The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
Saudi Arabia and Iran have often behaved as serious rivals for influence in the Middle East and especially the Gulf area since at least Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. While both nations define themselves as Islamic, the differences between their foreign policies could hardly be more dramatic. Recently, the rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has intensified and been reflected in their policies involving a number of regional states including Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and others.
Iraqis are debating the desirability of atomic power for their country. U.S. and international policymakers will have to consider Iraqi views as they shape policy to manage the process of an orderly, safe, and peaceful nuclear reintegration of Iraq in the civilian sector while guaranteeing safeguards against both accidents and any future diversion of a nuclear program for military purposes or terrorist exploitation.
Transnational insurgencies complicate traditional counterinsurgency operations in significant ways and can lead to conflict between states. This monograph examines several transnational militant groups, assesses the prospects for conflict and cooperation over cross-border violence, and discusses current issues facing Iraq and Afghanistan.
Rising oil prices facilitate the acquisition of greater resources and perhaps economic development. But oil revenues can also drive a government to finance massive military equipment purchases like Saudi Arabia did in 1979. The nature of governments that rely on raw material extraction and long-term development of military programs may affect how their current
and future spending occurs regardless of oil prices. How nations decide to use their national wealth helps explain some of the perennial problems facing oil and commodity exporting nations and provides insights into their relations with other countries.
Increasing numbers of Russian intellectuals became disenchanted with the West, particularly after the end of the USSR, and looked for alternative geopolitical alliances. The Muslim world, with Iran at the center, became one of the possible alternatives.
This monograph seeks to analyze military escalation and intrawar deterrence by examining two key wars where these concepts became especially relevant—the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A central conclusion of this monograph is that intrawar deterrence is an inherently fragile concept, and that the nonuse of weapons of mass destruction in both wars was the result of a number of positive factors that may not be repeated in future conflicts.
This monograph demonstrates that Moscow, especially in the Putin era, has not been helpful with U.S. efforts to curb Iran's nuclear program. It also illustrates the dangers Moscow faces in pursuing such a pro-Iranian policy.
This monograph considers the issues of Iranian influence in Iraq, and its impact on continuing sectarian violence there. The situation has been further complicated by the post-2003 change in the Iraqi Shi'a community’s status, Iran’s development of a nuclear program, and international efforts to contain that program.
In his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush proclaimed that "America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world." The plan he then proposed is step one in weaning America from its addiction, and is a necessary but not fully sufficient step to ensuring our future national security through Middle East Oil independence.
This book examines what additional security threats Iran might pose as it becomes increasingly capable of making nuclear weapons, what steps the United States and its friends might take to deter and contain it, and what should be done to assure Iran's neighbors do not follow in Tehran's nuclear footsteps.
The fear about what Iran might do with nuclear weapons is fed by the concern that Tehran has no clear reason to be pursuing nuclear weapons. The strategic rationale for Iran's nuclear program is by no means obvious. Unlike proliferators such as Israel or Pakistan, Iran faces no historic enemy who would welcome an opportunity to wipe the state off the face of the earth.
In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions.