Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective
Authored by Dr. Roger B. Myerson.
Other Studies by Keyword
A great power’s use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better rewarded. A reputation for resolve makes threats credible, but a great power also needs a reputation for restraint, to make the promises credible as well. Thus, international restraints on a nation’s use of military force may actually increase the effective influence of its military strength.
You may also be interested in the following titles:
View other pubs in the following categories:
Download it Now!
- Download Format: PDF
- PDF File Size: 0.25MB
- Study is: Available via Download Only
- View Cart
- All hardcopies are free of charge, shipping inclusive.
- For out of stock or digital only publications, refer to the new GPO on-demand site. For a small fee, recieve many prior publications. Click here to visit.
- All materials on our website are available as a free download.