The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
Troubled relations between the armed forces and civil society sap the vitality of the republic and undermine the effectiveness of the military. This timely monograph launches a discussion about what kind of civil-military relationship we have and how to improve it.
Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. This Paper describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan.
In this anthology, students in the U.S. Army War College Class of 2008 critically examine the emerging 21st century security environment and offer diverse and innovative thoughts on how military power should be applied in situations short of general war.
West Germany’s and South Africa’s experiences remind U.S. policymakers of the tremendous obstacles and challenges that confront states as they attempt to install liberal, democratic political institutions.
Added September 25, 2009
Type: Letort Papers
A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts. Authored by Lieutenant Colonel Theresa Baginski, Colonel Brian J. Clark, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Donovan, Ms. Karma Job, Lieutenant Colonel John S. Kolasheski, Colonel Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., Brigadier Simon "Don" Roach, Colonel Sean P. Swindell, Colonel Curt A. Van De Walle, Colonel Michael J. McMahon.
Security Force Assistance may be a new term but the activities are familiar and are related to how the Department of Defense trains, advises, and assists foreign partners' security establishments to accomplish common objectives. Recommendations to improve U.S. performance are provided.
Military commanders and diplomats in Iraq and Afghanistan have been meeting with important local officials since the inception of those conflicts. These engagements have aided commanders and diplomats alike in furthering their objectives by establishing productive relationships with those who know and understand Iraq’s complex human terrain best—the Iraqis. However, these engagements frequently take place on ad-hoc bases and are rarely incorporated into other counterinsurgency operations and strategies. In some cases, unit commanders fail to see the utility of using these engagements at all--an oversight that contributes to deteriorating security situations and loss of popular support.
The China Dragons of the 28th Combat Support Hospital deployed in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from September 2006 until November 2007. Their service epitomizes the strides that have been made in military combat medicine.
The author outlines eight principles for a risk management defense strategy. He argues that these principles provide “measures of merit” for evaluating the new administration’s defense choices.
The author examines the extent to which some states create the conditions for revolutionary movements to flourish. He explores how the governments in Vietnam (1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nicaragua (1967-79) unintentionally empowered revolutionary movements, resulting in these governments’ demise.
This collection of essays written by students enrolled in the U.S. Army War College Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) reflects the development of their strategic thought applied to a wide range of contemporary issues based in theory, doctrine, strategy and history.
The author offers a framework for improving the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian militaries, including increased and focused military training with a special emphasis on Special Forces units.
The 1990s showed the extremes of deciding when and how to use force, one of the central elements of strategy. Debate has raged over whether force is appropriate only in defense of the homeland and vital national interests or whether it should also be used to promote more expansive objectives. He concludes with a discussion of Army roles and requirements for future contingencies.
On February 2-3, 2000, the U.S. Army War College, the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and the Duke University Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security co-sponsored a conference in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The conference examined transnational threats, including terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats to the national infrastructure, and international organized crime.
Dr. Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult.