The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
The author examines three features of the war on terrorism as currently defined and conducted: (1) the administration's postulation of the terrorist threat, (2) the scope and feasibility of U.S. war aims, and (3) the war's political, fiscal, and military sustainability. He believes that the war on terrorism--as opposed to the campaign against al-Qaeda--lacks strategic clarity, embraces unrealistic objectives, and may not be sustainable over the long haul.
The author addresses the challenge that U.S. policymakers face in managing relations with numerous regional allies, including Israel and a host of moderate Arab states. These states often maintain differing concerns and are responding to diverse domestic and international pressures when they seek to influence the United States. These regional concerns and interests are thoroughly analyzed throughout this monograph.
The author addresses the critical questions involved in understanding the background of Iraqi national identity and the ways in which it may evolve in the future to either the favor or detriment of the United States. He pays particular attention to the issue of Iraqi sectarianism and the emerging role of the Shi'ite Muslims, noting the power of an emerging but fractionalized clergy.
War with Iraq signals the beginning of a new era in American national security policy and alters strategic balances and relationships around the world. The specific effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. A U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq will place popular pressure on a number of moderate Arab states to reduce high profile military cooperation with the United States. Following a war, Saudi Arabia will probably seek to reduce substantially or eliminate the U.S. military presence in the kingdom due to a more limited regional threat and the domestic difficulties with a U.S. presence.
The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.
The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.
The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.
The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.
The author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.
In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions.
With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to plan for its post-conflict reconstruction. To assist such planning, this study proposes a construct for identifying the postwar missions to be accomplished following a victory over the Hussein regime and suggests the time phasing for the accomplishment of specific tasks.
Should war break out between Iraq and the United States, Saddam Hussein will likely adopt a strategy designed to undermine the prestige of the United States and turn the Arab World against the West.