

Clausewitz's Contempt for Intelligence

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Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. . . . In short, most intelligence is false.¹

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

The latest intellectual revival of classical military thought (a trademark of the US military in the post-Vietnam era) has brought a proverbial breath of fresh air to our military literature. No doubt the establishment as a whole is benefiting substantially from this vigorous infusion of timeless thinking. The trend has raised the intellectual horizons of our profession and will continue to set the pace for military theorizing and doctrinal development through the next century.

During this current renaissance it is not at all unusual to find the military theories of notable writers copiously referenced: Machiavelli, Jomini, Du Picq, Mahan, Douhet, Fuller, and Liddell Hart routinely grace the pages of professional military journals. But of the many classical writers recently repopularized, the oft-quoted Carl von Clausewitz comes to mind as the most widely read and most influential. The revived popularity of his great treatise, *On War*, has generated healthy debates within the US military over the utility of such Clausewitzian concepts as “centers of gravity,” “culminating points,” and “fog and friction.”

One highly relevant—and controversial—Clausewitzian theme concerns the subject of intelligence. A reading of his views leaves the unequivocal impression that Clausewitz did not regard intelligence highly. His apparent attitude is best summarized by the statement that introduced this article: “Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. . . . In short, most intelligence is false.” Such a deliberate and dogmatic statement by a revered authority, particularly a statement so

at odds with the instincts of serving soldiers, simply demands investigation. This article will thus attempt to answer the question: Why does Clausewitz seem to regard intelligence with such contempt?

Clausewitz on Intelligence: A Different Focus

Research into Clausewitz's notions on intelligence is certainly not a new endeavor and has been treated with some frequency in the past.² So why another article on this subject? A significant shortcoming with previous such investigations is a general lack of balance. Some writers are prone to validate Clausewitz by overstating "historical intelligence failures" and then subscribing to the notion that "the causes of these intelligence failures are the same as Clausewitz's reasons for distrusting intelligence."³

If scores were kept to measure success, however, then the trite historical examples of strategic intelligence failures that are always trotted out—Pearl Harbor, the Ardennes, the Yalu, Yom Kippur, etc.—would obviously be overshadowed by all the recorded successes of intelligence. The true test of Clausewitzian logic should be the ability of intelligence systems and organizations to produce worthwhile intelligence effectively over extended periods in support of day-to-day missions at all levels, in peace and war.

Another criticism of past examinations of Clausewitz vis-à-vis intelligence is the tendency of writers to allow themselves to be led down the metaphorical path of Clausewitzian fog-shrouded battlefields which defy attempts at penetration owing to insurmountable uncertainty. Thus writers correctly acknowledge that the pervasive Clausewitzian theme of the ascendancy of the moral domain had the most influence in Clausewitz's distrust of intelligence. These moral influences are the role of chance; the imponderables of fog and friction and their effects on the reliability of information; the limitation inherent in observation; the inability to penetrate the mind of the adversary; the dominance of preconception over fact; and the limitations of intelligence analysis.⁴ Writers conclude by agreeing with Clausewitz because "in the larger picture . . . [Clausewitz's] views prevail. Intelligence can indeed magnify strength and improve command, but leaders do not always have it."⁵

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Clausewitz's observations are realistic if we accept without question that intelligence is not always available and that uncertainties are always present in any intelligence system or activity. The existence of limitations, however, does not invalidate the conceptual need and usefulness of intelligence. It is from this standpoint that Clausewitz may be criticized for displaying a shallow and one-sided view.

There is the final consideration that Clausewitz was after all a child of his times. His ideas were shaped by dramatic historical events that touched him personally and professionally. For Clausewitz, the transition in warfare created by the Napoleonic Wars served as the crucible in which the foundation of his concepts on military theory developed. The Napoleonic Wars have much to tell us about war, but not all.

The Sophistication of Napoleonic Intelligence

An extensive part of Clausewitz's writings in *On War* was based on personal observation and "an examination of the five wars in which he had served."⁶ It is quite likely that his perceptions of the value of intelligence also evolved from actual combat experience. Unfortunately, his first exposure to Napoleonic battle, while serving as adjutant of a Prussian infantry battalion, resulted in the greatest defeat of the Prussian army at the hands of Napoleon. The battle of Auerstadt in 1806, and the subsequent pursuit and rout of Prussian forces by Napoleon's army, left a deeply etched impression on the young Clausewitz, particularly since the debacle resulted in his humiliating capture and imprisonment by the French. Contributing to the defeat was the failure of Prussian intelligence to quickly assess the situation which developed as Napoleon maneuvered seven corps against the defenders. Notwithstanding that Prussian cavalry units were assigned the mission of reconnoitering a still-undeveloped situation, the order for their departure was transmitted late. "There was no way of knowing what was happening; reports from the front were muddled and contradictory."⁷ These intelligence failures, coupled with such other adverse factors as indecision and problems of command within the Prussian organization, were branded indelibly on the mind and memory of the future theorist.

The sad state of Prussian readiness, however, was only one side of the problem. An important factor which served to reinforce the notions of chance and uncertainty in the mind of Clausewitz was the nature of the enemy opposing him: the great Napoleon Bonaparte. Of the many accolades bestowed on Napoleon, one has particular relevance for us here: his mastery of deception and operations security:⁸

Napoleon's strategic deployments were carefully planned to set the stage for the great and decisive battle. Even before hostilities had begun, the Emperor's intentions were carefully shrouded from the enemy. Newspapers were censored,

borders closed, travelers detained. Then, when the Grand Army moved, its advance was preceded by swarms of light cavalry, screening its line of advance, protecting its communications, and gathering intelligence about the location of the enemy.⁹

At the same time, according to David Chandler, "Elaborate deception schemes and secondary offensives would be devised and implemented to confuse the foe and place him off balance. All those common characteristics of twentieth-century military security were employed by Napoleon at the beginning of the nineteenth."¹⁰

Efforts by the opposing side to penetrate the fog of war proved inadequate. The deception plans and the priority given to operations security by Napoleon quite simply overwhelmed the existing and limited intelligence resources of his opponents:

In the interests of security and deception, Napoleon was in the habit of continually altering the composition of his major formations . . . adding a division here, taking away a brigade there. . . . Even if . . . intelligence [of Napoleon's dispositions] was eventually discovered and digested by the enemy it was soon completely out of date. . . . Thus at no time could the foe rely on "accurate" information concerning the strength of their opponents or the placing of their units.¹¹

The last line of this quotation is important because it characterizes in Clausewitz's eyes the plight of Napoleon's foes who attempted to gather information on his movements, strength, and intentions. For one facing an opponent of the caliber of Napoleon, the rudimentary level of information-gathering in practice could not effectively lower the veil of brilliantly designed deception plans inherent in Napoleon's operations. Not only were Napoleon's counterintelligence means effective, but his intelligence service has often been regarded one of the most efficient of the era, with the Emperor devoting considerable attention to the acquisition of intelligence:

Indeed, if we accept Clausewitz's definition of "intelligence"—"every sort of information about the enemy and his country" that serves as the basis "of our own plans and operations"—then it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Napoleon was well served by his ambassadors, his roving general aides, his chief of intelligence and the infamous Black Cabinet. In asserting that "most intelligence is false," Clausewitz reveals only that he was ignorant of this dimension of Napoleon's generalship.¹²

Napoleon's relative sophistication in intelligence matters is particularly impressive since formal intelligence organizations did not exist during his era.¹³ The general staff of the Prussian army, well known to

Clausewitz, was exceptionally small—limited to approximately two dozen officers.¹⁴ With staff officers at a premium, the formal identification of intelligence officers was nonexistent.¹⁵ In most cases it was the supreme commander who acted as the overall intelligence analyst for the field army, choosing and discarding information as he saw fit. This rudimentary method was not limited to the Prussians, but appears also to have been a characteristic of most Napoleonic-era armies.

Owing to regular changes in Napoleon's headquarters organization, many variations of the basic organization evolved. It is generally accepted, however, that from 1805 on, Imperial Headquarters was composed of three parts: the Emperor's Personal Quarters ("Maison"), a General Staff, and an Administrative Headquarters.¹⁶ Of relevance to our discussion is the location of those sections tasked with information-gathering. This function was directed by two staff sections: the Statistical Bureau, forming part of the "Maison," and the General Staff. An intelligence function of the Statistical Bureau was to obtain information at the strategic level for use by tactical units. Its missions were wide-ranging, involving the collection and translation of newspapers and the placement of agents in all important cities to obtain information of political and military character.¹⁷

Information of a tactical nature was handled by the General Staff. Observation reports from the corps' cavalry patrols and interrogation reports obtained from enemy deserters and prisoners of war were passed to Napoleon through this section. Additionally, Napoleon supplemented information from the General Staff by incorporating special staff officers for missions he specifically assigned.¹⁸ When compared with that of his adversaries, the Emperor's intelligence arm provided an appreciably more systematic and effective approach to exploiting the existing information resources, thus dispelling some of the fog of war.

The Weaknesses of Napoleonic Intelligence

Napoleon's intelligence system should not be overrated. By modern standards, Napoleon's organization had serious flaws. Although highly advanced for the period, it is evident that the French intelligence organization suffered from inadequate coordination and lack of a centralized analytical facility.¹⁹ The various sections operated independently so that collection was not coordinated among them. And as to a central analytical center receiving the raw data, Napoleon chose to fulfill this role himself, thereby preventing a methodical effort fully dedicated to collecting, evaluating, interpreting, and transforming raw information into intelligence. This mode of operation ensured more timely decisions by Napoleon by eliminating intermediate staff layers, but it also increased the odds for making a poor decision based on incomplete assessments of the enemy situation.²⁰

Of note, Napoleon's British rival at Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington, used a similar system during his earlier years, and, like Napoleon, was his own intelligence officer:

All intelligence came to Wellington and . . . the appraisal of it was his and his alone. . . . It is not surprising that all reports of enemy movements, no matter what source they came from, whether from the outposts, the divisional or allied commanders, or officers on detached service and the rest, were brought to him as well. Nor do these reports appear to have been summarized, abstracted, or collected before they reached him, but were taken before him as they stood. What collating was done was almost certainly done by himself.²¹

By the latter stages of the war, however, Wellington was allowing his intelligence department, the Quartermaster General, the latitude of handling most of his intelligence functions.²²

The strengths and weaknesses within the respective quasi-intelligence organizations of the Napoleonic era are relevant to the study of Clausewitz and intelligence. A thorough exploitation of enemy information was largely precluded owing to the lack of a coordinated intelligence effort and the preference of the individual commanders to act as arbiters of truth. Consequently, Clausewitz's evaluation of intelligence may be interpreted as criticism of what he perceived to be the existing and dismal state of organizational and technical incapability to penetrate the fog of war, rather than a denial of the usefulness or general need for intelligence.

Clausewitz's primary perceptual disadvantage, however, was that he fought on the wrong side of the war. Clausewitz may simply not have been aware of the qualitative edge that intelligence gave Napoleon.²³ If he had been, Clausewitz's notions of intelligence would doubtless have developed differently, perhaps along the lines of his contemporary, Jomini.

Jomini on Intelligence

The Swiss military writer Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) firmly believed in the merits of intelligence. He served under Napoleon and thus "had a better appreciation for Napoleon's use of intelligence. He would argue that the role of intelligence 'is one of the chief causes of the great difference between theory and the practice of war.'"²⁴

As he did with most of his treatment of the subject of war, Jomini attempted to reduce intelligence to a science which was prescriptive in its form and technique. In contrast to Clausewitz, Jomini attempted to abstract war from its political and social context by describing it in terms of rules and principles. To his credit, his writings have endured and are still studied and discussed today.²⁵

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Jomini's treatment of intelligence in his classic work, *The Art of War*, was limited to one subsection under the chapter heading of "Logistics." Unlike Clausewitz, whose cursory three-paragraph coverage of intelligence devolves to a negative handwringing account of why intelligence doesn't work, Jomini's discussion of intelligence presents a more positive outlook, accurately assessing the important role of intelligence and sketching in the intelligence sources available to the commander.

Jomini recognized the shortfalls as well as the advantages of intelligence. Like Clausewitz, he understood that uncertainty was always present on the battlefield ("uncertainty results . . . from ignorance of the enemy's position and plans").²⁶ However, Jomini was sufficiently astute to realize that despite difficulties and the almost impossible task of eliminating fog, intelligence has to be aggressively gathered so as to increase the commander's success on the battlefield by helping eliminate some of this uncertainty:

One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's proceedings. In fact, how can a man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about? As it is unquestionably of the highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility.²⁷

As with Clausewitz, Jomini accepts that not all reports are reliable. For this reason he stresses the need to use multidimensional information systems, in a sense making him a progenitor of modern all-source intelligence:

A general should neglect no means of gaining information of the enemy's movements, and, for this purpose, should make use of reconnaissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capable officers, signals, and questioning deserters and prisoners. . . . Perfect reliance should be placed on none of these means.²⁸

Jomini also notes that intelligence collection alone does not hold the key to success. Good intelligence analysis must then occur so that the information can be used to form "hypotheses of probabilities." These are

something akin to modern predictive intelligence or Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield:

As it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods mentioned, a general should never move without arranging several courses of action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relative situation of the armies enables him to make, and never losing sight of the principles of the art.²⁹

Jomini understood that Napoleon's revolution in warfare (the organization of the Army into self-contained, mission-oriented, corps-size units and a command and control system to orchestrate it)³⁰ created new problems which complicated the ways in which the old intelligence systems worked:

When armies camped in tents and in a single mass, information of the enemy's operations was certain because reconnoitering parties could be thrown forward in sight of the camps, and the spies could report accurately their movements; but with the existing organization into corps d'armee which either canton or bivouac, it is very difficult to learn anything about them.³¹

Rather than turning his back on the complications created by these changes (as Clausewitz may be accused of doing), Jomini chose to confront the problem by emphasizing the need to develop a workable intelligence apparatus to better serve the commander, thereby elevating the overall importance of intelligence.

Clausewitzian Intelligence or Information?

To move now from the historical context of our discussion, a controversial question develops over the issue of "intelligence" versus "information." Was Clausewitz's criticism in fact aimed at the poor quality of combat information as opposed to combat intelligence? To the casual observer this point may appear to be hair-splitting, but members of the intelligence community today are quick to recognize that this distinction is indeed important.

Information is unevaluated material of every description including that derived from observations, communications, reports, rumors, imagery, and other sources from which intelligence is produced. Information itself may be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, confirmed or unconfirmed, pertinent or impertinent, positive or negative. "Intelligence" is the product resulting from the collection,³ evaluation, and interpretation of information.³²

The stroke of a translator's pen not in tune with these nuances could be at the heart of some of the controversy regarding Clausewitzian notions of intelligence. For example, in the problematic chapter where Clausewitz addresses intelligence (Chapter Six, Book One, titled "*Nachrichten Im Kriege*" in the German

text), the term *Nachrichten* is a focal point of debate because it may be translated variously as “intelligence,” “information,” “reports,” or even “news.” Similarly, the word *Kenntnis* may be translated as either “information” or “knowledge.”³³

In the excellent and most recent (1984) edition of *On War*, the distinguished military historians Michael Howard and Peter Paret translated the German opening line from Chapter Six, Book One, in a manner that has come to be widely accepted by most US military readers: “By intelligence” [i.e. *Nachrichten*] we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country.”³⁴

Should this construction be considered the final word? An editors’ note in the 1984 edition states:

We have attempted to present Clausewitz’s ideas as accurately as possible, while remaining as close to his style and vocabulary as modern English usage would permit. *But we have not hesitated to translate the same term in different ways if the context seemed to demand it.*³⁵ (Emphasis added.)

Howard and Paret chose to interpret *Nachrichten* as “intelligence.” The two previous English translations of *On War*, however, construed it simply as “information.” More specifically, in both the 1909 and 1943 editions the opening line previously referenced reads: “By the word ‘information’ we denote all the knowledge which we have of the enemy and his country.”³⁶

According to Dr. Paret, during Clausewitz’s times the modern distinction between intelligence and information did not exist. The decision to translate *Nachrichten* as “intelligence” was based on the determination that “it is most appropriate because it is the closest modern equivalent to what Clausewitz was referring to: information on the enemy and his country.” In Dr. Paret’s opinion, the previous translations were too literal, failing to capture the essence of Clausewitzian thought.³⁷

Howard and Paret’s decision becomes especially critical for modern readers of Clausewitz when they attempt to come to terms with his unflattering appraisal of intelligence as quoted in the epigraph of this article. To recall, the 1984 edition translation is as follows:

Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. . . . In short, most intelligence is false.³⁸

The 1909 and 1943 versions of this same line read:

A great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part somewhat doubtful. . . . In a few words, most reports are false.³⁹

These translations convey significantly different meanings. Unfortunately, the 1984 edition (currently the most widely read) suggests that

Clausewitz was critical of intelligence per se rather than of the confusing flow of information and reports from which intelligence must be distilled. To reiterate, it is essential to recognize that today intelligence professionals clearly distinguish between the two. The decision to regard intelligence as simply information on the enemy might be a purely academic argument, but in light of today's tendency to quote Clausewitz as an authority on modern military matters, the issue transcends academic boundaries. To accept the 1984 edition's translation of *Nachrichten* as "intelligence" is to imply that Napoleonic armies were knowingly producing the equivalent of what we today call intelligence. Such was just not the case.

Put in its proper historical context, then, Clausewitz's disparagement in *On War* of what Howard and Paret label as "intelligence" was actually directed at the raw flux of undigested "information" emanating from the theater of war. It can even be argued that because of the primitive approach to gathering and processing data in the Napoleonic era, Clausewitz never witnessed the production of true intelligence. With operational as well as intelligence problems to solve, it is no wonder that battlefield commanders serving as their own intelligence officers were habituated to false, incomplete, or misleading data on the enemy. From Clausewitz's perspective, contradiction, chance, and uncertainty were the hallmarks of battlefield information, and he was correct in taking a dim view of the prevailing state of affairs.

Concluding Thoughts

On War continues to be read, interpreted, and debated among the present generation of military professionals, just as it was debated by past generations. To reap maximum benefits from this great work, it is advisable to maintain an open mind and curb the tendency to make hasty judgments about those bold positions of Clausewitz that jar the modern sensibility. His treatment of intelligence is a perfect case in point.

Intelligence today is far from being a perfect science. Imperfect or not, however, it continues to fulfill a necessary function which encompasses provision of strategic indications and warning down through tactical support of the combat arms. The intelligence community strives to "minimize uncertainty" concerning the enemy through the scientific processing and weighing of multiple sources of data.⁴⁰ "Minimizing uncertainty" is a respectable and practical standard to pursue—one fully recognizing that the Clausewitzian concepts of chance, friction, and the fog of war are still very much a part of modern conflict.

Of course, intelligence failures will never be eliminated. But for every intelligence failure there are scores of important counterintelligence and intelligence-based operational successes. The failures neither invalidate

the conceptual usefulness of intelligence nor validate Clausewitz's skepticism concerning reportage on the enemy.

Observers point out the great strides that technology has made in the intelligence field, implying that technology alone is what readily distinguishes past from present intelligence.⁴¹ In reality, the important advancements have been more fundamental. The establishment of intelligence as a formal discipline and the creation of intelligence staffs at major combat unit levels—staffs exclusively dedicated to the collection, collation, and analysis of information—are the two most revolutionary advances in the entire intelligence endeavor. Deficiencies in these areas were the crippling weaknesses of intelligence efforts during the Napoleonic era.

Like the nations and armies that fell before Napoleon's revolutionary warfighting methods, the quasi-intelligence organizations of his era failed to keep pace with the changing nature of war. Master deception and counterintelligence executed by ensuing great captains strained an antiquated and outmoded organization already incapable of consistently and systematically producing reliable intelligence.

In writing from his personal observations, Clausewitz attempted to capture the state of the art of intelligence. But, as we have seen, warfare was in transition. Advances were required in several functional areas, to include intelligence. Systems and methods had yet to catch up with operational advances on the battlefield. A glaring mismatch between ends, ways, and means came to develop. Clausewitz recognized the intelligence shortfalls and reported what he saw. To a point, he was correct. Advances in intelligence would later be made, but not during his lifetime.

If Clausewitz can be faulted, the reason may be simply that his statements on intelligence violated his own injunctions with regard to the best approach to a theory of war. He had desired to create a non-prescriptive way of thinking. By alleging flatly that "most intelligence is false," he lapsed into the very dogmatism he elsewhere abjured. Certainly he demonstrated a lack of vision in failing to foresee that the wildly confused and confusing combat information reportage of his time—as frustrating as it was—would one day be largely harnessed by the scientific method. Lacking such foresight in this instance, he could hardly have recognized that the wretched *Nachrichten* about which he complained so sorely would ultimately metamorphose into what we today call "intelligence," a sine qua non for success in war.

NOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 117.

2. David Kahn, "Clausewitz and Intelligence," in *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 117-26.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

4. Ibid., p. 118-20.
5. Ibid., p. 125.
6. Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 61.
7. Roger Parkinson, *Clausewitz: A Biography* (New York: Stein and Day, 1970), p. 310.
8. David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 146.
9. Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1978), p. 147.
10. Chandler, p. 146.
11. Ibid., p. 147.
12. Jay Luvaas, "Napoleon's Use of Intelligence: The Jena Campaign of 1805," *Leaders and Intelligence*, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1989), p. 52.
13. Telephonic interview with Dr. Peter Paret, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J., 5 January 1989.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), p. 65.
17. Ibid., p. 66.
18. Ibid., p. 67.
19. John Elting, *Swords Around a Throne* (New York: The Free Press, 1988), p. 116.
20. Van Creveld, p. 68.
21. S. G. P. Ward, *Wellington's Headquarters: A Study of the Administrative Problems in the Peninsula, 1809-1814* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 119-20.
22. Ibid., p. 120.
23. Luvaas, p. 52.
24. Ibid.
25. John Shy, "Jomini," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret with Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), p. 144.
26. Henri Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977), p. 197.
27. Ibid., p. 269.
28. Ibid., p. 274.
29. Ibid.
30. Van Creveld, p. 97.
31. Jomini, p. 270.
32. Direct quotation from superseded US Army Field Manual 30-5, *Combat Intelligence*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 1973, p. 2-1. A point of interest is that this manual's definition of "information" closely matches Clausewitz's ideas of the uncertain nature of most reports. See also US Army Field Manual 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, July 1987, pp. 2-8, 2-13; US Army Field Manual 34-3, *Intelligence Analysis*, January 1986, p. 1-1; and Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, D.C., 1 June 1987, pp. 184, 188, for definitions of a similar nature.
33. Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, ed. Werner Hahlweg (Bonn: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, 1980), p. 258. "Mit dem Worte Nachrichten bezeichnen wir die ganze Kenntniss, welche man von dem Feinde und seinem Lande hat . . ."
34. Clausewitz (Howard and Paret), p. 117.
35. Ibid., p. xi.
36. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. J. J. Graham (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1909), p. 75; Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. O. J. Matthijs Jolles (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1950; reprinted from 1943 Random House edition), p. 51.
37. Telephonic interview.
38. Clausewitz (Howard and Paret), p. 117. The German original is as follows: "Ein grosser Teil der Nachrichten, die man im Kriege bekommt, ist widersprechend, ein noch grosserer ist falsch und bei weitem der grösste einer ziemlichen Ungewissheit unterworfen. Mit kurzen Worten: die meisten Nachrichten sind falsch" (Hahlweg, pp. 258-59).
39. Clausewitz (Graham), pp. 75-76; and Clausewitz (Jolles), p. 51.
40. FM 30-5, p. 2-1, and FM 34-3, p. 1-1, also refer to the role of the intelligence analyst in reducing uncertainty.
41. Kahn, pp. 123-24.