Strategic Studies Institute

Military Strategy and Policy Studies

Added October 01, 1995

Type: Book

Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders. Authored by Lieutenant General (USA, Ret) Richard A. Chilcoat.

Strategic art, broadly defined, is therefore: The skillful formulation, coordination, and application of end (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.

Added October 01, 1995

Type: Book

Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine and Antipodean Insights. Authored by Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Dr. Thomas-Durell Young.

The common view is that doctrine persists over a broader time frame than planning and that the latter draws on the former for context, syntax, even format. In truth the very process of planning shapes new ways of military action. The authors explore the relationship between strategic planning and doctrine at the joint level.

Added September 01, 1995

Type: Book

U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus. Authored by Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Dr. Thomas-Durell Young.

The authors define a formal strategic plan: one that contains specific strategic objectives, offers a clear and executable strategy for achieving objectives, illuminates force capability requirements, and is harmonized with the Future Years Defense Program. They conclude by examining three alternatives to improve the strategic planning processes and to facilitate efficient development of strategic plans.

Added August 01, 1995

Type: Monograph

The Principles of War in the 21st Century: Strategic Considerations. Authored by Dr. Steven Metz, Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Dr. Douglas V. Johnson, II, Dr. William T. Johnsen, LTC James Kievit.

For nearly two centuries, the principles of war have guided practitioners of the military art. During the last 55 years the principles of war have been a key element of U.S. Army doctrine, and recently they have been incorporated into other Service and Joint doctrines. The turn of the 21st century and the dawn of what some herald as the "Information Age," however, may call into question whether principles originally derived in the 19th century and based on the experience of "Industrial Age" armed forces still hold. Moreover, despite their long existence, the applicability of the principles of war at the strategic level of warfare has not been the subject of detailed analysis or assessment.

Added June 01, 1995

Type: Book

Time's Cycle and National Military Strategy: The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change. Authored by Dr. David Jablonsky.

Every April the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute hosts its Annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme, "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," brought together scholars, serving and retired officers, and civilian defense officials from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to discuss strategy formulation during times of penury from Tacitus to Force XXI.

Added March 01, 1995

Type: Book

The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision Second Edition. Authored by Dr. Don M. Snider.

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act requires the President to submit an annual report on the National Security Strategy. In theory, a formal presentation of grand strategy was intended to lend coherence to the budgeting process; a clear statement of interests, objectives, and concepts for achieving them gave Congress a clear idea of the resources required to support the President's strategy.

Added February 01, 1995

Type: Monograph

Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability. Authored by Dr. Steven Metz.

Dr. Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult.