The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College publishes national security and strategic research and analysis which serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
Counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism are each both efficient and sustainable from a military and economic perspective, and each have inherent political concerns, hazards, or constraints. The author maintains that an overall strategy combining counterterrorism and antiterrorism is the best means of employing military forces to counter violent extremism.
Reconstruction, defined in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07 as “the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for long-term development” has leapt to the forefront of Army priorities, measured by the important role that it plays in today’s counterinsurgency operations and its prominence in the latest doctrine. This paper examines the history of reconstruction as a part of Army operations, assesses the capabilities of today’s forces to conduct successful reconstruction operations in support of a counterinsurgency campaign, and makes recommendations to build a capability that is commensurate with the demands of our doctrine and the imperatives of the modern battlefield.
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to initiate its latest monograph series, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions. SSI started this project in an effort to give leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces some important insights into how military advice was provided to the Nation’s civilian leadership during the many years—including the months before the invasion—of the war in Iraq.
Dr. Metz starts this series with an impressive review of the decision to remove Saddam Hussein by force. The Strategic Studies Institute hopes that this and the succeeding monographs will generate debate on just how the United States made decisions—some of them disastrous—about Iraq. The resulting better understanding of the decisions should lead to strengthening of the processes—where appropriate—so that the military and civilian leadership forge better decisions in the future.
The security and stability of Africa has recently become an important national issue. However, to be effective this growing interest must be rooted in the desire to overcome centuries of ignorance and misunderstanding about the conditions and people of Africa.
Added September 25, 2009
Type: Letort Papers
A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts. Authored by Lieutenant Colonel Theresa Baginski, Colonel Brian J. Clark, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Donovan, Ms. Karma Job, Lieutenant Colonel John S. Kolasheski, Colonel Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., Brigadier Simon "Don" Roach, Colonel Sean P. Swindell, Colonel Curt A. Van De Walle, Colonel Michael J. McMahon.
Security Force Assistance may be a new term but the activities are familiar and are related to how the Department of Defense trains, advises, and assists foreign partners' security establishments to accomplish common objectives. Recommendations to improve U.S. performance are provided.
This monograph seeks to analyze military escalation and intrawar deterrence by examining two key wars where these concepts became especially relevant—the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A central conclusion of this monograph is that intrawar deterrence is an inherently fragile concept, and that the nonuse of weapons of mass destruction in both wars was the result of a number of positive factors that may not be repeated in future conflicts.
The author outlines eight principles for a risk management defense strategy. He argues that these principles provide “measures of merit” for evaluating the new administration’s defense choices.
Critics of irregular-warfare transformation often cite the 2006 Lebanon campaign as evidence that modern nonstate actors can wage conventional warfare in state-like ways. This analysis assesses this claim via a detailed analysis of Hezbollah’s conduct of the campaign at the tactical through theater-strategic levels of war.
The author contends that the long-term decline of the state will move the world into a New Dark Age in which the forces of chaos and disorder will be almost overwhelming. Alternative options for the U.S. response to the security challenges posed by such an environment are examined.
Since World War II, the relationship between Turkey and the United States has been characterized by periods of remarkable cooperation, even when significant disagreements existed.
The author examines the extent to which some states create the conditions for revolutionary movements to flourish. He explores how the governments in Vietnam (1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nicaragua (1967-79) unintentionally empowered revolutionary movements, resulting in these governments’ demise.
The author describes the state of the armed forces and the police in post-war Liberia, evaluates the ongoing process of security sector reform, and makes recommendations to the United Nations and the U.S. Government on consolidating military and police transformation
Russia presents an ever greater challenge to American policy and interests. This monograph analyzes the dimensions of Russian threat perception, the mainsprings and goals of contemporary Russian foreign policy, and the requirements for a coherent U.S. strategy to meet that challenge across the entire agenda of Russo-American and East-West relations.
Building on his 2005 monograph, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, the author answers questions regarding “What are the implications of the gang and other Transnational Criminal Organizations’ assault on stability in the Western Hemisphere?” and “What are the implications of the clash of values between liberal democracy and criminal anarchy?”
The United States and Jordan have maintained a valuable mutually-supportive relationship for decades as a result of shared interests in a moderate, prosperous, and stable Middle East. In this monograph, the author highlights Jordan’s ongoing value as a U.S. ally and considers ways that the U.S.-Jordanian alliance might be used to contain and minimize problems of concern to both countries.
The United States confronts an altered distribution of regional power in the aftermath of its invasion of Iraq. That distribution of power features new internal political dynamics that are shaping the ways that states are responding to the security environment. The United States needs to come to grips with these emerging dynamics if it is to successfully continue in its role of guarantor of regional security and stability.
The culture of irregular warfare was attributable to nearly 300 years of American military tradition from the colonial period until 1941, including extensive experience in cooperating with Native American tribes and individual scouts during the expansion of the western frontier. Since World War II, the wider military has lost this expertise. Given the variety of political environments in which today’s conventional soldiers may find themselves and the current nature of conflicts ongoing and likely to occur in the world, the Army culture as a whole can and must readapt itself to the new old realities of irregular war.
Al-Qaeda has declared war on the United States and the rest of the civilized world, but how does the organization plan to win that war? The author draws on sources from within the broader global jihad movement to explain the movement’s goals and the mechanisms it proposes to enact a revolution.
A healthy Latin America is of critical value to the United States as a global power. It is besieged by a powerful force of resentment engendered by a combination of weak states, social exclusion, criminal violence, and corruption. The United States needs a new grand strategy that addresses the causes rather than the symptoms of the malaise.
Contemporary Egypt evidences severe failures of governance and political and economic development. Along with the continued strength of moderate Islamists and violent outbursts of radical Islamists, the pressing need for democratization has been set back by the "emergency" procedures used by the government to control security.
Turkmenistan, a key natural gas producer in Central Asia is undergoing a transition from the sultanistic regime of President Sapirmurat Niyazov to some other form of rule. It also is being courted by all the major powers in Central Asian politics. This monograph examines the domestic dynamics of succession here and in Central Asia and the entwined international rivalry or great game for energy access and influence over regional security in Central Asia.
This keynote address given at the XVIII Annual Strategy Conference of the U.S. Army War College represented an effort to look beyond Iraq and Afghanistan and grasp contemporary global security dynamics.
The author argues that ASEAN and its offspring organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum work best when dealing with external powers and are less effective in resolving disputes within Southeast Asia.
The term insurgency has been used broadly to include all violent
struggles against the state by any group or section of the population of an area trying to establish its independent
political control over that area and its population. India has
been containing Islamic terrorism for years, with the second largest Muslim population in the world, about 12 percent of India’s total population.
While controversial, the “clash of civilizations” thesis has had a large influence in the debate over the causes of, and possible remedies for, the spread of terrorist activity.
One of the basics of strategy is understanding the foe and the type of war in which a nation is involved. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) does not fit easily into the mold of war, but that is because of too much comparison with conventional wars; the Cold War may provide a better model. This report chronicles the panels and resulting papers from the Seventeenth Annual U.S. Army War College Strategy Conference, held at Carlisle Barracks, PA, in April 2006.
This collection of essays written by students enrolled in the U.S. Army War College Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) reflects the development of their strategic thought applied to a wide range of contemporary issues based in theory, doctrine, strategy and history.
How serious is the threat posed by terrorist groups operating from failed states in Africa? This monograph asserts that the threat is very serious indeed, and presents alternative U.S. strategies to confront terrorist groups using failed states as sanctuaries and platforms for attacks on America and its partners.
The Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies provide a dramatic contrast to the issue of training local security forces. In Malaya, the British developed a very successful strategy for training the Malayan Police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for building and training local security forces generally was ineffective.
Three years after 9-11, some of the most important choices for American grand strategy have yet to be made. Heretofore, the costs of pursuing ambitious but ill-defined goals have been high but tolerable; the Iraqi insurgency, however, is raising the costs to the point where choices must be made. The two natural alternatives, rollback and containment, each have strengths. But they also have real drawbacks--and the choice between them rests on some basic, and inherently subjective, value judgments.
Female suicide bombers have been used in the past, but the spate of these type bombings in different venues, in different countries, and for different terrorist organizations encourages closer examination of this phenomenon. The author looks at the history, characteristics, and changes, and also provides within a strategic assessment the implications of change in future female suicide bombings.
The author offers a framework for improving the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian militaries, including increased and focused military training with a special emphasis on Special Forces units.
The author examines three features of the war on terrorism as currently defined and conducted: (1) the administration's postulation of the terrorist threat, (2) the scope and feasibility of U.S. war aims, and (3) the war's political, fiscal, and military sustainability. He believes that the war on terrorism--as opposed to the campaign against al-Qaeda--lacks strategic clarity, embraces unrealistic objectives, and may not be sustainable over the long haul.
The author addresses the ways that the age of terrorism is affecting American grand strategy. He contends that terrorism has made many of the basic concepts of international relations and national security obsolete. Declaring war on a tactic—terrorism—erodes the clarity necessary for coherent strategy.
The U.S. relationship with China and the global war on terrorism are the two most significant strategic challenges faced by the Bush administration. The author assesses how the war on terrorism has affected China. He concludes that the war on terrorism radically altered the Asian strategic environment in ways that negated China's foreign policy gains of the last decade.
The author analyzes the impact of the war on terrorism and the requirements of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review on the many essential missions conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces. Focusing primarily on the Army, he highlights the requirements associated with combat operations against terrorists, accelerating transformation and the new emphasis on homeland security and force protection.
The author explores the concept of victory in the war in terrorism, but he does so by placing it within the larger currents of change that are sweeping the global security environment. He contends that the time-tested idea of decisive victory is still an important one, but must be designed very carefully in this dangerous new world.
The author outlines the violent characteristics of the new security-stability environment and briefly examines the problem of terrorism and the related problem of governance. Finally, he enumerates some civil-military implications for playing effectively in the contemporary global security arena.
This monograph is the third in the Strategic Studies Institute's "Studies in Asymmetry" Series. In it, the author examines two paradigm shifts--one in relation to the threat and a second in relation to intelligence methods-- while offering a new model for threat analysis and a new model for intelligence operations in support to policy, acquisition, and command engaged in nontraditional asymmetric
Asymmetric guerrilla war--insurgencies, internal wars, and other small-scale contingencies (SSCs)--are the most pervasive and likely type of conflict in the post-Cold War era. The author draws from the lessons of the recent past to better prepare today's civilian and military leaders to meet the unconventional and asymmetric warfare challenges that face the United States and the rest of the intern
With the exception of attacks by ballistic missiles, the continental United States was long held to be virtually immune from attack. For Americans, wars were something that took place in other countries. In the future, that may not hold. But while strategic thinkers agree that homeland defense needs greater attention, there is less consensus on the precise nature of the threat.
On February 2-3, 2000, the U.S. Army War College, the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and the Duke University Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security co-sponsored a conference in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The conference examined transnational threats, including terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats to the national infrastructure, and international organized crime.
Islamic fundamentalism is growing at such a rapid rate that many believe it threatens to take over the Middle East. To prevent this, enormous resources have been summoned, not only from within the region, but in the West as well. The author concludes by building a theory about fundamentalism, which implies a need to redirect policy for coping with it. Dr. Pelletiere maintains that the solution is not to try to crush the movement--that has been attempted numerous times and consistently has failed.
The recent bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma has highlighted the complexity of the phenomenon of political extremism. Until this occurred, inside the United States foreign terrorists were the focus of attention, particularly the so-called Islamic fundamentalists. Undue emphasis on the "foreign connection" can make it appear that only Middle Eastern terror is of consequence. The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) has long resisted this approach.