

THE SPECIAL INTEREST STATE

by

RANDY HUWA

Our democratic system places on elected officials the responsibility to represent their fellow citizens, to govern with real but limited powers, and to fashion specific remedies to correct citizens' major grievances. These elected officials represent many different "publics." But whatever pressures the many constituencies generate, government still has certain requirements. At all levels government must be accountable, government must act rather than remain paralyzed, and government must help shape an overall policy rather than simply respond to economic power or other intense pressure from interests that are accustomed to getting their way.

The role of our political institutions should be to mediate competing ideologies, weigh conflicting demands, work out compromises, and shape policy on the basis of broad agreements that, while satisfying no group entirely, at least recognize and take into account the concerns of all. Unfortunately, this is not an accurate description of the way the federal government often works these days. Instead of mediating conflict, Congress all too frequently seems only to be responding to the loudest voice or to the highest bidder. Solutions are fragmented and piecemeal, not coordinated and comprehensive. Government policy all too often is simply the mindless aggregation of the solutions to a myriad of small and incremental issues, rather than a comprehensive, thoughtful approach to a problem.¹

This type of policymaking is due in no small part to the existence of what can be termed the "Special Interest State." The Special Interest State is a system in which

interest groups dominate the making of government policy in their own specific areas of concern. To a great extent, for example, dairy policy is written by the dairy industry, and trucking regulation has largely served the interests of the truckers and the Teamsters, not the public interest. These groups understandably concentrate on pursuing their own concerns, but in doing so they pay little attention to the effect of their demands on the nation as a whole. Looking at the broad picture is the responsibility of policymakers, but they are capitulating more and more to the pressures and political clout of narrow interest groups. The result has been a fragmented, short-sighted set of policies that serve the immediate interests of those with the most access to and greatest influence over government decision-makers.²

The special interests that seek benefits from the government are not inherently sinister forces. They spring from all of us. There are groups representing a variety of economic, occupational, and regional interests. There are public interest groups as well as business, professional, and labor groups. But the intensity of the competing and conflicting demands of interest groups, both public and private, has led to government by interest group, a system that ignores the overall national interest.

The solution to this problem does not lie with the special interest groups—they are seeking their own goals, striving to protect their own interests, and generally unable or unwilling to place national interests ahead of parochial concerns. Rather, the solution lies with those elements of government in a position to consider and moderate such demands.

At present, unfortunately, our government institutions seem unable to withstand the onslaught. In dealing with the narrow concerns of powerful interest groups, they take action all too readily; in dealing with broad issues of national concern, they are paralyzed by competing pressures. In the Special Interest State, public policy is too often based on who has money and access to public officials, not on whether the policy is in the public interest.

To understand the present paralysis in decision-making, we would do well to examine two recent and interrelated trends that have led to the stranglehold of the Special Interest State—the way our political campaigns are funded and the way lobbies work in Washington. These forces can be seen in action in a number of areas of activity within the Special Interest State—to include the shaping of the nation's defense policies.

During the last decade we have seen a dramatic increase in the price of obtaining political office in this country, particularly for seats in the US Congress. In 1977-78 races, for instance, congressional campaign spending totaled almost \$200 million.³ In 1980 campaigns, total expenditures jumped to \$300 million.⁴ Senator John Tower spent more than \$4 million in his 1978 race in Texas; Jesse Helms raised more than \$7 million for his 1978 Senate race. In 1980, 31 Senate candidates raised more than \$1 million; 11 raised more than \$2 million. And the escalation in campaign costs continues: 29 incumbent Senators who had formally announced their candidacies for reelection in 1982 had raised an average of nearly \$580,000 each by the end of 1981. In fact, 12 of the 29 had already exceeded the sums that they raised during the entire 1976 campaign.⁵

Outspending an opponent does not guarantee electoral success, but access to money is an important campaign consideration. In contests for open House seats in 1980, for example, the winner outspent the loser in four out of five cases.

In this campaign expenditure "arms race," the ability of some candidates to raise adequate funds is strained. As a result,

elective office is becoming a realistic ambition only for the very rich or for those who are willing to enter office beholden to those interests with the money to finance a competitive campaign.

In the last six years we have seen an extraordinary growth in both of these sources of campaign funds, particularly the latter in the form of congressional dependence on large political action committee (PAC) contributions.⁶ While federal law prohibits direct contributions from corporations and labor unions to federal candidates, a corporation or union may sponsor a political action committee to collect funds from employees, stockholders, or union members for distribution to congressional candidates. Since 1974, the number of PACs has increased from 608 to almost 3000. The most significant increase has been in the number of corporate PACs, which has risen from 89 in 1974 to more than 1300. Despite the skyrocketing number of PACs, many observers agree that the PAC explosion is still in its early stages.

The sharp growth in the number of political action committees has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the amount of PAC money going into congressional elections. In 1974 PAC contributions totaled \$12.5 million. In 1980 PAC contributions exceeded \$55 million. And in the 1981-82 election cycle, PAC contributions to congressional candidates will probably total \$80 million.

PAC contributions are generally given by groups that are also regularly engaged in organized lobbying efforts. In other words, they are contributions with a legislative

Randy Huwa is a registered lobbyist for Common Cause, specializing in campaign finance reform and environmental legislation. He is a graduate of Colorado College and holds a master's degree in political science from Rutgers University. Mr. Huwa joined the Common Cause national staff in 1978 as a Research Associate and was later named Associate Director of Issue Development. Before joining the national staff, he was the Executive Director of Common Cause/New Jersey.



purpose. Explicit quid pro quos are rarely involved, but the process, nevertheless, is designed to provide access and influence. Consider the following observations:

- Former Congressman Charles Vanik has said, "Every campaign contribution carries some sort of lien which is an encumbrance on the legislative process."⁷

- The Harvard Campaign Finance Study Group concluded:

PAC money is *interested* money. While those who run political action committees may not be successful in accomplishing their legislative design, it is clear that they do have specific agendas for public laws.⁸

- Steve Roberts, Washington correspondent for *The New York Times*, has written:

Many congressmen say that taking a contribution creates a feeling of obligation and sympathy, a debt that must eventually be paid. In one sense, power in Washington can be equated with access—the quicker your phone call gets returned, the more influence you have. And when a lobbyist calls a lawmaker who has taken his money, the return time is reduced considerably.⁹

- A Washington lobbyist confided:

Congressmen are always having \$50 or \$100 a plate fund-raising dinners or receptions, and I'll contribute to some of these, if they're given by people on the committees I work with. It's not much . . . but you would be surprised at how closely members pay attention to even the smallest contributions. I see them as basically insurance—insuring that I'll get beyond the receptionist when I need to see these guys.¹⁰

- Oklahoma Congressman Mike Synar has asked,

If the phone is ringing in my office and I have four lines, and my staff tells me there is a PAC on there that gave us \$10,000 in the

last election and [the other is] just an individual constituent, which phone do you think I'm going to punch in?¹¹

- Representative Hensen Moore has stated,

If [a congressman] knows you aren't politically active, he may be polite to you, but if you really want to see him perk up and be interested in what you say, let him know you represent a political action committee that is going to be active in the next election.¹²

- And Justin Dart, chairman of Dart Industries, was most forthcoming when he said that dialogue with politicians "is a fine thing, but with a little money they hear you better."¹³

To be sure, special interest groups do not always win. Campaign contributions do not necessarily assure votes or support. But these PAC dollars do provide access that is not available to every citizen or group. Special interest lobbyists are able to use PAC dollars to gain the ear of an elected official (or that of a staff member). And, time and again, in votes in congressional committees and on the floors of both houses, we have seen links between campaign contributions and voting behavior. Special interests exercise enormous and growing power in Congress, power that is often used to paralyze the policymaking process. Congressional decisions are made in an atmosphere permeated by PAC contributions, an atmosphere of allegiances from past contributions and the promise of future rewards.

Political action committees have played a large part in the increasing fragmentation of the American political system;¹⁴ they have further weakened already weak political parties. PAC contributions represent an important source of public distrust in the political system and are, in the words of Representative Millicent Fenwick, "the single greatest evil that still exists in our whole election process."¹⁵ And political action committees are a key factor in the recent and

rapid growth of the Special Interest State. Former Congressman Vanik has warned, "The public interest is just being bypassed by the . . . system of contributions which is a purchase of policy."¹⁶ And Representative Synar has expressed concern that

the recent proliferation of special interest group Political Action Committees, coupled with the increasing reliance of candidates for Congress on PAC contributions to finance their campaigns, has placed the national interest in jeopardy. I fear the greater national interest may be replaced by a conglomerate of special interests.¹⁷

The Washington landscape has also been transformed—literally—by the arrival of swarms of lobbyists. *Time* magazine estimates that the number of lobbyists in Washington has soared from 8000 to 15,000 in the last five years and adds, "New office buildings springing up west of the White House along Pennsylvania Avenue fill up with lobbyists as soon as the painters walk out." Ford Motor Company, which kept three representatives in Washington in the early 1960s, now maintains a full-time Washington staff of 40. The number of corporations with Washington representatives has increased 500 percent in the last decade. As House Speaker O'Neill has commented, "Everybody in America has a lobby."¹⁸

Contemporary lobbying strategy is not limited to visits by Washington lobbyists to elected officials. An important component of most sophisticated lobbying campaigns today is an indirect approach to a senator or congressman through his or her constituents. Through telephone networks, newspaper and television advertising, and direct mail blitzes, lobbying organizations are able to inform members of the general public about a pending congressional decision and are often successful in motivating those constituents to write or call their elected representatives. This type of grass-roots lobbying to orchestrate public opinion and public response accounts, it is estimated, for half of the lobbying expenditures in Washington—at least \$1 billion

a year.¹⁹ As US Chamber of Commerce President Richard Lesher has pointed out, "Lobbying that counts is done through the grass-roots process."²⁰

The chief reason for the growth in the number of Washington lobbyists and in grass-roots lobbying is the expansion of federal rules and regulations into virtually every corner of American life. The federal government now has statutes, programs, and implementing regulations that set tax rates on whiskey, establish construction standards for nuclear plants, guarantee milk content in ice cream, give tax credits for photovoltaic cells, and provide reimbursement for beekeepers who suffer losses of honey bees as a result of pesticides used on nearby property. A single change in a federal regulation—a slight modification of a federal statute—may make or break a fledgling industry; it may make a million-dollar difference in taxes. The lobbyist who gets that clause on the books can be worth his salary for a hundred lifetimes.²¹

The greatest problem with lobbyists in Washington is not that they are bribing legislators or delivering satchels bulging with cash. The problem is, rather, that lobbyists present a biased view of an issue—not necessarily an inaccurate one, but perhaps only one side of the story. The lobbyists most frequently heard from are those representing the groups that bear the costs of a particular program; those who are too frequently silent are those who receive the benefits. In the current term Congress is reviewing the federal Clean Air Act, a most important program for the protection of public health and the nation's environment. Yet Senator Robert Stafford, chairman of the committee reviewing the act, has said:

The lobbyists we have heard from most often are those representing business and industry [groups that gave more than \$1 million in PAC contributions to members of the two committees reviewing the Clean Air Act²²]. Those lobbyists representing the other side—the sick, the elderly, the young, the poor or, in short, the public in general—are not making their presence known.²³

Public knowledge of the way Congress works is often gleaned from media coverage of fights on major issues on Capitol Hill—those, for example, over the B-1 bomber and over the Clean Air Act. These are important issues on which both sides have been well represented. But while they have been instructive in their own right, they have not been reflective of the more common way that issues are aired in Washington. The balance of competing forces—the notion of countervailing groups—is becoming far less common. The major battles in Congress do not always pit labor against business; while labor and business may fight long and hard on issues such as labor law reform, they also can work hand-in-hand in pursuit of a single objective. The fight in the last Congress over the deregulation of the trucking industry, for example, did not pit the Teamsters against the truckers; the two were united in their opposition to the legislation. Similar alliances can be seen in such general areas as environmental and economic regulation and on more narrow issues such as cargo preference legislation or the Chrysler bailout bill. Frequently there are no countervailing forces on issues in Washington; often there are significant convergences of interests.

Further, the bulk of congressional business is not covered by the press. The issues on which many lobbyists spend most of their time are not front-page news stories; instead, they are items that are of particular concern only to a small group of individuals or firms. In 1975, for example, the Biscuit and Cracker Manufacturers Association hired a lobbyist to work to eliminate the five-cent-per-pound tariff on fig paste imported from Turkey, Spain, and Portugal—hardly a matter of national concern, but an issue of great importance to the manufacturers of Fig Newtons.²⁴

Though such examples seem innocuous, they point to the danger of the present explosion of lobbying efforts. A member of the House or Senate is frequently faced with the following problem: a seemingly inconsequential change in federal regulations, the tax code, or a federal subsidy is before his

committee. Although the proposed alteration may be relatively insignificant—a difference of only a few million dollars in a federal budget measured in the hundreds of billions—it is a change that is of very great importance to some industry or association. The lobbyists from that association have contacted the Member—in fact, the information that they provide may be the only information the Member has—and a PAC contribution may have been made. The path of least resistance for the Member—the path too frequently taken—is to vote with the special interest group.

The problem with this system is that the aggregation of these special interest demands does *not* represent the public good. The accumulated effect of hundreds of these incremental changes may cost the American taxpayer billions, has undoubtedly contributed to inflation, and in no way approximates the public interest.

Lobbying groups increasingly are pursuing narrow legislative goals that are placed above all other matters of congressional consideration. Many of us viewed with a mixture of alarm and amusement the efforts in the last campaign by the so-called “Moral Majority” to identify the votes in Congress that were indicative of a “moral” elected official. But this is not an isolated example. Increasingly, groups are identifying their own particular concerns and focusing exclusively on a legislator’s position on one issue. During Majority Leader Baker’s 1978 reelection campaign, he was challenged by an independent party candidate whose only real campaign issue was Baker’s vote on the Panama Canal Treaty. How unfair, Baker complained, to reduce a legislative career that had involved 6000 votes to consideration of only a single issue. Baker’s challenger responded by referring to Pontius Pilate: he too probably cast thousands of votes, but he is remembered for just one.²⁵

Unfortunately, too many groups now want us to view candidates as history views Pilate. Let’s set aside all consideration of the issues of war and peace, health and welfare, foreign and domestic policy, or leadership;

tell us instead how the candidate feels about abortion, or gun control, or the B-1 bomber, or the Equal Rights Amendment.

Columnist Meg Greenfield has written:

I can't remember a time in Washington when interest-group issues and politics so dominated events. And every day the units of protest and concern seem to be subdividing into even smaller and more specialized groupings . . . It puts a premium on identifying yourself with the special subgroup and helps to thin, if not destroy, whatever feelings of larger national loyalty various citizens may have.²⁶

The aggregation of these single interest issues does *not* necessarily present an appropriate gauge of the public interest; it instead is simply a bizarre collection of the pet concerns of innumerable narrow groups.

The federal government's defense program now consumes approximately one quarter of the total federal budget. And the nation's defense programs are not immune to the pitfalls of the Special Interest State.

Like other industries with a stake in federal policy, most defense-related firms have political action committees. These PACs are among the largest of all corporate PAC contributors, with contributions particularly keyed to members of the appropriations and armed services committees and subcommittees. In 1980, the General Dynamics political action committee gave \$353,660 to candidates; the Grumman PAC, \$306,370; and the Vought PAC (LTV Corporation), \$130,758.²⁷ A 1981 Common Cause study found that aerospace and defense firms had contributed more than \$2 million to the most powerful members of the Senate and House—the committee chairmen and party leaders.²⁸ And, as is the case with other PAC contributions, these defense-related PAC gifts have an effect and guarantee special influence. Representative Pat Schroeder, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, has reported, "I've had people

on my committee ask how many tickets a company bought to a fund-raiser, while we're trying to decide on what planes to buy."²⁹

These defense-related firms also employ lobbyists. In one two-year period in the 1970s, five defense-related industries—Boeing, General Dynamics, Grumman, Lockheed, and Rockwell—spent \$16.8 million for Washington offices.³⁰ A study of the Department of Defense audits of contractors suggests that many millions of dollars are spent by defense contractors on Washington lobbying and that millions have been included as part of the costs of government contracts.³¹ Defense contractors, too, have recognized the potential of constituent pressure and have undertaken efforts to stimulate and shape public opinion. In 1975 and 1976, for example, Rockwell International spent \$1.35 million on a grassroots lobbying campaign on behalf of the B-1 bomber.³²

Like other aspects of federal policy, defense policy is also strongly shaped by the emergence of iron triangles—special long-term relationships and friendships that develop between individuals in the federal bureaucracy (in this case, contract officers or program managers within the Department of Defense), members of key congressional committees or their staffs, and industry officials. In many cases, the same group of people have worked together over the years on the same projects. In some cases, the players are even interchangeable: the so-called revolving door saw almost 2000 people shuttle between the Department of Defense (and NASA) and eight major defense contractors during the last decade.³³ This pattern of long-term working relationships creates a community of shared assumptions about issues and procedures that is largely inimical to critical thinking and careful analysis. As economist Murray Weidenbaum, an advisor to President Reagan, has concluded,

The close, continuing relationship between the Department of Defense and its major suppliers is resulting in convergence between the two, which is blurring and reducing

much of the distinction between public and private activities in an important branch of the American economy.³⁴

The problem with defense policy—as is the case with most other aspects of the federal government—is that the pressures of the Special Interest State encourage incremental decision-making and provide no real incentives for comprehensive analysis. Fund this weapons program, invest in that technology, keep this base open The result? Too often, simply an aggregation of these individual decisions.

At a time when the Administration wants to increase defense spending significantly, the dangers presented by incremental decision-making are particularly important. As a nation we should be debating the goals of our defense policy and the ways to best attain them. Unfortunately, the Special Interest State discourages that kind of consideration, and the important questions may remain unanswered.

Some steps have already been taken to curb the Special Interest State and to encourage government to make critical decisions and evaluate policy comprehensively. The end to the seniority system in Congress, for example, and new restrictions on the revolving door have served to weaken iron triangles. Open-meeting laws, campaign finance disclosure laws, and conflict-of-interest legislation have also helped. Still, much remains to be done.

First, the federal lobby disclosure law needs to be amended or enforced more effectively. At this point, a member of Congress—or a member of the public—has no real way of knowing how much money is spent on lobbying and no sure way of assessing which groups are working for what programs. The goal is not to restrict lobbying, a constitutionally protected right. The goal is, rather, to ensure that all have the opportunity to assess the extent of lobbying activity, both in Washington and through grass-roots campaigns. As the Supreme Court noted 30 years ago, the “full realization of the American ideal of

government by elected representatives depends to no small extent” on the ability of legislators to assess and evaluate lobbying. “Otherwise the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of the special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public weal.”³⁵ In the words of former Senator Abraham Ribicoff, effective lobby disclosure is necessary “so that the voice of the few and the money of the few do not make it impossible to hear the voice of the many.”³⁶

Second, we need to establish processes whereby the federal government, and particularly Congress, is forced to look at existing programs and to assess their effectiveness. We need coherent policies and approaches in federal programs, agencies, regulations, and tax preferences; and any attempt to develop these comprehensive approaches must begin with a critical assessment of what now exists. One approach is through sunset legislation, a proposal that would require periodic termination and review of all types of federal programs, to include an examination of agencies, regulations, and tax preferences. If the programs under review are working, they should be renewed. If they are no longer effective, they should be modified. If they are no longer needed, they should be eliminated. Sunset laws are now in place in 35 states. A federal counterpart is needed.³⁷

Another approach is an idea put forward in this Congress by Representative Richard Bolling and Senator William Roth. They have proposed creating a special blue-ribbon commission, modeled after the Hoover Commission of the 1940s, to undertake a comprehensive review of the federal government—its programs and policies, its organization and operation, its relationships with the states, its unmet goals and unnecessary activities. Such proposals would require a thoughtful analysis of federal efforts, an important component of truly effective government.

Third, we must spend some time exploring ways of revitalizing political parties. At one time, political parties served as

mediators of special interest demands. The conflicting pressures of society were to some extent moderated by the national political parties, each of which tried to temper and balance those requests. The parties no longer serve in this mediating capacity, however, and members of Congress are simply whipsawed by special interest requests. The technological advances of the last two decades have served to replace the parties as the main conveyors of political information; information on issues and candidates now comes from Dan Rather, not from the party block captain.³⁸ But there still is a vital need for the development of a cohesive, practical force that can sift through special interest demands and rise above parochial concerns. Revitalizing the parties is one step that will assist in moderating those demands.

Finally, and most important, the primary change that must be made is reform of the process by which congressional campaigns are funded. Political action committee dollars are the cornerstones of the Special Interest State. By limiting this special interest money, and by providing an alternative, no-strings source of campaign funds, Congress could begin to emerge from the shadow of special interest domination.

The model for reform is already in place. In 1974 Congress established a campaign finance reform statute for presidential elections that limits the role of large contributors and provides an alternative source of funds—the money generated by the income tax check-off. This system, though not without flaws, worked well in 1976 and 1980 and continues to enjoy public support. Congress should act to end the existing two-track system for federal election campaigns and establish a voluntary, part-public financing system for congressional races. It is essential that we complete the cycle of campaign finance reform begun in the 1970s if our government institutions are to be able to move beyond the fragmentation that grips us today and effectively tackle the complex problems of the 1980s.

NOTES

1. David Cohen, "Government Can Perform Better Than We Think," speech prepared for University of Southern California Washington Public Affairs Center commencement exercises, Washington, 3 June 1979.

2. See Common Cause, *The Government Subsidy Squeeze* (Washington: Common Cause, 1980).

3. Unless otherwise noted, figures used in this article are based on Common Cause analyses of campaign finance disclosure statements filed with the Federal Election Commission.

4. Terence Smith, "Financing Campaign '80: Would You Believe Half a Billion?" *The New York Times*, 23 November 1980, p. E-3.

5. Richard E. Cohen, "Incumbent Senators Get Jump on Campaign Receipts," *National Journal*, 13 February 1982, pp. 267, 297-98.

6. For a general discussion of the role of political action committees in American politics, see Fred Wertheimer and Randy Huwa, "Campaign Finance Reforms: Past Accomplishments, Future Challenges," *New York University Review of Law and Social Policy* (forthcoming).

7. Morton Mintz, "Voters May Be Turning Off, But PAC Faucets are Gushing," *The Washington Post*, 25 October 1980, p. A5.

8. Campaign Finance Study Group, *An Analysis of the Impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act 1972-1978: Final Report to the Committee on House Administration of the U.S. House of Representatives* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Univ., May 1979), pp. 7-8.

9. Gordon Adams, *The Iron Triangle: The Politics of Defense Contracting* (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1981), p. 112.

10. Norman J. Ornstein and Shirley Elder, *Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1978), p. 72.

11. Interview with Representative Mike Synar, CBS Evening News with Dan Rather, 26 February 1982.

12. Jack Wardlaw, "Moore: Business Lobby Should Turn National," (New Orleans) *Times-Picayune/Stater-Item*, 4 December 1981, p. 20.

13. Neil Ulman, "Companies Organize Employees and Holders into a Political Force," *The Wall Street Journal*, 15 August 1981, p. 1.

14. The legislative agenda of a political action committee is generally more narrow and more focused than the concerns of an average constituent. *The Washington Post* described the difference between an individual contribution and a PAC contribution as follows:

A gift from an individual citizen is a contribution from a kind of one-person multiple source; consumer, employer or employee, family member, man or woman, a certain age, experience or education. Most citizens who do contribute have more than a single interest or objective. Too often the same cannot be said of the narrow-based PACs. Typically, the PAC to Preserve the Upper Great Lakes Widget Industry cares only how the legislator votes in the subcommittee on widgets. Little if any attention is given to the legislator's vote on widows, orphans, veterans, MXs or 14Bs. Individuals generally have wider interests than PACs.

"Staying Even with the PAC," *The Washington Post*, 2 December 1980, p. A18.

15. Millicent Fenwick, "The Best Congress . . .," *Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick Reports* (newsletter), 7 October 1981.

16. Interview with Charles Vanik, CBS Evening News with Dan Rather, 25 February 1982.

17. Mike Synar, "The Need for Reform of the Congressional Campaign Finance Laws," press conference statement, Washington, 8 July 1981.

18. "The Swarming Lobbyists," *Time*, 7 August 1978, pp. 14-22.

19. *Ibid.*

20. Quoted in R. Michael Cole, "Lobbying Disclosure Reform Legislation," testimony before Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of House Committee on the Judiciary, 7 March 1979, p. 13.

21. *Time*, p. 15.

22. Common Cause, *Dirty Money . . . Dirty Air?* (Washington: Common Cause, May 1981).

23. Laurence Mosher, "Acid Drizzle," *National Journal*, 18 July 1981, p. 1301.

24. Ornstein and Elder, pp. 225-26.

25. "It Happens Only in Washington," *National Journal*, 22 July 1978, p. 1184.

26. Ornstein and Elder, p. 228.

27. Morton Mintz, "Election '80 Was Record Year for PACs, Especially Those on Right," *The Washington Post*, 27 January 1981, p. A4.

28. Common Cause, *A Common Cause Guide to Money, Power and Politics in the 97th Congress* (Washington: Common Cause, 1981).

29. Adams, p. 112.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

31. Florence Graves, "The High and The Mighty," *Common Cause*, 7 (August 1981), 16-23.

32. Adams, p. 14. See also Ornstein and Elder, pp. 195, 206.

33. Adams, p. 13.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

35. *U.S. v. Harriss*, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).

36. Common Cause, *The Tip of The Iceberg: The Case for Full Disclosure of Lobbying* (Washington: Common Cause, 1977), p. 5.

37. Common Cause, *The Status of Sunset in the States: A Common Cause Report* (Washington: Common Cause, March 1982).

38. Fred Wertheimer and Randy Huwa, "Has the Tree Really Fallen? The Role of Television in American Politics," paper prepared for presentation at the second annual meeting of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Boston, 24 October 1980.

