SALT ON THE SHELF:

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

by

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More than a decade has now elapsed since the beginning of the SALT negotiations. Two rounds of those negotiations have been completed, but it is obvious that the SALT negotiation process is open-ended and that many additional rounds of arduous diplomacy will be needed before a categorically safe and stable strategic nuclear accommodation can be reached between the two superpowers. Indeed, we cannot be certain that such an accommodation will ever be reached.[1]

The difficulties are illustrated by the fate of SALT II. The ink was hardly dry on this accord when the Soviets launched their massive invasion of Afghanistan, thus dooming what were already regarded by some as slender chances for approval by the US Senate. Even if the Afghanistan issue eventually subsides sufficiently for an American administration realistically to take some version of SALT II before the Senate again, the reservations and amendments likely to be insisted on by that body may well render the original document unrecognizable. A further complication ensued from NATO's agreement following the Soviet Afghan invasion to deploy 572 US-made intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe to counter the Soviets' modern SS-20 missiles aimed at Western European cities. The Soviets have indicated a willingness to sit down with the NATO allies and discuss a possible resolution to this intra-European missile confrontation, with the stipulation, however, that such American forward-based nuclear delivery systems as warplanes stationed in Britain, West Germany, and other West European countries be brought into the discussions.[2] Discussion of this question would in turn re-raise the touchy question of the Soviet Backfire bombers. Once the foregoing Pandora's box is opened, the original SALT II agreement could easily become entirely unravelled.

The present interim between the initialing of the SALT II accord, on one hand, and the future effort to amend and gain Senate confirmation of the accord, on the other, offers an opportune moment to pause to take stock. During this pause, we may profitably look back at SALT II in an attempt to gain some insight into the problems and prospects of various bargaining strategies. Armed with such insights, it may then be possible to turn our glance to the future and gauge in some fashion the distant prospects for that elusive and now rarely mentioned goal—SALT III.

Central to the often acrimonious debate over the SALT II treaty has been the issue of who gave up what in the negotiations leading to it. This issue is sure to be resurrected as the treaty is renegotiated and debated in the Senate, with various skirted or glossed-over problems coming to the fore again. In an effort to shed some light on the issue of parity, balance, and fairness, this article will first examine the concessionary behavior of the two sides and then explore how the complexity of the points discussed and the hard and soft bargaining strategies of the two sides have affected outcomes. The concluding

section will examine the question of what sorts of weapons might be negotiable in pursuit of a revised version of SALT II or SALT III.

WHO GAVE UP WHAT?

Like most other negotiations, those of SALT II demonstrated that if agreement is to be reached, concessions must be made on both sides. Although the detailed dialogues of the SALT negotiations are highly classified, there has been enough official and unofficial material published about SALT to enable one to identify with assurance the basic US and Soviet positions and then relate them to the final provisions of the SALT II treaty.[3] The table on the following page lists 28 provisions and the preferred positions of the United States and the Soviet Union on each. Since these positions changed over time in some instances, the preference shown reflects the position most vigorously pressed by each state before resolution. In this sense the preferred position might be viewed as the most favorable one considered realistically possible among a range of alternatives; obviously, in the strict sense, the preferred position would restrict the weapons of the other side while leaving one's own options open.

In addition to setting forth the preferred positions of the two sides on the various provisions of the SALT II treaty, the table indicates whose position seemed to prevail in the final outcome. Check marks note whose positions were best reflected in the treaty's actual provisions. On issues clearly involving considerable give-and-take, no check mark is shown.

Of the 28 provisions, 22 are more consonant with the position of one side or the other. In most cases—17 of the 22—the provision seems closer to the position of the United States. In six cases, both sides apparently compromised in roughly equal measure or varied their positions so substantially over time that their preferences are not clear.

Obviously, the provisions of the treaty are not equally important; thus one might argue that no mathematic bean count can provide a definitive picture of which side's concessions were most substantive. But the point can be made legitimately that both sides compromised extensively. In many respects, one might infer that the structure of the treaty is more in keeping with the positions taken by the United States. One objective not achieved, however, was a lower ceiling on Soviet ICBMs to reduce the vulnerability of US land-based missiles. Moreover, the final US decision to accept only national means of verification represented a significant retreat from its original position.

It should be further remarked that the United States is viewed by some as taking less extreme positions during negotiations than the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet Union may only appear to have made more concessions, while in truth it merely gravitated to the more equitable and realistic positions that the United States assumed from the beginning.[4] One must remember, however, that such an interpretation is highly susceptible to one's own values—Soviet leaders are likely to have seen the US negotiating positions as extreme.

Of course, detractors might well argue that the give-and-take in the SALT negotiations has been largely irrelevant because the agreements have been little more than cosmetic in their effect, allowing both sides to produce whatever weapons they seriously wanted. No weapon system which the United States has been highly interested in building is prohibited by the SALT II treaty. Restrictions on land- and sea-based cruise missiles and the mobile MX missile will be limited to the duration of the Protocol, which is scheduled to expire at the end of 1981, leaving these options fully open. Although there are restrictions on the Soviet Union, including the requirement to dismantle some 250 missiles by 1982, the proscriptions are not severe. Since the Soviet Union has not been in the practice of dismantling its missiles when more modern versions come on line, it has a number of relatively obsolete liquid-fueled missiles in its arsenal which it can easily afford to dismantle.

RESULTS OF SALT II COMPARED TO THE TWO SIDES' PREFERRED POSITIONS

(✓ marks position closer to outcome)

SALT II PROVISIONS	US PREFERENCE	USSR PREFERENCE
Equal aggregates	✓ Equal aggregates	Extend interim levels
Ceiling 2250 (1982)	Ceiling 2000 or less	Ceiling 2400-2500
1320 MIRV sublimit	More to counter Soviet throw-weight	✓ Proposed as few as 1100
1200 sublimit on MIRVed missiles	✓ Low number to allow at least 100 bombers with cruise missiles	Preferred 50 more to limit number of bombers with cruise missiles
820 MIRV sublimit on ICBMs	✓ US concern to limit MIRVed ICBMs; lower limit preferred	Larger sublimit advantageous
300+ limit on Soviet heavy missiles; US to have none	Limit Soviets to 150 heavy ICBMs; no interest in having heavy missiles	✓ Not to reduce 300+ level achieved in SALT I
Limit fractionism of MIRV (10 ICBM, 14 SLBM)	✓ Limit fractionism to level Soviets capable of, according to US	Claimed fractionism had not proceeded as far as US believed
If missile is tested with MIRV, all will be considered MIRVed	✓ Count all if tested with MIRV	Wanted to deploy same ICBM in both single and MIRV mode
Test and deploy one new ICBM	Varied over time	Varied over time
Notify in advance of certain tests	Limit number of ICBM tests	✓ No limit to tests
Allow light, mobile land- and air-launched ICBMs	Unilaterally opposed in 1972; reversed in 1974-75	Refused to accept ban in 1972; later favored ban to stop MX
Ban on SS-16 mobile missile	✓ Concerned over verification and potential combination with SS-20	Wanted for its mobile potential when used with SS-20 launchers
Extra missiles cannot be stored near launchers	✓ Concerned over Soviet reload capabilities using same launcher	Appeared not to have raised the issue
Launch- and throw-weight ceilings on heavy and light missiles	✓ Concerned over qualitative upgrading of existing missiles	Appeared to be interested in keeping options open
Ban on 600+ km missiles not yet employed (e.g. FOBS, surface ships)	Interested in banning FOBS, which Soviets have developed	Less interested than US in emplacing missiles on ships
Forward-based systems excluded from treaty	✓ Exclude; consider only at SALT III or MBFR	Include; especially if low ceilings on delivery systems are established
Statement not to boost production or capability of Backfire bomber	Wanted to include in ceilings; settled for Soviet statement	✓ Backfire should be excluded entirely from ceilings
No circumvention by providing technology and weapons to allies	Don't include NATO allies' forces or compensate USSR	Include allied strategic weapons in ceilings or compensate USSR
ALCM range not limited	✓ 2500+ km range desired	Limit ALCM range to 600 km
Average of 28 ALCMs per bomber	✓ Wanted 35+ on some, less on others	Wanted a limit of 20 per bomber
ALCMs of 600+ km range may be deployed only on heavy bombers	Deploy on FB-111s (but provision also prevents use on Backfire)	Did not want ALCMs deployed on FB-111s
Regularly trade data on arsenals	✓ Wanted data on Soviet force levels	Traditional secrecy about military
National means of verification	Preferred on-site inspection	✓ Limit to national means
No interference with national means	✓ Concerned with evasion issue	Evasion not a real possibility
Ban on any telemetry encryption impeding verification	✓ Highly concerned; Soviets accepted US draft language	Not concerned about controls to prohibit masking missile tests
Protocol limits: mobile ICBM and ASBM test and deployment; ban on sea- and ground-based cruise missiles	✓ Wanted open options; since actions aren't scheduled before 1982, restrictions are moot	Less interested in systems than US; will want to extend restrictions if possible
Protocol expires 31 December 1981	✓ Wanted specific expiration date	Expire 3 years after ratification
Treaty expires in 1985	✓ Wanted treaty to expire in 1985	Wanted permanent treaty

COMPLEXITY AND BARGAINING BEHAVIOR

Much has been made of the fact that since the United States and the Soviet Union have highly asymmetrical strategic needs and interests, it is extremely difficult to negotiate agreements. But it can also be argued that strategic complexity offers greater opportunities for trade-offs and compromises. Such complexity may not make the bargaining easier, but it provides an opportunity to try out many variants until compromise can be found. And the ambiguity of relative gains and losses in an agreement may actually make it easier for both sides to sell an agreement to their respective publics, since one can find arguments to support any settlement. Much effort must be devoted to an attempt to make the agreement appear equal regardless of the settlement. This is particularly so in the United States owing to Senator Henry Jackson's amendment demanding that any SALT II treaty be based on equal levels.[5] The appearance of such equality was obtained through the concept of equal aggregates, allowing each side to continue emphasizing its preferred weapon systems within a broader ceiling imposed on both bombers and missiles. However, this technique has failed to satisfy Senator Jackson and others.

Given the complexity of the strategic issues involved, it is small wonder that there is pressure to accept settlements which simply freeze existing weapon systems. Yet freeze levels are difficult to obtain, for before one side will accept a freeze it must either feel sufficiently equal or believe itself unable to catch up.

HARD AND SOFT BARGAINING

Students of bargaining behavior have looked closely at the relative merits of "hard" and "soft" bargaining strategies. The consensus of both experimental and experiential study is that an initial hard strategy may be useful, particularly to preclude raising the aspirations of the other side.[6] Increased aspirations tend to reduce willingness to compromise. At the same time, if a mutually satisfactory agreement is to be worked out, it is essential that concessions be made by all parties.

Both sides have demonstrated hard bargaining tactics during the SALT negotiations. President Nixon's proposals for on-site inspection to verify MIRV limits during SALT I were known in advance to be totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union.[7] Similarly, President Carter's comprehensive proposal in March 1977 was given to the Soviet Union on virtually a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Particularly inequitable from the Soviet perspective was the fact that cruise missiles, in which the United States had the advantage, would not be restricted, whereas severe limits would apply to ICBMs, on which the Soviet Union relies so heavily.

During the SALT negotiations, the Soviet Union has generally begun with fairly one-sided proposals, desiring first and foremost to include US forward-based systems and the nuclear forces of Britain and France under the strategic arms limitations. As long as the Soviets press for this position, as they are likely to do in SALT III if deep cuts are proposed, negotiation will be virtually impossible. For the United States is unwilling (and probably unable) to negotiate away the security interests of its allies.

Although the SALT II treaty underlines the necessity of compromise if an agreement is to be reached, there can be some negative results from making concessions too readily.

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Adam Ulam has noted the concern on the part of Soviet negotiators that the United States tends to misread Soviet interests and intentions every time the latter assumes a more conciliatory position. As evidence, he quotes a Soviet diplomat: "Look, each time we begin to talk more softly about you, you people conclude we are having internal problems or a new conflict with China."[8]

A soft bargaining position may generate expectations on the part of the adversary that an actor may be willing to continue making concessions for which little is to be asked in return. US bargaining on the issue of heavy missiles is an example of a strategy which can do considerable harm to one's bargaining reputation. Reportedly, after Soviet rejection of the US March 1977 proposals placing a ceiling of 150 on Soviet heavy missiles, the United States successively retreated to figures of 190, 220, and 250, all to no avail.[9] Finally, in September the United States agreed to allow the Soviet Union to retain all of its 308 heavy missiles if the Soviets would agree to limit the number of MIRVed ICBMs to 820.

Another danger for the United States in making concessions too readily is that such behavior may foster suspicions among the Soviet elite of possible US trickery. Similarly, it has been suggested that "if concessions are made too easily, the Soviet leadership has to explain to its own more conservative members why it did not obtain more. Therefore, hard Western bargaining makes it easier for the Soviet Union to reach agreement with the West."[10]

The concessionary moves in SALT II suggest that when disagreements over quantity exist, the issue can often be resolved by splitting the difference. This was the case in SALT II with respect to the number of cruise missiles allowed on bombers. The United States preferred 35 per plane while the Soviet Union wanted 20. They compromised by agreeing that an average of 28 could be deployed on a given number of bombers. A similar midpoint was accepted with regard to an allowance for the zigzagging flight path of air-launched cruise missiles. The United States pressed for a 50 percent allowance above the range limit of 2500 kilometers, while the Soviet Union wanted no allowance. The two compromised at 25-30 percent. (Subsequently, however, the USSR proposed no range limit on the cruise missile at all, suggesting that the United States could even circle the earth with such a weapon if it could develop the capability.)

When an issue cannot be resolved through concessions, the tendency has been to set the issue aside to be considered later. This practice began with the decision to exclude underground nuclear testing from the Partial Test Ban Treaty because of US concerns about verifying underground tests. US forward-based systems, capable of reaching Soviet territory, were similarly dropped from both SALT I and SALT II, but the latter treaty's Joint Statement on Principles provides that either party may raise the issue during SALT III. An example of the trade-off of controversial systems, allowing each side to build its own pet project, can be found in US efforts to generate agreement on the Vladivostok levels by excluding the Backfire bomber and the cruise missile from the agreement. Another example occurred in November 1974, when both sides agreed neither to ban air-launched mobile missiles as proposed by the Soviet Union, nor to ban land-based mobile ICBMs as suggested by the United States. Using such exclusionary tactics frequently, however, tends to undermine the comprehensiveness and significance of the agreements which are reached and compound the difficulties of later negotiating stages.

The problem of inability to agree on limitations with respect to a particular weapon system has also been handled by temporary exclusions within the framework of the Protocol, which delays testing and deployment of the system while further negotiations are conducted. This has been the temporary solution for handling mobile missiles and ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles in SALT II. Of course, there is no requirement that any permanent agreement be reached, and a delay in restricting a weapon system will probably make restrictions more difficult if not impossible to obtain later.

NEGOTIABLE WEAPON SYSTEMS

If SALT II in some form is ultimately ratified and negotiations are undertaken for SALT III, what weapon systems will be negotiable? Past negotiations suggest reasons why the United States might prefer to focus negotiations on one weapon system while the Soviet Union prefers to address another. But since the nature of the arms race is always changing as new strategies and weapon refinements are developed, these preferences never remain static. Each party reacts to the strategic situation of the moment. For this reason, arms control negotiations have often had a musical-chairs quality, with one side gravitating to the position of the other just as the latter moves on. This pattern was particularly evident in deciding whether to stress limits on defensive arms, offensive arms, or both. When the two sides began exploring the prospects of strategic arms limitations in 1966-67, the United States preferred to address only antiballistic missiles while the Soviets wanted to place the emphasis on offensive weapons; by the time SALT I opened, however, the positions were completely reversed.

Several factors influence the kinds of weapon systems that a state would like to see regulated. First, a state is likely to propose testing restrictions on systems which it has already successfully tested, in an effort to prevent the adversary from following suit. This tendency was particularly evident during the nuclear test ban negotiations—one could count on proposals for an immediate test ban to be proposed after each test series. The unilateral nuclear test ban which both sides adhered to from 1958 to 1961 was a vital factor in the progress toward acceptable restrictions on nuclear testing.

The pattern has repeated itself during the SALT negotiations. After its successful round of ICBM tests in 1972, the Soviet Union proposed a freeze on all new strategic programs. The intent was to keep the United States from developing the Trident and the B-1 bomber while allowing the Soviet Union to retain its four new ICBM systems—SS-16 through SS-19. Similarly, the United States sought to prevent the Soviet Union from testing MIRVs by proposing in April 1970 a ban on MIRV testing and deployment. This proposal would have allowed the United States to continue producing MIRVed weapons, first successfully tested in August 1968, some five years before Soviet tests began.

A closely related principle is that a state will rarely negotiate with regard to a weapon system which it has not yet achieved but which the other side possesses. This was the major reason why the Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan in 1946 despite the fact that the United States seemed willing to relinquish its monopoly on nuclear weapons to an international control force. This principle also helps to explain why the Soviet Union, not yet having tested its first MIRV system, was reluctant even to discuss MIRV controls during SALT I. When a state does not share in a prohibited weapon technology, it may consider itself at the mercy of its adversary, precariously relying on the latter's promises not to produce the prohibited weapons secretly nor to maintain existing but undetected stockpiles ready for use.

Proposals to freeze a weapon system at a particular quantitative level will generally be made by the state with a numerical edge. Thus the United States preferred a freeze of strategic delivery systems at existing levels during the late 1960's, and the Soviet Union pushed similar proposals during the 1970's after the numerical balance had tipped in its favor. Similarly, the Soviet Union deferred the destruction of strategic missiles to the last stage of its general and complete disarmament proposals when it thought it was ahead in 1959, but it moved that matter to the fore a year or so later when it became clear that the United States was in the superior strategic position.

A state may choose to negotiate with regard to a particular weapon system if it believes itself falling behind, qualitatively or quantitatively, and sees little chance of reversing its inferior position. This appears to be what lay behind the Soviet Union's change of heart on ABM systems after 1967. At that time the Soviet Union's Galosh ABM system

around Moscow apparently was not functioning effectively, causing the Soviets to decide not to expand it beyond the missiles already in place. The subsequent US decision to proceed with its own ABM system, which could easily be superior to that of the Soviets, probably accounted for the high priority that the Soviet Union gave to the conclusion of an ABM treaty during SALT I.

Similarly, if the opposition shows no interest in building a given weapon system, a state will have little incentive for introducing controls on that system in its own proposals. The Soviet Union saw minimal pressure for negotiating an offensive missile agreement during SALT I since the United States was not adding to its offensive capability, at least in terms of numbers of missiles. Recognition of that attitude was instrumental in the US decision to press for funding new weapon systems to develop bargaining chips—a strategy which has proven to be counterproductive as far as the prospects of arms control are concerned.[11]

A state is also likely to try to regulate areas of weapon development in which the adversary would probably be a clear winner in an all-out arms race. For example, some have warned of the danger of allowing unlimited production of sea-based cruise missiles, arguing that the Soviets have a great advantage in that realm because they have far more conventional submarines with usable torpedo slots, and because they enjoy a superior air defense system capable of intercepting cruise missiles.[12] In fact, the Soviet Union has had a sea-based cruise missile capability for a number of years in the form of its Shaddock missile system.

A strategic arms proposal might also originate with the desire to destroy obsolete weapons. US proposals for bomber burnings in the 1960's appear to have been so motivated, the United States seeking to dismantle a number of obsolete B-47s. Former US arms negotiator William C. Foster, however, was disturbed that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara chose to announce the decision before asking the Soviet Union to reciprocate by reducing its own store of military weapons. The Carter Administration appears to have erred in the same way when it failed to inform the US SALT negotiating team in advance of its decision in June 1977 not to proceed with the B-1 bomber.[13]

A weapon system may also prove to be negotiable simply because neither side is terribly interested in it, views it as technologically infeasible, or considers it not worth its cost. This was the case with respect to nuclear weapons positioned in outer space and on the seabed floor. It may also partially account for the easy agreement on the ABM—a system which many authorities on both sides had come to view as ineffective against a massive nuclear strike. Should more exotic ABM systems become feasible, such as those based on laser technology, one might expect some reconsideration of the ABM treaty and its restrictions. Indeed, recent US press reports, noting new ABM feasibility studies, have broached the ABM option anew.[14]

Even though a state might hesitate to forgo a given weapon system completely, it may be willing to accept temporary limitations. For example, since the United States had neither the ability nor the desire to test or develop the mobile MX missile before 1982, accepting the Protocol to SALT II did nothing to change US planning with regard to the MX. The same can be said of the restrictions on the deployment of ground- and sea-based cruise missiles—both of which can still be tested during the span of the Protocol.

Finally, a proposal to regulate a weapon system might be motivated not so much for its inherent arms control value but rather as a political weapon to exploit divisions within the opposition, whether within the adversary's own government or within its alliance system. Moscow's decision to move the destruction of missile systems in its early general and complete disarmament schemes from the third stage to the first seemed partially designed to exploit French interest in a ban on missiles—a concern not shared by most of the NATO allies. Other issues similarly raised have included forward-based systems, the neutron bomb, and the ground-

launched cruise missile—all involving serious differences of opinion among the NATO allies. Since the prospect of developing almost any new weapon finds both supporters and opponents in Moscow and Washington, additional opportunities exist for dividing domestic constituencies simply by raising an issue.

CONCLUSION

Given the numerous and varied motivational factors in negotiating strategic arms limitations and the fact that interests in any given weapon system are often asymmetrical, it is small wonder that what little has been achieved in SALT I and II has come only after long and arduous negotiations. While considerable compromise has been necessary for both sides, the Soviet Union seems to have conceded more on SALT II than the United States, as shown in the comparison of preferred positions and treaty provisions. Even so, results to date have been little more than cosmetic; many weapon systems have been exempted from control because of the difficulties of reaching agreement in a world of conflicting strategic requirements. Furthermore, other serious issues have arisen since SALT II's negotiation which will have an influence on the treaty's fate. The exempted weapons and the new issues will have to be dealt with, however, whether during renegotiations on SALT II or in SALT III. The results of past negotiations and an analysis of what sorts of weapon systems are negotiable do not augur well for the prospects of SALT III. And as if these various factors impeding agreement were not enough, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Western responses to it may well be all that is required to make substantial progress on strategic arms limitation virtually impossible in the foreseeable future.

NOTES

1. This article is adapted from the author's paper, "Bargaining Strategies and Strategic Arms Limitation," delivered at the 1979 Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C. The author is indebted to Bruce C. Ressner for research assistance.

2. "Soviet Reported Willing to Drop 2d Bar to Talks," *The New York Times*, 4 July 1980, p. A3.

3. In addition to *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, other useful sources consulted in reconstructing positions taken during SALT II were: Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979); Thomas W. Wolfe, *The SALT Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1979); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook* (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, various dates); Richard Burt, "The Scope and Limits of SALT," *Foreign Affairs*, 56 (July 1978), 751-70; Jan M. Lodal, "SALT II and American Security," *Foreign Affairs*, 57 (Winter 1978/79), 245-68; and James E. Dougherty, "SALT: An Introduction to the Substance and Politics of the Negotiations," in National Strategy Information Center, Inc., *The Fateful Ends and Shades of SALT* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1979), pp. 1-37.

4. For a discussion of this tendency in US negotiating tactics and Soviet efforts to exploit it, see Foy D. Kohler, *SALT II: How Not to Negotiate With the Russians* (Coral Gables: Advanced International Studies Institute, Univ. of Miami, 1979).

5. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament, 1972* (Washington: GPO, 1974), pp. 546-47.

6. For a summary of some of these studies, see S. S. Komorita, "Concession-Making and Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 17 (December 1973), 745-62.

7. John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973), p. 181.

8. US Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, *Detente Hearings*, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 1974, p. 133.

9. Elmo Zumwalt, "The McNeil-Lehrer Report," Public Broadcasting System, 18 June 1979.

10. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., *Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974), p. 81.

11. See Robert J. Bresler and Robert C. Gray, "The Bargaining Chips and SALT," *Political Science Quarterly*, 92 (Spring 1977), 65-88; and Ted Greenwood and Michael L. Nacht, "The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense?" *Foreign Affairs*, 52 (July 1974), 761-80.

12. Henry S. Bradsher, "Soviets Seek Ban on New US Missile," *Washington Star*, 26 June 1975.

13. US Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, *Testimony of Lieutenant General Edward J. Rowny, 12 July 1979*, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979.

14. See John K. Cooley, "Study Finds Defense Against Missiles Can Be Cheap, Safe," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 9 June 1980, p. 10.