military. As early as 1993, some single-parent military members were being encouraged to leave their children in the continental United States and go to Germany alone because of the high probability of a deployment shortly after their arrival. Although there was frequent talk of a possible deployment, the cry "Wolf!" had been sounded so often, and for so long, that upon my arrival any mention of a deployment was taken lightly and without concern or belief that it would actually occur.

Approximately 15 months later, however, the atmosphere changed. By autumn 1995, there were more high-level command meetings and briefings regarding the possible support of a Balkan peace enforcement operation than I had seen since my arrival in Europe. In September 1995, we were tasked to support a multi-national exercise in Grafenwoehr, Germany. During October frequent inquiries into unit status and readiness came down to us from higher command.

As peace talks progressed, the reality of a possible deployment began to strike home. In November the talk was not "whether" we would deploy, but rather "when." However, many remained skeptical. Then, in early November we were ordered to deploy the CSH to Grafenwoehr for a validation exercise. All units designated as units to deploy in support of any peace enforcement measures in the Balkans were required to "validate" that they were trained, prepared, and equipped to immediately respond to such a deployment.

The validation exercise was of grave concern to those of us in the CSH—purely from an equipment readiness perspective. The weather was extremely rainy during this period, and had been so for some time. Our major concern was the time needed to recover and clean the hospital tents, facilities, and equipment upon return from the validation exercise. We felt that our recent primary medical support of a major multi-national exercise "validated" that we were prepared to deploy immediately and support any plan or

scenario tasked down to us. We requested an exemption from the validation exercise, but were told that *all* units deploying would validate, regardless of any recent training or exercise experiences. We therefore moved the unit to Grafenwoehr for the validation exercise, still concerned that a deployment notice soon after our return could prevent us from recovering fully.

The validation exercise turned out worse than we even expected. We were given a site for the establishment of the hospital in a field that immediately turned to above-ankle-deep mud early in the construction phase. By the time the hospital was fully established, there was mud and standing water throughout the entire facility. All of our equipment, medical and nonmedical, along with the interior of the hospital was covered with mud. The rains continued throughout the exercise, and by the time we disassembled the hospital and packed up to return home, it was virtually impossible to clean our equipment properly due to the site we were established on and the lack of available cleaning resources.

Immediately upon return to garrison, we identified teams to clean, re-inventory, and restock the hospital. These teams worked two 12-hour shifts to allow us to recover the hospital and return as quickly as possible to our pre-exercise state of readiness. In less than 1 week, the hospital, with its entire complement of equipment and vehicles, was positioned back in the motor pool and ready for immediate deployment if called upon to do so.

Once we returned from the validation exercise and had the equipment cleaned and positioned, a marked increase in anxiety began to develop regarding our inevitable deployment and the period when it would take place. Would we leave before Thanksgiving? Would we leave before Christmas? Who would go? How long would we be gone? These were just a few of the questions frequently being asked throughout the organization. We were receiving very little information regarding these questions from our higher

command, because the National Command Authorities (NCA) were not making any final decisions until the results of the Dayton Peace Accords could be evaluated and subsequently acted upon.

However, there soon developed a feeling throughout the command that information was being withheld, and this led to a growing level of frustration. We, the command group, soon realized that we needed to schedule frequent information updates to provide all information that we knew to be true at that point, squelch the many rumors that were circulating throughout the command, and answer the multitude of questions that our soldiers and their family members had. We determined to present daily briefings at 1600 in the hospital chapel. We decided on a policy to pass along all information we received that day with the rare exception of any classified or sensitive material, and opened up the briefings to all soldiers and their family members.

This decision to hold daily briefings was probably one of the most effective measures we initiated prior to deployment. In a matter of a couple of days, we were able to pass along enough relevant information to put virtually an end to the numerous rumors running rampant throughout the organization. And, because our soldiers and their families were being supplied with the most current information the command possessed, their ability to prepare for the inevitable deployment was enhanced.

However, as the days of November, and then early December, passed by, no date for deployment was announced. At the end of the first week of December, the Commander called me into the office and said that if we deployed in increments, he wanted me to go as the Advance Party Commander and that he would follow in the final wave. However, we still had no information regarding a deployment date, or how we would flow our troops into the theater.

Then, on the evening of December 10, I received a call at home from our Deputy Commander for Administration

stating that he just received word that a train was positioned at Kitzingen, Germany (some 10 miles from our motor pool), for us to begin loading up the hospital for possible deployment sometime during the upcoming week. The next morning, I arrived at work and immediately got involved with the ongoing rail load plans that we had initiated the evening before. The plan called for 24-hour around the clock loading until all the equipment and vehicles were loaded. Meanwhile, rumors began to surface regarding when the unit would deploy. The rumors included leaving immediately or by the end of the week (December 17). Still, no word regarding a firm departure date arrived from higher headquarters.

At the 1600 briefing to the soldiers and their family members on December 11, we stated that no deployment date or time had been forwarded to us at this point, but that we expected to be notified very soon. We announced that if one's name was on the 32-bed Hospital Unit Base (HUB), he/she should be prepared to leave as early as tomorrow. After answering a few questions, we returned to our offices to see if the Medical Brigade had any information regarding our departure date.

At approximately 1800, we received notification from brigade regarding our departure. We were told we would deploy 100 personnel, with equipment and vehicles, in two 50-member increments. The first group would leave at 1200 on December 12; the second group would leave at 1800. The remainder of the unit (some 200 individuals) would follow at some later date. This date would be established once the Advanced Party got into Theater and established an initial medical treatment facility. We immediately got on the telephone to contact all those individuals scheduled to depart on December 12. By 2100, all of the personnel had been notified.

I arrived at work early the next morning and met with the Commander. After reviewing our deployment plan one final time, he told me he wanted to form the first wave of

soldiers up at 1130 for a formal send-off. After some words of praise and encouragement from both the Commander and myself, the soldiers bid farewell to family and friends and loaded up on buses for the 30-minute ride to Kitzingen. We arrived at the railhead at 1245 and immediately downloaded rucks and A-bags and then in-processed with the Personnel Services Branch. The soldiers were given soup and juice while waiting for the arrival of the passenger train. The train was scheduled to depart at 1430. However, delays resulted in us leaving at 1600. Prior to departure, we had loaded an immense amount of Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) and water. We were not sure exactly how long the trip was going to take, but were told it would be a 2-3 day trip and that we would not be allowed to leave the train. It was for this reason that I decided to take as much food and water as we could safely store on the train.

Our destination was Taszar, Hungary, which had been designated as the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE). Taszar was a town none of us had heard of prior to the deployment, and Hungary was a country only a couple of our personnel had visited. Yet, over the next few months, over 20,000 American service men and women would either be assigned in the Taszar area or deploy through it on their way into Croatia and Bosnia.

After approximately 3 hours, our train passed through Schweinfurt, Germany (a 40-minute automobile drive from Kitzingen). The problem, we were to find out later, was that our train had the lowest priority on the German rail system and therefore was placed on secondary rail routes to avoid negatively impacting on regularly scheduled German passenger and freight rail traffic.

At 0100 on Wednesday, December 13, we were awakened by Czech Republic government officials and required to show our documents authorizing our travel through the Czech Republic. We were awakened two more

times throughout the night to present the same documentation to other authorities in other towns.

We traveled through the Czech Republic for most of December 13. At approximately 1700, we reached the Slovakian border where we exchanged escort officers. At each border, a military officer from that country would board the train and act as an escort until we got to the next border crossing. Unfortunately, these escort officers could not speak English, leaving us without the capability of communications with rail personnel regarding our current location and our estimated time of arrival into Taszar.

We reached the Hungarian border at about 2130 on December 13. For reasons still unknown to us, we sat at the border for more than 3 hours before the train continued on its way at approximately 0100 on December 14.

I woke up at about 0600, and the train was stopped once again. We had apparently been stopped for some time considering the amount of snow that had accumulated on our rail cars and on the track in front of us. We had absolutely no idea where in Hungary we were, or how close we might be to our final destination. I moved throughout the passenger car that I was assigned in order to determine how everyone was doing and whether we had any problems that needed to be addressed. We soon discovered that the running water on the train had stopped, thus preventing us from washing our hands or flushing the toilets. At the same time, I discovered that heat had gone out in the second passenger car, and the temperature was dropping to a critical point. I immediately contacted the engineer. Neither he nor any of his crew spoke one word of English, and none of our personnel spoke Hungarian. After "sign-languaging" our way through the issue, the engineer was finally able to communicate to me that we were only a few minutes from Taszar. We got the train rolling again shortly thereafter and pulled into the loading dock in Taszar at about 0930.

We arrived to an environment of utter chaos. I had various individuals directing me to do five different

actions—all at the same time. Once I established the fact that our soldiers could only do one thing at a time and that we needed to move through the unloading process in an orderly and organized fashion, we were able to bring some structure to our actions. We expeditiously unloaded all the rucksacks, A-bags, MREs, and water. This process took about 45 minutes. We then assigned a detail to clean the two passenger cars while the rest of the unit loaded the personal gear, MREs, and water on two buses that had been assigned to us for transporting the soldiers and our personal equipment. We also had an additional detail assisting in downloading our vehicles and hospital equipment.

The one event that I was totally unprepared for was the number of news media personnel that descended upon us like a swarm of bees shortly after our arrival. I quickly asked the ISB public affairs officer to give us a couple of minutes before we met with them. I used this time to remind our soldiers to answer their questions honestly, but to not speculate on any issue that we were not prepared to address. We were here to provide medical support to all soldiers deploying into and through the ISB, and our responses should be directed toward what our mission was and not to try to answer questions that were not in our realm of responsibility or authority. The interviews went well. Our soldiers were proud to address questions related to our mission in the ISB, but were extremely careful not to try to speculate on questions pertaining to non-medical issues.

Taszar was a Russian MiG Base prior to the end of the Cold War. After the Cold War ended, the base was shut down with the exception of a few buildings on the airfield that were utilized by the Hungarian forces. The MiGs were flown only rarely, and the remainder of the military base slipped into a state of disrepair. Upon our arrival, we were directed toward old barracks buildings some two miles from the airfield and railhead area. The buildings had not been used in over 5 years, and, as we were approaching them, we all pictured the worst. We soon arrived at the barracks building that had been designated as “temporary” billeting

for our initial 100-person contingent. We were all pleasantly surprised. Although the building was physically in poor shape, it had heat, hot and cold running water, six male shower stalls, and three female shower stalls. We were fortunate to have not only these luxuries, but also to be afforded the opportunity to billet in a permanent structure with concrete floors. There was no complaining heard from any of our soldiers.

We spent the next hour unpacking the buses and moving all the packs, weapons, MREs, and water into the barracks. We immediately established an arms room in a caged-in area that appeared to have been an arms room during the Russian occupation. After everything was removed from the buses, I told everyone to break for lunch. A mess facility was located across the street from our barracks. Although there was no food being provided at this point, it was a great place for our soldiers to be able to sit down at tables and have hot coffee or juice with their MREs.

After lunch, we formed back up at the barracks. The First Sergeant had located a large number of metal bed frames to the rear of the building, and one of the other senior NCOs had discovered a number of old mattresses in a storage area in the building. We immediately identified teams to clean rooms, carry metal bed frames, carry mattresses, and assemble the bed frames in the rooms. The First Sergeant, the Chief Wardmaster, and I then went around the barracks, identifying how many soldiers would be billeted in each room. The space available was extremely limited, thereby requiring us to double-bunk in every room. In addition, we needed to include, and establish beds for, the nearly 60 additional members of our unit due to arrive sometime during the day.

By 1630, the entire barracks was cleaned and the beds assembled. We formed up the soldiers, congratulated them on their efforts thus far, and announced (per guidance from the Medical Brigade staff) that all protective masks would be checked in at the weapons room and that, for the time

being, load-bearing equipment (LBE) would not be required. Upon completion of their protective mask turn-in, we released the soldiers to dinner.

I immediately went to USAREUR Forward Headquarters to meet with Lieutenant Colonel Moloff, V Corps Surgeon, to discuss what our initial operational mission was. After some discussion, he stated that, at the current time, we would only have a sick call mission. I then proceeded to dinner. We were provided with a hot meal for dinner that evening, the first since we left home. This proved to be a great morale booster. At dinner, I discussed our sick call mission with our senior physicians, nurses, and NCOs, and they then left to begin locating and preparing a site suitable to provide sick call capability.

Shortly after their departure, the Medical Brigade Sergeant Major came charging into the dining facility and stated that they had just had a meeting with Brigadier General Bell, the Corps Chief of Staff, who stated that he wanted the "hospital up and functioning," with operating room (OR) capability, by close of business tomorrow. I then asked for clarification on "up and functioning" and was told that we should have a functioning emergency medical treatment (EMT) facility along with "some" in-patient capability. Because of this sudden change in requirements, I immediately called a staff meeting with my key clinical and operational officers and NCOs to formulate a plan of action to meet these newly established requirements directed by Brigadier General Bell.

The Medical Brigade had arranged a site directly across from the airfield on a concrete aircraft pad. The U.S. Air Force had been given all these aircraft pads prior to our arrival, but agreed to allow us to use one-half of one pad for a "temporary" site for our initial facility until the ground could be prepared at a different site some one mile away. After our staff meeting, a handful of us proceeded to the identified aircraft pad to lay out and measure a course of action for the following day. It was now about 2000, and the

site given to us was under about two feet of snow. After doing some minor snow removal by shovel to determine where the edges of the concrete pad ended, we marked off where we would erect our EMT, operating room, and central materiel supply (sterilization equipment). The next issue would be snow removal from the aircraft pad.

The fact that we were the first unit of any size to arrive at the ISB resulted in the nonavailability of a number of resources. One resource we could not get was snow removal equipment. It was now 2200, and we tried to determine what our options were. If we shoveled the site out the next day, we would lose valuable daylight hours that could then result in constructing part of the hospital in the dark. This is not necessarily a critical issue, but the risk for injury would increase if we were constructing the external facility in the dark. It was at this point that I noticed a snow plow out clearing the runway some 1,000 meters from us. I instructed one of our soldiers to drive out to the runway and tell the snow plow operator that we were in urgent need of snow removal from the site we were to establish the hospital on. In a matter of a few minutes, the plow was following the CSH vehicle off the runway and over to our site. He began plowing the area for us and approximately 2 1/2 hours later had the aircraft pad and the surrounding area completely cleared.

We returned to the barracks and got to sleep at about 0200. At 0345, I was awakened to be told that the second trainload of individuals had just arrived. The primary staff got up to greet the two busloads and assist them in unloading their equipment, securing weapons and protective masks, and placing them in specific rooms. I instructed them to get to sleep, and that they would be awakened at approximately 1200 to have lunch and then proceed to the site to assist in establishing the hospital.

We then got the first trainload of individuals up and off to breakfast. We held a post-breakfast formation at 0730 and then moved everyone to the site. We broke the unit into

teams and had one team erect the EMT while the other team put up the OR and CMS. We decided to run the three sections in parallel. Patients would enter the facility from the front of the EMT where we would establish a registration and triage area. The patient would then move to the middle of the EMT where he would be seen by a health care provider and rendered medical treatment. In the rear of the EMT, our plan was to place four intensive-care beds for any soldiers requiring in-patient care. To the rear of the EMT, a controlled entrance would be erected to allow passage into our CMS area. This area could provide sterile instruments to both the OR and the EMT, yet be out of the flow of normal patient and staff activity. On the backside of CMS, we would erect another passageway into the Operating Room area.

We were able to position all the pieces of equipment for this first phase without any major difficulties. The second phase of construction planned for this first day of operations was to locate our x-ray and laboratory "boxes" alongside the EMT/CMS/OR complex. However, the contracted truck driver stated he could not drive the truck into the designated locations to drop these expansible boxes because he would get stuck in the mud surrounding the aircraft pad. We therefore called for a crane to unload the expansibles. Approximately 2 hours later, one arrived at the scene. The crane operator attempted to unload the laboratory expansible for over 3 hours. However, his crane was not large enough to complete the job. So, both the x-ray expansible and the laboratory expansible placement needed to be postponed until the following day.

The next issue we needed to address was the absence of fuel for our generators that provide power for heat, lighting, and medical equipment within the hospital. We were having difficulty scheduling a fuel truck to transport fuel to our hospital site. After many attempts at arranging for a fuel truck, one finally arrived on the scene. However, he arrived with no fuel. After discovering he was empty, he left to resupply, and it was some 2 hours before he returned. Upon

his return, he inserted the fuel line into the generator tank, only to find that the fuel line was frozen. He continued to attempt to pump the fuel, however, and soon burnt out the motor which pumps the fuel. Once again, he left the scene and returned some 90 minutes later with a full operational fuel tanker. We now had fuel for our generators, which allowed us to heat and light the inside of our facility and thus enable us to complete the interior establishment of the hospital.

In spite of the external resource problems described above, the unit moved methodically and expeditiously in erecting the hospital complex. By 1200, the external portions of the EMT, CMS, and OR were up and positioned. The difficulty with obtaining fuel earlier in the day somewhat delayed our ability to complete the interior construction. However, by 2000 that evening our enlisted soldiers and officers had completed a highly successful day. We had a fully functioning EMT with four intensive-care in-patient beds, a completely supplied CMS, and an operating room equipped with two surgical tables.

In addition to the hospital construction, we had also been tasked to establish a sick call facility in a barracks building close to the one we were billeted in. We had identified an old arms room and used that for our sick call area. It allowed us to lock up our pharmaceuticals at night without concern for their security. One nurse, one physician, and one medic were assigned to this area. They established the sick call area in a matter of 2 hours and then proceeded to provide health care daily at this site.

The construction of the remainder of the facility was constrained by two primary factors. The first was space. Our instructions were to place as much of the hospital on the half of aircraft pad as we could. After measuring the dimensions required for additions to the hospital, we determined that we could only place the x-ray and laboratory expansibles in the space allowed. Lieutenant General Abrams, V Corps Commander, then sent word that the entire aircraft pad

was ours. Once we received this additional space, we determined we could place an additional 12-bed Intensive-Care Unit (ICU) and a 20-bed Intermediate-Care Ward (ICW).

The other limiting factor was the availability of heavy equipment side-loaders to unload our equipment from the trucks they were transported on. Our ability to construct the hospital was directly limited by the amount of equipment the side-loaders could unload during the day.

On the third day, Lieutenant General Abrams asked me what we needed in order to construct the entire hospital on the current site. After consultation with my primary staff and extensive measurement of the area surrounding the aircraft pad, we determined that if we could have all the grassy area surrounding the pad prepped (graded) and then have rock laid down in the prepped area, we could accommodate the entire hospital set-up in that specific location. Lieutenant General Abrams reviewed our proposal, approved a \$199,000 contract to do the necessary ground preparation, and directed the project proceed immediately. In a matter of 4 days, the entire area had been graded and 3 layers of rock laid to stabilize the ground and make it feasible to support the weight of the CSH. Once the ground preparation was completed, construction continued at a pace consistent with the availability of heavy equipment to down load our hospital equipment. In a matter of 3 weeks from our arrival in Tazsar, we had the following hospital resources on ground, staffed, and operational:

- Optometry Clinic
- Dental Clinic with two dental chairs
- Physical Therapy Department
- Orthopedic Clinic
- Obstetrics/Gynogological examination area

- Pharmacy
- X-ray to include fluoroscopy
- Laboratory
- Blood Bank
- EMT
- 2 Operating Rooms with 4 operating tables
- 2 CMS
- 1 12-bed ICU
- 1 fully staffed 20-bed ICW
- 2 fully equipped stand-by 2-bed ICWs
- Medical Maintenance Section
- Briefing Room
- Tactical Operation Center (TOC)
- Patient Administration Division
- Chaplain Section
- Personnel Section
- Logistics Division
- Psychiatric Clinic
- Dining Facility

In addition, we were given some land space adjoining our hospital area to establish our motor pool. This proved extremely beneficial due to its close proximity to the

hospital area and our consequent ability to turn vehicles around quickly if needed.

The remainder of the hospital (some 150 additional personnel) arrived on December 19. With our complete complement of personnel and a rapidly maturing theater, we were prepared to meet the health care needs of the 20,000-plus soldiers scheduled to deploy through the ISB into Bosnia and for the approximately 5,000 soldiers assigned to duty in the Taszar/Kaposvar area.

Three items of special interest should be noted regarding our health care support to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. First, we made the decision very early on to invite the Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team (AELT) to physically establish themselves inside the walls of the hospital. To my knowledge, this is the first time that the AELT has been physically collocated in an Army hospital. This decision paid big dividends throughout the operation. The inclusion of the AELT on the CSH health care team greatly enhanced our ability to coordinate necessary aeromedical evacuations. Our ability to better understand the AELT's capabilities and requirements, and the AELT's ability to understand our needs, resulted in a more efficient and effective system for aeromedical evacuation.

Second, in February 1996, we received the newest model Computed Tomography (CT) Scan developed for TO&E use. We connected the CT Scan (which also was housed in an expansible) to our preexisting X-Ray Department. Constructed to the side of the CT Scan, yet attached to it, was a CT "reading room." This reading room provided the equipment and space necessary for our radiologists to interpret the results of the CT Scan. This radiographic device provided a capability heretofore not available to our physician staff. Prior to the arrival of the CT Scan, we had transferred some 75 patients to the local Kaposvar Hungarian Medical Center for CT Scans in their facility. This highly sophisticated piece of equipment allowed our physicians to make a more definitive diagnosis on our

soldiers in a much quicker time frame, thus greatly increasing the quality of care we were providing.

In conjunction with the CT Scan, we also were provided the necessary equipment for a teleradiology system. Teleradiology enables health care providers anywhere in the Bosnian Theater who have x-ray capabilities, to electronically send the results of their radiographic studies to the CSH for evaluation by the radiologist. The CSH had the only radiologist in the Bosnian/Croatian/Hungarian AO and, accordingly, was the receiving center of radiographic exams throughout the Theater. This proved extremely useful for the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) located in Tuzla, Bosnia. They were the only other U.S. hospital in theater, but did not have the availability of a radiologist. Teleradiology allowed physicians at the 212th MASH to send their results immediately to the CSH for professional radiological review; those results were then returned to the 212th MASH expeditiously via electronic transmission. Again, the end result was an increase in the quality of health care provided to our soldiers.

Third, host nation health care support was readily available, and the quality was generally on par with U.S. health care. Their laboratory facilities were more sophisticated than the CSH's, so we periodically sent laboratory specimens to the Hungarians when their facilities exceeded the capabilities of the CSH. During the first 9 months of deployment, we utilized the local Hungarian laboratory approximately 360 times. In addition, we utilized the Hungarian medical center for surgical intervention requirements that exceeded the capabilities of our staff or our equipment. For example, a couple of soldiers needed neurosurgical procedures that we could not provide at the CSH. They were surgically treated in the Hungarian medical facility with excellent post-operative results. Other soldiers needed endoscopic procedures that we could not provide (due to equipment restrictions); thus these soldiers were cared for at the host nation facility as well. Our preference was to care for all of

our soldiers in a U.S. facility, but when staffing, equipment, or urgency dictated otherwise, it was extremely helpful to have such a high-quality host nation medical facility so readily available.

The final issue I would like to address within the confines of this paper is that of additional taskings. Not unlike any exercise or real world operation, we were tasked to provide CSH resources outside the walls of the CSH. One of the first taskings we received was to provide medical support (medics plus an ambulance) at all the railheads. Next, health care clinics began to surface throughout the area. Outside the hospital, we supported clinics at Taszar Main, Kaposvar, Kaposjulak, the Life Support Area, and Taborflava Training Area. These clinics required professional and enlisted staffing that we often provided or supported from our staff assigned to the 67th CSH.

One of our larger early commitments came in a tasking to send a 20-bed ICW forward with the 212th MASH when they arrived in Theater in mid-January. Our requirement was to send the 20-bed ward, all of its equipment and supplies, all the nursing personnel required to support it, and additional physician support. The impact of this tasking was more morale-related than operational. The requirement to split off a part of any unit for an extended period of time can have an adverse effect on the morale of both those departing and those remaining.

The heaviest tasking, manpower-wise, was one we received in February to begin the JOINT ENDEAVOR Medical Screening (JEMS) Program. This program was a newly initiated Department of Defense directed program of health screening, education, and medical/psychological surveillance for soldiers and civilians returning from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. It was a labor-intensive program requiring enlisted, nursing, and physician resources on a daily basis. The time required varied daily, being dependent on the number of soldiers redeploying through the ISB. Most days involved 2-4 hours, with some

days going as high as 8 hours. The JEMS process entailed the following:

- Hepatitis A Booster
- Psychological Questionnaire
- Medical Questionnaire
- Medical Threat Briefing
- Psychological Briefing
- Blood Samples
- Medical Threat Fact Sheet.

The blood samples were obtained and then shipped to Rockville, Maryland, where they remain frozen in a vault, readily available for examination if a soldier is afflicted with some disease in the future that he feels may be linked to his deployment in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

In addition, professional medical and psychiatric staff were available to review the medical and psychiatric questionnaires to determine if any soldiers needed immediate intervention or intervention once he/she returned to their home station.

Shortly after the start of the JEMS program, it was determined that all returning soldiers would have a routine dental examination in conjunction with their JEMS. This additional tasking was given to the dental facility of the 67th CSH, further impacting on our staffing situation.

The deployment of the 67th CSH to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR was an extremely successful deployment. Fortunately, casualties and injuries were low. From December 1995 to March 1997, the CSH conducted the following medical activities:

- Treated 801 In-patients

- Treated 19,899 Outpatients
- 33,423 Medical Redeployment Screenings
- 24,065 Dental Redeployment Screenings
- 280 Air Evacuations
- 1037 Host Nation Referrals

The 67th CSH spent 485 days deployed in the Bosnian Theater. As of April 1, 1998, the 67th CSH had deployed approximately 100 soldiers back into the Bosnian Theater. The outstanding performance of this unit at every level of rank and professional standing is an example for future medical units to emulate. The AMEDD's motto "Proud to Care" was never better exemplified.

CHAPTER 9

A REAR DETACHMENT COMMANDER IN OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Lieutenant Colonel Sherrie L. Balko

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND PURPOSE

It is hard to know where to begin to thank the many great soldiers and Americans who helped me survive my year's tenure as a Rear Detachment Commander. I chose not to use names in this paper beyond those in the following paragraph, because my accounting talks in generalities about the members of the detachment and does not go into specific situations. There also were many personnel changes over the course of the year, and I did not want to accidentally forget someone.

That said, I would be remiss if I did not thank some of the key leaders who shouldered most of the burdens, had more than their fair share of face time with me, and served at least half of the deployment in the rear detachment. My subordinate commanders, Diane Fortini, Rich DuBreuil and Scott Baier were absolutely awesome. I only hope that their next assignments were a bit more fun. My staff, who were significantly underpaid for all the responsibility they had, Maria Drew, Brian Dockery, Scott Pearson, Tony Hale, Wendy Rivers, Mo Cashman, and Derryk Julien, kept the brigade in the game. My right-hand man, Sergeant Major Johnson, kept me squared away and let me know when I was getting ready to do something dumb. A special thanks goes to Lisa Stein, who did a lot more than the title "secretary" would suggest. She kept the Headquarters afloat and the paperwork moving, even when the rest of us went to the field. I also want to acknowledge Jeanne Slupik

and Steve Walker, commanders of the two battalions that did not deploy. They were always there when I needed some help, and they overlooked most of the errors my junior staff made. They were true team players and good friends. Last, some very special ladies who not only took care of the families, but also made it their mission to look after me: Deb Culbert, Anne Premo, Hattie Graham, and Kelly Tate were the epitome of great Family Support Group Leaders.

These folks and many others were all part of the success story told in this monograph. I will never be able to adequately thank them for their dedication and tireless efforts. It was a wild ride and I am glad they were aboard.

This monograph is an accounting of the life of the rear detachment commander of the 22d Signal Brigade, V Corps, United States Army Europe during the brigade's deployment as part of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE). It is not a diary, instead it is a look at key aspects and certain events of the year-long deployment and describes how the various elements of the rear detachments managed them. If the reader has never had an opportunity to serve in one, especially overseas, it will be an eye-opener. The intent of this paper, then, is to share my experiences, observations, and lessons learned with others who may find themselves in a similar situation or are trying to develop a plan now for future rear detachments.

THE WARNING ORDER

They say timing is everything. Well, that was very true for the 22d Signal Brigade's leadership early in October 1995. The warning order of a possible deployment to Bosnia came as the brigade's key leaders and staff were gathered together at an off-site during the 3-day training holiday for Columbus Day. The brigade commander had to absent himself to attend the V Corps briefing, and, when he came back late that night, he officially broke the news. Elements of the brigade, under the command of the 1st Armored Division, would be deploying to Bosnia-Herzegovina, if and

when the warring factions signed the Dayton Peace Accords. For the brigade, the first cut at forces had the brigade Headquarters, the 17th Signal Battalion, and the 440th Signal Battalion deploying with the division signal battalion. Eventually, the 17th was cut from the list, although one of their platoons and some additional teams did go. The announcement that my battalion was going to be the Base Support Battalion's "pusher" unit and I was going to be the brigade's Rear Detachment Commander was extremely disappointing to me. A pusher unit is responsible for facilitating the movement of other organizations through air and railheads by providing the personnel to run the loading operations. Clearly that meant that I was going to miss all of the action. Well, nothing could have been further from the truth.

PREPARING FOR THE DEPLOYMENT

The brigade, as an organization, had not deployed before, except for some selective teams during the Gulf War. There were no Standing Operational Procedures for deploying or for rear detachment operations. Fortunately, there were a number of soldiers who had either gone to the Gulf or participated in a more recent deployment, so we were not working totally in the dark. My own personal experience was in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, when the battalion of which I was the Executive Officer (XO), deployed with VII Corps. Having "been there, done that," I thought I knew it all, or at least most of it. The truth is, the only similarity was that both deployments originated in Germany. There, the similarity ceased.

The first difference that contradicted my expectations of the deployment was the train-up and validation exercise, held at the Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels Training Areas that Corps was developing for the 1st Armored Division Task Force. The intent was to rehearse and then validate the plan, while training the division's staffs. Simultaneously, there was a requirement to train every deploying soldier in

the unique tasks required for the upcoming mission (cold weather operations, mine identification and clearing, etc.) plus validate individual weapons qualification. Unlike the Gulf, this required deploying units from home stations, especially the staffs. They essentially stopped working on pre-deployment activities and headed to the field. Although the exercise and subsequent validation were absolutely essential, it made coordinating the deployment extremely difficult. The telephone trunks out of Grafenwoehr always stayed busy. The exercise also caused the brigade to put rear detachment development on the back burner until the return to garrison. Last, the separation of soldiers from their families, with a deployment imminent, increased the stress levels for all. For me, the exercise required my battalion to be out at Grafenwoehr for over a month, as we provided the tactical communications that supported the whole thing. So my attention remained on the exercise, the personnel cross-leveling that we were being constantly levied for, the training of my Delta Company that was going to Tazsar, Hungary, and the 12 or so signal teams that I had been tasked to provide to other signal units. Clearly my attention was not on my upcoming rear detachment responsibilities.

My return to garrison a month later did not improve that situation. As a battalion commander, my focus remained on preparing my soldiers and their equipment and trying to keep a handle on property accountability. The taskings for equipment, like those for personnel, came fast and furious. As the brigade's Rear Detachment Commander, I did attend every deployment briefing within the brigade, mostly to introduce myself to the families, but it also provided an opportunity to hear what was troubling them. I was able to resolve a couple of those issues with the local community staff, so it was time well spent. But as the month of November came to a close and reports or rumors of units deploying at any time were running rampant, the brigade commander, his wife, and I agreed it was time to start the weekly Family Member Briefings. The briefings were to be

an opportunity for me to update the families on the current situation, discuss upcoming events and troop movements, if any, and provide information on community events and services. Other attendees with information to share were provided an opportunity to speak and then I would close with the question-and-answer period. I must admit there were questions that I did not have an answer to. So on December 8, 1995, I began the briefings that were conducted until December 1996, when the units started coming home, and the rest of the redeployment schedule was set. The attendance ranged from a nearly full chapel, where I conducted them, to ten spouses. In June 1996, I made the decision to have the briefings only once a month, as there just was not enough activity at home or down range to support weekly briefings. The briefings proved to be a good tool, even if it only gave the family members an opportunity to vent or me an opportunity to quell rumors. It was worth the effort.

DEPLOYMENT

The month of December was very tense. Everyone knew it was just a matter of time. There were many false starts, and soldiers and families alike jumped whenever the phone rang. Fortunately, most of the brigade's soldiers were able to spend Christmas at home. Units and teams supporting operations in Tazar, Hungary, and advance parties going into Tuzla Air Base, Bosnia-Herzegovina, were, for the most part, the only elements that deployed before the holidays. But as the month drew to a close, the railheads became busier, and anxiety grew. As advance party elements of the brigade were starting to head out, I was forced to start taking an interest in the brigade's Rear Detachment staff, as they were now running the Crisis Action Center, managing all deployments, and submitting reports to the Corps. Fortunately for me, most of the soldiers working there were from my battalion (an earlier tasking), and, if there was a problem, they knew whom to call. As for the rest of the staff, it looked a little thin, but there was nothing I

could do to change it now. The good news was that there was at least one knowledgeable person per staff section staying behind, excluding the S-2. But I knew deep down inside that I could not have a robust staff, as every able-bodied person was needed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What I failed to realize at the time was how important my little staff and new rear detachment commanders would be.

THE DUST SETTLES

It was not until the end of January that I finally had an idea of what lay ahead. All of our deployments were done, but there were daily calls from deployed units, asking for additional items to be shipped their way. Routine and not so routine paperwork was starting to pile up on the brigade commander's desk, and the staff kept calling to get my approval on a myriad of issues. So I was slowly forced to wean myself away from my nearly total focus on my battalion, and I began to spend half the day at the brigade. One of the first things I had to do was to move some members of my battalion to the brigade staff. This was essential because there just were not enough soldiers to answer the phones or fill critical billets like the Logistics Officer (S-4) and the Intelligence Officer (S-2). It did not make me, the battalion commander, very happy, but it was the right thing to do.

My change of command at the end of February was a blessing in disguise. I was now able to focus completely on the operations of the brigade. The timing could not have been better. Unlike DESERT SHIELD/STORM where a stop-loss personnel policy was in effect, the deployment for OJE required troops to have only 90 days or more remaining in their tours to be deployable. That meant that come the first of March, rear detachments would need to start out-processing those returning soldiers. This just overwhelmed the rear detachments, as their resources were already taxed to the limits by the mission of in-processing new soldiers. Although in-processing sounds easy, it was

not. The rear detachments had to receive new soldiers into the unit, properly in-process them, make sure they were fully deployable (some were not), qualify them on their assigned weapon, send them to Grafenwoehr for Bosnia-Herzegovina specific training, and take them to Ramstein Air Force Base for their flight to Bosnia- Herzegovina. If the new soldiers brought families with them, and many did, there were more actions to complete. The implied tasks are too numerous to mention, but it was a daunting challenge for those young commanders. So you can imagine how much more cumbersome it became when soldiers started to filter back to out-process.

Although the detachments were doing the best job they could, there were many, both at Corps and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who thought that the process was taking entirely too long. A “well-meaning” staff officer at Corps developed a timeline that showed how it should take only 21 days or so for a new soldier to go through the required hoops and be ready to deploy. That became the standard, and all of a sudden we were building spreadsheets, depicting where everyone was in the process, and sending it daily to the corps headquarters and to the brigade. Unfortunately the timeline was built assuming a perfect world, but our world was decidedly imperfect. So we had to write lots of justifications for those who did not meet the standard. For the first few months, that was nearly everybody, as there were insufficient seats for the training at Grafenwoehr and for the flight to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Heaven help us if a soldier had other problems like a preexisting medical problem or some other personal issue. But the pressure to meet the standard never abated, and those first few weeks were pretty tough on the morale of the rear detachments. Eventually the backlog disappeared and the rear detachments met the standard.

As you can see, the rear detachment commanders had their hands full and were constantly being asked to do more (and do it faster) with less. It is only fitting to take a look at these tireless heroes.

THE SUBORDINATE REAR DETACHMENT COMMANDERS

A thankless but vitally important job during this particular deployment was that of rear detachment commander. The two in the brigade that reported directly to me commanded the 440th Signal Battalion and the brigade's Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). Their responsibilities compared to their rank and resources were overwhelming. But their commanders had chosen well, and I had the pleasure of working with two extremely professional officers who consistently kept their heads in the game and never gave into the enormous pressure they faced everyday. This proved to be very important, as they had lots of challenges.

First, the size of the detachment was pitiful to say the least. The commander was a junior captain or a senior first lieutenant with either a master sergeant or sergeant first class to fill the first sergeant's position. They had a handful of soldiers to assist them, many of whom were in a nondeployable status. Their Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) did not match the jobs they had to do. But there were certain missions that had to be performed regardless of their experience. Needless to say, there was a lot of on-the-job training (OJT) required.

One of the concerns at corps was the accountability of the soldiers, because there just was not any subordinate leadership like platoon sergeants or section chiefs built into the rear detachment organizations. My commanders conducted their accountability formations prior to beginning physical training (PT) and at the close of the day. More often than that was not very realistic, and it worked for us. Apparently, there were a couple of units who had no method of daily accountability.

As mentioned, the in- and out-processing of the unit's soldiers was a constant challenge. To make it easier for the soldiers and to standardize the procedure, the rear

detachments developed standard operating procedures (SOPs) and checklists for each stage of the process. These proved to be most beneficial, because it told each soldier exactly what tasks had to be done and how to do them (the standard), and what hours they could be accomplished in. This was essential because supply rooms and arms rooms could not be open all day long, and the leaders could not be everywhere to answer questions.

In order to transition soldiers in and out of the unit, the detachments had to run a supply room and an arms room. To lessen the manpower requirements, remaining supplies and weapons were consolidated into one detachment arms room and supply room in the battalion. Properly operating these was more challenging, since supply clerks and armorers require skills and knowledge that signal soldiers do not readily possess. There was no good solution for this problem except for OJT. I had the S-2 from one of the other battalions conduct security inspections and instruction in maintaining the paperwork and control of the keys. If a weapon needed maintenance, it was taken directly to the Direct Support Maintenance facility. We were not capable of performing organizational maintenance. On the supply side, hand receipts were used to keep accountability, but, with soldiers coming and going daily, it was a difficult task. When supplies needed to be ordered, the detachments had to go to my property book officer (PBO) for assistance, as the rear detachments did not have a document register or money of their own.

The one resource always in short supply, but always in great demand, was transportation. Seven days a week the rear detachment commanders had to haul soldiers to and from training and airfields. The brigade had left a couple of tactical vehicles behind, but almost all of those had shelters mounted on them. The Transportation Motor Pool (TMP) tried valiantly to meet all the requirements, but clearly had not foreseen the increase in demand. To be truthful, no one accurately predicted the rear detachments' requirements for support vehicles. Soldiers had to be taken to ranges and

to Grafenwoehr for deployment-specific training. Grafenwoehr on a good day was a 4-hour drive, and anywhere from 1-10 soldiers with weapons and duffel bags would attend any one class. Vehicles were constantly running to and from Ramstein and Rhein Main airbases, the Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) storage lots, and hospitals. More times than not, the TMP came through, but there were many times when we had to go hat-in-hand to nondeployed units to wrest a vehicle or two from them.

Another problematic issue was the soldier who had been categorized as nondeployable. When the warning order for OJE came, great efforts were made to bring as many as possible to a deployable status. Those soldiers whose status could not be upgraded for whatever reason stayed back in the rear detachments. In some units they numbered in the teens and twenties. For most rear detachment commanders, these soldiers comprised the detachment's work force and were very valuable in the conduct of daily operations. Unfortunately, the brigade, like many other units throughout Europe, was not manned at 100 percent of its authorized strength. So every one of these nondeployable soldiers compounded the personnel shortages of the deployed units. Initially, as the operation started, the shortages were fixed by pulling soldiers out of nondeploying units. But that method had to stop when the Germany-based units started to report critically low personnel ratings in their monthly Unit Status Reports. The solution from higher headquarters was to reduce the number of non-deployable soldiers, so new soldiers could be assigned. Getting rid of nondeployable soldiers was a tedious, bureaucratic procedure that had stumped battalion and company commanders long before the operation, but now the rear detachment commanders had to find the answers. This became an emotional issue with the rear detachments, as many of these soldiers were key members of their little staffs, who were doing yeomans' work. If properly processed, these soldiers would be discharged from the Army and their "deployable" replacement would be processed for duty with

the unit downrange. This was akin to shooting yourself in the foot, and commanders kept questioning the sanity of this exercise. Without great enthusiasm, the commanders struggled with kind-hearted doctors (who kept writing continuous temporary profiles) and the snail-like pace of the Medical Review Board and the subsequent reviews that followed for those with permanent medical problems. We made only minimal headway for the amount of time and energy that was expended on this mission. This was one battle that was not won.

Another unplanned mission that quickly received a lot of attention was the state of cleanliness of now empty barracks rooms, storerooms, team rooms, and offices. I will not debate whether the speed of the deployment did or did not provide sufficient time to inspect and clean areas, but in every unit that deployed, leaders caught up in the planning and execution failed to check their soldiers' work and living areas. So the first few months found the detachments hauling tons of trash and cleaning rooms. This was a major project that consumed lots of time and manpower that were not there. While walking through the areas, I also found lots of military equipment that was either in need of turn-in or excess to the unit. Where the clean-up took about half of the year, the turn-in of the excess stuff took more than the other half, requiring assistance from other units to load and move the material. That mission was totally uncalled for.

If that was not enough for my rear detachment commanders to handle, there was a USAREUR-wide decision to renovate the barracks for returning soldiers. The renovation included painting the rooms and installing drop ceilings, wall-to-wall carpeting, and new furnishings. It was a commendable project, but it entailed a lot of scarce manual labor from the rear detachments for tasks like removing old furniture. Fortunately, the soldiers returning to out-process did not need the full 30 days they were allotted, so they became a small temporary work force that did most of the work. And the deployed soldiers wondered why we needed "so many" soldiers in the rear.

Those were some of the major missions that faced my unit rear detachment commanders. I am sure there were more, but those hard-working leaders took care of them, without my ever knowing about it. As the Rear Detachment Commander for the brigade, they were only part of my responsibility. Just as important and equally demanding was the rest of the brigade who did not deploy. And to assist me in that role was another group of equally hard working soldiers, my staff.

THE BRIGADE STAFF

It took me a while to appreciate fully the enormity of the task of running a brigade. I know this is hard to believe, but it is tougher than commanding a battalion. I also had a skeleton crew for a staff, and nearly all of the staff officers were lieutenants. These officers were responsible not only for supporting the deployed force, but also the two battalions remaining in Germany. The corps headquarters expected my little staff to continue business as usual. That meant actively monitoring and reporting personnel accountability, maintenance status, and training status, plus supporting other units' exercises. Even more unbelievable was the expectation that we would also conduct the annual command inspections for both battalions and their external evaluations (EXEVAL). This was quite overwhelming for all of us, but every one of my staff sections pulled it off. Sometimes it was not pretty, but the job got done. For me, every day was a long professional development class, with me trying to impart my knowledge and experience to my young staff. They were fast learners, and I enjoyed every opportunity I had to train the officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers in the new or additional responsibilities they had just inherited.

The S-1 had the most contentious job. There was a mandate to keep the deployed units at a 90 percent fill, while trying to keep the battalions left in Germany at a 70 percent fill. This kept the soldiers of the S-1 on a treadmill

that never stopped, as the demands always exceeded the personnel resources. Projected inbounds from the corps headquarters always looked likely, but rarely, if ever, did all the soldiers show up. So the S-1 had to talk daily with the Corps G-1, scrubbing the list to ensure diverted soldiers were found and/or replaced. This was an essential task that had to be done every day. Daily conversations or e-mail with the deployed S-1 decided whether a new soldier would be sent down to them or stay in one of the Germany-based units. Eventually a decision was reached, and, as expected, it normally benefited the deployed units. Those units that did not deploy always suffered from a significant lack of personnel. The corps blamed the personnel shortfalls on an inaccurate Standard Installation Database for Personnel (SIDPERS), and we spent untold hours purging the system with our local Personnel Detachment. But in the end we were something less than successful because external powers kept adding erroneous data, and we could never totally clean it up.

Another bane to the daily existence of the S-1 was the unending number of personnel actions and awards that kept flowing in. At first, they came not only from the units in the rear but also from the deployed units. That stopped when the personnel and finance units finally deployed and became operational. But the remaining administrative load quickly overwhelmed the abilities of the S-1 staff. This was an emotional issue throughout the deployment, as my small S-1 staff was not able to process all of those personnel actions in a timely manner. We did the best we could and eventually eliminated the backlog. But it was not easy, and, unfortunately, we did not take care of some soldiers the way they should have been.

Although not a vital position, the administrative specialist running the S-2 section was kept busy just trying to verify the security clearances of incoming soldiers to the brigade and monitoring soldiers who needed to complete their periodic security clearance updates. This soldier also

kept track of the classified information that came to the Headquarters.

Unlike the lone S-2, the S-3 section had several soldiers, for good reason. Like the one that supported the brigade prior to the deployment, my S-3 section had its hands full managing the full range of operational and training missions for the nondeployed units and supporting the rear detachments.

One of the first challenges was the numerous taskings for personnel and equipment that we received from corps. Each required an assessment of the impact on the unit and often ended up in a lively debate between one of my lieutenants or captains and a major or lieutenant colonel on the corps staff. The conversations were always professional, and, believe it or not, we won almost as many as we lost.

Something that none of us appreciated at the beginning was the frequency of taskings to provide tactical communications support to all of the corps and USAREUR exercises involving non-OJE units. Fortunately, I had great soldiers who worked overtime running those requirements into the ground and developing solid operations orders. To their credit, every exercise had a well-developed communications network that more than met the requirements.

The most intensive requirement imposed on the S-3 was to develop and conduct EXEVALs for the two battalions. This required all members of the headquarters staff to chip in to build challenging scenarios, tasks, conditions, and standards for each event, and an extensive operations order. This was a huge event as the EXEVAL within the corps is an annual culminating event for our units, much like the one the combat units undergo at the Combined Maneuver Training Center. We got the corps to provide the opposing force (OPFOR) and a chemical decontamination unit to support the evaluation. The rest of the work was laid upon the shoulders of my staff led by the S-3, and they came through with flying colors. They conducted the warning order brief, the operations order brief, trained up the

observers/controllers and role players, and conducted a rehearsal for the OPFOR and everybody else. Then we emptied out the building and spent 10 days in the field executing the evaluation. It was a tremendous undertaking, and my young warriors made me proud.

The other major event the S-3 handled was the lead for the dreaded Annual Command Inspection of the battalions. Those inspections, which the staff orchestrated, required a lot of outside support by subject matter experts. The S-3 had the staff update the checklists, conduct the weeklong inspections, give the out-brief, and then provide a final written report that was distributed a month later. Like the EXEVAL, the inspections were a huge drain on the staff because they were extremely time intensive.

When not busy, the S-3 also managed the Unit Status Report (USR), training ammunition, the semiannual training brief to the corps' Deputy Commanding General (DCG), and all briefings to visiting general officers. The S-3 also oversaw the Crisis Action Center, which still monitored all personnel deployments, equipment passing between the rear and forward deployed units, and acted as the Staff Duty Officer for the brigade.

The S-4 section was also kept very busy. One of the toughest missions was property accountability. In accordance with the guidance received from corps, a separate property book was established for the equipment that was deployed. The Property Book Officer (PBO) from the 440th was responsible for the deployed equipment. The brigade's PBO stayed with the Rear Detachment and was responsible for the equipment that remained. Although the two rear detachment commanders had done inventories and signed hand receipts, there were some discrepancies. That was because of inventories being rushed, last-minute changes being made to equipment lists, and the tremendous amount of equipment that was transferred within and outside of the brigade. Keeping an accurate equipment status was a nearly insurmountable task. The PBO spent

considerable time updating the books as new equipment kept arriving. Normally it would be transferred to the deployed property book, and there were frequent requests for additional items from deployed commanders that were also transferred. There was also the challenge of accounting for equipment that soldiers brought back with them when they out-processed and equipment new soldiers took down with them after in-processing. This kept the property books somewhat unbalanced until everyone returned to Germany.

Property accountability was not the only mission in the S-4's shop. A major effort involved the budget. Fortunately, the comptroller civilians did not deploy, but for those assuming positions way above their pay grades, there was a steep learning curve. Especially tough was fighting for the next year's budget and undergoing the year-end close. Throughout the deployment, there were constant requests from corps to take monies from the subordinate commands to finance the deployment and other unplanned events. As a result, I saw my budget shop almost weekly.

With two battalions worth of equipment in Germany, the brigade S-4 also had to monitor their maintenance status and help where possible. At brigade, we hosted monthly maintenance and supply reviews with the battalion XO's and their maintenance staffs, along with the representatives from the Direct Support Units, the Combat Support Groups, the Corps Support Command (COSCOM), and other agencies who specialized in motor or communications maintenance. These were held prior to a similar meeting at Corps where I had to brief the DCG every month. Those meetings could be brutal if you did not have your act together, but my guys kept me well prepared.

The S-4 assisted the Rear Detachments with the excess equipment turn-in. As nothing can get turned back to the supply system without a condition code and a document number, the S-4 always had lots to do here. The brigade had mounds of equipment to move, and this operation was still ongoing as the units started their redeployment.

THE FAMILY SUPPORT GROUP LEADERS

Not everyone who was mission essential to the brigade's daily operations wore uniforms. One vital group worked just as hard, if not harder, and they needed no supervision. This group was the Family Support Group Leaders (FSGLs).

The year would have been a lot tougher if it had not been for the FSGLs. These "volunteers" were the unsung heroes of the deployment. They were often the first people subjected to the emotional outbursts of families that were experiencing difficulties. How they persevered (none of ours quit) is a true story of selfless service.

Having profited from lessons learned during DESERT SHIELD/STORM, USAREUR had regulated the Family Support Group (FSG) program, and it was alive and well. So there was a significant program already in place that needed only some fine-tuning. FSGLs were already conducting monthly meetings, and many were publishing monthly newsletters, too. The FSG became an informational avenue for many of the families. But there were many who really did not need that association with others from their own unit to get through the deployment. Therein lay the challenge of trying to get the word out. It was impossible to get all of them together. But the FSGLs felt compelled to reach out and try to include all families. It was a tough proposition.

To ease the strain of the separation, the rear detachment commanders established rooms where the families could come in and use either the phone or e-mail to converse with their spouses. As members of a signal brigade, most soldiers had telephones in their work areas, so they could communicate in real-time with their significant others back in Germany. That became a problem when trying to control rumors. And it was always a concern that, should there be a major injury or death to one of our soldiers, a neighbor would inform the affected family before the Army did.

Fortunately, we never had to deal with an incident that required family notification.

The FSGLs were an essential part of the rear detachment team. They took care of many of the problems that families were undergoing. They worked with their unit rear detachment commanders to take care of institutional problems, and most, if not all, of them were resolved to the family member's satisfaction. They were also vital participants in the preparation for the reunion (redeployment) ceremonies.

It was my philosophy to have lunch or dinner at least once a month with the brigade commander's spouse. The informal setting allowed both of us to talk about issues concerning families and their problems or frustrations. For me, it was time well spent. I also made a habit of calling the Battalion FSGLs at least once a month to see how they were doing and to offer my assistance to solve any problems they might have. Trust me, these ladies (in my case, they were all ladies) did yeoman's work, and they handled a lot of family issues that did not have to come to the attention of the rear detachment commanders. Thank heavens. They were a godsend, and it was my opinion that the least I could do was to engage them and, if nothing else, let them vent a little. A major responsibility of the rear detachment commander is to take care of families and the FSGLs were the avenue to do it efficiently.

TRAINING FOR THE ELEMENTS OF THE REAR DETACHMENT

One of the more positive aspects of this deployment was the tremendous effort expended by USAREUR to train both the rear detachment leadership and the FSGLs. The rear detachment leadership team (officer and senior NCO) conducted mandatory week-long training that covered many of the responsibilities that a command team would have and those deployment special issues that would affect them. I attended, but it was not very informative for me

because I was at the end of my tour as a battalion commander. However, for the young lieutenants and captains without any previous command experience who were selected to be rear detachment commanders, it was a great week. But all of us were required to attend, and it was done well. The speakers were key members of the USAREUR staff, to include General William W. Crouch, the USAREUR Commander.

For the FSGLs, there were seminars with experts in fields like stress management and interpersonal relationships to help them handle the seemingly constant demands of their families. These also provided them a forum to share similar problems and solutions that have worked. For the FSGLs, it was a great break from the daily routine. Those who were able to attend found it to be a valuable experience, but the often-short notification for those seminars truly hurt the FSGLs that had young children and had no day care solutions. Most of them never attended. Day care was always a problem and, more times than not, overlooked.

I would be remiss if I did not mention the training sessions and get-togethers that our local base support battalion held. Normally once a month, there were sessions for rear detachment commanders, FSGLs, and family members in general. The community was always trying to make our lives easier.

LESSONS LEARNED

I have already related many of the points that were learned. So as not to belabor the points, I will highlight the important ones in bullet format.

- If the rose gets pinned on you, get interested quick.
- Stay interested in your FSGLs.

- Good rear detachment commanders are a must. If possible, pick one that can stay for the entire time.
- Deployments without a stop-loss policy require a larger rear detachment and more resources.
- Rear detachments cannot consist solely of temporary and permanently profiled soldiers.
- Get as much permanent motor pool support as you can.
- Use SOPs and checklists.
- Be prepared to get lots of visitors. Some will actually help you.
- Ask for help when you need it.

CONCLUSION

The appropriate way to end this tale is with the redeployment which all of us had looked forward to from the beginning. Like all good military operations, it was planned, briefed, back-briefed, rehearsed, executed, and reviewed. The soldiers took care of the set-up and tear-down, and the families handled the decorations and the goodies. From mid-October through mid-December, contracted busses made the long haul from Taszar, Hungary, to Kasernes in Germany, where anxious families and friends awaited their loved ones. Having been separated from their soldiers, the company commanders had to quickly account for the soldiers and sensitive items and knock out a couple administrative tasks before marching their units to the gym where the return ceremony was held. Accompanied by lots of patriotic songs, the short ceremony was concluded with an order from me for the company commander to dismiss the troops. Bedlam ensued as Lee Greenwood's "God Bless the USA" rang out in the background. It was a miracle that no one got hurt as families and friends poured out of the

bleachers and soldiers charged them in a crush for a long overdue reunion. There was not a dry eye in the place, to include mine. I presided over eight such ceremonies, and each one was equally moving. The dedication of the rear detachments and families in providing a fitting tribute to their returning heroes was not lost on those standing in formation on the gym floor. And it was worth the effort because those soldiers had earned that recognition and more.

After every last soldier had returned safely (the brigade did not have any serious casualties), I had a moment to reflect back on that tumultuous year. What struck me most was the tremendous attitude and spirit all members of the rear detachments had. To a man (or woman), every one of them had wanted to go with their unit instead of being relegated to the rear. Out-manned, out-gunned, and under-appreciated, they could have tossed in the towel on numerous occasions, but they never did. Just as important, everything they did was done well, a demonstration of their great pride. And if someone needed help, they rolled up their sleeves and jumped in. It was truly amazing. For me, if I had to do it all again, I would take that team any day. After all, they made my job easy. And if you do not believe me, ask the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG). The crowning moment for the team was Lieutenant General Bates' visit to the brigade. V Corps had picked us for the visit because the brigade had figured out how to do it right. The DAIG was indeed impressed and took copies of the SOPs and checklists that the detachments had created to show other commands. Enough said.

AFTERWORD

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II

The National Defense University recently published a collection of essays on the intervention force (IFOR) in Bosnia constituting a worthy review of policy decisions in that endeavor (*Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*, Larry K. Wentz, ed., 1997). The present collection of monographs discusses the consequences of those policy decisions down at the level where the proverbial "rubber meets the road."

As USAWC students continue to contribute their experiences to the Personal Experience Monograph Program, additional compendia may well be forthcoming, telling the readers what truth looks like from all aspects of an engagement that could prove to be equal in length to the occupation and restoration of Germany and Japan following World War II. In one sense, as a speaker at a recent conference on Civil Dimensions of Military Operations noted, this too is a war, but it is a war against war. If it is treated in that sense, the casualty count is more likely to be low and the success more enduring. The situation may even transform over time to the point where the need for soldiers diminishes, but that will not be soon.

Students of peace operations need to pay particular attention to Colonel Peter Dausen's essay on communications, focusing not so much on the technical process of establishing telecommunications as on the difficulty of doing business with "friends and allies" who are working under a somewhat different mandate. Allies in war and "friends and allies" in peace operations may not react as cooperatively as one might expect. The lesson may be that, absent enough stress or danger to cause willing cooperation

and burden sharing, one may expect to confront political agendas that give new meaning to the term “unity of effort.”

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Hammond is the only contributor who took his unit to and brought it back from the Bosnian theater. His training in connection with that experience is worth remembering, but the reader should note that except for the dispersed nature of his unit's operations, its daily activities were quite similar to the established tactics, techniques, and procedures required in wartime. There were obvious exceptions—camouflage was replaced by a conscious effort to achieve visibility. But it is not too difficult to recover from that practice.

I could not help marveling at the ability of these units and their soldiers and leaders to adapt effectively to the vagaries of rapidly changing policies. That they were able to do so speaks volumes about the effectiveness of the training and leadership they have been receiving. That they have reacted effectively as a mostly married force says a great deal for the strength of their families and their willingness to make sacrifices. The nation owes a debt of gratitude to them all, and to those who are following in their footsteps, it owes more than gratitude. It owes them time and resources. Since it cannot give them time, it must give them resources.

Finally, on a philosophical note, many of the criteria laid down in the so-called “Weinberger Doctrine” of 1984 are evident in this operation. And even though his criteria were never intended to be enshrined as doctrine, they were at least to be viewed as informal policy—a kind of guide for determining when to go to war. Whether the Bosnian intervention was in our “vital national interest” or not depends upon how we look at war in the Balkans—and most of us fear it. Once before, in events leading to the Great War, it leapt the boundaries of that international backwater. When we put our troops in Bosnia, we did so with military and political objectives that were as clear as the situation allowed. Further, we knew full well how to accomplish our initial military objectives and—taking a page from General

Colin Powell's philosophy—we went in with enough force to remove doubt of our intentions or abilities. Then, as we reevaluated the situation, we reduced forces according to the reduced need.

Whether the American people will continue to support this involvement remains to be seen. As long as casualties are restricted to accidents, their tolerance will probably continue despite the relatively high expense. Such tolerance may not be all good, for it may signal their lack of interest as well. It may also reflect the absence of CNN coverage of a spectacularly bloody nature. In short, American public support is likely to remain problematic. Nobody can question that muscular peacemaking in this region was undertaken only when all other options had been exhausted, short of allowing genocide. The "Last Resort" criterion of the Weinberger Doctrine was fully satisfied.

When the final chapter of this operation is written, I trust that the personal accounts of those involved, such as these here recorded, will be acknowledged with appropriate pride and gratitude.

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