The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
This monograph offers a new model for the management of the national security system—at the strategic level—which is the first step in transforming our national security system to meet the challenges and opportunities of the global security environment of the 21st century. This monograph provides a proposed response to Section 1072 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires the President to report to Congress on the organizational changes required to implement the National Security Strategy of May 2010.
This monograph compares and contrasts how different countries craft their national security strategy documents. It highlights similarities as well as differences, and provides lessons learned that all national strategy makers can apply.
On June 24, 2009, in Washington, DC, the Bush School of Government and Public Service and Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at Texas A&M University, and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College conducted a conference on Leadership and Government Reform. Two panels discussed "Leader Development in Schools of Public Affairs" and "Leadership, National Security and 'Whole of Government' Reforms." The authors in this volume are from universities and policy institutes focused on international affairs, history, foreign policy, intelligence, and national and homeland security.
The China Dragons of the 28th Combat Support Hospital deployed in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from September 2006 until November 2007. Their service epitomizes the strides that have been made in military combat medicine.
How did the Army get to the point where it is the perennial bronze medal winner in a three-man funding race? Are the Army’s relations with Congress part of the problem in obtaining sufficient funding? How does DoD determine who gets what and how do they determine how much is enough?
Theater strategy and theater security cooperation (TSC) are two of the most important tools available in attaining national security. This paper explains what theater strategy is, its basis, how it is formulated, and how it is executed with emphasis on theater security cooperation.
The concept of the “four challenges,” outlined in the 2005 National Defense Strategy, has long suffered from underdefinition. For three of the four challenges (traditional, irregular, and catastrophic) and a fourth new category (the “hybrid norm”), the wait is over. The author provides the reader with the conceptual foundations of the challenges as they were conceived at the working level during the strategy’s development.
This Letort Paper addresses how the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1990 to 2005 used a strategic planning system to respond to their global challenges.
This book provides a basic examination of strategy and the national security policymaking environment and process. It reflects both the method and manner the U.S. Army War College uses to teach strategy formulation to America's future senior leaders.
The author examines how three Chairmen--Generals Powell, Shalikashvili, and Shelton--adapted and used strategic planning to provide direction and shape the military in the rapidly changing strategic environment of the 1990s. He identifies five broad recommendations relevant to future leaders on how to use a strategic planning system to transform their organizations.
The common view is that doctrine persists over a broader time frame than planning and that the latter draws on the former for context, syntax, even format. In truth the very process of planning shapes new ways of military action. The authors explore the relationship between strategic planning and doctrine at the joint level.
The authors define a formal strategic plan: one that contains specific strategic objectives, offers a clear and executable strategy for achieving objectives, illuminates force capability requirements, and is harmonized with the Future Years Defense Program. They conclude by examining three alternatives to improve the strategic planning processes and to facilitate efficient development of strategic plans.
Few if any American officers performed a wider array of strategic functions as Dwight D. Eisenhower--he was a staff planner in the War Department, wartime commander of a massive coalition force, peacetime Chief of Staff, and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.