The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
The increasing diffusion and application of expertise acquired by jihadists in fabricating “improvised explosive devices” and the extent to which local jihadist cells in the West may or may not be connected to veteran terrorist groups and networks in other countries and regions are vital concerns for Western military forces and security and intelligence agencies as they relate to these veteran terrorist groups and networks in other countries and regions of the world.
As the United States and Russia negotiate to bring their number of deployed nuclear weapons down, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel continue to bump their numbers up while a growing number of smaller states develop “peaceful” nuclear programs that will bring them closer to getting bombs if they choose. Welcome to the brave new world of tighter, more opaque nuclear competitions, the focus of The Next Arms Race—a must read for policy analysts and planners eager to understand and prevent the worst.
What is the role that tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) play in NATO defense policy and strategy? This book examines the key issues surrounding this question as the Alliance seeks to redefine itself in the 21st century and meet the requirements in the Defense and Deterrence Policy Review.
Should the United States relinquish its nuclear weapons? This monograph discusses both the technical and political factors related to the future of American nuclear weapons.
A new work by leading Russian, European, and U.S. experts analyzing the multiple issues of force structure, doctrine, strategy, and Russian national security policy connected with Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons as the main deterrent of threats to its security.
Will the global spread of nuclear power programs, which could bring many more countries much closer to acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities, be an inevitable consequence of energy market economics? Or is such an expansion impossible without government subsidies and new policies to support them? This volume showcases the analyses of some of the world’s leading energy experts to shed light on this key 21st century security issue.
The author has experienced dramatic changes in homeland security theory, policy and practices. He proposes the establishment of All-Hazard Training Centers in the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions to train civil support team (weapons of mass destruction) emergency responders for chemical, biological radiological, nuclear, explosive, and cyberspace events or natural catastrophes.
This monograph seeks to analyze military escalation and intrawar deterrence by examining two key wars where these concepts became especially relevant—the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A central conclusion of this monograph is that intrawar deterrence is an inherently fragile concept, and that the nonuse of weapons of mass destruction in both wars was the result of a number of positive factors that may not be repeated in future conflicts.
Pioneers of nuclear-age policy analysis, Albert Wohlstetter (1913-1997) and Roberta Wohlstetter (1912-2007) emerged as two of America's most consequential, innovative and controversial strategists. Through the clarity of their thinking, the rigor of their research, and the persistence of their personalities, they were able to shape the views and aid the decisions of Democratic and Republican policy makers both during and after the Cold War. Although the Wohlstetters' strategic concepts and analytical methods continue to be highly influential, no book has brought together their most important published and unpublished essays--until now.
For a number of reasons, many of which are self-induced, the United States is in danger of losing, or may have already lost, the strategic initiative in Korea to the People's Republic of China. Given time, the ramifications of ceding the initiative to China may result in a unified Korea tilted toward Beijing.
If possible, it would be useful to enhance the International Atomic Energy Agency’s ability to detect and prevent nuclear diversions. This would not only reduce the current risk of nuclear proliferation, it would make the further expansion of nuclear power much less risky.
North Korea has never officially abandoned its objective of “completing the revolution in the south” and has continued an alarming military buildup. The ballistic missile inventory now totals about 800 road-mobile missiles, including about 200 Nodong missiles that could strike Japan.
The Proliferation Security Initiative is a multinational activity launched in 2003 to enable the United States and like-minded countries to interdict the flow of weapons of mass destruction. The author addresses some of the legal, political and strategic issues raised by this ambitious and timely initiative.
It is nearly 15 years since biological weapons (BW) have become a significant national security preoccupation. The events of September 11, 2001, although not in any way related to BW, combined with the distribution of professionally prepared anthrax spores through the U.S. postal system in the weeks afterwards, magnified previous concerns by orders of magnitude.
On February 2-3, 2000, the U.S. Army War College, the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and the Duke University Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security co-sponsored a conference in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The conference examined transnational threats, including terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats to the national infrastructure, and international organized crime.
This book provides insights into the competitive strategies methodology. The book also demonstrates the strengths of the competitive strategies approach as an instrument for examining U.S. policy. The method focuses on policies regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
This monograph addresses the important question of the security implications for the nations of the region of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The author offers a unique perspective based on extensive interviews that he conducted in the region, and makes specific policy recommendations for U.S. military and civilian decisionmakers.
On January 13, 1993, in Paris, 130 countries signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to ban the entire class of chemical weapons. Many of those nations have since ratified it. In this country, debate continues on the strategic implications of the convention, as drafted, and whether it is in the U.S. national security interest.
The editors of the nation's two leading journals on foreign policy were asked to examine the nature of the post-cold war world and America's transitional role. Charles Maynes believes power will become more evenly distributed as America's military dominance recedes and others' economic power increases. William Hyland advises against grand strategic visions.