The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
This monograph takes the logic of the contemporary security dilemma to another level. The intent is to operationalize and elaborate Ambassador Stephen Krasner’s "Responsible Sovereignty" orienting principle for foreign policy and military management.
The case studies in this volume confirm that flawed responses recur in issue areas as diverse as biodefense, public diplomacy, and military intervention as well as across presidential administrations. The piecemeal national security organizational reforms enacted to date have not fostered improved policy outcomes or decisionmaking, while capability building, especially in the civilian national security agencies, remains less than optimal.
"First, do no harm" is a golden rule for both medicine and strategic theory. Challenges to national security are simply challenges, they are neither irregular nor traditional.
Historically, systematic power transitions were settled in war. Can China and the United States avoid a deadly contest and spare the world another catastrophe? What can we expect from China and the United States with respect to the future of international relations?
This monograph is part of a continuing effort to inform the contemporary transnational security debate, move it to the strategic level, and support the best interests of the United States Government and peoples, and also those of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world.
This book includes a summary report of three panels, along with selected papers, from an April 22, 2010, colloquium in Washington, DC, on “2010: Preparing for a Mid-Term Assessment of Leadership and National Security Reform in the Obama Administration.”
The concepts of "hard" and "soft" power are subjected to close critical scrutiny. The author finds the latter is significantly misunderstood and therefore inappropriately assessed as a substitute for the former, the threat or the use of military force.
Is it possible to wage war against radical Muslim terrorists if your national security policy does not consider religion as power which motivates terrorist behavior? Yes, but you risk being ineffective or inefficient, or both.
SSI's XXI Strategic Conference convened many of the world's top experts to assess and debate the definition of war and the strategic implications of how it is defined.
This paper explores a risk-based approach to a strategically balanced force that assesses alternative postures and the viability of competing force concepts in mitigating national risk in a resource-constrained environment. This assessment also examines alternate definitions of balance and the continued relevance of U.S. conventional capabilities and nuclear deterrence.
The critical need to develop a serious hemispheric partnership for opening “A New Chapter in Trans-American Engagement” was stressed at the 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium, held on May 25-26, 2010, in Miami, Florida. The issues and recommendations discussed emphasized that building a viable regional security partnership in the Hemisphere is not a strictly short-term, or unilateral, or even bilateral defense effort. Regional security will result only from long-term, multilateral, civil-military partnering efforts. Thus, the generalized results of the colloquium emphasize three highly interrelated needs and an associated recommendation.
The author discusses the grand strategy Brazil has pursued under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. He argues that Lula’s policies have raised Brazil’s profile and enhanced its diplomatic flexibility, but have also exposed Brazil to several potent strategic dilemmas that could compromise, or at the very least complicate, its geopolitical ascent.
The colloquium theme focused on the need for advancing the research and study of key national security issues by engaging the invited participants to share their expertise, and by informing interested community members of ways to develop a deeper awareness and understanding of the security reform issues facing the U.S. Government.
Stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to be challenged by the lack of effective local police forces to secure the civilian population from insurgent infiltration and criminal violence. Given U.S. government legal and organizational shortfalls to train and advise foreign police forces, coupled with an operational environment characterized by local police corruption and abusiveness, this monograph proposes a way ahead for effective community based policing despite these adverse circumstances.
The author explores the centrality of Human Intelligence in meeting the needs of the U.S. Army, as well as the Department of Defense, and the whole of government, for relevant information and tailored intelligence essential to creating a national security strategy; for defining whole of government policies that work in harmony; for acquisition of the right capabilities at the right price in time to be useful; and for operations, both local and global.
On June 24, 2009, in Washington, DC, the Bush School of Government and Public Service and Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at Texas A&M University, and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College conducted a conference on Leadership and Government Reform. Two panels discussed "Leader Development in Schools of Public Affairs" and "Leadership, National Security and 'Whole of Government' Reforms." The authors in this volume are from universities and policy institutes focused on international affairs, history, foreign policy, intelligence, and national and homeland security.
In this monograph, the author argues that rampant crime and violence have led to a full-blown crisis of the democratic state in Guatemala. He discusses the various criminal groups active in that country, and outlines a strategy for improving public order, strengthening government institutions, and combating the root causes that inform criminal activity.
North Korea’s criminal conduct—smuggling, trafficking and counterfeiting—is well known, but the portion of the government, Office Number 39, which directs it, is understudied or overlooked. This shadowy part of an already opaque government is examined to reveal how it conducts its activities and supports the longevity of the regime.
No subject is more essential in the preparation of national security professionals and military leaders than the teaching of strategy, from grand to military strategy. Nor is there one that is more timeless and intellectually demanding. The questions dealing with teaching strategy—why we should study it, what we should teach, and how we should teach it—may bear most directly on the system of PME. However, the answers need to be applied much more broadly across a wider range of our society today. For only then can we expect to regain strategic competence, not just in the crisis of the moment but in a sustained manner well into the 21st century. The contributions to this edited volume will advance that society-wide discussion and debate. This book should stimulate discussion and introspection that will in time enhance the security of our nation.
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to initiate its latest monograph series, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions. SSI started this project in an effort to give leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces some important insights into how military advice was provided to the Nation’s civilian leadership during the many years—including the months before the invasion—of the war in Iraq.
Dr. Metz starts this series with an impressive review of the decision to remove Saddam Hussein by force. The Strategic Studies Institute hopes that this and the succeeding monographs will generate debate on just how the United States made decisions—some of them disastrous—about Iraq. The resulting better understanding of the decisions should lead to strengthening of the processes—where appropriate—so that the military and civilian leadership forge better decisions in the future.
Rising oil prices facilitate the acquisition of greater resources and perhaps economic development. But oil revenues can also drive a government to finance massive military equipment purchases like Saudi Arabia did in 1979. The nature of governments that rely on raw material extraction and long-term development of military programs may affect how their current
and future spending occurs regardless of oil prices. How nations decide to use their national wealth helps explain some of the perennial problems facing oil and commodity exporting nations and provides insights into their relations with other countries.
The growing violence and instability in Mexico and the Caribbean will clearly demand greater attention from the United States in the future. As the trafficking organizations continue to defy authorities, undermine governance, and escalate violence, Mexico has become much more of a national security challenge rather than simply a border problem. This conference offered an important opportunity to assess these threats, and to consider what can be done to counter them.
The security and stability of Africa has recently become an important national issue. However, to be effective this growing interest must be rooted in the desire to overcome centuries of ignorance and misunderstanding about the conditions and people of Africa.
With any attempt to assess security threats, there is a natural tendency to focus first on the worst. Consider the most recent appraisals of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Normally, the risk of war between Pakistan and India, and possible nuclear escalation, would be bad enough. Now, however, most American security experts are riveted on the frightening possibility of Pakistani nuclear weapons capabilities falling into the hands of terrorists who are intent on attacking the United States. Presented with the horrific implications of such an attack, the American public and media have increasingly come to view nearly all Pakistani security issues through this lens.
The author revisits Medvedev’s proposal and, while some Western analysts deem the conflicting interests and value gap that separate the West from Russia to be overwhelming, others argue that the time has come to engage Russia in seeking a common security agenda in Europe. The most compelling question confronting those who favor a security partnership with Russia is: How to give Russia a voice but not a veto in a new European security system?
The need for significant changes in leader development and government reform to improve the alignment, coordination, integration, and interoperability among largely autonomous U.S. Government agencies was addressed. The two conference panels were challenged to discuss leadership in a broader sense rather than focusing solely at the top, or on presidential leadership.
The author outlines eight principles for a risk management defense strategy. He argues that these principles provide “measures of merit” for evaluating the new administration’s defense choices.
The security implications of climate change, including man-made global warming, will be most pronounced in places where the effects of climate change are greatest. Two things are vitally important: stemming the tide of climate change and adapting to its far-reaching consequences.
The Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS), the Duke University Program in American Grand Strategy, and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) conducted a colloquium on February 26-28, 2009, that examined debates over grand strategy after World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold War, and grand strategies likely to follow U.S. involvement in Iraq.
As of September 2008, the Bush administration was contemplating not just a break in arms talks but actual sanctions, and allowed the bilateral civil nuclear treaty with Russia to die in the Senate rather than go forward for confirmation. Russian spokesmen make clear their belief that American concessions on key elements of arms control issues like missile defenses in Europe are a touchstone for the relationship and a condition of any further progress towards genuine dialogue.
The prospects for U.S.-Russian security cooperation lay buried under the wheels of Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008. But ultimately, given Russia's power, standing, and nuclear capability, dialogue and cooperation will be resumed at some point in the future. Therefore, an analysis of the prospects for and conditions favoring such cooperation is an urgent and important task that cries out for clarification precisely because current U.S.-Russian relations are so difficult.
A sustainable national security strategy is feasible only when directed by a sustainable national security policy. In the absence of policy guidance, strategy will be meaningless. The only policy that meets both the mandates of American culture and the challenges of the outside world is one that seeks to lead the necessary mission of guarding and advancing world order.
National security professionals need to understand how to work in the interagency process. This volume captures invaluable information and insights to assist students and practitioners.
Historically, defense strategy demonstrates three flaws: (1) it is generally reactive, (2) it lacks sufficient strategic imagination, and (3) as a result, it is vulnerable to surprise. The current administration confronted a game-changing “strategic shock” in its first 8 months in office. The next team would be well-advised to expect the same kind of unconventional and nonmilitary shock to DoD convention early in its first term.
The Bush School of Government and Public Service held a conference on “Leadership and National Security Reform: The Next President’s Agenda” on March 20, 2008, at the Annenberg Presidential Conference Center, Texas A&M University. The conference addressed national and international security reforms and the next presidency.
This report maintains that, although Chinese-Russian relations have improved along several important dimensions, security cooperation between Beijing and Moscow has remained limited, episodic, and tenuous. Nevertheless, U.S. national security planners should prepare for possible major discontinuities in Sino-Russian relations. American officials should pursue a mixture of “shaping and hedging” policies that aim to avert a hostile Chinese-Russian alignment while preparing the United States to better counter one, should it nevertheless arise.
Volume I of the U.S. Army War College Guide (USAWC) to National Security Issues corresponds roughly to one of the two core courses that the Department of National Security and Strategy (DNSS) teaches: “Theory of War and Strategy.”
Volume II of the U.S. Army War College Guide (USAWC) to National Security Issues corresponds roughly to one of the two core courses that the Department of National Security and Strategy (DNSS) teaches: “National Security Policy and Strategy.”
The author contends that the long-term decline of the state will move the world into a New Dark Age in which the forces of chaos and disorder will be almost overwhelming. Alternative options for the U.S. response to the security challenges posed by such an environment are examined.
Do American military ties with other nations help prevent violence and terrorism? Or are foreign states more likely to experience domestic unrest and instability in part because of an American military presence?
Contributors to this volume agree that climate change is a threat deserving of serious attention. They stress the need for greater planning and coordination and for further research as well as the utility of engagement—military to military and state to state—on environmental issues. They differ as to whether the Armed Forces should play a leading or supporting role, but agree that they can—and already do—make a valuable contribution.
The attack on the World Trade Center and subsequent conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan changed forever how Americans think about “national security.” These events expanded not only the number and scope of issues, but also the overall complexity of the process. Consequently, the requirement for interagency decisionmaking accelerated, demands for greater policy flexibility increased, and an interagency process that was largely confined to a few departments of the Federal Government now involves a multitude of new players and allied states.