The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
This monograph compares and contrasts how different countries craft their national security strategy documents. It highlights similarities as well as differences, and provides lessons learned that all national strategy makers can apply.
For more than 30 years, the term “hollow army” has represented President Carter’s alleged willingness to allow American military capability to deteriorate in the face of growing Soviet capability. The true story is more complicated than the metaphor suggests.
This monograph offers a critical analysis of the idea of “grand strategy.” It explains why grand strategy is simultaneously so important and so difficult to do, and offers suggestions for how U.S. officials might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the 21st century.
This book includes a summary report of three panels, along with selected papers, from an April 22, 2010, colloquium in Washington, DC, on “2010: Preparing for a Mid-Term Assessment of Leadership and National Security Reform in the Obama Administration.”
The concepts of "hard" and "soft" power are subjected to close critical scrutiny. The author finds the latter is significantly misunderstood and therefore inappropriately assessed as a substitute for the former, the threat or the use of military force.
SSI's XXI Strategic Conference convened many of the world's top experts to assess and debate the definition of war and the strategic implications of how it is defined.
On June 24, 2009, in Washington, DC, the Bush School of Government and Public Service and Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at Texas A&M University, and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College conducted a conference on Leadership and Government Reform. Two panels discussed "Leader Development in Schools of Public Affairs" and "Leadership, National Security and 'Whole of Government' Reforms." The authors in this volume are from universities and policy institutes focused on international affairs, history, foreign policy, intelligence, and national and homeland security.
No subject is more essential in the preparation of national security professionals and military leaders than the teaching of strategy, from grand to military strategy. Nor is there one that is more timeless and intellectually demanding. The questions dealing with teaching strategy—why we should study it, what we should teach, and how we should teach it—may bear most directly on the system of PME. However, the answers need to be applied much more broadly across a wider range of our society today. For only then can we expect to regain strategic competence, not just in the crisis of the moment but in a sustained manner well into the 21st century. The contributions to this edited volume will advance that society-wide discussion and debate. This book should stimulate discussion and introspection that will in time enhance the security of our nation.
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to initiate its latest monograph series, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions. SSI started this project in an effort to give leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces some important insights into how military advice was provided to the Nation’s civilian leadership during the many years—including the months before the invasion—of the war in Iraq.
Dr. Metz starts this series with an impressive review of the decision to remove Saddam Hussein by force. The Strategic Studies Institute hopes that this and the succeeding monographs will generate debate on just how the United States made decisions—some of them disastrous—about Iraq. The resulting better understanding of the decisions should lead to strengthening of the processes—where appropriate—so that the military and civilian leadership forge better decisions in the future.
Rising oil prices facilitate the acquisition of greater resources and perhaps economic development. But oil revenues can also drive a government to finance massive military equipment purchases like Saudi Arabia did in 1979. The nature of governments that rely on raw material extraction and long-term development of military programs may affect how their current
and future spending occurs regardless of oil prices. How nations decide to use their national wealth helps explain some of the perennial problems facing oil and commodity exporting nations and provides insights into their relations with other countries.
Participants in this conference sought to understand the PLA's evolving view of its roles and responsibilities in a changing global security landscape.
The author outlines eight principles for a risk management defense strategy. He argues that these principles provide “measures of merit” for evaluating the new administration’s defense choices.
Historically, defense strategy demonstrates three flaws: (1) it is generally reactive, (2) it lacks sufficient strategic imagination, and (3) as a result, it is vulnerable to surprise. The current administration confronted a game-changing “strategic shock” in its first 8 months in office. The next team would be well-advised to expect the same kind of unconventional and nonmilitary shock to DoD convention early in its first term.
The Bush School of Government and Public Service held a conference on “Leadership and National Security Reform: The Next President’s Agenda” on March 20, 2008, at the Annenberg Presidential Conference Center, Texas A&M University. The conference addressed national and international security reforms and the next presidency.
Critics of irregular-warfare transformation often cite the 2006 Lebanon campaign as evidence that modern nonstate actors can wage conventional warfare in state-like ways. This analysis assesses this claim via a detailed analysis of Hezbollah’s conduct of the campaign at the tactical through theater-strategic levels of war.
On September 28, 2007, under the joint leadership of the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute and NBR’s Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies, approximately 70 leading experts on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) convened at Carlisle Barracks, PA, for a 2-day discussion on the Chinese military’s human infrastructure. Presentations and discussions focused on identifying trends in PLA recruitment, education, training, personnel management, and demographics.
Contributors to this volume agree that climate change is a threat deserving of serious attention. They stress the need for greater planning and coordination and for further research as well as the utility of engagement—military to military and state to state—on environmental issues. They differ as to whether the Armed Forces should play a leading or supporting role, but agree that they can—and already do—make a valuable contribution.
Given the wide-ranging and deep impact of counterinsurgency, the participants in the "Future Defense Dilemmas" seminar conducted by The Brookings Institution and the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, explored two key questions: (1) Is the United States pursuing and executing the right strategy? And (2) Does the military’s focus on counterinsurgency detract from other defense and security needs?
Since the end of World War II, there have been four times as many civil wars as interstate wars. The introduction of peacekeeping forces, investment in economic development and reconstruction, and the establishment of democratic political institutions tailored to the configuration of ethnic and religious cleavages in the society also affect the durability of peace after civil war. In applying these propositions in an analysis of the civil war in Iraq, what can be done to bring the Iraq conflict to an earlier, less destructive, and more stable conclusion?
How did the Army get to the point where it is the perennial bronze medal winner in a three-man funding race? Are the Army’s relations with Congress part of the problem in obtaining sufficient funding? How does DoD determine who gets what and how do they determine how much is enough?
This paper focuses on the interrelationship among national interests, stated ends, means to achieve those ends, and the strategies required to tie all of them together into a cohesive and effective vision for the commitment of U.S. forces.
Understanding between the Departments of State and Defense is critical to ensuring national security. Nonetheless, these two key internationally-oriented agencies take different paths to arrive at the same goals--paths that must ultimately cross in order to heal the wounds of conflict.
The military reserve policies of the world’s major powers are undergoing sweeping transformations. Since the United States will continue to engage with these countries—in cooperation, conflict, or both—the U.S. defense community needs to keep abreast of new developments in their reserve policies and, in certain cases, adjust its own policies in response.
Theater strategy and theater security cooperation (TSC) are two of the most important tools available in attaining national security. This paper explains what theater strategy is, its basis, how it is formulated, and how it is executed with emphasis on theater security cooperation.
To be successful at counterinsurgency, the U.S. military and defense community must rethink insurgency. This has profound implications for American strategy and military doctrine.
The concept of the “four challenges,” outlined in the 2005 National Defense Strategy, has long suffered from underdefinition. For three of the four challenges (traditional, irregular, and catastrophic) and a fourth new category (the “hybrid norm”), the wait is over. The author provides the reader with the conceptual foundations of the challenges as they were conceived at the working level during the strategy’s development.
One of the basics of strategy is understanding the foe and the type of war in which a nation is involved. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) does not fit easily into the mold of war, but that is because of too much comparison with conventional wars; the Cold War may provide a better model. This report chronicles the panels and resulting papers from the Seventeenth Annual U.S. Army War College Strategy Conference, held at Carlisle Barracks, PA, in April 2006.
This edition of the U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy reflects both the method and manner the college uses to teach strategy formulation to America’s future senior leaders. It contains essays on the general security environment, strategic thought and formulation, the elements of national power, the national security policymaking process in the United States, and selected strategic issues.
This book provides a basic examination of strategy and the national security policymaking environment and process. It reflects both the method and manner the U.S. Army War College uses to teach strategy formulation to America's future senior leaders.
The author analyzes the Army's response to that defeat in Southeast Asia and its long-term impact. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that nations which lose wars tend to learn best how to correct their mistakes, he argues that Americans tried to forget the unhappy experience with counterinsurgency by refocusing on conventional wars.
The author explores the concept of victory in the war in terrorism, but he does so by placing it within the larger currents of change that are sweeping the global security environment. He contends that the time-tested idea of decisive victory is still an important one, but must be designed very carefully in this dangerous new world.
This report gives a simple and comprehensive definition of strategic asymmetry reflecting the need for military doctrine which transcends today's specific issues. The authors assess the strategic situation of the United States in terms of positive and negative asymmetry and offer five strategic concepts as part of the response to asymmetry: maximum conceptual and organizational adaptability, focused intelligence, minimal vulnerability, full spectrum precision, and an integrated homeland security strategy.
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and the Georgetown University Center for Peace and Security Studies convened a conference on "Alternative Military Strategies for the United States" to highlight the key issues that will have to be analyzed by the QDR and the new administration's security planning. This report summarizes the presentations from a distinguished group of patrons.
The authors report their observations of the different ways combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs) produce a strategy document, and suggest that new joint doctrine is needed to bring a degree of regularity and orderliness to the CINCs' strategic planning process. The CINCs' Strategies: The Combatant Command Process provides a brief look at the CINCs' strategy objectives and concepts in order to place the planning process in context.
On July 15, 1997, the U.S. Army War College hosted a delegation from the Chinese Academy of Military Science. A speech was delivered to the U.S. Army War College Corresponding Studies Class of 1997 by the Chinese delegation's leader, Lieutenant General Li Jijun. General Li graciously agreed to the publication of his address.
The common view is that doctrine persists over a broader time frame than planning and that the latter draws on the former for context, syntax, even format. In truth the very process of planning shapes new ways of military action. The authors explore the relationship between strategic planning and doctrine at the joint level.
Every April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosts its Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation during times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.
The "national interest" is a composite declaration derived from those values that a nation prizes most-liberty, freedom, and security. Interests are usually expressed in terms of physical survival, economic prosperity, and political sovereignty. As an object of political debate, the concept of national interest serves to propose, justify, or denounce policies.
The monograph illuminates the critical series of events that resulted in the development of the National Military Strategy of the United States and the "base force."